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Chapter 1. Introduction.
I. Aim of the Thesis
This thesis analyzes British, French and German policies with respect to the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) in two specific crises. In recent years much has been made of 
the ongoing Europeanization of national foreign policy, including security and 
defence policy.1 Since the end of the Cold War, and informed by the experience of 
the conflicts in the Balkans throughout the 1990s, EU member states have created 
European security institutions in order to be able to act independently from NATO 
and the US. Two countries in particular, Britain and France, have adjusted their 
national positions in order to make possible the creation of the EU ESDP in the first 
place. While there is more than one institutional tool at EU member states’ disposal 
in matters of international security, the broad question this thesis seeks to address is 
what circumstances, national preferences and crisis situations determine the choice 
and the extent of the use of political and military instruments located in the EU CFSP 
and ESDP as opposed to other institutional venues or bilateral initiatives.
II. Research Question
The two cases analyzed in this thesis are national policies towards the crisis in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the war in Afghanistan in 
2001. These were the first two crises to occur after the creation of ESDP in 1999 that 
prompted significant political and military involvement on the part of EU member 
states. However, national responses towards the two crises with respect to the
1 For the most recent academic studies see Wong (2006), Miskimmon (2004), Irondelle (2003).
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involvement of instruments located in EU CFSP/ESDP were very different. Whereas 
the EU CFSP in the persona of EU High Representative Javier Solana was very 
active2 in the political mediation of the crisis in FYROM, initial suggestions for an 
ESDP take-over of the NATO Operation were rejected by EU member states. It was 
not until March 2003 that the first ever military ESDP mission, Operation Concordia, 
took over from NATO. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, the EU CFSP and ESDP 
both appeared to be eclipsed by the national considerations of member states, 
prompting concerns over a re-nationalization of foreign policy after 11 September 
(see Hill, 2004). Similarly, the suggestion by then-Belgian Foreign Minister Louis 
Michel that EU member states’ contributions to the International Security and 
Assistance Force (ISAF) constituted ‘EU’ rather than national contributions was 
rejected. Moreover, NATO -not ESDP - assumed ISAF command in 2003.
Unlike FYROM, the role of the EU CFSP and ESDP in Afghanistan has not 
fundamentally changed since the beginning of the political and military activities by 
the EU and its member states since the assumption of military tasks in Afghanistan 
20013, and the further evolution of instruments located within CFSP/ESDP. 
Reactions towards the two crises, then, appear to contradict conclusions about the 
ongoing ‘Europeanization’ of national foreign policy, particularly when it comes to 
the application of military instruments located in the EU ESDP: although the EU is in 
possession of military instruments, it did not employ them -  or at least not 
immediately, in the case of FYROM - in two significant crises. The crises were 
significant for different reasons: FYROM threatened to de-stabilise once more the
2 And, as the analysis presented in chapter 3 will demonstrate, successful.
3 Although the EU has played an important role in the post-conflict reconstruction o f Afghanistan 
(Smith and Steffenson, 2005: 354) and although Javier Solana has recently stated that ‘the EU stands 
ready to do even more to contribute to the collective effort and I think that an ESDP police operation 
could be o f great value’ (see Council o f  the European Union, 2006a), at the time o f writing of this 
thesis the nature o f the EU’s engagement has not been expanded from economic and political to 
include military or civilian crisis management tools under the ESDP.
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Western Balkans and to demonstrate the EU’s inability to act; and the war in 
Afghanistan represented a systemic shock where member states quickly had to 
formulate and adopt policies on the US-led war on terror and the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan.
This raises the following question that will be addressed in this thesis: What 
was the role afforded to the EU CFSP/ESDP in the management of the crisis in 
FYROM and the war in Afghanistan in national foreign policy decision-making in 
Britain, France and Germany, and why did it stop short of a military operation under 
the EU ESDP - initially in the case of FYROM and altogether in the case of 
Afghanistan? Focusing on decisions taken with regard to the EU CFSP and ESDP 
during these two crises promises to shed light on the underlying attitudes towards the 
European security institutions in the three countries when it comes to the application 
of available crisis management instruments. It will also allow me to draw broader 
conclusions on the role of CFSP/ESDP in national decision-making, and to determine 
whether and to what extent national foreign policies exhibit evidence of 
Europeanization in the sense that existing EU security institutions exert influence on 
individual governments to adapt their decision-making in favour of a larger role for 
the EU - or whether other considerations, such as the position or preferences of the 
US4 and the transatlantic alliance are more pertinent to explain specific policy 
outcomes in these two cases.
4 The inclusion o f the US in addition to NATO is justified both on account o f the U S’ central role in 
the management o f the two crises as well as on account o f the fact that the US ‘certainly has a 
privileged position in terms o f access to European decision-making, with some particularly ‘special’ 
relationships with member states and individuals ( ...)  it often succeeds in dividing and ruling the 
Europeans, as well as over-shadowing them in high politics’ (Hill and Smith, 2005: 394).
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III. Contribution to Literature
This particular research undertaking is situated on the cusp of traditional International 
Relations (IR) and European studies, but potentially makes a contribution to both by 
contrasting the ‘Europeanization’ approach that arises out of integration studies with 
that of alliance politics.5 The hypotheses derived from the two approaches are 
integrated in a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) model of governmental politics. Its 
purpose in this thesis is to analyse the domestic context of foreign policy decision­
making in the two crises in order to derive conclusion as to the explanatory value of 
the two conceptual approaches, Europeanization and alliance politics.
For scholars of international relations in general and of European foreign 
relations in particular, the question of how to analytically approach the role of the 
individual member states in the EU decision-making process and how to best capture 
the nature of this interaction has been a contentious one. As EU foreign policy 
cooperation has been argued to be ‘less than supranational but more than 
intergovernmental’ (Wessels, 1982), theoretical approaches found in the mainstream 
IR literature have not always been entirely useful in addressing or explaining the 
processes of European foreign policy making more generally. Similarly, CFSP is too 
intergovernmental to fit comfortably within the framework of integration theories 
(0hrgaard, 2004). The existing literature on CFSP more generally has been 
dominated by empirical accounts of case studies that more often than not lack an 
explicit theoretical framework, leaving the study of CFSP at the pre-theoretical stage.
5 There is a longstanding debate over the extent to which European Studies and IR have theoretical or 
practical insights to give one another (Warleigh, 2006). European Studies, the argument goes, is 
located at the intersection between IR and comparative politics (Waever, 2004), has an interdisciplinary 
basis (Calhoun, 2003) and can ‘act as a transmission belt for ideas concepts and approaches between 
the study o f ‘domestic politics’ and the study o f ‘international relations” (Warleigh, 2006: 32). The 
Europeanization framework applied in this thesis has its roots in integration studies, and is combined 
here with traditional IR approaches; and the argument that emerges from the analysis o f the individual 
policy decisions taken is that neither o f the two approaches alone can adequately explain national 
policy decisions towards the two crises.
11
Because of the intergovernmental nature of decision-making in the EU CFSP 
(including ESDP), the policies and attitudes of national governments towards CFSP 
remain relevant as they are crucial not only for the institutional evolution of CFSP 
but also for its application: if CFSP is sidelined by national policy priorities, it cannot 
be expected to be an effective policy instrument. This research therefore proceeds 
from the assumption that member states policies and preferences are crucial in the 
formulation of policies adopted under CFSP. This in turn warrants a study that 
focuses solely on the national decision-making processes and the resulting decisions.
This research locates potential explanations for national decision-making in 
three separate levels of analysis (see Singer, 1961). The impact of European 
institutions on national foreign policies as a result of Europeanization privileges the 
regional level of analysis and therefore regional institutions. Alliance politics, and the 
enduring relevance of NATO and US preferences to European security locates the 
explanation primarily at the systemic level6; whereas a focus on domestic politics 
based on a governmental politics approach focuses on the domestic level of analysis 
and assumes that domestic preferences and policy processes involving government 
agencies and ministries, elected government officials as well as the elite public 
sphere, determine policy outcomes. For the purpose of this thesis, the analysis of the 
underlying preferences and bargaining games among the different domestic actors is 
to draw conclusions on the explanatory power of Europeanization or alliance politics 
with respect to national decision-making in the two crises.
6 To be sure, NATO is a regional rather than a global alliance, and membership in NATO and the EU 
overlaps in the case o f the three countries analysed in this thesis. Moreover, the analysis o f the two 
crises will show that some of the considerations over the use o f NATO rather than ESDP instruments 
were motivated by utilitarian considerations over the availability of military assets rather than systemic 
considerations. However, the preference of the US, both a NATO member and the remaining 
superpower in a unipolar system after the end o f the Cold War, and preferences on the part of the three 
states to keep the US involved in European security through the transatlantic alliance, point towards 
the relevance o f the systemic level o f analysis.
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Europeanization focuses on the impact of the EU institutions on national 
politics, both as a potential platform to export policy preferences and as a constraint 
that influences national foreign policy making. The Europeanization approach 
conceptualizes EU institutions as exerting influence on national foreign policy 
through separate processes: the projection of national preferences, the adaptation of 
national policies, or the emergence or change of national preferences that privilege a 
European approach (Wong, 2005). Alliance politics and the preferences and attitudes 
towards and relations within the transatlantic alliance, on the other hand, assumes that 
the role of NATO along with US hegemony as a broader response to an anarchical 
international system plays a central role in the decision-making process that leads 
states to seek the preservation of existing alliances. Central within this alliance 
framework, of course, is also the role of the US in European -and global- security. 
The model of governmental politics, lastly, focuses on the domestic political 
conditions in the individual countries, and the way key participants in the political 
process bargain successfully to implement their policy preferences. In this context, 
the perception and preferences of key officials and bureaucracies, as well as the elite 
public sphere are important in assessing the choices for or against a larger role of the 
EU CFSP and ESDP in crisis decision-making. This in turn permits drawing some 
conclusions over which approach, Europeanization or Alliance politics, is more 
appropriate for explaining national foreign policy choices.
The contribution of this particular research is two-fold. First, it applies 
approaches originating in the European integration and the IR paradigms, 
Europeanization and alliance politics as well as an FPA approach that focuses on 
domestic policy processes, to member states foreign policies to analyze the influence 
exerted by the EU CFSP/ESDP on policy decisions taken during two crises. And, it
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\does this in a case that involves ‘hard’ politics: foreign security and defence policy, 
the bastion of state sovereignty (Howorth, 2005). If it can be shown that even in this 
area integration mechanisms are at work in the sense that existing EU institutions 
result in policy adaptation on the national level, this would weaken state-centric, 
liberal intergovemmentalist analyses (see Moravcsik, 1993) that argue that outcomes 
of bargaining between member states are determined by the preferences and 
bargaining power of states. Applied to the EU CFSP/ESDP, this approach attributes 
the major decision-making power to the member states, and assumes that domestic 
preferences are fixed and unaffected by normative concerns and interstate bargaining 
processes.7 Alternatively, if there is no or only weak evidence of Europeanization, 
then this would strengthen the state-centric approaches located in the IR paradigm. 
Lastly, both approaches located in a systemic theory (alliance politics) and regional 
integration theory (Europeanization) would be weakened if it were to be shown that 
specific domestic political considerations that do not point towards systemic or 
regional preferences conditioned policy responses in these two crises.
The second contribution of this research lies in the actual cases selected. 
There is a small but growing literature on the activities of the EU CFSP and ESDP in 
FYROM and the Western Balkan region in general (Piana, 2002; Ioannides, 2006; 
Juncos, 2006) to which this research adds. Little has been written on member states’ 
policy towards Afghanistan from the perspective of the EU CFSP (Gross, 2006), and 
this research therefore stands to make an original contribution in this respect. While 
there have been some academic analyses of the Europeanization of national foreign 
policy (Keatinge, 1983; Torreblanca, 2001; Tonra, 2001; Wong, 2006), these have 
tended to focus either on smaller member states (Keatinge, 1983; Tonra, 2001), the
7 Although Moravcsik does not concern himself with EU foreign and security policy, his theoretical 
approach has been applied to the analysis of policy-making in EU CFSP/ESDP (see Gegout, 2004).
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impact of EU accession on national foreign policy (Torreblanca, 2001), or have not 
focused exclusively on foreign and, importantly, security policy of the bigger 
member states (Wong, 2006). The original contribution this research makes, 
therefore, is to apply the Europeanization approach to an analysis of the policies of 
the ‘big three’ member states in the area of security and defence -  and to do so in a 
comparative framework.
Based on the empirical analysis undertaken, this thesis demonstrates that 
while policy decisions taken with respect to the two crises show evidence of 
Europeanization in all three countries, considerations of alliance politics both with a 
view to the role of NATO as well as US preferences, have tended to take precedence 
when it came to the application of military instruments - with the exception of the 
French position towards an ESDP take-over from NATO in FYROM, which shows 
evidence of Europeanization. The governmental politics approach, finally, highlights 
domestic and intra-govemmental processes that reveal not only internal divisions and 
differences of opinions with respect to preferences that would point towards 
Europeanization and alliance politics, but also the extent to which national priorities 
have influenced these policy decisions. While there is evidence of the 
Europeanization of foreign policy, then, this does not apply to security and defence 
policy with respect to the two crises analysed in this thesis.
IV. Case selection, Research Design and Methodology
This is a qualitative research project that analyzes the impact of the EU CFSP/ESDP 
on the national policies of Britain, France and Germany. Britain and France naturally 
lend themselves as country case studies for this thesis. Not only are they the two 
biggest military powers in Europe, Paris and London also adapted their long-held
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policy views to make the creation of ESDP possible in the first place. The inclusion 
of Germany as a third case is justified both by the fact that Germany is the biggest 
country in the EU and by the fact that significant military operations are unlikely to 
take place without Berlin’s approval and increasingly also participation. The ‘big 
three’ -Germany, Britain and France- are also the three countries expected to take the 
diplomatic lead on policy matters pertaining to the EU CFSP, and have been the 
driving forces behind the policy’s creation and evolution.
The end of the Cold War presented a strong impetus for improving European 
security and foreign policy coordination. Although European Political Cooperation 
(EPC), created in 1970, had the aim of establishing the EU as a foreign policy actor, 
policy means available were of a declaratory nature, and policy implementation took
o
place using Community instruments, such as aid programmes or economic sanctions. 
The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht institutional! zed EPC mechanisms in the new 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Reforms outlined in the 1997 Treaty 
of Amsterdam included the provision for a High Representative, and the 
establishment of a CFSP Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. The wars in the 
Balkans starkly underlined the EU’s shortcomings in the field of foreign and security 
policy (see Gow, 1997; Howorth, 2005; Lucarelli, 2000), although the first Gulf War 
in 1991 had already demonstrated the degree of dependence of the participating EU 
states on the US and NATO, further underlining the need for the incorporation of a 
security and defence component to the EU structures (Duke, 1999).
The EU ESDP, created in 1999, represents a new security institution that has 
moved the EU into a policy realm previously reserved for NATO. The purpose of
8 Defence and military security issues were explicitly excluded. A second strand of European foreign 
policy, security politics, included the creation o f the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954, even if 
the WEU was throughout the Cold War neglected in favour o f the transatlantic defence structure 
(Duke, 1999).
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ESDP is to complete and strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the 
development of civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention 
and crisis management. Although the idea of a European foreign and defence policy 
preceded the end of the Cold War, the creation of corresponding institutions was 
precluded by conflicting positions of member states on the purpose and the existence 
of European security and defence institutions. The changing positions of member 
states towards the creation of a European security and defence policy thus makes the 
analysis of member states’ positions towards the application of instruments located 
in the CFSP/ESDP an important subject for further research.
The changing positions of Britain, France, and Germany towards the 
evolution of European security institutions were crucial in the evolution of CFSP and 
ESDP instruments as well as their future application. Throughout the Cold War, 
efforts at creating mechanisms for coordination in the areas of security and defence 
stalled on account of the lack of support for a European foreign policy independent of 
NATO among atlanticist member states -Britain in particular- and French 
unwillingness to consider foreign policy cooperation that excluded defence issues 
(Smith, 2004). This makes this particular research endeavour of dual interest: for 
one, it analyzes the positions of those member states that had been furthest apart from 
one another with respect to the creation and purpose of the EU CFSP/ESDP; with one 
(France) rooted in the Europeanist camp and the other (Britain) in the Atlanticist 
camp -with the third (Germany) situated somewhat uneasily between the two.
The election of a Labour government under Tony Blair in 1997 proved to be a 
key factor for the future development of CFSP and ESDP (see Whitman, 1999). 
Along with Blair’s commitment to a greater British role within Europe to 
counterbalance French-German dominance and the recognition that European
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autonomy did not have to mean emancipation from NATO but improvement of 
European means inside the alliance, London dropped its objections to an autonomous 
European defence for the first time and made possible the creation of ESDP 
(Howorth, 2000: 377-396).
In contrast, German attitudes to the use of force have undergone a significant 
transition since the end of the Cold War. This makes Germany an interesting case on 
purely domestic grounds: Germany’s international engagement since the end of the 
Cold War had been guided largely by the principles of German post-World War II 
foreign policy -  multilateralism and a culture of restraint with regards to the use of 
military force (Maull, 2000). However, the historical taboo against the use of force 
increasingly eroded in light of post-Cold War realities, starting with allies’ 
expectations in the first Gulf War, and increasing doubts over whether Germany 
could remain a credible partner in the transatlantic alliance without military 
participation. On a normative level, the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in the 
Balkans raised the question of whether pacifism was the only, and the most 
appropriate, historical lesson to draw from the experience of World War II (Janning, 
1996). The conflict in Kosovo crystallised these conflicting pressures, and German 
reactions to the crisis marked a watershed in post-war German policy as Berlin for 
the first time since the end of World War II took part in offensive military operations 
against a sovereign state. In addition to a changing view on the use of military force, 
Germany also moved from its traditional post-World War II transatlanticist 
orientation to one that increasingly accommodated the emergence of CFSP/ESDP.9
9 It should be noted here that Germany’s position vis-a-vis the two other member states is best 
characterized as fence-sitting: not as fiercely transatlanticist as the UK, but not as keen on European 
autonomy in security and defence matters as France, Germany has traditionally tried to balance the 
two positions (Interview with German official, 19 October 2005).
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For France, the end of the Cold War and changed geopolitical realities raised 
the issue of the EU’s role in European security and the preservation of France’s 
status, particularly in light of a reunified Germany and resulting concerns over the 
geo-strategic marginalization of France. Bosnia demonstrated to France that its 
European partners not only lacked the political will but also the confidence for 
Europe to act alone in security matters (Treacher, 2001: 33). To avoid 
marginalization in Europe, France modified its vision of the European security 
architecture, particularly with regard to NATO. Although this did not mean the 
abandonment of the idea of building an autonomous European defence structure (see 
Howorth, 2000), it did signal a more pragmatic approach. At the Anglo-French 
summit at St. Malo in December 1998 Britain and France issued a ‘Joint Declaration 
on European Defence’ that called for the establishment of ‘autonomous’ capacities 
backed by credible military force.
The German EU presidency in the first half of 1999 worked to turn the 
British-French bilateral initiative at St. Malo into a European reality and to create the 
EU ESDP. At the European Council of Cologne in 1999, Javier Solana was appointed 
as the first CFSP Secretary General/High Representative, and leaders agreed to limit 
the defence capacity of the EU to the ‘Petersberg Tasks’.10 The WEU as an 
organisation was considered to have completed its function, and its assets were 
transferred to the EU (Gnesotto, 2004). At the European Council of Helsinki 10-11 
December 1999, EU leaders agreed on the Headline Goal (60,000 troops by 2003, 
deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year), to set up a new institutional 
structure, and to agree on the modalities for cooperation between the EU and NATO
10 The Petersberg Tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks o f  
combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking
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(Gnesotto, 2004).11 At the Laeken European Council 14-15 December 2001, finally, 
EU leaders declared the EU capable of conducting some crisis management 
operations.
Decision-making in the EU CFSP and ESDP proceeds along 
intergovernmental lines. This makes the study of individual countries’ foreign 
policies rather than policy processes at the institutional level a pertinent approach for 
addressing the research question formulated in the preceding section. The selection of 
Britain, France and Germany as country case studies is motivated by a number of 
considerations in addition to the three countries’ changing positions vis-a-vis the EU 
ESDP. Given the evolution of the EU foreign and security policy instruments since 
the creation of CFSP and ESDP, and the increasing demands placed on the EU and its 
member states in matters of external relations and international security, the ‘big 
three’ member states occupy a central position in the formulation and the putting into 
practice of EU foreign and security policy. Britain and France enjoy a foreign policy 
lead based on the size of their military contributions and engagements world wide. 
Together with Germany, although it is not on par with Britain and France in the 
military arena, the three are indispensable in diplomatic terms (Everts, 2000:19). The 
three countries also contributed significantly in military and diplomatic terms in 
FYROM and Afghanistan. Lastly, the substantial change in all three countries’ 
national positions vis-a-vis the development of CFSP and ESDP but the conflicting 
positions when it came to questions of these instruments’ application in the two crises 
makes the analysis of the foreign policies of the three countries highly topical. The 
two crises analyzed in this thesis highlight differences among the three member states
11 It is important to note that agreeing on the modalities o f EU-NATO cooperation in the final stages in 
the preparation for the use o f military instruments located in the EU ESDP did no longer hinge on 
member states’ different conceptions on the role o f NATO or the EU, but on differences between 
Greece and Turkey on the use o f NATO assets on the part of the EU that precluded the finalization of  
the so-called ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements that give the EU access to NATO assets.
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with respect to the EU’s global and regional role and different national positions over 
where the instruments located in the EU CFSP/ESDP should be applied.
The selection of the two crisis case studies is motivated by the following 
reasons: first, they were the first two crises prompting significant involvement on the 
part of EU member states to occur after the further development of CFSP after the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the creation of ESDP in 1999. They were also the 
first two crises to occur after the Kosovo conflict, which was widely cited as a 
‘catalyst for Europe’ (Pond, 1999). After the traumatic events in the former 
Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s and the failure on the part of the EU to act, there 
was an expectation that the EU would play a stronger role in future crises. The cases 
of FYROM and Afghanistan thus constitute test cases in the sense that they show to 
what extent EU member states involved the EU CFSP and ESDP in crisis responses, 
and to what extent they sought to provide ‘European’ responses (rather than 
‘national’ or ‘NATO’ responses) to these two crises. Second, although both crises 
occurred during roughly the same time period -2001- they seemed to elicit a very 
different policy response in terms of the involvement of the EU CFSP and ESDP on 
the part of EU member states. This makes the two cases an interesting contrast, and 
highlights the regional as well as the global dimension in which foreign policy 
decisions of the three EU member states take place. Lastly, the two crises also 
occurred during the late stage of the institutional set-up of CFSP and ESDP. This 
makes policy reactions to the crises with respect to the involvement of EU policy 
instruments relevant for drawing broader conclusions about the place occupied by 
these institutions in national foreign policy and the constraints that act on their use.
This thesis uses the comparative method of structured, focused comparison 
(George, 1979) to study the impact of CFSP in Britain, France and Germany. It
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addresses the ‘many variables, small n’ problem by focusing the analysis on 
‘comparable’ cases that are similar in a number of important characteristics, but 
dissimilar as far as the explanatory variables are concerned, and by focusing on key 
variables (Lijphart, 1971). Britain, France and Germany, while similar with respect 
to their size and expected contribution to and expected lead in the formulation of 
decisions taken under CFSP/ESDP, are dissimilar in their historic military and 
strategic role, their attitude towards the use of force, and their policies towards the 
creation and the use of the EU CFSP and ESDP instruments. Whereas Germany since 
the end of World War II has conducted its foreign policy through multilateral 
channels and conceives of itself as a civilian power (Maull, 2000), British and French 
foreign policies in contrast have been characterized by a strong transatlantic 
relationship and emphasis on national sovereignty in the case of Britain, and a by a 
desire to maintain the status of a world power, and French exceptionalism, in the case 
of France (Howorth, 2004). Due to their size and influence in the European setting, 
the three countries also represent ‘hard cases’, as preferences that point towards 
Europeanization observed in these countries will be more relevant for the future 
development of CFSP and ESDP than in countries less influential in the integration 
process. The comparison of the three countries stands to provide an assessment of the 
influence of the EU level on national decision making and to what extent it has 
changed policy preferences in favour of a larger role for the EU in foreign and 
security policy. If such influences can be shown in all three countries this would 
support a conclusion that integration process are at work that lead towards 
convergence of preferences, and to an increasing role and application of EU 
CFSP/ESDP instruments in future crises. The thesis will analyze and compare policy 
responses by the three individual countries along three separate aspects that required
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policy responses and a choice between the EU and other institutional settings in each 
crisis. These aspects will be identified in chapter 3.
This thesis is based on five kinds of sources: 1) academic literature on the 
conceptual approaches to the study of EU foreigil policy, the foreign policies of EU 
member states, and EU-NATO relations; 2) think tank publications; 3) newspaper 
articles; 4) official documents; and 5) interviews carried out at the Foreign Offices 
and the Ministries of Defence in the capitals, the Permanent Representations of the 
EU member states in Brussels, think tanks and the EU institutions.
Interviews in particular are important for a number of reasons. First, the 
official documents are insufficient as far as they show the result of policy decision­
making but do not reveal policy negotiations or disagreements among the member 
states (as well as their solution). Foreign and security policy is also a special realm as 
diplomatic activities take place behind the scenes and away from the public realm. 
Interviews also provide the researcher with a clearer picture of the policy-making 
process, in particular if conducted with eyewitnesses -  officials who were directly 
involved in the political decisions taken at the time. At the same time, data/evidence 
derived from interviews is insufficient as interviewees may be biased, or not fully 
understand or remember a process. It is therefore necessary to supplement the data 
gathered from the interviews with official documents as well as the available 
secondary literature.
Data derived from these five sources is then used to test the hypotheses 
formulated in section VI through the method of process-tracing. Process-tracing 
makes possible to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes 
resulting in an analytical explanation. That is, it transforms a historical narrative into 
an analytical causal explanation (George and Bennett, 2005: 211).
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V. Hypotheses generated from the conceptual approaches; some definitions
Having briefly introduced the conceptual approaches that will be used to analyze 
national policy decisions with respect to the two crises, and having provided the 
historical context on the creation of the EU CFSP/ESDP, this section formulates 
hypotheses generated from the two conceptual approaches. These hypotheses will 
then be ‘tested’ in the individual country chapters. To recall, the specific question this 
research addresses is: what was the role afforded to the EU CFSP (including ESDP), 
in the management of the crisis in FYROM and the war in Afghanistan in national 
foreign policy decision-making in Britain, France and Germany, and why did it stop 
short of an EU military operation under ESDP- initially in the case of FYROM and 
altogether in the case of Afghanistan?
The dependent variable in this research is the national foreign policy decision 
with regard to the use of EU CFSP and ESDP instruments in the crisis in question. 
Two competing independent variables -considerations derived from Europeanization 
and alliance politics -  have been suggested as likely relevant explanations that 
emerge from the analysis of domestic policy processes. These will be applied to the 
empirical evidence presented in later chapters in order to ascertain their explanatory 
power in the decisions in the two crises.
An inquiry into the nature of the role afforded to the EU CFSP in national 
foreign policy decision-making also necessitates a closer definition of the meaning of 
the term. For the purposes of this research, ‘role’ will be taken to mean the nature of 
the task assigned to the EU CFSP/ESDP, including the nature of the mandate for 
either HR/SG Javier Solana or a EU Special Representative (EUSR) appointed to 
deal with a specific issue area; and the application of ESDP instruments.
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A ‘significant’ role for the EU CFSP/ESDP can be expected to entail a 
mandate for a representative of the EU CFSP to negotiate on behalf of EU member 
states in a given crisis; the deployment of military instruments located in the EU 
ESDP; the adoption of joint actions and common position as well as joint policies in 
response to a crisis in addition to a high profile for the EU CFSP/ESDP in national 
foreign policy discourse. This could mean, for instance, that EU political and 
military tools are suggested and supported as the most appropriate instruments for 
dealing with the crisis in question.
In contrast, a ‘small’ role for the EU CFSP/ESDP can be expected to include 
the adoption of joint actions and common positions but without the corresponding 
high profile in national foreign policy discourse; no exclusive mandate for a 
representative of the EU CFSP to negotiate on behalf of EU member states in a given 
crisis; and the refusal to seriously consider the use of all instruments located within 
the EU CFSP/ESDP, or to block or delay decisions. Lastly, ‘no’ role for the EU 
CFSP/ESDP would mean that the application of instruments located in the EU 
CFSP/ESDP, although it may be discussed, does not lead to the adoption of policies 
that involve EU CFSP/ESDP instruments.
A second definitional matter concerns the distinction between a ‘significant’
10and ‘small’ influence of either EU security institutions or the transatlantic alliance 
on national foreign policy decisions. Following from the definition of 
Europeanization adopted in the thesis (see Wong, 2005), ‘significant’ influence of EU 
security institutions is conceptualized here as either adaptational pressures acting on 
policy makers to utilize EU institutions; as the potential for policy projection and the 
export of national preferences on to the European level; or a reflexive preference for
12 In the case o f the transatlantic alliance, this applies both to preferences o f the US and national policy 
preferences.
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the utilization of policy instruments located within the EU CFSP and ESDP. These 
can arise from the nature and location of the conflict as well as the EU’s past 
involvement in a geographic area; the existence of EU political and military 
instruments that have yet to be put to use; the desire to maximize national influence 
on a given policy area by means of the EU; or an inherently strong European 
orientation in national foreign policy. ‘Small’ influence by contrast can be expected 
to manifest itself as the opposite: weak or nonexistent adaptational pressures; no 
potential or perceived advantage to export national preference on to the European 
level; and the absence of preferences for the utilization of policy instruments located 
within the EU CFSP and ESDP.
‘Significant’ influence of considerations of alliance politics on national policy 
decisions, by contrast, is taken to mean that US involvement is deemed crucial by 
policy makers; that the US objects to the application of instruments other than those 
located in NATO; or that policy makers regard NATO as the most appropriate forum 
for the resolution of the crisis, either out of a transatlantic preference or because the 
necessary military tools are located in NATO. A ‘weak’ influence of alliance politics 
considerations, on the other hand, is defined to mean the absence of US objections or 
that policy makers do not view NATO as the only or most appropriate forum for the 
resolution of the crisis.
Having defined the terms, as well as the dependent and independent variables 
in this research endeavor, it is now possible to formulate a number of hypotheses that 
will be tested in the empirical chapters. The governmental politics approach is 
concerned with analyzing the decision-making process in a particular instance rather 
than with the formulation of a grand theory. Two competing assumptions can
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nevertheless be derived from this approach that tie together the analysis of 
Europeanization versus alliance politics:
(1) if key government officials, bureaucrats and/or the elite public sphere favor the 
utilization of EU CFPS/ESDP over other institutional venues, and if they succeed in 
implementing their preferences, this results in a significant role for the EU 
CFSP/ESDP and points towards evidence of Europeanization; whereas
(2) if the reverse is true -  that key officials either do not favour the utilization of the 
EU CFSP/ESDP, or favour the utilization but do not succeed in implementing their 
preferences, then this results in a small role for the EU CFSP and ESDP and 
disproves the Europeanization hypotheses that are formulated below.
The Europeanization thesis generates the following hypotheses:
(1) if there is a significant influence of EU security institutions on national foreign 
policy, then one would expect to find national governments to advocate a significant 
role for the EU CFSP and ESDP in both crises.
(2) if there is little evidence of an influence of EU security institutions on national 
foreign policy, then one would expect to find a small role afforded to the EU 
CFSP/ESDP in both cases.
(3) if there is significant influence of EU security institutions but this influence is 
weighed against other factors, then one would expect to find a role afforded to the EU
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CFSP/ESDP in specific cases only, or only a partial role afforded to policy 
instruments located in CFSP/ESDP.
According to the alliance politics approach, one can formulate these hypotheses:
(1) if there is significant influence of the transatlantic alliance, both in terms of US 
preferences against an EU role, or other pressures to keep NATO in play and adjust 
policy preferences accordingly, then one would expect to find a small role afforded to 
the EU CFSP/ESDP
(2) if there is little influence of the transatlantic alliance on member states, or if there 
is little interest of (or perceived threat towards) the alliance in a particular region or 
conflict, then one would expect to find a significant role afforded to the EU 
CFSP/ESDP.
Lastly, with regard to military operations in particular there is also a utilitarian 
argument to be derived from alliance politics that focuses on the availability of 
military assets:
(3) if NATO assets are required for carrying out an operation that are not available to 
the EU, then one can expect to find a small role afforded to the EU CFSP/ESDP.
VI. Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
28
Chapter 2 introduces the conceptual framework, the competing theoretical 
approaches that generate the working hypotheses presented in this chapter, and 
develops specific indicators by which to judge the empirical data. Chapter 3 analyses 
the two crisis case studies, highlights the relevant decisions with respect to the 
involvement of the EU, NATO and the US in the two crises, and identifies aspects of 
the political response to the two crises that crystallize decisions taken with respect to 
the research question posed in this introductory chapter. Chapters 4 and 5 consist of 
the empirical study of German policy towards the two crises. Chapters 6 and 7 apply 
the same structure to French policy towards the two crises, and chapters 8 and 9 do 
the same for the British case. Chapter 10 summarises the empirical findings and 
draws conclusions from the evidence established in Chapters 4 through 9. It will do 
so particularly with a view to the explanatory power of the Europeanization 
hypotheses in the two cases.
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Chapter 2. Conceptual framework.
I. Introduction
This chapter presents in more detail the three conceptual approaches -  
Europeanization, alliance politics, and governmental politics- and their application in 
this thesis to explain national policy decisions in the two crises. It also situates them 
in the broader literature of International Relations (IR) and European integration. 
Finally, it presents the indicators that will be applied in the empirical chapters that 
follow to test the hypotheses formulated in chapter 1. By focussing on the application 
of CFSP/ESDP policy instruments in specific crisis situations, this thesis addresses 
the conceptual question of the nature of the interaction between the national and the 
European level. It takes the nation-state as the unit of analysis and assumes that 
member-states are the main actors in the EU CFSP/ESDP as far as decisions to 
employ political and military instruments located in CFSP/ESDP are concerned. It 
also assumes that existing EU institutions and the transatlantic alliance, and the 
preferences that national decision-makers hold vis-a-vis one or the other, influences 
the outcomes of national decision-making. This chapter is structured as follows: the 
first section introduces the problem of applying IR theory to the EU’s external 
relations with a view to placing the conceptual approaches applied in this thesis in a 
broader theoretical framework. The second section introduces the individual 
conceptual approaches that are applied to the empirical material in the individual 
country chapters. Section three outlines the potential contributions of a traditional 
FPA approach to the analysis of decision-making in the two crises. Section four 
critically assesses the Europeanization approach and its applicability to the research 
question this thesis sets out to answer. Although EU foreign policy challenges 
traditional IR approaches, the enduring choice between NATO and ESDP/CFSP in
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the formulation of foreign policy in crisis decisions suggests that alliance politics and 
the role of US hegemony continues to play a significant role in national decision­
making. The conceptual framework -alliance politics- resulting from these 
assumptions arises from traditional IR approaches of balancing, band wagoning, and 
cooperation under anarchy. The fifth section will therefore analyze this literature and 
develop indicators that help test the empirical data in a more traditional IR 
framework. Based on the indicators developed in the two sections, the final section 
will restate the hypotheses introduced in chapter 1, and present possible outcomes.
II. International Relations Theory and EU Foreign and Security Policy
Although the EU CFSP since its inception has been criticized for its incoherence and
ineffectiveness (Stavridis, 1997; Zielonka, 1998), EU member states have made
continuous efforts to create effective institutional structures and to formulate
common policies. This challenges realist assumptions about the limits of cooperation.
A European foreign policy not only exists but is a dynamic and ongoing process in
11which EU member states play a defining role. What is more, the creation of CFSP 
and ESDP has also raised expectations of further foreign policy activities on the part 
of the EU, and the increasing application of these instruments provide evidence that 
the Capabilities-Expectations Gap (CEG), identified some years ago by Christopher
13 The term ‘ European foreign policy’ is somewhat contested on account o f the fact that the EU is not a 
state and does not implement policies the way states do. As for the nature o f the EU as an international 
actor, it has been argued that the concept o f ‘presence’ permits explanations ofthe international impact 
o f the EU without having to define the international activity o f an actor that is not a state (Allen and 
Smith, 1990) and gives weight to outside perceptions o f the EU and its effects on the psychological 
and operational environments o f third parties (Hill, 1993). Conceiving o f European foreign policy as 
an external relations system that reflects ‘parallel sets o f activity, increasingly intermeshed and easy to 
confuse ( ...)  but still essentially distinct’ (Hill, 1993: 322) offers a more neutral conception that stays 
clear o f debates over whether the EU can have a foreign policy or be regarded as an actor in foreign 
policy (Ginsberg, 1999). However, in the definition o f foreign policy as ‘the sum o f official external 
relations conducted by an independent actor in international relations’ (Hill, 2003:3), the EU as an 
independent actor does qualify as has having a foreign policy. As for the specific types o f European 
foreign policy, one can identify the following (White, 1999): Community foreign policy, Union 
foreign policy, and national foreign policy. In the context o f this typology, this thesis focuses on 
national foreign policy and analyses the ways in which national and Union foreign policies interact.
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Hill, is diminishing (Hill, 1993 and 1998). This makes the impact and the interaction 
between the national and the European level a fruitful line of inquiry. It also raises 
the question of the theoretical approach best suited for explaining the nature of these 
interactions.
For mainstream IR theory, the creation of CFSP/ESDP presents a challenge as 
it puts into question the notion of state sovereignty -  the European Union is ‘neither a 
state, nor a traditional alliance, and (...) presents a heterodox unit of analysis’ 
(Andreatta, 2005:19); and is unique in the nature of its international cooperation and 
integration (Wallace, 1994), even if the area of foreign and security policy is 
intergovernmental and likely to remain so. Theories and concepts found in the 
literature on European integration generally have not been applied to foreign and 
security policy,14 but have instead concerned themselves with the problem of 
economic and political integration. Theories of regional integration, particularly 
functionalism (Mitrany, 1966) and later neo-functionalism (Haas, 1964) were more 
specifically concerned with processes of European integration and, in their 
supranational focus, form the antidote to liberal intergovemmentalism within the 
liberal paradigm. Neofunctionalism in particular conceptualizes the process of 
integration as proceeding via ‘functional spillover’ between issue-areas or ‘political 
spillover’ involving the supranational actor (Caporaso, 2001). Neofunctionalism 
assumes that integration brings ‘loyalties, expectations and political activities toward 
a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political 
community, superimposed over pre-existing ones’ (Haas, 1958: 16). In this reading, 
the pursuit of common interests is ultimately assigned to a supranational authority
14 One exception is the concept o f ‘security communities’ that was first explored by Karl Deutsch 
(1957) and systematically studied in an edited volume by Adler and Barnett (1998).
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that over time extends its policy reach. As a theoretical explanation, however, 
functionalism is better suited to explain economic integration: political spillover in 
particular does not serve as a potent explanatory tool as EU institutions have played 
a much more limited role in EPC/CFSP than in other policy areas (Smith, 2004).
The two main theories of international relations, realism and liberalism both 
show weaknesses with respect to their explanatory power of European integration and 
European foreign policy, including the EU CFSP/ESDP. Given its emphasis on the 
constraints of anarchy, realist approaches are sceptical about the possibility of 
international cooperation or European integration, and generally more useful to 
explain why co-operation fails rather than why it succeeds or how it functions. 
Accordingly, ‘the interests displayed by the European countries in the EU creates a 
problem for realist theory’ (Grieco, 1997: 184). Filipo Andreatta (2005:25) also 
emphasizes that although Waltz, a key proponent of neo-realism, takes note of 
integration taking place, he nevertheless argues that this would merely alter the 
distribution of power among the different units, but not the basic characteristics ofthe 
international system and the constraints on the individual units within it. Other realist 
thinkers allow for cooperation -and, by extension, European integration- as either a 
result of US hegemony (Gilpin, 1981) or the bipolar structure (Gowa, 1989) in its 
ability to provide order; or conceptualise European integration as a means to 
constrain Germany, particularly after unification (Art, 1996). Neither of these 
thinkers, however, allow for the possibility of changing preferences or policy impact 
on national foreign policy as result of European integration.
Theoretical approaches based on the liberal paradigm are better suited to 
explain European integration and the emergence of the EU CFSP because they do 
allow for the emergence of supranational organizations. Interdependence theories,
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most closely associated with theories of international political economy but equally 
applicable to other areas of international politics, focus on mutual sensitivity and 
vulnerability that in turn leads to increased cooperation as autonomy becomes harder 
to sustain and states recognize the potential for joint gains (Keohane and Nye, 1977). 
Regime theory, as developed by liberal institutionalism, focuses on potentials for 
cooperation between states (see Krasner, 1983). Neoliberal institutionalism in 
particular allows for the emergence of international institutions in order to reducing 
uncertainty and mistrust in interstate relations (Keohane, 1984; Axelrod and 
Keohane, 1985). Applied to the EU CFSP, European institutions can serve the 
purpose of ameliorating collective action problems that emerge from cooperation in 
the military field (Tams, 1999). In contrast, liberal intergovemmentalism emphasises 
domestic structures and holds that states remain the basic unit in world politics and 
privileges the role of national governments in defining their interests. Andrew 
Moravcsik, a prominent proponent of liberal intergovemmentalism, thus argues that 
‘the primary source of (European) integration lies in the interests of the states 
themselves and the relative power they each bring to Brussels’ (Moravcsik, 1998: 
75). Accordingly, governments negotiate those issues at the supranational level that 
favour their domestic constituencies. Integration only happens when governments 
judge it in their interest to resort to supranational strategies. The pooling of 
sovereignty serves to enhance the credibility of member states’ commitments 
(Moravcsik, 1998); and the process of EU foreign policy making in EU CFSP can be 
expected to remain intergovernmental (Wagner, 2003). However, the limitations of 
the liberal approach is that it is too narrow to account for the development of EU 
foreign policy as EU foreign policy has not always enjoyed a convergence of view on 
the goals of the institution, and as it is difficult to conceive of EU foreign policy as a
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distinct issue-area in international relations (Smith, 2004). And, liberal 
intergovemmentalism assumes that the demands of society will always be clear 
when, particularly in the case of foreign policy, they may either not exist or may not 
be heard by policy makers.
Whereas realism and liberalism assume the rationality of actors, reflectivist 
approaches question the assumption of objectivity in social science (Hollis and 
Smith, 1991). Social constructivism in particular views interests and identities as 
endogenous to social interaction and conceptualizes agents and structures as mutually 
constitutive (Wendt, 1992). Reflectivist approaches to the study of international 
relations are potentially fruitful approaches to the study of EU foreign policy because 
they focus on issues related to governance, norms and identity that are largely outside 
the grasp of a more traditional, positivist rationalist research tradition. The EU, not 
as a supranational organ but as socially constituted by the states and in the states as a 
converging national policies and identities, increasingly takes on its own political 
logic. In a reflectivist reading, the construction of an identity (particularly in the 
post-Cold War era) requires the presence of an ‘Other’ to define oneself (Neumann, 
1998). In the case of Europe, a constructivist reading of European identity has 
argued that Europe ‘is not primarily built as a political category through the nation­
state imitating rhetoric of cultural identity and shared ancestry, but rather through a 
peculiar security argument: Europe’s past of wars and divisions is held up as the 
other to be negated, and on this basis it is argued that Europe can only be if we avoid 
renewed fragmentation’ (Waever, 1996).
Reflectivist approaches thus focus on the normative and ideational aspects 
and motivations not only of the EU’s international actions but also the EU itself 
toward democracy, peace and the rule of law, for instance (Manners, 2002).
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Exclusive emphasis on CFSP’s intergovernmental character, understood as 
intergovernmental cooperation, also neglects processes of socialization and 
institutional dynamics. Possible starting points for a communitarian conception of 
CFSP include focusing on informal rules of the game that constrain actor behaviour, 
socialisation processes and organisational dynamics (Jorgensen, 1997). Evidence of 
such socialisation or processes of change at the national level across a range of states 
and issues includes the internationalisation of norms and expectations (Tonra, 2001), 
or the development of a ‘consultation reflex’ (Nuttall, 1992), or policy networks and 
epistemic communities influence decision-making in an institutional context (Flaas, 
1960). Tonra (2003) suggests that a cognitive approach that focuses on rules that 
build on the conception of CFSP as a cognitive regime, resting on shared 
understandings of acceptable norms of behaviour (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986) can 
offer insights into the reciprocal relationship between CFSP and national foreign 
policies and the transforming capacity of the CFSP vis-a-vis national foreign policies 
beyond those offered by a rationalist approach. This includes role perceptions, a set 
of norms of foreign policy behaviour and action orientation that serves as a 'road 
map’ that foreign policy-makers rely on to simplify and facilitate an understanding of 
a complex political reality (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). In the context of Europe, 
Aggestam (1999) distinguishes between several and sometimes overlapping role 
conceptions, each of which carries its own normative implication as to an actors’ 
likely policy behaviour.
This albeit brief overview of existing approaches to analyzing the EU’s 
foreign policy has demonstrated that existing theories of both IR and European 
integration are ill-equipped to explain either the emergence of the EU CFSP/ESDP, 
the process under which policies are adopted, or the nature of the impact and
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influence of the European on the national level and vice versa. It has also shown that 
research on the interaction between the EU CFSP and national foreign policies has 
yielded some results that point towards change in national foreign policy practice 
(Nuttall, 1992) as well as policy outcomes (Tonra, 2003). This justifies the use ofthe 
Europeanization concept to analyze the question posed in this thesis: based on the 
brief overview of the existing literature and its limitation, the EU CFSP can be 
expected to have some influence on the formulation of national foreign policy. Still, 
the question remains whether changing practices result in a change of preferences, 
and in national governments advocating a qualitatively different role for the EU 
CFSP/ESDP as a result. The Europeanization concept is a promising one because it 
allows a detailed study of the nature of the interaction between the national and the 
European level. Before analyzing the Europeanization approach in more detail, 
however, the next section introduces the governmental politics model. The analysis of 
national policy decision-making based on this model will be used in this thesis as a 
framework that allows drawing conclusions on the degree of Europeanization and/or 
alliance politics, as well as the explanatory value of the two approaches, in national 
foreign policy towards the two crises.
III. Governmental Politics
The governmental politics model, which is to provide a basis from which to draw 
conclusions as to the validity of the alliance politics and Europeanization 
frameworks, is located in the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) paradigm. It differs 
from the two conceptual lenses applied in this thesis in that it does not offer a theory- 
driven explanation in the sense that it does not aim to derive an explanation for a 
policy decision from a general theory of IR. FPA in general aims at formulating
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middle-range theories, which offer explanations of particular, limited phenomena 
rather than more general explanations of state behaviour (Merton, 1957). The 
advantages of an FPA approach for this project are that it ‘enquires into the motives 
and other sources of the behaviour of international actors, particularly states... by 
giving a good deal of attention to decision-making, initially so as to probe behind the 
formal self-description (and fictions) of the processes government and public 
administration’ (Hill, 2003:10). The particular approach adopted in this project is 
closely modelled on Allison’s bureaucratic politics model (Allison, 1999), which 
seeks to open the ‘black box’ of policy-making in order to identify the chain of 
decision-making and the different players involved policy decisions about the two 
crises under investigation in this thesis. It stands to offer a detailed explanation of the 
decision-making process, and will make it possible to draw conclusions over whether 
considerations that would point towards Europeanization or alliance politics drove 
policy decisions in the three countries in the two crises. Before outlining the 
governmental politics framework as it will be applied in this thesis as well as its 
applicability to this particular research project, the following section briefly addresses 
the problem of applying a FPA framework in a European context.
a. Applying FPA to the European context
Although a potentially fruitful line of inquiry, FPA approaches have been criticized 
for their state-centric outlook and the exclusive focus on US foreign policy (Smith, 
1994; Brown, 2001). More generally, and partly as a result of these criticisms, the 
FPA approach itself has suffered from neglect as a separate field of investigation 
even if it has generated a large body of scholarship (Light, 1994). However, the 
criticism of state-centrism can be effectively countered by the argument that FPA
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itself grew out of reactions to realist assumptions of the state as a unitary actor, and is 
fundamentally pluralist in orientation (Hill, 2003). As outlined in preceding sections, 
the study of European foreign policy in general and CFSP/ESDP in particular sits 
somewhat uneasily within IR theory due to the specific nature of the EU and its 
foreign policy. Traditional IR theories assume that systemic conditions determine 
state behaviour and/or that states are rational, unitary actors. In holding on to 
assumptions of the state as a unitary actor, these theories have resulted in a simplified 
view on the policy process in general, and in the European context in particular. An 
analytical focus on the state itself, and policy processes that take place at the 
domestic level promises a more nuanced analysis of policy decisions and outcomes 
than structuralist theories can provide. It is also a promising approach in the context 
of foreign policy making in the CFPS/ESDP context. There is a gap in the 
scholarship on the EU’s impact on member states’ foreign policies, which also points 
towards the applicability of FPA in a European context. Accordingly, it has been 
argued that the existing foreign policy literature has ‘under-explored the 
distinctiveness of the foreign policies of European states who are members ofthe EU 
and the issues that this membership raises’ (Manners and Whitman, 2000:3).
Much of the literature on European foreign policy and, by extension, CFSP is 
implicitly occupied with the study of policy-making with attention to the relationship 
between the decision-making process and policy outcome-in other words, foreign 
policy analysis (Peterson, 1998). FPA can be regarded as the most prominent 
approach when it comes to probing the processes of decision-making in European 
foreign policy. FPA perspectives, adapted to the European context, offer a useful 
framework for the study of European foreign policy, even if the sui generis nature of 
the EU context means that traditional FPA categories should not just simply be
39
transported to a European context (White, 1999), This in turn points towards the 
degree of modification necessary for FPA approaches to accommodate European 
foreign policy.
Although traditional FPA approaches and the majority of the literature on the 
subject have focussed predominately on US political processes, they can be adapted 
to fit the European context. Accordingly, Christopher Hill and Michael Smith 
suggest that ‘bureaucratic politics within the Commission and the Council Secretariat, 
distinctive ‘domestic’ constituencies for leaders to defer to, and serious problems of 
coherence and legitimacy all demand the attention of the middle-range theories 
generated within FPA’ (2005: 393). Although the subject of this thesis is member 
states’ foreign policies as they related to the formulation of policies in the second 
intergovernmental pillar, some amendments to an FPA framework are nevertheless 
required in order to analyze the interplay between national foreign policy and Union 
foreign policy. The following section will analyze the application of a specific FPA 
approach, that of governmental politics, to the European setting as well as the 
necessary amendments in order to make the approach applicable to this particular 
research project.
b. Governmental politics in the EU CFSP/ESDP framework 
The framework and application of governmental politics15 was conceptualized by 
Graham Allison in Essence o f  Decision, his influential study of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, and focuses on the ‘competing preferences and processes for aggregating 
among them’ (Allison, 1999:11). Originally published in 1971, Allison’s study built 
on the work of first generation foreign policy analysts who focussed on the ‘political
15 Allison originally called the model ‘bureaucratic politics’ but changed the name in the 2nd edition of 
his study, which this thesis adopts.
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process’ approach to foreign policy (Huntington, 1960, Neustadt, 1960; Schilling et 
ah, 1962). The governmental politics model conceives of government behaviour and 
policy outputs as the results of bargaining games among decision-makers and departs 
from assumptions of states as unitary actors and of government actions as partially 
coordinated by leaders. The players in this model include in the first instance 
political leaders as well as officials occupying positions on top of major 
bureaucracies. In addition, other actors might play a role, including lower level 
officials, the press, NGOs, and the public. The model assumes that policy-makers 
positions derive from the department or agency they represent; that their preferences 
and beliefs are related to the different organizations they represent; and that their 
analysis accordingly yields conflicting recommendations (Allison, 1999:256). 
Another basic and crucial assumption underlying this approach is that power is 
shared, and that the foreign policy process is inherently a political one. As a result, 
policy outcomes are not guided by a rational course of action, but according to the 
power and performance of proponents and opponents of the action in question. 
Allison suggests that the organizing concepts of the governmental politics model can 
be arranged along four interrelated factors: who plays; the factors that shape players’ 
perceptions, preferences, and stance on a particular issue; determinants of a player’s 
impact on results; and the combination of players’ stands, influence and moves to 
yield governmental decisions and actions (Allison, 1999: 390).
While there has been a continuing interest in the influence of governmental 
politics that has gone hand in hand with increased attention to the impact of domestic 
politics on foreign policy more generally (Light, 1994), the governmental politics 
model has also met with significant criticism. Governmental politics has been 
criticized for underestimating the power of the executive in the context of US politics
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(Art, 1973; Rosati, 1981); the failure to specify assumption and formulate testable 
hypotheses (Art, 1973; Wagner, 1974); for being inapplicable to the non-US setting 
(Wagner, 1974; Caldwell, 1977); for assuming too close a fit between roles and 
positions and for ignoring the images and beliefs that are shared cross role positions 
(Art, 1973; Krasner, 1971; Steiner, 1997; Welch, 1992); and for being ineffective as a 
model because it requires researchers to analyze too much detailed information about 
a foreign policy decision in order to draw conclusions -  and therefore does not 
simplify the task of analysis (Ripley, 1995). Allison himself conceded that while his 
model stands to yield a detailed and nuanced picture of decision-making, the amoimt 
of detail the data collection and analysis required to carry out a study on government 
decisions means that accurate accounts of the bargaining processes involved pose a 
challenge for the researcher (Allison, 1999). Much of the necessary information must 
be obtained from the participants themselves. This in turn can pose a problem as 
memories of past events are not only unreliable, but access to the players in question 
may not always be possible. The model also presupposes a level of knowledge and 
familiarity of governmental processes that is difficult to obtain for an outside 
observer who has not been able to immerse him- or herself in the government 
process, either as a practitioner or as a participant observer. On the other hand, it is 
precisely the distance to the policy process that enables abstraction. And, government 
processes and outcomes can be reconstructed not just through partial interviews, but 
also through the use of public documents, newspapers, and discussion with close 
observers of the relevant participants.
As a result of these criticisms, but also of other trends in social science 
research, such as the apolitical bias in foreign policy scholarship and the focus on 
grand theory and its emphasis on parsimony and hypothesis testing, relatively little
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theoretical progress has occurred since the mid-1970s (Kaarbo, 1998: 72). At the 
same time, the enduring finding of the model, that policy makers are influenced by 
ingrained bureaucratic habits even under extraordinary circumstances, continues to 
apply to present day conditions. As a result, despite the criticisms and despite the lack 
of theoretical development of this approach (Welch, 1992), the governmental politics 
model remains a useful analytical approach. It also continues to be applied in FPA 
scholarship, albeit with modifications. The governmental politics model has been 
adjusted in particular by combining it with new theoretical development in FPA that 
includes research on organizational culture and social cognition (Ripley, 1995). 
Ripley’s amended approach thus focuses on the analysis of three related concepts: 
bureaucratic roles (how participants see themselves and others contributing to the 
decision process), procedural scripts (the structures, strategies, and premises that 
make pragmatic sense in a decision process), and cultural rationales (the attempt by 
participants to define appropriate behaviour and invoke symbols to help give meaning 
to their decisions) (Ripley, 1995:90). A second approach that argues in favour of the 
relaxation of assumptions in the original model focuses on the more general notion of 
political power as dispersed and of conflict as deriving from incentive structures 
(Kaarbo, 1998:91). It therefore advocates dropping overly strict assumptions and 
predictions in favour of using governmental politics to inform a research question -as 
is the case in this research- and of taking the concepts of power, conflict and 
institutional structures as a backdrop for the investigation of specific question in 
foreign policy. Taken together, the suggested modifications result in an explanatory 
approach or perspective rather than a strict model, and include the individual players’ 
views and beliefs on their role in the decision-making process, the appropriate 
behavioural structures, and their views on appropriate behaviour.
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The criticism that the model is not applicable in a non-US setting is, I would 
argue, overstated as the model is not inherently US-centric but has been applied by 
Allison to a case in US foreign policy, and can thus be amended to explain non-US 
policy outcomes (Allison, 1999). It is possible to apply the governmental politics 
model in the European setting and to specify the key players and identify the relevant 
policy processes that lead to a policy decision. Policy-making in the area of the EU 
CFSP/ESDP is distinct because of the ongoing growth in this particular policy field. 
Beyond specific governmental processes and the beliefs and preferences with regard 
to the EU CFSP/ESDP that may span across bureaucracies, the model should 
therefore be mindful of the wider governmental process, such as the role of 
parliaments, political parties and the elite public sphere, defined as outputs from think 
tanks, and the press: in other words, the public debates that form and reflect 
participants’ preferences and opinions with respect to the applicability of instruments 
located in the EU CFSP/ESDP in the two crises.
Applied to the European context, and to this particular research, the 
governmental politics approach yields the following guiding questions around which 
to structure the analysis:
Organizing Concept
Operationalization
Who are the participants? Who were the individuals and 
departments within the relevant ministries 
(Foreign and Defence) involved in this 
issue area?
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Who were the executive decision-makers 
involved in these crises?
Who were the relevant actors in the wider 
governmental process (members of 
parliament, think tanks, press)?
What shapes participants’ perceptions, 
preferences and stance?
What, if any, were the priorities of the 
participants with regard to CFSP/ESDP, 
the transatlantic alliance and the role of 
the US in European security?
What were the participants’ conception of 
how the national interest would be served 
by the application of CFSP/ESDP or 
NATO instruments (or lack thereof)?
What determines their impact on results? What was the formal authority and 
responsibility of the participants in 
question?
What was their degree of control over 
resources in order to carry out a mission? 
What was their access to players with 
bargaining advantages?
What combination of stands, influence 
and moves result in decisions and
What was the decision structure?
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actions? What were the rules of the game, in terms
of constitutional limitations, executive
orders, or conventions?
Structuring the empirical data around these questions will result in a thorough 
analysis of the governmental processes involved in the decision-making towards 
these two crises and identify the key decision-makers as well as their preferences in 
both cases. Having presented the first conceptual approach, the next section 
introduces the Europeanization model.
IV. Europeanization
The concept of Europeanization has been increasingly used to study aspects of 
European integration and to analyze the way in which ‘Europe matters’ in a specific 
policy field (Borzel, 2003; Caporaso et al., 2001; Dyson and Goetz, 2003; Knill, 
2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). 
Europeanization has been conceptualized as an historic phenomenon, transnational 
cultural diffusion, institutional adaptation, or the adaptation of policies and policy 
processes - reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of the use of the concept 
(Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). The broad usage of the term thus poses a number 
of challenges for researchers wishing to employ the concept. First, ‘Europeanization’ 
must be properly defined in order to delineate Europeanization from related processes 
and concepts, in particular that of European integration. This is also important with a 
view to establishing relevant indicators of Europeanization for the analysis of 
empirical data collected. More fundamentally, the concept’s applicability in the area 
of foreign and security policy must also be established, as foreign and security policy
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differs from other policy areas because of the intergovernmental nature of decision­
making.16 In addition, decision-making in matters of foreign and security policy tends 
to be entrusted to the national executive with less domestic parliamentary oversight 
than in other policy areas. As a result, any influence of the EU on the formulation on 
national foreign policy is not immediately apparent. And, the intergovernmental 
nature of EU foreign and security policy that does not generate the type of legally 
binding adaptation pressures policy areas in the first pillar do.
Apart from the problem of defining Europeanization, another frequently 
voiced concern regarding the utility of research on Europeanization is that it is an 
analytical concept rather than a theory. These are certainly valid reservations. 
However, it has been argued that Europeanization, rather than serving as an 
explanatory concept or theory, can be useful ‘as an attention-directing device and a 
starting point for further exploration’ (Olsen, 2002: 943). Thus, the potential 
contribution of the application of the concept of Europeanization is that it helps the 
understanding and the analysis of the impact of the EU on the national level. It also 
helps focus on processes of change (Radaelli, 2004). Europeanization thus allows the 
researcher to focus on puzzles beyond the cause of European integration or the nature 
of EU decision-making, and to inquire into the nature of the ‘reciprocal relationship’ 
between the European and the national level (Borzel, 2002: 195). For the purpose of 
addressing the research question posed in this thesis, therefore, the use of the 
Europeanization concept seems not only promising but also appropriate.
16 Decision-making in the first or 'Community' pillar policies is supranational, whereas the second 
‘CFSP’ pillar and the third ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ pillar proceed by intergovernmental decision­
making.
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a. Applying ‘Europeanization ’ to foreign and security policy 
Due to the intergovernmental nature of the EU foreign policy process in the area of 
foreign policy, pressures emanating from the EU level are not as strong or direct than 
in areas of economic and social policy. There, research has established modifications 
occurring in national policies and institutional structures in policy areas located in the 
first pillar (Borzel, 1999; Bulmer and Burch, 1999; Cole and Drake, 2000). With 
regard to foreign policy, therefore, the delegation of policy competences in foreign 
affairs has been said to have had a limited impact on domestic policy choices (Hix 
and Goertz, 2000). On the other hand, EU membership has resulted in an adaptation 
process for new and for founding EU member states, both in terms of their policies 
towards previously external states as they join the EU, as well as policies towards 
third states in order to align it with existing EU policies (Manners and Whitman, 
2000). Through the institutionalisation of EPC and later CFSP and ESDP, foreign 
policy and security policy have become part of the integration process, despite its 
intergovernmental decision-making, and co-operation within the EU CFSP has been
17shown to reinforce shared norms of behaviour (Ginsberg, 2001).
Although the effects of Europeanization on national foreign policy are weak 
in comparison with policy areas located in the first pillar, there do exist a number of 
documented changes in states’ foreign policy as a result of national and European 
interactions, even if those changes are not always explicitly referred to as 
‘Europeanization’. Research has shown that repeated interactions and the quantity 
and quality of information available has changed working patterns among the 
diplomats of EU member states (Nuttall, 1992; Forster and Wallace, 2000), resulting 
in a coordination reflex going beyond calculated exchanges of information (Tonra,
17 See for instance Forster and Blair (2002) on the impact of European policy making on the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the UK.
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2003) and pointing towards a socializing dimension of Europeanization where 
changing practices can be expected to change preferences and interests. With the 
evolution of EU foreign policy coordination, some scholars have used a 
Europeanization approach to document changes in national foreign policy: in his 
study of Irish foreign policy, Keatinge (1983) referred to the ‘Europeanization’ of 
foreign policy to label the reorientation of Irish foreign policy as a result of EC entry, 
whereas Torreblanca some years later identified such a shift in the case of Spanish 
EU membership (2001). More recently, Tonra has analyzed the Europeanization in 
the cases of Holland, Denmark and Ireland (2001), Wong in the case of France 
(2006) and Miskimmon in the case of Germany (2004). In applying the concept to 
national decision-making under CFSP and ESDP, therefore, one can reasonably 
expect to find evidence of some degree of Europeanization even in the field of 
security and defence. This in turn makes the application of the concept valid for the 
purpose of the research question posed in chapter 1. But, the analytical challenge of 
delineating the ‘EU effect’ from other influences - including domestic politics, other 
international security institutions and the United States -  in addition to the risk of 
overestimating the effect of Europeanization (Major, 2005: 183) by focussing 
exclusively on the interplay between the national and European level warrants the 
inclusion of alliance politics approaches in this thesis.
b. Defining Europeanization
One commonly cited definition of Europeanization focuses on domestic change 
caused by European cooperation and defines Europeanization as ‘an incremental 
process reorienting the direction and shape of policies to the degree that EC political 
and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics
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and policy m aking’ (Ladrech, 1994: 69). In addition to a process o f domestic change, 
however, analysts adopting a bottom-up perspective understand Europeanization as 
‘the emergence and development at the European level o f distinctive structures of 
governance’ (Caporaso et al. 2001: 3). But, because member states initiate these EU 
policies that they later adapt to, the two dimensions o f Europeanization are linked in 
practice, suggesting that Europeanization is a mutually constitutive process o f change 
at the national and the European level (Radaelli, 2002; Borzel, 2003). In addition, 
socialization mechanisms and cognitive change also suggest a third dimension of 
Europeanization, where changes comes about through the transfer o f norms or ideas.
Building on the broad definitions o f Europeanization presented above, Wong 
(2005) subsequently suggests that three conceptions o f Europeanization in particular 
can be useful in explaining possible changes taking place in foreign policy-making in 
EU member states: national adaptation (a top-down process), national projection (a 
bottom-up process), and identity reconstruction (changing interests and identities). 
The following graph illustrates the interaction between the national and the European 
level.
EU level
Projection
Adaptation
Identity reconstruction
National National level
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adaptation understands Europeanization as a reactive, top-down process that 
introduces change from the European level to the national level of policy decision­
making. Europeanization as national adaptation can be defined as ‘.. .the process of 
change at the domestic level (be it of policies, preferences or institutions) originated 
by the adaptation pressures generated by the European integration process; a process 
of change whose identity and character depend on the “goodness of fit” of domestic 
institutions and adaptation pressures’ (Torreblanca, 2001). This definition extends to 
institutional processes as well as informal structures. In the context of foreign and 
security policy, this understanding of Europeanization runs counter to liberal 
intergovemmentalist conceptions of CFSP/ESDP as a forum where states try to push 
through individual objectives, and outcomes are the lowest common denominators 
(Moravcsik, 1998). It conceptualises participation in CFSP as a reciprocal 
relationship. It is more congruent with domestic structure approaches found in 
international relations and comparative politics and fits into what has been termed 
“the second image reversed” (Gourevitch, 1978), or the international (in this case, 
European) sources of domestic change.
Following Smith (2000), one can expect to observe changes in one or more of 
the following as a result of Europeanization as national adaptation: bureaucratic 
reorganisation, constitutional change, elite socialization and shifts in public opinion. 
In addition, adaptation can be expected to result in a more general change in policies, 
preferences, and institutions, increased salience of the European agenda, and 
adherence to common policy objectives, policies agreed to for the sake of EU unity 
(high price of defection) and the relaxation of traditional policy positions to 
accommodate progress of EU projects. In the context of decisions taken in crisis 
situation, or decisions that concern the application of a policy instrument located in
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CFSP/ESDP in a specific instance, bureaucratic reorganisation and constitutional 
change are less likely to be observed as these constitute changes as a long-term 
response to events and the institutional evolution of CFSP/ESDP. One could expect 
to find, however, a high degree of salience of the European agenda, the adherence to 
common objectives, and the relaxation of national policy positions in order to 
accommodate the progress of EU policy and institutions. ‘Salience’ can be 
understood as a general importance or prominence of the EU CFSP/ESDP in national 
foreign policy. ‘European agenda’ here refers to the development of EU security 
institutions. In practice, this means that an increased importance of the EU 
CFSP/ESDP in the minds of decision-makers leads to advocating increased 
application of CFSP/ESDP instruments.
Europeanization as national projection (a bottom-up process), on the other 
hand, can be regarded as a process of where states seek to export domestic policy 
models, ideas and details to the EU (Bulmer, 1998). The concept of politics of scale 
(Ginsberg, 1989), and the benefits of collective action in conducting foreign policy 
actions at lower costs and risks than member states acting alone applies here as well. 
States are not just passively reacting to changes at the institutional level but are the 
primary actors in the process of policy change, and pro-actively project preferences 
and policy ideas and initiatives to the European level. By ‘Europeanizing’ previously 
national policies and generalizing them onto a larger stage, a dialectical relationship 
between the state and the EU level is created which in turn feeds back to the national 
level. The benefits of national projection are first, that the state increases its 
international influence; second, that it reduces the costs of pursuing a controversial 
policy against an extra-European power; and third, that a strong European presence in 
the world is potentially beneficial to all EU members as it increases individual states’
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international influence (Regelsberger, 1997). Policy outcomes of national projection 
could see states taking advantage of the EU to promote specific national interests, 
states attempt to increase national influence in the world by participating in or 
initiating EU policies, and states using EU as cover to influence foreign policies of 
other member states.
In practice, these top-down and bottom-up processes are interlinked, 
rendering. Europeanization not just a result or a consequence of policy, but also an 
ongoing and mutually constitutive process as the responses of member states to the 
EU integration process feed back into EU institutions (Borzel, 2003, Radaelli, 2002). 
This creates a methodological problem as far as EU policies and institutions can be 
regarded both as modifying policy preferences at the national level while at the same 
time originating at the national level, and therefore can potentially serve as a 
dependent or an independent variable. Nevertheless, the empirical analysis of 
member states foreign policies presented in later chapters shows that it is possible to 
analytically distinguish between the impact of the institution on a member states’ 
policy as well as moves of policy projection, especially when analyzing a particular 
policy decision, as is the case in this research project.
The third conception of Europeanization, that of changing policy preferences, 
moves the definition of Europeanization closer to notions of integration and suggests 
the possibility of eventual convergence of national foreign policy. It evokes the 
concept of security communities (Deutsch, 1957), and that of elite socialization 
previously referred to (Smith, 2000) as well as the broader literature on national 
identity. Such readings of European identity also focus on the redefinition and 
negotiation of identities within EU institutions as well as national citizenry, mirroring 
a neo-functionalist reading of a gradual transfer of identity and affiliation towards a
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new supranational Europe (Haas, 1960), even if it should be quite obvious that 
Europe as an identity category is far from replacing national identity and that Europe 
does not enjoy the same level of legitimacy that the individual nation-states do. In the 
context of Europeanization, ‘Europe’ as an identity category co-exists and can be 
incorporated in a given nation-state identity, depending on the degree of resonance. 
The question then becomes how much space there is for ‘Europe’ in collective 
nation-sate identities and how these identity constructions o f ‘Europe’ relate to given 
nation-state identities and ideas about the European political and economic order 
(Risse, 2001). Evidence of conceptions of identity towards Europeanization includes 
the emergence or existence of norms among policy-making elites, shared definitions 
of European and national interests, increase in public support for European political 
cooperation, shared or overlapping definitions of the state’s and Europe’s role in the 
world, and of Europe’s security parameters. Identity construction also suggests 
convergence, and in the context of EU foreign policy and CFSP ‘prolonged 
participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients their 
foreign policy cultures along similar lines’ (Smith, 2000: 614).
However, Europeanization should not be regarded as synonymous with 
convergence or integration, even if it can lead to aspects of both. Adaptation 
pressures and simultaneous policy projection are both filtered through national 
preferences and strategic cultures. This means that it is equally likely that national 
foreign policy cultures, although changing as a result of CFSP, remain significantly 
distinct from one another. This can be expected to negatively impact the emergence 
of a truly common European interest, identity, or foreign policy -  as research on the 
emergence of a European strategic culture has documented (Giegerich, 2006; Meyer, 
2005). The conceptual questions aside, conceiving of Europeanization as identity
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formation also points towards long-term processes of change that are not necessarily 
captured in single policy-decisions, as is the focus of this research. This does not 
mean, however, that norms and more generally the value attached to a ‘European 
approach’ cannot impact on national decision-making. Potential indicators for 
Europeanization as a result of identity formation can be expected to include the 
recourse to the European option as an instinctive choice, and the value attached to a 
European approach in a particular policy decision -  in other words, similar the 
indicators one would expect to observe as a result of Europeanization conceptualized 
as national adaptation.
c. Operationalizing Europeanization
Europeanization thus promises to be a useful analytical approach as it allows for a 
conceptualisation of the parallel processes of adaptation and national influence 
exerted on the institution, as well as the potential for long-term changes in policy 
preferences. In the context of this particular research project, the first two definitions 
-  national adaptation and the projection of policy preferences on to the EU level -  are 
most directly relevant for the purposes of this particular research. Following from the 
discussion on the various potential observations as a result of Europeanization, the 
following indicators, and questions that result from them, are suggested that allow for 
an operationalization of Europeanization in the two case studies:
Indicator of Europeanization Operationalization
The salience of the EU CFSP/ESDP in 
national foreign policy (adaptation)
Was the EU CFPS/ESDP suggested as 
the appropriate institution?
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Was the application of CFSP/ESDP 
instruments in the decision-making 
process considered important, or a 
priority, on the part of national 
governments?
The adherence to EU policy objectives, 
especially over other considerations and 
preferences (adaptation)
Did the member state compromise its 
national preferences in order to 
accommodate the use of CFSP/ESDP 
instruments?
The use, or advocating the use of the EU 
CFSP/ESDP in an attempt to increase 
national influence (projection)
Did the EU CFSP/ESDP represent a 
vehicle for the member state to increase 
their influence in this particular policy 
case?
The use of the EU CFSP/ESDP to push 
through policies on either the domestic or 
international level (projection)
Did the member state pursue national 
policy preferences through the EU 
CFSP/ESDP in this particular case?
The existence of shared definitions of 
national and European preferences 
among policy makers (changing 
preferences)
Did the member state equate national 
with European preferences in this 
particular case?
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The existence of norms and preferences 
among elites that favours the application 
of EU instruments over other available 
possibilities (changing preferences)
Did policy elites, including the elite 
public sphere, favour the application of 
CFSP/ESDP instruments?
Increase in public support for the EU 
CFSP/ESDP (changing preferences)
Was there public support for the use of 
CFSP/ESDP instruments?
The relaxation of traditional policy 
positions to accommodate progress of EU 
projects (adaptation/changing 
preferences)
Was the EU CFSP/ESDP suggested as 
the appropriate institution in this case 
despite previously held preferences to the 
contrary that would have suggested the 
adoption of a different course of action?
If evidence for these indicators are found in the empirical evidence presented in later 
chapters, national foreign policy can be said to exhibit signs of Europeanization and, 
more generally, substantiates the claim of the impact of the regional level on national 
foreign policy.
V. Alliance Politics
The final conceptual approach applied in this thesis locates a potential explanation in 
the role of alliances in international politics, in this particular case NATO, and the 
way in which they influence national foreign policy. It locates the explanation 
primarily at the systemic rather than the regional level and assumes that states’
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interest in the preservation of the transatlantic alliance and the continued involvement 
of the US in European security conditions their policy responses. NATO’s survival 
after the end of the Cold War and its evolving role since the 1990s suggest that the 
transatlantic alliance continues to play a role in national foreign policies, even if 
NATO’s original purpose -the defence of Western Europe against a possible attack 
from the Soviet Union- has disappeared. This explanatory approach thus places 
weight on the preferences and role assigned to NATO, as opposed to the EU 
CFSP/ESDP. The following sections will first analyze the literature on theoretical 
approaches towards the existence and purpose of alliances; apply this theoretical 
framework to the context of the EU member states in the context of the post-Cold 
War era, and discuss ways to assess the role of NATO and US preferences in national 
foreign policy in the two cases.
a. Alliances in international politics
Studies of the role of alliances in international politics are generally grounded in 
realist thinking. This approach assumes that states are unitary actors in world politics, 
and that states form alliances in order to protect themselves against threats in an 
anarchical system. Alliance formation is thus a product of systemic anarchy, 
inequality of strength, and conflicts and common interests among states (Snyder, 
1977). The belief that states form alliances to prevent stronger powers from 
dominating them lies at the heart of balance of power theory, which holds that states 
join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources 
could pose a threat (Bull, 2002; Waltz, 1979; Morgenthau, 1948). The tendency to 
balance will increase if a powerful state is nearby, especially if it appears to have 
especially dangerous intentions, such as territorial ambitions or an expansionist
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ideology (Walt, 1987). Shifts in the level of threat will alter the nature of existing 
alliances, and the alliances formed to protect against a state that is weakened are less 
necessary and more likely to resolve (Walt, 1997). The absence of an overarching 
threat makes the disappearance of an alliance likely: thus, the end of the Cold War 
and the emergence of a unipolar system prompted predictions that the US and Europe 
would drift apart and security competition would return if the US were to withdraw 
from Europe (Layne, 1993; Mearsheimer, 1990).
b. NATO since the end o f  the Cold War
While the conceptual literature on the formation of alliances explains the origins and 
persistence of NATO throughout the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 posed a significant challenge not only to NATO, but also to theorists of 
alliances who were faced with having to explain NATO’s persistence in view of the 
disappearance of the Soviet threat. For one, it was argued that traditional balance of 
power theory in itself does not predict the disappearances of alliances but rather their 
becoming less coherent and more fragile (Walt, 1999). Others attribute a certain type 
of stability to the current unipolar system that leaves the US so powerful that other 
states are unlikely to challenge it. As long as the US remains willing to remain 
actively involved (even if its vital interests are no longer at stake), NATO is likely to 
persist in the future (Wohlforth, 1999; Mastanduno, 1999). From an institutionalist 
perspective, on the other hand, institutions encourage cooperation through reducing 
transaction costs and facilitating compliance with existing agreements (Keohane, 
1984), and are therefore likely to endure. NATO’s highly institutionalized character 
and the transatlantic network of an elite community consisting of former NATO 
officials, defence intellectuals, military officers and researchers is more likely to keep
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the institution alive, even more so since NATO’s capabilities and assets have been 
demonstrated to be useful in the post-Cold War world during the Gulf War 1990-91 
and in the Balkans (Walt, 1999). But, this point of view is most applicable in cases 
where states have common interests -  and when common interests decline and the 
number of potential points of conflicts is growing it can be expected that it is more 
likely that Europe and America drift apart, with negative implications for the future 
ofNATO.
The fact that NATO did survive the end of the Cold War reinforces the 
argument that approaches rooted in the rationalist tradition do not suffice in 
explaining the creation and participation in an alliance, as they cannot account for 
underlying themes of institutional identity, and the socialisation effect that 
participation in an institutions has for members of an alliance (Williams and 
Newman, 1996). Constructivist approaches that understand NATO as a security 
community (Deutsch, 1957) focus on norms and identity issues similar to those raised 
in the context of the creation and participation in the EU CFSP in section II. From a 
social constructivist perspective, NATO did not fragment because of the shared 
norms and identities of its members. NATO, therefore, represents an 
institutionalization of the transatlantic security community based on common values 
and a collective identity of liberal democracies’ (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 395). In 
addition to having persisted, however, NATO has also embarked on a process of 
enlargement -  demonstrating that the end of the Cold War instead of terminating led 
to an extension of the concept of a ‘democratic security community’ (Risse-Kappen, 
1996; Schimmelfennig, 1998/99). Accordingly, NATO has since the end of the Cold 
War changed its identity from purely that of a military alliance, to that of an 
organization of cooperative security: whereas NATO during and immediately after
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the Cold War was tied to ‘the maintenance of an ‘overall strategic balance’ (Ciuta, 
2002: 51), it has shifted towards ‘cooperative security’ and regards as its fundamental 
security tasks the creation of partnerships, along with crisis management (NATO, 
23/24 April 1999).
Although NATO has undergone significant changes since the end of the Cold 
War both with regards to membership as well as the definition of its main tasks, it 
remains a significant fixture in national foreign policy. This is both for the continuing 
involvement of the US in European affairs as well as for its political purpose as a 
permanent forum for diplomatic exchanges between member states. Arguments exist 
for both sides: that NATO is kept together by a shared recognition that the solution of 
common problems are best found through cooperation (Keohane, 1984) or that the 
transatlantic relationship is one essentially dominated by the US. In this reading, the 
creation of ESDP itself can be regarded as a response to US hegemony: even if 
ESDP does not quite constitute a balancing project it is certainly an effort to develop 
an alternative security supplier (Posen 2004). Either position in this debate, however, 
assigns a significant role to the role ofNATO and by implication the US, in national 
foreign policy.
c. Operationalizing alliance politics
Applied to this research, a framework informed by alliance politics yields the 
following indicators:
Indicator of alliance politics Operationalization
States align with NATO or the US in 
order to keep the US involved in
Was US involvement deemed crucial in 
this particular case by the member states,
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European security concerns and did this result in alliance behaviour?
US preference leans towards the use of 
NATO
Did the US prefer (or insist) on NATO 
involvement, and did this result in the 
decision on the part of member states to 
use NATO in this particular case?
Preference is given to NATO as 
institutional forum, or to US policy 
preferences, out of a clear transatlantic 
preference
Did the member state in question exhibit 
a preference towards NATO over other 
institutional settings?
Did the member states regard NATO as 
the primary forum for the solution of the 
crisis?
Did the member states regard the crisis as 
a platform for NATO to prove NATO’s 
continued relevance in the post-Cold War 
era?
Did the member state regard the use of 
NATO as a means to express solidarity 
with another member of the alliance?
Preference is given to NATO for 
utilitarian reasons: military instruments
Were necessary military tools available 
only through NATO?
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are in possession ofNATO, NATO more
capable/acceptable to do the job at hand Was NATO considered the more
appropriate resource for reasons of prior
involvement in the region or case?
Was NATO the preferred option for the
host country?
If evidence of these indicators is found in the empirical data, national foreign policy 
can be said to be determined by alliance behaviour, and by a preference for NATO. 
More generally, it would substantiate claims that alliance politics play a decisive role 
in the formulation of national foreign policy when it comes to crisis decision-making.
VT. Conclusion
Based on the discussion of the three approaches it is now possible to restate the 
hypotheses formulated in the introductory chapter in more specific terms. Significant 
evidence of Europeanization -  manifested either as policy responses as a result of 
adaptational pressures, or the export of national preferences on to the European 
agenda -  can be expected to result in a significant role for the EU CFSP/ESDP in the 
resolution of both crises. However, evidence of Europeanization may not necessarily 
result in a significant role for the EU CFSP/ESDP if alliance politics, and the 
presence ofNATO, play a bigger role in national decision-making. National member 
states may prefer the use of NATO either for utilitarian reasons, for reasons of 
solidarity with another member of the alliance, out of preference for the involvement 
of the US and NATO, or because of US pressures or concern over possible negative
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consequences for transatlantic relations. In this case, one would not expect a 
significant role afforded for the EU CFSP/ESDP, even if some evidence of 
Europeanization is present in both cases. Focussing on governmental politics, lastly, 
will open the black box of policy making and reveal what impact the preferences and 
influence of the individual agencies, key participants, and the elite public sphere 
(consisting research institutes and think tanks, the press, and the elite public) had on 
policy outcomes. Governmental politics will disaggregate the broader concepts of 
Europeanization and alliance politics by identifying preferences and bargaining 
positions within the national governments. In applying these conceptual approaches 
to the individual country case studies, this thesis will be able to arrive at a nuanced 
analysis of policy decisions taken both from the domestic as well as the international 
level. First, however, it is necessary to provide a more detailed analysis of the two 
crisis case studies to highlight the empirical puzzle and the contradictions between 
Europeanization and alliance politics impulses among the member states.
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Chapter 3. The crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) and the war in Afghanistan
I. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on the crisis in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the war in Afghanistan for 
the analysis of the policy decisions taken by Britain, France and Germany that will be 
presented in subsequent chapters. This chapter also highlights the differences as well 
as the similarities of the two cases and the policy responses to the two crises, and 
demonstrates that their juxtaposition makes for a valuable analytical exercise. The 
first case, FYROM, is a regional crisis that took place in a region where the EU, 
NATO and individual member states had been active in the decade leading to the 
crisis, and was resolved peacefully. It also illustrates the politics leading to the 
implementation of the Berlin Plus agreement and the first military ESDP operation 
undertaken. The war in Afghanistan, on the other hand, took place in response to a 
global and systemic shock after the attacks on 11 September 2001 and the invocation 
of the NATO treaty’s article V. This case therefore highlights national policy 
initiatives in response to a fundamentally changed international environment. The 
nature of the application of military instruments in the two cases is also different. 
This applies to the nature of the peace-keeping operations required involving both 
low and high end Petersberg tasks and the combination of warfare and peace-keeping 
in the case of Afghanistan, and the goal of deterrence of violent acts in the case of 
FYROM. But, the cases also show remarkable similarities. This applies to the 
importance of the US as a political and military actor in both cases as well as stated 
ambitions for a greater political and military role for the EU CFSP/ESDP that were 
not equally shared among member states. And, it shows the aim to establish the EU
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as a political actor, and the friction between transatlantic and European commitments 
among the member states in formulating their policy choices. Finally, this chapter 
identifies a number of conceptual issues raised by these cases with respect to the role 
of the EU CFSP/ESDP, NATO, and the influence of the US on EU foreign policy 
more generally; and identifies specific policy areas that highlight the Europeanization 
and alliance politics hypotheses. These are to provide structure to the analysis and to 
allow comparison of the individual policy decisions in the empirical country chapters 
that follow.
II. FYROM
a. The significance o f  the crisis for EUforeign policy
The crisis in FYROM, although smaller in scale than the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia during the 1990s nevertheless posed a significant threat to regional 
security because of the potential for a spill-over of the conflict into neighbouring 
Kosovo and the de-stabilization of the entire region. Another failure to act on the part 
of the EU would also have been quite damaging to EU credibility in the region and 
beyond, a threat that was taken very seriously by the EU and the individual member 
states (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005). The crisis in FYROM thus 
had a strong symbolic character for EU crisis management, and was ‘a first’ in 
several respects: the first time the EU made use of crisis management tools located in 
CFSP and ESDP; the first time NATO and the EU worked together on a practical 
level; and the first time a military mission for the EU was suggested and eventually 
realised under the EU ESDP framework. Operation Concordia, the first ever ESDP 
military mission, put into practice the Berlin-plus agreements and was high on 
symbolism even if it was a relatively small mission (Interview with EU official, 21
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June 2005). This particular case, therefore, appears to validate the Europeanization 
hypothesis as far as the policy decisions of the member states were concerned. 
However, the involvement of NATO in the conflict, differences among member 
states with respect to the application of instruments located in the EU CFSP/ESDP, 
the timing of an ESDP take-over from NATO, and US interests in the region suggest 
that alliance politics considerations played an important part in this case as well. The 
conflicts among member states’ interests and policy preferences therefore justify the 
selection of this particular case for analysis.
b. Background. The crisis in FYROM
FYROM holds an important position in the security in the Western Balkans due to its
geographic location at the southern border of Kosovo and the eastern border of
Albania, and because of persistent interethnic tensions and the resulting potential for
escalating violence that could result in the destabilization of the entire region. One of
the poorest republics of the former Yugoslavia, FYROM is a country over which
Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians have historically asserted and maintained cultural and
geographic claims. As part of the Yugoslav Federation, FYROM worked to create its
own cultural identity; at the same time, the concerns of the Albanian population were
not high on the agenda.18 Albanian nationalism thus took root and began to grow
predominantly in Kosovo, as well as in FYROM (Liotta, 2003). The presence of the
UN, OSCE, NATO and ultimately the EU in FYROM dates back to 1992, shortly
after the country declared its independence, although much of the international,
particularly NATO, presence has not been put in place necessarily for the benefit of
FYROM but as part of the effort to deter violence in Kosovo. Following the
18 In 2002, the population profile was Macedonian (64.2 %), Albanian (25.2 %), along with Turkish 
(3.8 %), Roma (2.7%), Serb (1.8 %), Bosniacs (0.8 %), Vlachs (0.5 %), other (1 %) (European 
Commission, 2006).
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declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, FYROM held a 
referendum on 8 September 1991 and declared independence on 17 November 1991. 
Whereas Serbia agreed to Macedonian independence and Bulgaria also quickly 
recognized the new state (although not its language), Greece blocked the recognition 
of the country.19 In addition to these external problems, internal challenges included 
the need for democratic institutions and legal and economic reforms in a bankrupt 
state with the potential for multiethnic tensions.
In light of the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, then President 
Gligorov asked the UN for an observer force that would enhance FYROM’s 
sovereignty and international recognition, and keep the conflicts away from 
FYROM’s borders. The mission, which was subsequently known as the United 
Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), had as its objectives to monitor 
the border areas and to report any developments that could pose a threat to FYROM; 
to deter such threats from any source and help prevent clashes between external 
elements and Macedonian forces, and to use good offices to contribute to the 
maintenance of peace and stability in the republic (Sokalski, 2003: 102). The US 
also deployed troops in support of UNPREDEP in order to contain the fighting south 
of Bosnia and to signal to Milosevic that the US considered both Kosovo and 
FYROM of interest. In 1999, as the situation in Kosovo was becoming increasingly 
unstable and the potential for spill-over of the conflict into FYROM increased, 
UNPREDEP lost its mandate on 25 February 1999 due to China’s veto in the 
Security Council (United Nations, 25 February 1999). The US UNPREDEP elements 
remained in FYROM initially under national control with the mission to maintain,
19 Greece used its veto power in 1991 and blocked EU recognition because of the name and symbols of 
the new state. Later, the country was only able to become a member o f international organizations 
under the name ‘Former Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia’ (Schneckener, 2002).
20 The main contributors to UNPREDEP were the US (362 Troops), Norway (152 Troops), Finland 
(199 Troops) and Sweden (198 Troops) (United Nations 1999).
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protect and preserve US infrastructure but came under NATO jurisdiction and 
remained in the country under a more precisely defined force protection mission and 
a logistical support base for NATO’s Kosovo operation (The White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary 26 March 1999). NATO and US forces, therefore, were already in 
FYROM when the conflict began in early 2001, signalling the US’ broader interests 
in the region.
With respect to international economic assistance, FYROM has been part of 
the Stability Pact since 1999 and the recipient of funds through the EU’s CARDS 
(Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) regional 
programme. FYROM also signed the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement in 
March 2001 (European Commission, 2006) as part of the attempt to stave of violence 
in the initial period of the crisis. This provided some opportunity for economic and 
material assistance. However, smuggling and economic criminal activity along the 
border between FYROM and Kosovo by ethnic Albanians further complicated 
interethnic tensions in an economic climate where unemployment was as high as 32 
per cent (Liotta and Jebb, 2002: 73). The end of the UN mandate, coupled with 
NATO’s apparent lack of interest in internal Macedonian stability on account of an 
exclusive focus on the situation in Kosovo in turn created a window for ethnic 
Albanian extremists to radicalize the political agenda. Stability began to unravel as 
members of the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) led by Ali Ahmeti, 
many infiltrating from the US sector in Kosovo, staged several attacks along the ill- 
defined Kosovo-Macedonian border during 2000 and increasingly frequent as of 
January 2001 (International Crisis Group, 2001a). The rebels claimed to be fighting 
for Albanian national rights in FYROM, including citizenship, ownership, education, 
language and representative government, but there was concern on the part of the
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international community that a second aim could include joining Albania or Kosovo, 
which would have reopened the question of borders in the Western Balkans region 
and could have led to wider regional instability (BBC News, 18 March 2001).
The history of international involvement in FYROM illustrates that a number 
of international actors had been active in the country prior to the outbreak of the 2001 
crisis. Given the previous failures of the EU in the Western Balkans in the 1990s, the 
EU’s aim in the resolution of this conflict was to create a profile as an international 
political actor, particularly in the Western Balkan region (Interview with French 
official, 8 September 2005). The high stakes for regional security in the crisis also 
suggest that the US and the international community as a whole had an interest in the 
peaceful resolution of the crisis and to protect prior investments in the region. For the 
EU and its member states, three particular policy areas of involvement in the crisis 
and post-crisis intervention are of analytical importance for exploring the 
applicability of the Europeanization and alliance politics frameworks: EU 
involvement in the negotiations leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement; the 
launch of the NATO operations to aid its implementation; and the politics of an 
eventual ESDP take-over of the NATO missions. The analysis in the individual 
country chapters will therefore be structured around these three policy areas in order 
to provide clarity and continuity as far as the structure of this thesis is concerned.
c. Policy area 1: the negotiations leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
As the nature of international intervention changed from preventive diplomacy to 
third-party mediation focused on crisis management and containment and later to a 
post-peace agreement intervention (Ackermann, 2005:105-119), the involvement of 
NATO and EU increased considerably. For the EU in particular, the crisis in FYROM
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presented an opportunity to act early and decisively to absorb the lessons from Bosnia 
and Kosovo and demonstrate its credibility as a global actor. With respect to the 
negotiations leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement the EU quite successfully 
managed to do so, eclipsing the OSCE as a political actor in the crisis, for instance.21 
However, the presence of the revived Contact Group22 and NATO in the negotiations 
also raises the question of the importance attached to the EU CFSP in this particular 
case given the commitment among member states to NATO, and the Contact Group 
as forums for coordinating positions and to conduct negotiations. Subsequent 
chapters will analyze to what extent considerations of the role of the EU CFSP that 
support the Europeanization hypothesis were in direct conflict with the use of the 
Contact Group and NATO as negotiation forums.
The EU was active in FYROM early on in the crisis, and successfully 
employed economic as well as political incentives in the resolution of the conflict and 
the eventual signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement on 8 August 2001. To be
21 The OSCE was continually present in FYROM with an observer mission and participated in the 
negotiations through Ambassador Robert Forwick, OSCE Personal Representative for the situation in 
FYROM (OSCE Press release, 30 March 2001), and it was not automatically given that the EU CFSP 
would assume a political lead role in the negotiations. In fact, German diplomats repeatedly stressed in 
interviews that they were concerned about introducing a new and untested actor in the conflict due to 
the likely ramifications of a failure o f the peace negotiations and one explicitly stated that s/he had 
expected the OSCE rather than the EU CFSP to assume a bigger part in the political negotiations and 
in the post-conflict phase (Interview with German officials 9 August 2005 and 21 November 2005). 
This is significant because it demonstrates that despite the importance o f the crisis in FYROM for the 
establishment o f the EU CFSP as a political actor, this political objective seems to have been weighed 
against pragmatic considerations by at least one member state, and suggests a degree of scepticism 
towards the EU CFSP as a political instrument in the crisis. This in turn raises questions not only of 
the salience o f the Europeanization hypothesis but also o f potential internal divisions within member 
state administrations that will be analysed in subsequent chapters. For a more detailed discussion of 
Robert Forwick’s role in the negotiations, see International Crisis Group (2001b).
22 The Contact Group was formed in 1994 and comprised senior officials from Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, Russia and the US to coordinate policy towards the Western Balkans. On the 
interaction between the Contact Group and the EU’s institutional structure see Schwegmann (2000). 
One important change to the composition of the Contact Group in this case, however, consisted of 
Javier Solana, or Stefan Lehne, Solana’s representative, in Solana’s absence (Interview with German 
official, 21 November 2005). While the existence o f directorates and the presence o f the US as part of 
these directorates do not point towards decision-making independently from the US it does not a priori 
rule out processes o f Europeanization as defined in chapter 2. On the one hand, the fact that the big 
three member states acted outside European structures in the negotiation o f the crisis appears to 
weaken the Europeanization hypothesis. However, the fact that the EU CFSP in the persona of Javier 
had a place at the table affirms the Europeanization hypothesis because it shows that member states, in 
agreeing to give the EU a seat at the table, adapted policy processes to accommodate EU institutions.
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sure, the initial discussions on the possible steps to stop the violence and to seal the 
border between Kosovo and FYROM to prevent the NLA to use the safety zone in 
Kosovo as a base from which to launch its attacks and to store weapons, had taken 
place between NATO and the Macedonian government. However, the crisis was 
discussed for the first time in the General Affairs Council on 19-20 March 2001, and 
support for Javier Solana’s efforts confirmed (Council of the European Union, 19-20 
March 2001). Javier Solana was due in Skopje on 19 March 2001, a visit that marked 
the beginning of a rather intensive shuttle diplomacy, often in conjunction with 
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and/or Chris Patten, the Director of the 
Commission’s Directorate General of External Relations (DG Relex).23 Importantly, 
the cooperation between NATO and the EU on the crisis in FYROM took place in the 
context of increasingly institutionalized relations between the two organizations, 
including the first formal NATO-EU meeting at the level of foreign ministers on 30 
May 2001, where the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency issued a joint 
statement on the Western Balkans (NATO, 29 July 2004).
This was the first time that NATO and the EU joined forces, announcing on 
19 March 2001 that the two organisations would coordinate their efforts in order to 
prevent FYROM from sliding into a civil war (Le Monde, 21 March 2001). The role 
of the EU consisted in diplomatic and economic support for the Macedonian 
government, combining both CFSP (pillar 2) and Commission (pillar 1) policy 
tools.24 Javier Solana played a very visible and effective role in managing the crisis
23 Javier Solana acted on behalf o f the CFSP pillar, whereas Chris Patten, the director of the External 
Relations directorate represented the Commission, a working relationship that proved quite effective, 
without a bureaucratic battle over competencies between the Council and the Commission (Piana, 
2002; United States Institute for Peace, 2002).
24 As for the Commission (first pillar), the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with 
FYROM, proposed by the EU contingent on political dialogue on reforms between the two ethnic 
groups, also proved to be an important political and economic incentive for the resolution o f the 
conflict. Also, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), which was created in February 2001 to allow 
the rapid dispatch o f Community funds, was first used in FYROM (European Commission, 2001). The
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through frequent visits to Skopje to put pressure on the government as well as the 
Albanian side to arrive at a political solution to the conflict. In turn, the Foreign 
Minister of FYROM visited Brussels several times and President Trajkovski attended 
the EU Goethenburg summit in 2001 at the suggestion of France and Germany. 
Solana, in conjunction with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, played a 
crucial role in mediating cease-fires, establishing a government of national unity and 
bringing political leaders -  Albanian as well as their Macedonian counterparts -  to 
the negotiating table to work out a political agreement. Both acted as ‘trouble 
shooters’ keeping on track the pursuit of a negotiated settlement by softening 
entrenched positions and mending internal divisions within the different political 
parties (Ackermann, 2005: 105-119).
Importantly, Javier Solana was proactive not only in the negotiation of the 
crisis but also in carving out a role for himself in the negotiations in the first place. 
He thereby acting as what may be termed a policy entrepreneur (Roberts and King, 
1991; Sabatier, 1999) in defining his role as HR/SG of the EU CFSP as well as his 
action radius vis-a-vis the member states. His role and stature also indicates the 
Europeanization of national foreign policy with respect to the support of the member 
states for an increasingly visible role for the EU CFSP. With respect to decisions by 
the three member states analyzed in this thesis, there are two potential indicators of 
Europeanization may apply that will be explored in the empirical chapters: policy 
adaptation, where member states supported Solana in order to accommodate the
Commission established a Delegation in Skopje, but its profile was much lower than that o f Javier 
Solana, Chris Patten, or the succession o f EU Special Representatives since the first appointment in 
March 2001 (Piana, 2002).
25 A number o f interviewees mentioned Solana’s proactive stance, with one national official explicitly 
stating that ‘o f course, if  you give Solana the freedom to move into a certain policy area he will take 
the opportunity to do so’ (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006).
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progress of the EU CFSP; and identity formation, where member states held an 
inherent preference for a proactive role for the EU CFSP.
In the emerging division of labour NATO brokered security arrangements 
between the NLA and the government security forces and generally provided the 
military deterrent, whereas the EU and US encouraged political dialogue and 
confidence-building measures (Eldridge, 2002:65). The urgency of the situation and 
the need for demonstrating unity also proved an additional incentive for the member 
states to act together in support of EU unity. This suggests a high degree of salience 
of the EU agenda, and points towards evidence of Europeanization of member states’ 
foreign policies. As the crisis worsened under the Swedish EU Presidency, which did 
not have an Embassy in FYROM and thus could not represent the whole EU, British 
Ambassador Mark Dickinson represented Sweden’s interests. The UK thus acted as 
the local presidency on the ground (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006). The 
need for a continuous EU presence forged a consensus to create the position of an EU 
Special Envoy to FYROM -  Mark Dickinson was appointed on 6 March 2001. In 
accordance with French interests (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005), 
F rancis Leotard, a former French Defence Minister, was subsequently appointed as 
EU Special Representative (EUSR) on 25 July 2001.26 This suggests a preference on 
the part of at least one member state, France, to raise its profile within the EU CFSP 
and points towards Europeanization understood as policy projection.
In early May 2001 Solana played an important role in negotiating the creation 
of a government of national unity consisting of all political parties. Solana and 
Robertson were also actively involved in negotiating several cease-fires and,
26 Lyotard was replaced on 9 October 2001 by Alain Leroy, another Frenchman. There have been five 
EU Special Representatives to FYROM since: Alexis Brouhns (from 30 September 2002); Soren 
Jessen-Petersen (from 26 January 2004), Michael Salin (from 12 July 2004) and Erwan Fou6r6 (from 
17 October 2005). Source: Council o f the European Union, 2006b
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Iimportantly, were twice able to prevent Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski from 
proclaiming a state of war, a move that would have led to a considerable escalation of 
the conflict (International Crisis Group, 2001b). Apart from the domestic 
negotiations, Solana also persuaded Ukrainian prime minister Anatolli Kinakh to end 
at least temporarily weapons sales to FYROM in late July 2001, which may have 
helped move along the negotiations leading to the Ohrid accords, and pressured the 
Slav Macedonian parties to incorporate ethnic Albanians concerns -  such as the use 
of Albanian as a second language, or security sector reforms -  into the political 
process (International Crisis Group, 2001b). The negotiations in Ohrid, in South- 
Eastern FYROM close to the Albanian border, took place between the leaders of the 
four major political parties (two Slav, two Albanian) in the presence of President 
Trajkovski as well as Francis Leotard and US negotiator James Pardew. The 
appointment of a US negotiator three days after Leotard’s appointment (Interview 
with French official, 8 September 2005) in turn highlighted the interest on the part of 
the US to maintain its influence on the outcome of the negotiations. Leotard also met 
with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov for support of the EU’s and NATO’s 
initiative in FYROM. In response to diplomatic pressure from the international 
community, the ethnic Slav and Albanian political leaders began negotiations on 2 
April 2001. Upon the signature of the Ohrid Agreement on August 13, the EU 
pledged an additional $42 million in aid to push the parliament to back the reform 
plan and ratify the Agreement -  the precondition for NATO Operation Essential 
Harvest, which began on 27 August 2001 (NATO, 15 August 2001).
All three member states analyzed in this thesis therefore played an active role 
in the solution in the crisis and the support for the EU platform in supporting and/or 
endorsing Solana and the use of EU CFSP instruments. The UK acted as the EU local
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presidency, whereas Germany and France used the EU platform to invite President 
Trajkovski to the Goethenburg Summit; France, lastly, lobbied for the appointment of 
an EUSR. This potentially serves to underline the European hypothesis as the EU 
appears to have been suggested and perceived as an appropriate and salient platform.
But, the EU was not the only institution active in the negotiations, and broader 
geostrategic issues were of salience as was the credibility of NATO on the ground. 
These suggest support for the alliance politics hypothesis rather than 
Europeanization. First, the crisis in FYROM coincided with the advent of a new US 
administration and doubts on the part of the EU whether the US would continue to be 
engaged in the Balkans. Although the US allayed fears of withdrawal from Kosovo 
and Bosnia at the US-EU summit in Goetenburg in June and James Pardew, the US 
negotiator, acted side by side with Solana, lending weight to the European effort -  
but also signalling that the US was not yet confident that the Europeans could 
manage this conflict on their own (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005), 
and suggested that the role of the US in member states political considerations had 
important weight. Another highly salient actor in the negotiations was the Contact 
Group, which was resurrected and first met on the crisis in FYROM in April 2001. 
Although the Contact Group ended up endorsing the EU’s political mediation in the 
crisis in FYROM and included Javier Solana or his representative Stefan Lehne, its 
resurrection for coordinating policy nevertheless questions the extent to which 
alliance politics considerations by the member states took precedence over those of 
Europeanization in the case of the negotiations leading to the Ohrid Accords. The 
conceptual implications for the Europeanization approach will be discussed in 
chapter 10.
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d. Policy area 2: NATO Operation Essential Harvest
The second relevant policy area for the international community -  the deployment of 
NATO to assist the implementation of the Ohrid Peace Agreement -  illustrates the 
applicability of alliance politics considerations. The need for a NATO presence was 
not contested among EU member states.27 However, NATO Operation Essential 
Harvest and its follow-up operations serve as a precursor to considerations of an 
eventual ESDP take-over. Of interest analytically with respect to this particular 
policy area is also the question of what particular alliance politics considerations 
were at play because they highlight the points of conflict with respect to the eventual 
handover to the ESDP mission, and to what extent these differed among the three 
member states analyzed in this thesis 28
Since the end of the conflict in Kosovo, about 4,000 NATO troops (KFOR
90  •  ♦rear ) were based in FYROM, in addition to intelligence and training personnel 
stationed there since the early 1990s when NATO and FYROM signed the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreement (Financial Times, 7 August 2001). For NATO, 
a peace accord in FYROM was also important from this perspective, as instability 
potentially could negatively impact the logistic lines to Kosovo. NATO had been 
active in FYROM on one prior occasion when the Extraction Force (XFOR) was
A
assembled in 1999 to protect the first elements of KFOR in the area. At the 
beginning of the crisis, KFOR initially made open-ended security assurances, but 
came to play an increasingly activist role in FYROM. Upon the first signs of crisis,
27 Although the participation in the NATO Operation was contested domestically in at least one 
member state, Germany, as chapter 4 will analyze in more detail.
28 This in turn is significant because in the case o f primarily utilitarian motivations, an eventual ESDP 
handover can be expected to be less contested than in case of fundamental transatlantic preferences.
29 KFOR stands for Kosovo Force while KFOR Rear is the logistic backup for troops in Kosovo based 
in FYROM (NATO Notes, 27 March 2002).
30 The corps and commander for XFOR was provided by France, and placed under NATO (American) 
command, proof that France was not as hostile to NATOas is sometimes believed (Mathiopoulos and 
Gyarmati, 1999: 67) -  and an indication that alliance politics considerations played a part in French 
decision-making in the crisis in FYROM as well.
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President Trajovski made an immediate request to NATO to help secure borders 
(NATO, 20 June 2001). This shows that NATO, and in particular the US, were 
necessary for Western credibility in FYROM (Interview with French official, 8 
September 2005), although there was no desire to extend KFOR’s mandate to 
FYROM, and KFOR troops were criticized for not taking a tougher stance on 
Albanian guerrillas. Active in the political negotiations -  apart from Lord Robertson 
-  was Pieter Feith, NATO special envoy and Senior Civilian Representative to 
Skopje, Ambassador Hanjorg Eiff (NATO, 20 June 2001). A NATO presence was 
also necessary because NATO was already in the area and had a degree of political 
credibility both with the Albanian as well as the Slav part of the population 
(Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005). The conclusion of the Ohrid Agreement 
was the precondition for a NATO peace keeping operation.
Operation Essential Harvest was deployed ‘in order to collect weapons and
ammunitions, on a voluntary basis, from those who have been fighting government
forces’ (NATO, 17 August 2001). Key tasks were the collection of weapons and
ammunition from the insurgents; transportation and disposal of weapons which are
surrendered; and transportation and destruction of ammunition that is turned in
(NATO, 16 December 2002). Britain, France and Germany contributed sizably to the
force.31 Soon after the launch of the NATO mission it became apparent that an
international military presence would be required beyond the term of Operation
Essential Harvest. About 50 EU and OSCE observers, a number that was intended to
double, had entered FYROM in late August and early September 2001, and their
mandate extended beyond that of Operation Essential Harvest. The EU foreign
ministers soon expressed security concerns for the safety of the monitors. There were
31 The UK contributed Brigade Headquarters and one battle group; France one infantry battle group 
and Germany two infantry companies (NATO, 16 December 2002). The UK also commanded the 400- 
strong pre-deployment force to prepare for the activation of the full task force (NATO, 31 July 2003).
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still potential for conflict: two further parliamentary votes were needed to pass 
Albanian rights into law, and rebels were still occupying areas of the country, and 
armed Slav Macedonian paramilitary groups were unhappy with the peace deal 
(International Crisis Group, 2001c). NLA commanders warned that they would 
remobilise and the Interior Minister, Ljube Boskovski, said he would launch a 
security crackdown on them (The Independent, 7 September 2001). Operation 
Amber Fox , the follow-on operation to protect OSCE and EU unarmed monitors 
that entered FYROM to oversee the settlement after Operation Essential Harvest 
ended, began with a three-month security mandate that was extended until 15 
December 2002 (NATO, 31 July 2003). The next mission began 16 December 2002 
-  Operation Allied Harmony -  which was eventually taken over by the EU ESDP.
While there is no expected evidence of Europeanization in this case as it 
involves member state deliberation on the size and nature of a NATO mission, the 
nature of alliance politics considerations behind the NATO deployment is of interest 
here also to better understand and analyze the next policy area. Were member state 
commitments to NATO as a political and military tool motivated by utilitarian 
considerations of NATO credibility that made a peaceful outcome in FYROM more 
likely, or were decisions motivated by a more fundamental transatlantic preference? 
These can be expected to impact member states’ considerations with respect to the 
third and final policy area for the crisis in FYROM.
32 Task Force Fox consisted o f up to 700 troops, with 300 already in the country. The extraction force 
consisted o f three companies with approximately 100 personnel each: one from France, one from Italy 
and one from Germany (NATO, 31 July 2003). The participation o f France in the NATO missions in 
FYROM in turn suggests that alliance politics considerations played a part in French decision-making 
as well, affirms the argument made earlier (see footnote 8) -  and further justifies the inclusion of 
France in this research project.
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e. Policy area 3: The politics o f the ESDP take over from NATO 
Success in political mediation and EU-NATO cooperation prepared the groundwork 
for a ESDP take-over from NATO and the first ever EU military mission. In the case 
of FYROM, the risk of failure was low because the demands of the KLA -  a 
multiethnic state where Slav and Albanian Macedonians enjoyed equal rights rather 
than secession - were regarded as reasonable on the part of the West (Garton Ash, 
2001), and because the threat of full-scale civil war had receded with the signing of 
the Ohrid Agreement. Accordingly, the EU and member states expressed interest in a 
take-over early on, and according to EU officials and outside observers it was not so 
much a question of if but of when the EU would assume a more central role in the 
military and political process (Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005; Interview 
with UK academic, 17 June 2005). However, the initial suggestion for an ESDP 
takeover was rejected by the member states, and the actual take-over delayed on 
account of unresolved issues between NATO and the EU with regard to the Berlin 
plus agreements. This makes this particular policy area salient with respect to the 
Europeanization and alliance politics hypotheses. Were member states’ concerns 
with respect to the ESDP take-over a question of principle with respect to 
transatlantic relations, a question of prior NATO-EU arrangements, or a matter of 
pushing for EU autonomy? And, to what extent were Europeanization and alliance 
politics considerations in conflict and how were they eventually resolved?
The debate over a potential EU take-over of the NATO mission first arose 
publicly out of the continuing need to fill the impending security vacuum left by the 
end of Operation Essential Harvest, discussed in the last decision point (see also 
International Crisis Group, 2001c). On 5 September, EUSR Francis Leotard 
proposed to send a 1500-strong multinational EU force to keep the peace after the
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end of the NATO mission, a proposal he claimed had been discussed with the British, 
French and German governments, and that was said to have the backing of the French 
government (Financial Times, 6 September 2001). At the informal meeting of EU 
foreign ministers at Genval near Brussels, Javier Solana was to ask colleagues to 
agree on what tasks any new force in FYROM should perform before deciding on 
which organisation would be best-equipped to undertake it. NATO on the other hand 
claimed that an EU force would be ‘messy and silly’, and the emerging consensus 
among the EU foreign ministers was that a follow-on peacekeeping force would 
require UN approval, must include Russia, and should be NATO-led to ‘tie the US 
in’, although Skopje had by that time not consented to further NATO presence (let 
alone invited an EU military mission).33
At least one member state, then, had come to look for a more robust military 
role in FYROM in an effort to give credibility to the emerging ESDP. The operation 
in FYROM was as much, if not more, about its symbolic character for the EU rather 
than about the nature of the mission (Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005).34 At 
the Laeken summit in December 2001 the Belgian EU Presidency declared ESDP
- j c
operational and capable of conducting some crisis management operations , and both
33 With respect to the question o f how to fill the security vacuum, an International Crisis Group report 
noted that ‘in principle, NATO should not be the only candidate for a security role in Macedonia after 
“Essential Harvest’” , but noted that ‘L6otard’s confidence may owe more to traditional French 
ambitions to build up European defence and security capacity than to realistic assessments o f what is 
possible in Macedonia in 2001. Early indications are that his “initiative”, if such it was, is falling on 
deaf ears’ (International Crisis Group, 2001c: 14). While it is true that the initial suggestion fell on 
deaf ears, the idea was taken up at a later stage. This signals that the initial rejection was less a matter 
of principle on the part o f the member states but rather one o f timing -  other than in the case of  
Afghanistan, which will be introduced next.
34 In this context, the International Crisis Group noted that ‘Brussels must recognize that it faces 
legitimate scepticism in Washington and in the region about both its capabilities and will in the 
security field, making a successful first endeavour all the more important’ (International Crisis Group, 
2002: 15).
35 This was done despite the objection of the UK, who deemed declaring ESDP operational too early. 
While the British stance will be analyzed in more detail in chapter 8, it is nevertheless worth pointing 
out at this stage that member states differed with respect to the timing o f this decision, and that this has 
implications for the validity o f the Europeanization hypothesis in at least one member state analyzed in 
this thesis.
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the Spanish EU Presidency in the first half o f2002 as well as President Chirac urged 
the EU to take over the mission in FYROM (International Crisis Group, 2002).36 At 
the European Council in Barcelona on 15-16 March the EU pledged to take over from 
NATO, declaring the ‘EU’s availability to take responsibility, following elections in 
FYROM and at the request of its government, for an operation to follow that 
currently undertaken by NATO in FYROM, on the understanding that the permanent 
arrangement on EU-NATO co-operation (‘Berlin Plus’) would be in place by then’ 
(cited in NATO Notes, 27 March 2002:1). With regard to Operation Amber Fox, the 
operation following Essential Harvest, Secretary of State Colin Powell hinted that the 
US would not object if EU wanted to take over responsibility in the Balkans. From 
the part of the US, then, there seemed to be little objection in principle for the EU to 
take over a security function in FYROM, including under the ESDP label (Interview 
with US official, 20 October 2005). Member states reservations by that time 
appeared to have been resolved in favour of an ESDP mission provided the ‘Berlin 
Plus’ agreement were in place.
But, the dispute between Greece and Turkey over EU access to NATO assets
prevented the formulation of a timetable for EU troops to assume the mission. After
the EU-NATO declaration on the ‘Berlin-plus’ agreement on 16 December 2002 that
gives the EU access to NATO assets for crisis management (NATO, 2 December
2004), EU foreign ministers formally approved the first EU military mission in
FYROM. Operation Concordia was launched on 31 March 2003 with Admiral
Rainer Feist, the Deputy SACEUR, as Operation Commander. Its operational tasks
were to “contribute to a stable, secure environment to allow the [Macedonian]
government to implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement” (Council of the
36 The issue o f EU assured access to NATO’s common assets and planning remained the major 
stumbling block, although at least one EU member -France- considered ad hoc access an acceptable 
solution (NATO Notes, 27 March 2002).
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European Union, 27 January 2003). EU liaison officers were working alongside their 
NATO colleagues in the NATO command structure, both at the strategic level in an 
EU cell at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, and at regional level at AFSOUTH in Naples, 
Italy. In the field, in Skopje, the Force Commander French Major-General Maral and 
his staff were working closely with the NATO Senior Military Representative. It was 
the first EU operation to draw on the ‘Berlin-plus’ arrangement and involved 350 
lightly armed military personnel. Initially expected to last six months, its mandate 
was extended at the General Affairs Council (GAC) on 21 July until 15 December 
2003, after which a police operation -Operation Proxima- succeeded Concordia to 
help FYROM authorities develop their police forces.
/  Conclusion: questions raised by this case
The crisis in FYROM represents a success story for the EU in crisis management. 
Together with the eventual launch of the first ESDP mission this points towards the 
Europeanization of national foreign policies. However, with respect to the policy 
areas introduced in this chapter, it has been shown that several factors pose salient 
questions that will be further analyzed in the individual country chapters that follow. 
To summarize, they include the motivation on the part of individual member states to 
support Javier Solana and the EU CFSP in the negotiation efforts, and the importance 
attached to other institutional venues, most notably NATO and the Contact Group; 
the nature of national commitments to NATO, and whether they were motivated by a 
fundamental transatlantic preference in ensuring continued US presence in European 
affairs or rather utilitarian motives that related to NATO’s military assets; and 
member states positions with respect to the ESDP take-over of the NATO mission. In 
particular this concerns whether they were motivated by considerations of timing, of
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a fundamental preference for ESDP (or rejection thereof), or of co-ordination with the 
US over sharing of NATO assets. Having provided a detailed history of the crisis in 
FYROM and the international response, the next section introduces the war in 
Afghanistan and the conceptual questions the case raises with respect to the 
Europeanization of member states’ foreign policies.
III. Afghanistan
a. The significance o f Afghanistan for international security 
The significance of the war in Afghanistan for international security in the first 
instance lies in the fight against terrorism following the attacks on September 11, as 
well as in the changing nature of international coalitions: the US, rather than calling 
on NATO for support in its fight against the Taliban through Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), instead relied on ad-hoc coalitions of the willing, thereby calling 
into question the role and purpose of military alliances in the post-11 September era 
(see Lieven, 2001). Military operations in Afghanistan are conducted in the 
framework of two separate operations. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) centres 
on the fight against terrorism whereas the initial role of the International Assistance 
and Security Force (ISAF) was to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) 
prior to the country’s 2004 elections in providing a safe and secure environment 
within Kabul and its surrounding areas.37 To a varying degree Britain, France and 
Germany have played significant roles in each of the two operations. The 
coordination of contributions to both OEF and ISAF of each member state with the 
US as well as with each other, the domestic justifications for the deployment of 
troops and the extent of the involvement of the EU CFSP in these efforts raises a set 
of analytical questions with regard to national priorities with regards to CFSP and
37 ISAF was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 o f 20 December 2001.
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ESDP, the role of NATO in national foreign policy post-11 September, and the 
assertion of national influence in a transatlantic context, that will be explored in the 
individual country chapters.
In the context of the EU and its emerging CFSP/ESDP, responses to the 
attacks of 11 September brought with it the apparent re-nationalisation of foreign 
policy (see Hill, 2004), as individual EU member states -  Britain, France and 
Germany at the forefront- sought to contribute to the US-led war on terror both to 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF)38 and to demonstrate their solidarity with the US. This in turn provoked 
resentment not only for compromising EU unity but also for engaging in what may be 
termed mini-lateralism: discussing contributions in closed meetings, often ahead of 
EU summits- thereby sidelining smaller EU member states, including Belgium, 
which held the EU presidency during the second half of 2001.
The war in Afghanistan also raises issues of reconstruction, state building and 
the provision of humanitarian aid to a war-tom country. The events of 11 September 
brought Afghanistan, one of the poorest countries in the world, once more to the fore 
of world attention. Located at the crossroads of Central Asia, Afghanistan’s strategic 
position has long made it a target for invasion by regional as well as great powers 
during the Cold War: the Soviet Union invaded in 1979 and was driven out by the 
Mujahidin in 1989 (Roy, 2004). The US, until the Soviet withdrawal, funded the 
Afghan war efforts and maintained strategic linkages with Afghan mujahidin who
38 Whereas OEF is the U S’ military response to the attacks on 11 September 2001, ISAF is a 
multinational peacekeeping operation under an UN mandate. Significantly for this thesis, EU member 
states, including German, Britain and France, contribute in significant numbers to ISAF: Germany is 
the biggest single contributor with 1816 troops, whereas France contributes 742 troops and the UK 461 
(NATO, 21 February 2005). But, initially neither NATO nor EU assumed overall command. While 
suggestions that European contributions to ISAF could be labelled an ‘EU-force’ were roundly 
rejected, calls for NATO to assume command on the part of the UK and later Germany, also proved to 
be contentious. This makes the assembly o f ISAF and the question o f the force’s institutional 
anchoring relevant for this thesis.
85
came to occupy the power vacuum left behind. Soon after the fall of the Soviet- 
backed government in Kabul in 1992, the various Mujahidin religious, tribal and 
linguistic factions began a devastating civil war. The Taliban (‘religious students’), 
under the direction of Mullah Muhammad Omar, began their ascent to power around 
Kandahar in 1994, took control of Kabul in 1996 and soon controlled most of the 
country, bringing about order through the institution of a very strict interpretation of 
Sharia, or Islamic law (Roy, 2004). Human rights abuses, particularly of ethnic and 
religious minorities and women were widespread. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan 
also became a haven for terrorist groups, in particular al-Qaeda. Prior to the fall of the 
Taliban regime, Afghanistan was one of the world’s worst humanitarian emergencies: 
a quarter-century of civil war had left an estimated one million people dead and over 
six million people displaced, many as refugees in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran 
(UNHCR 2005). The country was one of the most heavily mined in the world, and 
per capita GDP was on par with Somalia and Eritrea, estimated at $140 - $180 
(Rubin, 2002; European Commission, 2003). The development task alone, therefore, 
was and remains a significant challenge.
The reconstruction of Afghanistan has been placed under UN auspices in 
order to coordinate economic and political measures on the part of the various 
international actors involved in the reconstruction of the country. The peacekeeping 
operation, also sanctioned by UNSC Resolutions, has since 2003 been placed under
•JQ
overall NATO command. NATO became formally involved in February 2003, 
when Germany and the Netherlands assumed ISAF command and sought NATO 
support for the planning and execution of the operation. EU activities are thus spread
39 The fact that ISAF came under overall NATO command in 2003 in turn signalled the alliance’s need 
to reinvent itself at the same time as the EU ESDP was in the process o f inventing itself (Toje 2003). 
This highlights the possibility for tension between ESDP and NATO instruments on the part of the 
member states and affirms the applicability of this particular case for a detailed study of member states 
preferences with respect to the two institutions.
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across three dimensions and include security, political, and economic contributions. 
The EU and its member states have been active in all three, but with various degrees 
of coordination and not always under an EU-label. The EU did not assume a role in 
the military aspect of crisis management through ISAF -  this task fell to individual 
nations including EU member states, and later to NATO as the institutional 
framework -  but it did carve out a significant political and economic role with regard 
to Afghanistan, both in terms of the financial contributions to the country’s 
reconstruction as well as a political profile (and influence) for the EU in Afghanistan 
and worldwide through the office of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) Klaus- 
Peter Klaiber40 and later Francesc Vendrell.41 The emphasis on a profile for the EU 
in the reconstruction of Afghanistan suggests considerations that would support the 
Europeanization hypothesis, despite the overwhelming influence of the US on the 
policies towards Afghanistan. This makes Afghanistan a worthwhile case for 
analyzing member states preferences with respect to the EU CFSP.
To be sure, the overriding instinct and determining factor of international 
policy responses to Afghanistan was solidarity with the United States and the 
recognition that this was a case of self-defence and that the US as a result would 
determine much of the military policy towards Afghanistan.42 However, for EU 
member states, the war in Afghanistan nevertheless posed the problem of what sort of 
a political role the EU CFSP could and should play in the reconstruction efforts, to 
what extent - i f  at all- EU member states were ready to subsume their military and
40 EUSR Klaiber also lobbied for increased member states contributions to ISAF both out of  
considerations o f security measures as the most pressing item in order for economic and political 
reconstruction as well as efforts at providing an EU lead and voice in the political decisions 
surrounding Afghanistan’s reconstruction (Klaiber, 2002). Vendrell’s role has been equally important 
for giving the EU global visibility as a foreign policy actor.
41 Francesc Vendrell was first appointed in 2002, and his mandate has been extended until 28 February 
2007 (Council o f the European Union, 2006b).
42 This was pointed out in every interview conducted on the role o f the EU as well as the individual 
member states in Afghanistan.
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political actions under an EU label, and what sort of role the EU should assume in the 
crisis management and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The emerging 
contradictions between national contributions and the simultaneous search for a 
political role for the EU in response to the crisis thus make the war in Afghanistan a 
pertinent case study of member states’ preferences on the role of the EU CFSP in 
crisis management.43 Given member states fragmentation, the refusal to seriously 
consider a coordinated ‘EU-force’ that was suggested by Belgian Foreign Minister 
Verhofstadt, and the resulting appearance of a poor showing of the EU CFSP raises 
the question of what, if any, Europeanization considerations can be observed in 
member states decision making? The rejection of suggestions for a possible ‘EU 
force’ as part of ISAF44 in particular illustrated the divergent views on the part of EU 
member states as to the EU CFSP/ESDP’s global and military reach and ambitions. 
More broadly, it illustrates the tension between transatlantic and European 
commitments in times of a systemic shock.
With respect to decisions that would point towards Europeanization, the 
Belgian EU Presidency also pushed for declaring the EU ESDP capable of 
conducting some crisis management operations so as to raise the ESDP’s profile in 
response to 11 September.45 This points towards an increasing salience of the EU 
CFSP/ESDP in the minds of individual member states and the need for the EU to 
have a voice in a post-11 September environment. However, although the EU played
43 These contradictions extend to the EU institutions as well. The European Union fact sheet (Council 
o f the European Union 2005) ‘The EU and Afghanistan’ subsumes EU member state contributions 
under ‘EU’ efforts, although member states had explicitly rejected a ‘EU’ label for ISAF when the 
force was put together in 2001. What is more, commitments continue to be based on national rather 
than European contributions and are perceived and portrayed as such in the individual member states.
44 Discussions to this end took place in the PSC at the time (Interview with French official, 7 March 
2006), which demonstrates that considerations over a potential EU force went beyond misplaced 
public statements on the part of the Belgian Presidency, as one policy analyst interviewed suggested 
(Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005). Unlike FYROM, however, these suggestions never 
turned into concrete policy proposals.
45 As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, this was not in accordance with at least one 
member state’s preference -  the UK (see chapter 8).
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an important facilitating role at the Bonn Conference in 2001 and made substantial 
financial donation, its role in crisis management was negligible. But, within the 
broader framework of international efforts in Afghanistan, the EU did carve out a 
significant role through the appointment of an EU Special Representative and through 
the release of substantial amounts of financial aid. Even if the EU role in the 
management of the crisis was not centre stage, then, it was nevertheless significant.
The next three sections analyze in more detail the involvement of the EU, as 
well as NATO and the US, in the war in Afghanistan in order to set the context for 
the individual national policies analyzed in subsequent chapters. Three policy areas 
are of particular relevance for the analysis of member states’ policies: the military 
commitments as part of OEF and the war on terror; political and economic 
measures taken with a view to the reconstruction of Afghanistan; and the 
construction of ISAF including its institutional anchoring.46 While the EU did not 
assume a role in the military aspect of crisis management through ISAF -  this task 
fell to individual nations, and later to NATO as the institutional framework -  it did 
carve out a significant political role with regard to Afghanistan, both in terms of the 
financial contributions to the country’s reconstruction as well as the coordination, at 
least initially, of EU and member states contributions, including those to ISAF, 
through the office of the EU Special Representative. This suggests that some political 
considerations that would support the Europeanization hypothesis came into play on 
the part of the member states in addition to transatlantic preferences that support the 
alliance politics framework.
46 The division into the three policy areas is not as neat as the one in the case o f FYROM, where 
developments unfolded in a more linear manner rather than parallel and under different time 
constraints due to the nature of the crisis. It nevertheless serves the purpose, however imperfectly, of 
structuring the analysis.
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b. Policy area 1: OEF and the war on terror
After the attacks on 11 September, the US took steps to oust the Taliban from power. 
However, rather than calling on NATO for military contributions -  NATO had, for 
the first time in its history invoked article 5 of the NATO treaty on 12 September47 - 
the US instead decided to form coalitions of the willing for OEF, accepting military 
contributions from Britain and, to a lesser extent, France and Germany, under overall 
US command.48 While military contributions on the part of the US’ allies are not 
surprising given the magnitude of the event and the US’ right to self defence, they 
nevertheless appear to contradict engrained national positions in two of the three 
member states analysed in this thesis: anti-Americanism on the part of France, and 
remnants of post-World War II pacifism on the part of Germany. These apparent 
contradictions in turn make this policy area of analytical interest with respect to the 
nature of national deliberations on the reason for military contributions.
EU policy responses towards 11 September and the war in Afghanistan have 
made use both of Community and CFSP instruments. The initial response to the 
attacks of 11 September was immediate -  and common, as the EU and its member 
states declared solidarity with the US and established an Action Plan for the fight 
against terrorism at the Extraordinary European Council in Brussels on 21 September 
(Council of the European Union, 21 September 2001). Beyond questions of 
solidarity, particularly with regard to contributions to the US-led military operation as 
well as a peace keeping force for reconstruction, contradictions between national
47 Correspondingly, the invocation o f Article V as a response to the attacks o f 11 September has been 
interpreted as a response to ‘NATO’s self-preservation challenge’ (Toje, 2003: 64). However, while 
Toje argues that the invocation o f article V was an initiative on the part of NATO the institutions, 
information collected in interviews and secondary sources for this thesis suggests that this arose out of 
the initiative from a NATO member state rather than just NATO’s institutional leadership -  the UK. 
This in turn supports the alliance politics hypothesis formulated in chapter 2 in the case o f at least one 
member state analysed in this thesis.
48 A total o f 27 countries contributed troops to Operation Enduring Freedom. See The White House 
(2002).
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commitments and the EU soon became apparent, as individual leaders offered 
national contributions to the US war effort, eclipsing not only the country holding the 
EU Presidency, Belgium, but other member states as well. This was true in 
particular for Britain and France. Tony Blair earned some resentment for his active 
cooperation with the US as well as his calling of a strategy meeting in London 
between Britain, France and Germany. Jacques Chirac was also criticized for calling 
a tri-lateral meeting prior to the EU summit at Ghent to discuss the national 
contributions to the war in Afghanistan.
Military operations against the Taliban under Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) began on 7 October 2001,49 While the UK contributed significant numbers of 
forces to OEF, the US made token use of French contributions - to the consternation 
of Paris (Lansford, 2002).50 Germany’s contributions to OEF were the smallest of the 
three countries, although Berlin provided a large contingent of troops to ISAF.51 UK 
Forces participated in OEF from the start through Operation Veritas, which had as its 
goal the capture of Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, the prevention of 
further attacks by al Qaeda, the end of Afghanistan's harbouring of terrorists, their 
training camps and infrastructure, and the removal of Mullah Omar and the Taliban 
Regime (BBC News, 16 April 2002). In contrast, France had 2,000 military 
personnel in the region as of early November 2001. In addition to the support for the 
ground operations in Afghanistan, France took part in the maritime patrol. A French 
task force composed of soldiers from the 21st Marine Infantry Regiment was
49 The legal basis for the operation was Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognises ‘the inherent 
right o f individual or collective self-defence’ and requires states to report such actions immediately 
(United Nations, 1945).
50 At the same time, French contributions to OEF are in fact considerably more substantial than 
commonly acknowledged: for instance, France played a major role in the air campaign, and was the 
only country to deliver air strikes alongside the US (Interview with UK academic, 17 June 2005).
51 The exact nature -and number- o f German contributions to OEF was also not well publicised as 
contributions included Special Forces. But, Germany’s participation in OEF and ISAF was significant 
because it marked another step in the ‘normalisation’ of German foreign policy with respect to the end 
of its aversion to the use o f force after the country’s defeat in World War II.
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deployed on November 17, 2001 to survey the modalities of operations aimed at 
repairing the airfield at Mazar-e Sharif (US Department of Defence, 14 June 2002). 
Germany began participating in OEF on 27 November 2001 by dispatching three 
Transall transport aircraft in order to assist the US Air Force in its operations in 
Afghanistan. A few days later reconnaissance commandos flew to Bahrain to prepare 
for naval deployment. In addition, up to 100 troops from the Special Commando 
Forces (KSK), a unit specialized in covert operations, made short-term missions in 
Afghanistan (US Department of Defence, 14 June 2002). There were also plans for 
future co-operation with the German navy that included the allocation of areas of 
deployment of the US, French and German navies to patrol waters between the 
Arabian Peninsula and the east African coast. With regard to OEF, the individual 
national contributions were regarded as expressions of solidarity with the US and 
contributions to the war on terror. Although these contributions were not contentious 
in terms of EU unity or decision-making, the closed meetings between the UK, 
France and Germany ahead of the Ghent summit in November 2001 to coordinate 
military contributions to the war on terror raised concerns over a directorate in EU 
decision-making and appeared to further damage EU unity. With respect to this 
particular policy area, then, alliance politics considerations appear to have 
overwhelmingly dictated policy responses -  even in countries that had historically 
either not appeared as being particularly close to the US, or had distinct political 
cultures with respect to the use of force.
c. Policy area 2: the reconstruction o f Afghanistan
The UN assumed a central role in the reconstruction and the creation of an interim 
government in Afghanistan. In December 2001, at the Bonn Conference on the future
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of Afghanistan, Afghan factions, assisted by the UN, agreed on a transitional process 
leading to elections for a ‘broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully 
representative government’ (United Nations, 7 December 2001).52 The Afghan 
Interim Authority (AIA) under the leadership of Hamid Karzai was established for a 
six-month period. An Emergency Loya Jirga met in June 2002 and elected Karzai as 
the Chief of State and Chairman of the Afghan Transitional Authority, which 
governed the country until elections could be held. After a nationwide Loya Jirga in
2002, Karzai was elected President.
As for the EU Council, and reflecting EU/EC Cooperation objectives, the 
2001 and 2002 General Affairs Councils (GAC)53 agreed to the following overall 
objectives for the EU/EC in Afghanistan: to promote the Bonn Agreement; restore 
stability to the country; provide support for civil, social and military structures; 
promote democracy and human rights; give special attention to the inclusion of 
women; reinforce the fight against illegal drugs and terrorism; and promote 
cooperation with neighbouring countries. The EU played an important role in post- 
conflict reconstruction and the release of economic aid. Since the fall of the Taliban 
the Commission has set its support in the context of the provisions made in the 2001 
Bonn Agreement. At the Tokyo Conference in January 2002 the EC pledged about € 
1 billion over five years. About € 207 million were spent in 2002 on recovery and 
reconstruction, plus €73 million from ECHO. €400 million were earmarked for 
2003-04, with continuing humanitarian assistance from ECHO, up to €55 million in
2003. The first year in particular, given the huge scale of the reconstruction task 
faced by the country, the need for strong political commitment and leadership lead to
52 Commonly referred to as the Bonn Agreement, The Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in 
Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions was endorsed 
by the United Nations Security Council on 7 December 2001.
53 See European Commission, The EU’s relations with Afghanistan, General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC), http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal_relations/afghanistan/intro/gac.htm
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the creation of the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group (with the co-chairs US, 
EU, Japan and Saudi Arabia) to provide strategic direction.
The Commission made effective use of its conflict prevention instrument, by 
drawing €4.93 million from the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) for use in 
Afghanistan following the Bonn Conference in 2001 in order to help legitimize the 
political transition; and the EC also moved swiftly to open a representative office in 
Kabul in February 2002 (International Crisis Group, 2005). The ministers also 
supported the work by the Commission to set up a strategy to rebuild Afghanistan. 
The EU co-chaired the first meeting of the steering group to support political renewal 
in Afghanistan and better coordinate donors’ efforts with a view to the ministerial 
conference scheduled for January 2002 in Tokyo. This shows that the Commission in 
particular was very active.
With respect to the political aspects of the reconstruction of Afghanistan, on 
Germany’s suggestion EU foreign ministers agreed in their meeting in Brussels on to 
appoint a special envoy for Afghanistan to co-ordinate humanitarian aid and the 
political efforts to contribute to rebuilding the country (CNN.com, 19 November
2001). Klaus-Peter Klaiber, former assistant secretary-general of NATO was 
appointed EU Special Representative at the 10 December 2001 foreign minister 
meeting. His initial mandate was due to expire on June 10, but was extended to June 
30 at the Council Meeting on 27 May 2002 (Council of the European Union, 27 May
2002). The foreign ministers also welcomed the signing of the inter-Afghan 
agreement signed in Bonn on 5 December, stated that they were prepared to consider 
a contribution by the EU member states in furtherance of UNSC Resolutions, 
including the establishment of an international security force. The EU also re­
emphasized its commitment to play a key role in the international effort to rebuild the
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Afghan society and economy. Klaiber’s appointment was also to ‘help the EU speak 
with one voice again’, despite the shift to bilateralism in the wake of September 11 
(Financial Times, 15 December 2001; see also Klaiber, 2002).
Klaiber proved pivotal in coordinating efforts of the member states and that 
supplied by the EU through meetings, for example, with French Foreign Minister 
Vedrine on 7 January 2002 to discuss reconstruction. He also often spoke on behalf 
of ISAF, for instance he suggested that it might be necessary to broaden the mandated 
area of ISAF to include areas outside Kabul (Agence France Press, 10 January 2002), 
and lobbying among several EU capitals for an extension of the ISAF mandate 
beyond June 2002 and in an extended geographic focus, in light of the reluctance on 
the part of most European countries to commit to a longer-term operation in 
Afghanistan. Klaiber stated that the EU should follow through politically, not just 
limit itself to its financial contributions. Klaiber also travelled and dealt with 
neighbouring countries, visiting Pakistan in April to meet with senior Pakistani 
ministers and officials to assess the post-Taliban situation and its impact on the 
Afghan refugees living there. Klaiber stated that Pakistan’s role was crucial for the 
future of Afghanistan, and also distanced himself from US statements that Iran was 
working to destabilize Afghanistan. He also expressed reservations about President 
Karzai, who travelled too much rather than concentrating on the work in the country 
itself. In contrast to the case of FYROM, Solana’s role in Afghanistan was not as 
pronounced (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006), although he 
did visit Kabul at the end of May 2002 to consult local leaders before the opening of 
Afghanistan’s emergency loya jirga, as the EU ministers had agreed on 15 April at 
the meeting in Luxembourg. Francesc Vendrell, a 62-year old Spanish diplomat who 
had served as the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s special representative for
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Afghanistan from February 2000 to the beginning of 2002, was subsequently 
appointed EUSR after the expiration of Klaiber’s mandate.
With respect to the political and economic aspects of Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction, then, evidence of Europeanization among at least one of the three EU 
member states analyzed in this thesis appears to be pronounced as Germany pushed 
for the appointment of an EUSR. With respect to the three member states analyzed in 
this thesis, potential motivations include policy adaptation, policy projection as well 
as identity formation, although the different priorities among the three countries 
suggest differences with respect to individual motivating forces.
d. Policy area 3: ISAF and its institutional anchoring
Like OEF, ISAF, the peacekeeping force assembled under the framework of UNSC
Resolution 1378 and Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN’s Secretary General’s Special
Representative, is a coalition of the willing that until very recently excluded US
forces.54 ISAF works closely with the United Nations and the Afghan interim
government and has three principal tasks: to aid the interim government in
developing national security structures; to assist the country's reconstruction; and to
assist in developing and training future Afghan security forces. Rules of engagement
were to be closely linked to the terms of the military-technical agreement between the
British commander, Maj. Gen. John McColl, and the interim government in
Afghanistan on 31 December 2001. Under the agreement, the ISAF has ‘complete
and unimpeded freedom of movement throughout the territory and airspace of
Afghanistan’ (UK Ministry of Defence, 2001). Apart from the UK, a number of
countries were expected to become lead nations of ISAF, including France and
54 12,000 US troops came under the command o f NATO-ISAF on 5 October 2006, although 8,000 
more troops remain under US command to train the Afghan National Army and to hunt Taliban 
leaders and Al-Qaida members (BBC News, 5 October 2006).
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Germany.55 While the UK made a significant contribution to ISAF as the first lead 
nation, Germany made a substantive commitment to Afghanistan with 3900 troops, 
which marked another major step in the country’s willingness to send troops abroad 
in peace keeping operations.
With respect to ISAF, several issues in particular proved contentious: the 
geographic extension of the mandate beyond Kabul, the temporal extension of the 
mandate altogether, and the strengthening of numbers. There was also a debate over 
US command over ISAF, and the mixing of the peacekeeping and counter-terrorism 
operations. While Britain was in principle in favour of a single US command for both 
OEF and ISAF, Germany rejected this idea partly out concern over attaining domestic 
consent for the sending of Bundeswehr troops to an offensive military operation. 
Difference in command structure of the coalition forces limited the role of Paris as 
well: Chirac insisted on a multilateral command structure for ISAF, but found itself 
sidelined by the US. Although the nature of the military mission was and remains 
peace enforcement, the problem o f ‘warlordism’56 and weak security structures made 
a constant political international presence on the regional level necessary - the 
question was under which institutional framework.
Discussions of assembling a multinational peacekeeping force had progressed 
by the time the EU heads of state met in Laeken. Disagreement broke out at the EU 
Summit when Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel in a press conference on 14 
December 2001 termed the contributions to ISAF of the individual EU member states
55 Importantly, the list o f potential lead nations also included Turkey. The inclusion o f a Muslim 
country in ISAF was to signal legitimacy for the reconstruction of Afghanistan beyond the West 
(Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005).
56 After the fall o f the Taliban a number o f local military commanders, often referred to as 'warlords', 
were brought into government. There are still large areas of the country where the Afghan government 
depends on the support, or at least the sufferance, o f local commanders, and this compromises the 
legitimacy and the power o f the central government under President Karzai (House o f Commons, 29 
July 2004).
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as an EU force, prompting speculation by the media that an ‘EU army’ was to be sent 
to Afghanistan. Member states, Britain at the forefront, stated that ‘there was no 
question of the EU being able to deploy a defence force it doesn’t have in 
Afghanistan’ (Financial Times, 15 December 2001). This seems to affirm the lack of 
Europeanization considerations in the case of ISAF as well, with alliance politics 
considerations paramount.
On 14 December, at the EU Council in Laeken, EU leaders agreed that 
member states would take part in ISAF, even if the EU was not putting together its 
own force for Afghanistan. While Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel welcomed 
this step as being ‘of capital importance for European security and defence policy’ 
and ‘an extremely significant precedent’, British foreign minister Jack Straw stressed 
that the EU states were still examining what forces they could offer to the 
international force. Solana, meanwhile, stated that ISAF would face ‘a task more 
difficult than other peacekeeping missions in the past’ (BBC News, 14 December 
2001). The Presidency Conclusions on the European Council meeting in Laeken 
stated that ‘the participation of the Member States of the Union in that international 
force will provide a strong signal of their resolve to better assume their crisis- 
management responsibilities and hence help stabilise Afghanistan’ (Council of the 
European Union, 14/15 December 2001).
Initially at least, NATO did not play a role in OEF and ISAF, suggesting that 
the US after the events of 11 September viewed NATO as a political forum rather 
than a military alliance: the US called on individual nations, not on NATO, for 
support against the war against the Taliban. Given the invocation of Article 5, NATO 
involvement was first raised in November 2001, but blocked by several NATO 
countries, including France, and later the UN. Germany, on the other hand, was in
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favour of NATO assuming ISAF command whereas France was not eager to see a 
‘NATO flag in Kabul’ (NATO Notes, 19 December, 2002). This points towards 
difference with respect to the role of NATO among member states and towards the 
explanatory potential of the alliance politics approach for policy decision taken by at 
least one member state (France). On 16 April 2003 the North Atlantic Council 
decided to approve the deployment of NATO troops to Afghanistan to work under the 
ISAF mandate and on 11 August 2003, NATO assumed the lead of the International 
Security Assistance Force in a Transfer of Authority Ceremony in Kabul, 
Afghanistan (NATO Notes, October 2003). The analytical question posed by this 
policy area, then, is why some member states pushed for NATO to assume military 
command of ISAF in a case where the US had initially conceived of ISAF as a 
coalition of the willing rather than a NATO force57, and where at least one member 
state -France- was not keen on placing ISAF under NATO command. What kind of 
alliance politics considerations were most relevant here?
e. Conclusion: questions raised by this case
To summarize, the analytical questions raised by the war in Afghanistan include 
motivations for national contributions to OEF and the war on terror. This also 
includes initiatives to fight terrorism on the EU level, including CFSP/ESDP 
instruments -  although this is not the focus of this thesis. They also encompass 
national considerations on the institutional anchoring of ISAF, particularly why 
NATO was chosen in the absence of a clear US preference to use the institution. 
Lastly, the political and economic aspects in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, 
including the appointment of a EUSR and significant financial contributions on the
57 However, US officials reportedly later admitted ‘that they missed an opportunity to use NATO more 
actively’ in the fight against the Taliban (International Herald Tribute 27 November 2002).
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part of the European Commission suggest considerations that would support the 
Europeanization hypothesis. What appeared a clear case of transatlantic solidarity and 
alliance politics, therefore, exhibits evidence of Europeanization in questions with 
respect to the political aspects of Afghanistan’s reconstruction. This justifies the 
inclusion of the case of Afghanistan in this thesis.
IV. Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to provide background information on the two crises 
and to identify key policy areas around which the individual country chapters will be 
structured. With respect to the crisis in FYROM, they are EU involvement in the 
negotiations leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement; the launch of the NATO 
operations to aid its implementation; and the politics of an eventual take-over of the 
NATO mission. Whereas the first policy area highlights the important role of SG/HR 
Javier Solana in the negotiations and raises questions as to individual member states 
preferences towards the role of the EU CFSP in the crisis and the nature of the 
Europeanization of national foreign policy, the second policy area highlights that 
while a NATO operation was uncontested in principle, analyzing the nature of the 
preference for NATO and alliance politics on the part of the member states is of 
interest for member states preferences with respect to the third policy area: the 
handover from NATO to ESDP. Here, one of the three member states -France- 
initiated and pushed for an early handover, whereas the other two countries analyzed 
in this thesis took a more conservative stance, insisting on the conclusion of the 
Berlin Plus agreement prior to the take-over. It is here that Europeanization and 
alliance politics considerations appear to be most in conflict. With respect to 
Afghanistan, on the other hand, the three policy areas include member states military 
commitments to OEF and reactions to the war on terror; the construction of ISAF
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including its institutional anchoring; and political and economic measures taken in 
the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, the first two highlight alliance 
politics considerations more than Europeanization, but do so in the case of one 
member state (France) that is commonly perceived as having a rather difficult 
relationship with the US. EU and member state activities do, however, point towards 
Europeanization with respect to the political and economic aspects in the war in 
Afghanistan. What at first glance may appear as a clear-cut case of alliance politics, 
then, includes decisions that point towards Europeanization as well. The chapters that 
follow will analyze the member states decisions and preferences in more detail and 
draw conclusions on the validity of the alliance politics and Europeanization model 
for explaining policy decisions. As mentioned in the two previous chapters, they will 
do so against the backdrop of a governmental politics approach, which will highlight 
the internal divisions and the domestic decision-making process.
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Chapter 4. Germany and the crisis in FYROM
I. Introduction
This chapter analyzes German foreign policy decisions with respect to the application 
of EU CFSP and ESDP instruments in the crisis in FYROM. German foreign policy 
makers favoured the EU CFSP as a key platform in the political process leading to 
the resolution of the conflict. As far as the first policy area is concerned, therefore, 
empirical evidence supports the Europeanization hypothesis in particular with respect 
to the high salience of the European agenda and the adherence to common policy 
objectives in the political solution to the crisis. However, the emphasis placed on the 
Contact Group also indicates that Germany retained national influence in the 
negotiations. With respect to military operations Germany had a clear preference for 
NATO. This was both because the EU ESDP was not considered ready to carry out a 
mission in terms of its institutional development, and because utilizing the NATO 
framework ensured the continued participation of the US. US involvement was 
considered vital by German policy makers in particular to regain and maintain 
stability in the country as well as the broader region. Broader considerations 
concerning transatlantic relations were also important factors as Germany wanted to 
reassure that the US would support an eventual ESDP mission and that this would not 
prove detrimental to EU-US relations. The alliance politics approach, therefore, 
explains the decision to participate in the NATO operation and the rejection of an 
early ESDP take-over of the NATO mission. However, the evolution of and 
possibility for Germany to shape EU CFSP and ESDP instruments were frequently 
used in domestic debates as a justification for seeking support for German 
participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest. This suggests a generally high 
salience of the European agenda as far as the EU CFSP or ESDP are concerned.
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With respect to Germany’s military participation in the NATO as well as the ESDP 
missions, domestic considerations are an important factor for understanding policy 
decisions, in particular Schroder’s goal for Germany to assume increasing 
responsibility in the military realm and to become a more credible and influential 
player. This goal had to be weighed against domestic opposition based on the 
aversion to the use of force, reflecting unease among the members of parliament 
about Schroder’s military commitments. German post-war foreign policy had been 
conducted through multilateral institutions (Garton Ash 1993; Bulmer and Paterson, 
1996; Katzenstein, 1997) and the EU, including the EU CFSP, continues to represent 
a potential vehicle to increase German influence in foreign and security policy. The 
analysis presented in this chapter will demonstrate that the emphasis on 
multilateralism, specifically with respect to Europe’s capacity to act, was indeed an 
important argument on the part of the government to obtain support for participation 
in the NATO Operation Essential Harvest. Lastly, while there is ample evidence of 
Europeanization expressed as high salience of the EU CFSP in German foreign 
policy at least in the negotiation phase, there is little evidence of a compromise of 
national preferences that would have pushed for the application of ESDP instruments.
II. Policy area 1: Support for the EU CFSP in the political negotiations
German policy towards FYROM after the country declared independence in 1991 
centred on conflict prevention and was mainly conducted through multilateral 
channels, particularly the UN, OSCE and the EU. This also included bilateral 
relations and cooperation in support of these multilateral efforts to stabilise the 
Balkans such as meetings and visits between high ranking German officials and their
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Macedonian counterparts. Germany was sensitive to the crisis not just on account 
of previous experiences in the Balkans and the failure on the part of the EU to act, but 
also as the danger of wider regional destabilization would have meant a threat of 
refugee flows and instability close to Germany’s borders. The conflict in FYROM 
also threatened to undermine the broader regional framework that had been put in 
place after the end of the conflict in Kosovo in no small part due to a German policy 
initiative during its EU Presidency in the second half of 1999: a comprehensive 
regional framework anchored in the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe that 
aimed at the reconstruction of the individual countries in the region coupled with the 
perspective of integration and eventual EU membership (Calic, 2000). There was, 
therefore, a considerable sense of urgency for German policy makers based on the 
likely detrimental domestic ramifications mentioned above (Interview with German 
official, 1 September 2005). The EU was already an important platform for the 
political and economic process of regional post-conflict reconstruction, and given the 
goal of eventual integration of the countries of the Western Balkans in the EU 
together with the goal for a greater role for the EU as a regional political actor, the 
EU CFSP was a natural institutional venue for resolving the crisis from the 
perspective of German policy makers. For these reasons, success for the EU CFSP in 
resolving the crisis in FYROM was of high salience.
The key participants with respect to this particular policy area included 
officials in the foreign ministry as well as elected officials, primarily Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer, but also Chancellor Schroder. In the Federal Foreign Office 
(Auswartiges Amt), the key participants in the decisions made during the crisis in
58 For example, Secretary o f State Ischinger and Minister o f State ZCpel visited FYROM on 21 March 
and 31 October 2001, respectively, whereas Foreign Minister Fischer met with Prime Minster 
Georgievski and Foreign Minister Kerim on 11 January 2001 (Auswartiges Amt 21 March 2000; 31 
October 2000; 11 January 2001)
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FYROM, both as they concern the role of the EU CFSP/ESDP as well as the specific 
policies taken towards the crisis in FYROM, involved the political department 
(Politische Abteilung 2), and the relevant sub-department, the Balkan department. 
Whereas elected officials supported the application of instruments located in the EU 
CFSP/ESDP, the Federal Foreign Office emphasized restoring stability over the 
application of new instruments. This shows that although the use of EU CFSP 
instruments in the negotiation of the crisis was supported and deemed important on 
account of the symbolism for the evolution of the EU as a political actor, this position 
was not equally shared among all participants in the governmental process. The elite 
press and think tanks played a negligible role in the agenda setting and decision­
making in this case.59
During the negotiating phase with the Macedonian government, Germany 
supported international efforts, particularly those of the EU, to contain the conflict. 
Berlin also conducted its diplomatic efforts through various channels. After Javier 
Solana had been given a mandate to conduct the political negotiations, member state 
officials, such as the political directors of the foreign ministries including the Federal 
Foreign Office, had little impact on the outcomes of the negotiating processes within 
the EU CFSP (Interview with German official 30 August 2005), although officials 
conducted bilateral meetings, or multilateral negotiations and discussions within the 
framework of the Contact Group (Interview with German official, 21 November 
2005). Policy makers, particularly those in the Federal Foreign Office, regarded the 
Contact Group as an important platform as US involvement was deemed crucial in 
resolving the conflict, and considered it an effective platform to influence broader
59 Unlike, for instance, in the case o f the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 (see Maull, 1995)
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policy responses to the crisis among the major powers involved (Interview with 
German official, 21 November 2005).
Europeanization
The analysis of decisions taken with respect to the political negotiations of the crisis 
as well as press statements, interviews and the parliamentary debates show 
considerable evidence of Europeanization. The EU CFSP was regarded as an 
appropriate institution to resolve the crisis, and the application of CFSP instruments 
was deemed important. This supports the first conception of Europeanization of 
policy adaptation as German support for Javier Solana and EU Special Representative 
F rancis Leotard in the negotiation of the crisis accommodated the progress of the 
EU CFSP. The salience of the EU CFSP agenda is reflected in the German 
government’s decision to agree to their mandates as well as German support for the 
political negotiations. Statements in the press and Bundestag debates also support this 
argument.
There is also some evidence of Germany conflating national with European 
preferences in this case, and of policy elites favouring the application of EU CFSP 
instruments. This supports the third conception of Europeanization, that of changing 
or emerging policy preferences. The application of CFSP and eventually also ESDP 
instruments was an important consideration in the decision-making in this case, as 
statements in the Bundestag demonstrate. However, not all indicators of 
Europeanization are reflected in German policy actions or domestic debates: for 
instance, there is little evidence of Germany compromising national preferences to 
accommodate the use of CFSP instruments. The same is true of evidence of German
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policy makers using the EU CFSP as a cover to pursue national interests, or of 
increasing Berlin’s international clout.
The fact that the EU CFSP was one of the key institutional frameworks 
employed in the solution of the crisis60, and that Germany supported Javier Solana’s 
role, indicates the salience of the application of CFSP instruments for EU member 
states, including Germany. Schroder and Fischer both publicly supported EU unity 
and a leading role for the EU CFSP and Solana in the political negotiation of the 
conflict. Support for the EU CFSP in political negotiations, and for the 
comprehensive concept instituted in the Western Balkans since 1999 also crossed 
party lines. Foreign Minister Fischer made several statements to this effect in the 
press, and his frequent visits to the region and meetings with Macedonian officials 
served to underline Germany’s support for the EU CFSP negotiating positions and 
the European agenda more generally, rather than separate German interests 
(Auswartiges Amt, 11 March 2001; 4 May 2001; 24 May 2001; 7 June 2001). In his 
address to the government on the situation in FYROM on 6 July, Fischer emphasized 
the necessity for a political solution to the crisis, and the chance for EU Special 
Representative Leotard to shape these negotiations. He stressed the necessity of a 
comprehensive regional perspective for the Western Balkans (Deutscher Bundestag, 
6 July 2001, 18065D).
While the initiative for the EU CFSP’s role in the political negotiations effort 
did not originate in Berlin but was essentially the result of a proactive approach by 
High Representative Javier Solana (Interview with German official, 21 November 
2005), Germany did consider the EU CFSP as the appropriate political institution for 
solving the conflict. In particular, it was clear for Germany that the crisis in FYROM
60 This refers to NATO and the EU -  and the Contact Group, which was an important platform for 
negotiations, even if it does not constitute a formal institution.
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was a symbolic occasion for the EU CFSP to show that it now possessed the 
necessary instruments to act -  other than in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, where 
European efforts had failed previously (Interview with German official, 30 August 
2005). And, although the timing of the application of ESDP instruments was delayed 
on account of security concerns on the ground as well as broader policy 
considerations of the effect on transatlantic relations, the successful application of 
CFSP instruments was of high salience for German foreign policy in the crisis in 
FYROM.
Statements made in the Bundestag support the above argument, and 
demonstrate that elites favoured the application of CFSP instruments. In addition to 
the salience of the European agenda, then, evidence of Europeanization also points 
towards the existence of norms and preferences that favoured the application of EU 
instruments This is reflected in public statements by members of the German 
parliament, which suggest a broad domestic consensus on the goal of a successful 
role for the EU CFSP in the negotiation efforts. In the debate surrounding German 
participation in Essential Harvest on August 29, Fischer explicitly stated that the 
main weight in the resolution of the crisis was with the Europeans, and was ‘about a 
new role for Europe in the developing common foreign and security policy’ (Fischer, 
Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001,18179C). This suggests high salience of the 
European agenda for the government; importantly, other members of the Bundestag 
concurred with this basic assessment. Speaking for the Christian Democrats (CDU), 
Friedrich Merz stated that ‘it is undoubtedly valuable that NATO and the EU for the 
first time have jointly developed and realized a political concept for the negotiations’ 
(Merz, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18204D). Wolfgang Gerhardt, 
speaking for the Free Democrats (FDP), stressed ‘Germany’s responsibility in
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shaping Europe’s security’ (Gerhardt, Deutscher Bundestag, 6 July 2001, 18071C) 
and emphasized that the significance of the negotiations leading to the Ohrid 
Agreement was that ‘for the first time a European component had been placed along 
the US component in the negotiations’ and that this was ‘beneficial for European self 
confidence’ (Gerhardt, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18184 B). This 
demonstrates that the salience of the European agenda cut across party lines. With 
the exception of the former socialist party PDS, who argued for the UN and OSCE as 
the appropriate institutional framework for the solution of the crisis (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 6 July 2001, 18075 A), statements made in the Bundestag support the 
conclusion that the application of CFSP instruments in the negotiations leading to the 
Ohrid Agreements were considered appropriate and of high importance for the 
development of the EU CFSP.
Evidence of Europeanization also extends to the equation of European and 
national preferences: both were conflated in the sense that a strong Europe in the 
Balkans was in Germany’s interest, and that national policy objectives were shared 
with those of the EU CFSP. Both Fischer and Schroder framed the crisis in FYROM 
and future of the region as ‘central to European and therefore also German security’ 
(Fischer, Deutscher Bundestag, 6 July 2001, 18065D; Schroder, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 29 August 2001,1820 ID), and members of the ruling coalition termed it 
‘a test case for the emerging EU CFSP’ (Erler, Deutscher Bundestag, 6 July 2001, 
18069 D). Significantly, one member of the Bundestag stated that the use of the 
CFSP ‘had been a goal for Germany in particularly with regards to the Balkans’ 
(Sterzing, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18207A).
With respect to the second conception of Europeanization, that of national 
projection, there is little evidence of Germany attempting to increase national
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influence through the EU CFSP platform. Given that member states’ influence 
decreased after Javier Solana had been given a mandate to conduct the political 
negotiations (Interview with German official 30 August 2005), the EU CFSP was not 
used as a means to project particular national preferences on to the European agenda 
in this case. If anything, national influence on EU policies decreased on account of 
the consolidation of the political negotiation under Javier Solana.
Although a prominent role for the EU CFSP in FYROM was considered to be 
in the interest of Germany, this did not mean that Germany reneged on influencing 
the political negotiations. The Contact Group represented an important venue where 
Germany could more directly influence and shape the agenda. As Germany did play 
a significant part in the diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis through the Contact 
Group there was little national influence to project through the EU CFSP in this 
particular case. This also reflected the preferences of the Federal Foreign Office, 
which did not define its policy priority as pushing or initiating the application of new 
institutional instruments located in the EU CFSP. Instead, the Federal Foreign Office 
emphasized ensuring regional stability and a speedy resolution to the conflict that 
would involve all major international partners, in particular the US (Interview with 
German official, 21 November 2005). Indeed, rather than the EU CFSP, the Federal 
Foreign Office regarded the Contact Group as an important venue for Germany to 
discuss the crisis precisely because it did serve the purpose to keep the US involved 
in Balkan politics and did provide a forum for negotiation among the major powers 
(Interview with German official, 21 November 2005).
While the growing role of the CFSP as well as the need for the EU to make up 
for past failings in the region was acknowledged (Interview with German official, 8 
August 2005), the priority on the part of the Federal Foreign Office was to respond to
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the conflict in a way that would contain the spread of violence, see the conflict to a 
speedy and peaceful resolution, and involve the US as one of the vital participants in 
the peace process and its implementation. The overall approach to the negotiations, 
therefore, was cautious. In this sense, the EU CFSP represented one, but not the only 
and not the most important, forum for the political negotiations in the minds of 
individual officials. And, because Germany participated in the negotiations in the 
framework of the Contact Group, it could retain influence on the overall negotiations 
of this particular crisis.
The use of the Contact Group as a forum to conduct negotiations has some 
implications for the validity of the Europeanization hypothesis. It shows that the EU 
CFSP did not have an exclusive mandate to negotiate on behalf of Germany, even if 
German foreign policy in this case shows evidence of Europeanization as it 
accommodated the developments of instruments located in the EU CFSP. In fact, 
several officials interviewed on the institutional actors in the resolution of the conflict 
used the analogy of juggling when explaining the different actors in the political 
negotiations and the difficulty of substituting one element (NATO) with another (EU 
CFSP but especially ESDP): removing one element from the negotiations at the 
expense of another would have led to the collapse of the entire construction 
(Interview with German officials, 8 August 2005; 20 October 2005). Applied to this 
policy area, this explains the use of both the Contact Group as well as the EU CFSP -  
and NATO- as platforms for negotiation.61 To be sure, the two policy objectives, of 
giving an increasing profile to the EU CFSP and retaining national influence in the 
Contact Group forum, were not in direct conflict with one another in this case. The 
role of the EU CFSP was strengthened at the same time that Germany retained
61 And, applied to the third policy area, the analogy cited helps to explain German hesitations over an 
earlier takeover o f ESDP from NATO
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influence on the international negotiations with respect to FYROM. Still, Berlin’s 
emphasis on national influence on the outcome of the negotiations, but also on the 
involvement of the US but also of NATO suggest support for the alliance politics 
hypothesis. The reluctance on the part of the Foreign Office for the EU CFSP to 
assume the main responsibility in the negotiation of the conflict also weakens the 
Europeanization hypothesis.
Alliance Politics
Indeed, although it has been shown that there is strong evidence of Europeanization 
in this policy area, NATO and US involvement were deemed crucial components for 
a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The political negotiations not just of Javier Solana 
and Stefan Lehne, but also of George Robertson and Pieter Feith on behalf of NATO 
had the full support of the federal government. This supports several indicators of 
alliance politics. First, preference was given to NATO and US involvement for 
utilitarian reasons as both had been involved in the region throughout the 1990s, and 
were the preferred option for the host country. NATO enjoyed more trust on the part 
of FYROM than the EU CFSP on account of previous failures on the part of the EU 
in the Balkans (Interview with German official 21 November 2005). The cautious 
attitude adopted by the Federal Foreign Office on the introduction of new 
institutional actors in the region cited in the previous section also shows that the 
preference for NATO and US involvement extended to other branches of the German 
government and included not just NATO but also US national influence through the 
Contact Group as well as a US negotiator.
A second indicator of alliance politics, that of transatlantic preferences, is also 
supported by the empirical evidence. For its part, the US equally insisted on
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maintaining influence in the negotiations in FYROM, and thus in European security 
more generally. This is demonstrated by the fact that the US appointed a negotiator 
for FYROM, James Pardew, three days after the appointment of F rancis Leotard 
(Interview with French official, 8 September 2005). On the part of Germany, US 
involvement was not contested by members of the polity -  on the contrary: in 
parliamentary debates a member of the Green party stated the US had gotten 
increasingly engaged in FYROM and acknowledged that US engagement had 
strengthened the political and diplomatic efforts on the part of the EU (Lippelt, 
Deutscher Bundestag, 6 July 2001, 18074B). The German government also 
considered NATO a crucial part of the Ohrid peace agreement in Macedonia and 
therefore as a primary forum for the resolution of the crisis (Struck, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 29 August 2001,18191 D). Given that NATO and the EU CFSP worked 
alongside one another, there was no perceived conflict of interest between the two 
institutions, as the statement by the Christian Democrats in the Bundestag on the 
value of NATO and EU cooperation in the crisis demonstrates (Merz, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18204D).
The analysis of the first policy area has shown that responses to the crisis in 
FYROM were marked by support for the emerging EU CFSP, as well as the 
involvement of the US and NATO in the political negotiations. It has also shown that 
although there is significant evidence of Europeanization -  the CFSP agenda was of 
high salience, national elites favoured the application of CFSP instruments, and there 
was evidence of shared definitions of national and European interests -  NATO and 
the US ‘anchored’ the negotiation efforts of the EU. This in turn supports for the 
alliance politics framework. As the analysis of the next policy area demonstrates,
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NATO’s political involvement in the crisis was also important to Germany with a 
view to its later military involvement in the peacekeeping force.
III. Policy area 2: Participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest
With respect to the second policy area, Germany’s position in the European and 
transatlantic security structures was significant particularly with respect to the use of 
military force. Despite the weakening of the taboo against the use of military force 
since the end of the Cold War, in the eyes of NATO allies Germany still had to prove 
itself a reliable partner in NATO even after the first substantial military deployment 
since the end of World War II during the crisis in Kosovo (Maull, 2000; Grund, 
2003). For his part, Chancellor Schroder pushed for an increasing profile for 
Germany in NATO to demonstrate that Germany was no longer bound by its past. 
Although this becomes even more evident in the German response to the war in 
Afghanistan analyzed in chapter 5, considerations with respect to German 
participation in the NATO Operations Essential Harvest and Amber Fox reflect a 
similar goal on the part of the Chancellor. Apart from Chancellor Schroder, the 
elected decision-makers involved in this policy area included Foreign Minister 
Fischer, Defence Minister Scharping and members of the Bundestag who voted on 
the deployment of troops. Although contested in the Bundestag, compared to the 
conflict in Kosovo participation in the NATO Operation Essential Harvest but also 
the follow-up operation was also less of an issue in the press on account of the size of 
the mission and the less alarmist scenario, but also because the events of September 
11 and their aftermath soon came to occupy the press and analysts alike (Grund, 
2003: 114).
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The US, while expecting the Europeans to take the lead in the solution of the 
crisis, preferred the use of NATO for the peacekeeping operation.62 US preferences 
and a fundamentally transatlanticist orientation in German foreign policy (Fischer, 
2001) constituted important factors in German decision-making in this case. This 
supports the conclusion that with respect to this policy area, alliance politics 
considerations took precedence over considerations of Europeanization. However, in 
press statements and domestic debates, international responsibility and solidarity with 
NATO allies was often portrayed as the necessary precondition for Europe to act. 
This points towards some evidence of Europeanization alongside alliance politics 
considerations, in particular with regard to the third conceptualization of 
Europeanization: public debates and elite preferences reflect an emerging preference 
formation towards the application of EU CFSP and ESDP instruments. Importantly, 
however, this has to be understood in a specific domestic context where the use of 
force remained contested and where a comprehensive European approach was bound 
to be more attractive and persuasive than military deployment under NATO. Policy 
officials in the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, however, were 
clear on the need for a NATO presence, including German participation in a NATO 
operation, to stabilize FYROM (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005).
Unlike the first policy area, participation in NATO Operation Essential 
Harvest was contested and correspondingly received more public attention. Although 
Germany did not take the lead in initiating a NATO Operation during the multilateral 
negotiations leading to the resolution of the crisis -this was left to the UK and 
France- Berlin did make a commitment to contribute troops to NATO Operation
62 This does not mean, however, that the US naturally consented to a NATO peacekeeping operation 
and the British chair o f the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting at the time faced a challenge in 
persuading the US o f the necessity to militarily intervene in FYROM (Interview with EU official, 11 
September 2006).
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Essential Harvest and to its extensions, Operation Amber Fox and Allied Harmony. 
After the NATO Council had decided on the British-led Operation Essential Harvest 
on 29 June 2001 (NATO, 15 August 2001), the Bundestag agreed to the participation 
of 500 troops after a vote on 29 August 2001 (Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 
2001).
Domestic differences, however, made the question of German military 
contribution to the NATO mission a significant topic of domestic debate. In 
particular, this applied to members of the Bundestag, the German parliament, who 
threatened to vote against a German NATO deployment. Domestic objection to 
military deployment arose out of two separate positions. The long-held taboo against 
the use of force was a source of reservations particularly among members of the 
ruling Red-Green coalition. Members of the Christian Democrats, the leading 
opposition party, on the other hand, argued that insufficient defence budgets and the 
resulting military overstretch of Germany’s armed forces would prevent Germany 
from playing the leadership role in Europe advocated by Chancellor Schroder (Rtihe, 
Deutscher Bundestag, 15 March 2001, 15366C). Chancellor Schroder was 
constrained by allies’ expectations for Germany to provide troops on the one hand 
and by domestic reservations toward German deployments on the other. In a classic 
example of a two-level game (Putnam, 1988), Schroder pushed for Germany to 
assume increasing responsibility in the field of security and defence by pledging 
troops to the NATO Operation in response to allies’ expectations while at the same 
time having to negotiate domestic support; in particular, winning the support not of 
the opposition but his own ruling coalition -  indicating a lack of support from 
Schroder’s own constituency.
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The military operation pushed by Britain and France in the NATO framework 
was eyed with doubts in the beginning because domestic differences over the role of 
military force in German foreign policy and the role Germany should play in any 
NATO Operation in the minds of Germany’s allies threatened to come in direct 
conflict (Die Zeit, 2001). On the one hand, Schroder was under pressure from 
Germany’s allies to consent to a military participation, and on the other hand had to 
face the prospect of the Bundestag voting against a Bundeswehr deployment, leaving 
his government discredited internationally and weakened domestically. The promise 
to participate in the NATO operation was in the first instance delayed but, partly to 
avoid international damage to Germany’s credibility, on 28 June 2001 Schroder 
promised German military participation even if it would be of a ‘robust’ nature (Die 
Zeit, 2001). Schroder’s international commitment to military participation led to 
intense domestic negotiations over German participation in NATO Operation 
Essential Harvest. Schroder informed the Bundestagsfraktion (the section of members 
of the SPD in the Bundestag) about a possible Bundeswehr deployment, arguing that 
the government should act in the framework of the EU and NATO to enable a 
peaceful solution to the conflict on the basis of a peace plan. He also made clear that 
Germany was to participate in a NATO mission based on reasons of solidarity with 
Germany’s partners, and that Germany should not risk damaging its relations with its 
allies out of fears of a parliamentary defeat (Financial Times Deutschland, 28 June 
2001). The conservative opposition consequently accused Germany of lack of 
international leadership on the question of the NATO operation because Berlin had 
missed the chance of taking the lead, possibly as a result of the lack of conviction of 
the military operation and consideration of domestic opposition, notably from within 
the ruling coalition (Die Zeit, 2001).
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The Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung - BmVg) 
took a conservative stance in terms of the number of troops it could provide under the 
current budget, but was in principle in favour of military participation, for similar 
reasoning as the government. Defense Minister Scharping warned that Germany 
could at most commit around 450 soldiers. At the same time the BmVg was in favour 
of a German contribution. The chief of armed forces (Generalinspekteur der 
Bundeswehr) Harald Kujat had claimed in an interview that NATO had decided to 
demand troops from France, the UK, Italy, Greece and support from the US, but not 
from Germany (Financial Times Deutschland, 2 July 2001) -  thereby putting the 
Schroder government under pressure to pledge German troop commitments.63 Apart 
from alliance solidarity, participation in the NATO Operation was also deemed 
important in view of Germany’s potential weight in the emerging ESDP: if Germany 
did not pull its weight in NATO in FYROM, Britain and France would continue to 
dominate. For the government, this created a dilemma between keeping in line with 
the defense budget and keeping Germany’s commitment within NATO and ESDP 
(Financial Times Deutschland, 2 July 2001).
As for the opposition, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) made its consent to 
Essential Harvest contingent on a stable cease-fire but had no objection to the 
mandate in general (Financial Times Deutschland, 16 August 2001). The FDP also 
supported the extension of the NATO mandate (Kinkel, Deutscher Bundestag, 27 
September 2001,18562B) and the fact that Germany assumed the role of lead nation. 
Not so the Christian Democrats (CDU), however: former defence minister Riihe 
linked consent to the increase of the defence budget by at least 500 million 
Deutschmark (€ 250 million) even if other members of the CDU were in favour of the
63 A secondary aim o f the claim made in this interview was, o f course, to lobby for an increase in 
defence spending.
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mandate.64 Riihe’s gamble paid off in so far as the CDU fraction in the Bundestag did 
lift its opposition to the deployment after the government increased the budget for the 
German contingent in FYROM from DM 120 Million to DM 148 Million. This was 
decided after a meeting between Schauble, Ruhe, minister of the chancellery 
(Kanzleramtsminister) Steinmeier, Fischer and Scharping, and after the CDU 
increasingly threatened to isolate itself within the Bundestag, and had received 
significant criticism in the press (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 29 August 2001). The CDU 
also supported the extension of mandate amid renewed accusations that the 
Bundeswehr had been used to capacity (Deutscher Bundestag, 13 December 2001, 
20568 B). The former Communist party (PDS) adopted an anti-military stance and 
rejected both NATO mandates (Deutscher Bundestag, 27 September 2001,18563D).
In order to secure the votes of the Bundestag, the heads of both Foreign and 
Defence ministries as well as the Chancellor submitted an official request (Antrag), 
on which to Bundestag voted on 29 August 2001. As expected, Schroder could not 
rely on his own party to carry the vote: 20 SPD members had written an open letter 
opposing the NATO Operation. When Operation Essential Harvest was voted on, of 
635 votes, 497 voted in favour, 130 against, and 8 abstained (Deutscher Bundestag, 
29 August 2001, 18210 A). This gave the government the mandate it needed, but 
showed that the government’s domestic support was weak.
In contrast, participation in NATO Operation Amber Fox was decided on 27 
September 2001 with 528 of 578 voting yes on the mandate (Deutscher Bundestag,
64 The emphasis on increased defence spending was in continuation o f the CDU’s reasoning that 
‘responsibility-the politically correct synonym for foreign policy engagement-requires the exertion 
of influence and the use o f power’ (Janning, 1996: 38). To be credible, therefore, Germany must 
participate in military operations. However, the context o f European integration is vital for the exercise 
of power and responsibility, and Germany should therefore not act alone but be capable of action 
alongside its partners in the EU or NATO (Rtthe, 1994; Schauble, 1994). Although Schrbder and 
Fischer had come to share this assessment, many members of the ruling coalition had not, revealing a 
normative division within the SPD as well as the Green party first over participation in military action 
over Kosovo and later on in FYROM.
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27 September 2001, 1857 A-D). Given the different nature of the mandate65, even 
some of those members of the Bundestag who had been opposed to Operation 
Essential Harvest could agree to deployment for Operation Amber Fox (Associated 
Press, 27 September 2001). The Bundestag was in broad agreement to send 600 
German soldiers to FYROM for Operation Amber Fox, and the government did 
receive the majority vote overall as well as from its own party (Deutscher Bundestag, 
27 September 2001). For the first time Germany was lead nation in a NATO 
operation together with France, which was going to take the lead after six months. 
Germany also provided the largest contingent of troops. Britain, France and Italy had 
taken the lead in other Balkan operations and, according to Schroder’s foreign policy 
adviser Michael Steiner, it was Germany’s turn -  both in terms of the changed 
circumstances in world politics following 11 September and because of the changed 
political conditions in FYROM that made escalation of the conflict unlikely 
(Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 28 September 2001).
The above analysis has shown that the Chancellor and Foreign Minister 
assigned political priority to the participation in NATO on account of discussions 
with Germany’s allies, and solidarity with European partners in the NATO 
framework. This supports the alliance politics framework. Preserving German weight 
in the emerging ESDP was a secondary but nevertheless important concern. This 
indicates a general preference on the part of the German government for a leadership 
role in Europe, but also inside the emerging European security structures. As the next 
section will demonstrate in more detail, the aim for leadership within Europe and a 
high profile of the EU CFSP and ESDP in public discourse in turn point towards
65 Essential Harvest was a weapons collection mission whereas Amber Fox was to protect EU 
observers in the country.
120
evidence of Europeanization understood as the existence of preferences in favour of 
the EU CFSP and ESDP.
Europeanization
Although this policy area is concerned with the application of NATO rather than 
CFSP or ESDP instruments, military participation in the NATO Operation was 
explicitly linked to the country’s present and future role in and development of, the 
EU security institutions -  CFSP and ESDP. As a result, the public debates over 
participation in NATO demonstrates some evidence of Europeanization with respect 
to the equation of national with European preferences and the rhetorical use of the 
EU as a cover to pursue national policy preferences and to persuade members of the 
government to consent to participation in a military operation. The high profile of 
‘Europe’ and the ‘emerging ESDP’ in the foreign policy discourse suggests evidence 
of the third conception of Europeanization, that of changing preferences.
In the debates in the Bundestag surrounding German participation in 
Operations Essential Harvest and later Amber Fox, members of the SPD stressed the 
comprehensive preventative concept as part of the EU approach (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 15 March 2001,15494D) and the credibility of the still developing CFSP 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001,18069D). Bundnissolidaritat (solidarity with 
the alliance) in NATO, closely linked to Germany’s European responsibilities were 
key words in the Bundestag debate over the mandate to send troops to FYROM as 
part of NATO Operation Essential Harvest. The discussion of a NATO contribution 
was also frequently linked to increasing national influence in the future, also with 
regard to the nascent ESDP. For instance, Fischer argued on 6 July that a refusal to 
participate in the NATO Operation would have negative implications for the 
developing ESDP, particularly at a time where the barriers between NATO and the
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EU were disappearing (Deutscher Bundestag, 6 July 2001,18065D). Evidence that 
EU CFSP was used as a rhetoric device to gain support for German participation in 
the military operation also points towards evidence of Europeanization understood as 
the use of the EU as a cover to pursue national policy preferences in addition to 
adaptational pressures acting on Germany to participate in the NATO Operation for 
solidarity with its allies. This is evident in the linking of the NATO Operation to a 
comprehensive EU conflict prevention strategy towards FYROM. For instance, Peter 
Struck, the leader of the SPD fraction in the Bundestag argued that the NATO 
Operation was an ‘important part of the preventive war- and conflict prevention 
strategy of the EU towards Macedonia’ (Struck, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 
2001,18191 C). While Germany did not pursue national policy preferences as far as 
military tools were concerned through the EU CFSP and ESDP in the crisis in 
FYROM, the argument that participation in the NATO operation would help Europe 
play a bigger and stronger role in the future played a considerable role in shoring up 
support for German participation in the NATO Operation. The EU represented an 
important reference point, especially for members of the ruling coalition. For the 
opposition, which has traditionally focussed more on the transatlantic relationship, 
this was not as important, although the CDU and FDP also favoured European 
capabilities. This linkage of German participation in the NATO Operation to the 
overall success of the EU CFSP and ESDP, as well as Germany’s weight in these 
emerging European security structures, supports the conclusion that German policy 
exhibited evidence of Europeanization in the sense that the EU was used as a cover to 
push through policies on the domestic level, even if these policies did not involve EU 
instruments. It is also evidence of Europeanization in the sense that European and 
national preference overlap: the use of EU CFSP and ESDP instruments was
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suggested -  however not in the present but the near future. Consequently, a German 
official interviewed answered the question of whether Leotard’s suggestion had come 
too early with ‘no, it came at the right time’ for planning the execution of an eventual 
ESDP mission (Interview with German official, 1 September 2005). This indicates 
that the use of ESDP instruments was supported in principle.
Alliance Politics
While the analysis of German foreign policy towards the crisis in FYROM in the first 
policy area has revealed considerable evidence of Europeanization, when it comes to 
the application of military instruments German responses to the crisis support the 
conclusion that preference was given to NATO out of considerations of alliance 
politics. There is evidence of Germany preferring NATO as a military instrument 
both for utilitarian reasons, and in order to keep the US involved in European security 
concerns. Preference was given to NATO because the necessary military tools were 
in the hands of NATO, because NATO was considered the more appropriate resource 
due to its prior involvement in the region, and because NATO was the preferred 
option for the host country.
In addition to utilitarian considerations, there is also some evidence of 
Germany giving preference to NATO as an institutional forum out of a transatlantic 
preference, that it considered NATO as the prime forum for the solution of the crisis, 
and that Germany preferred NATO over other institutional settings. This is illustrated 
by the fact that Germany wanted to ensure US support and sound EU-US relations in 
the handling of the crisis. In addition, the opposition explicitly referred to NATO as a 
community of shared values that should be strengthened also through this mandate 
(Merkel, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18193 C), suggesting an inherent
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preference towards NATO. Importantly, this sentiment was expressed before 11 
September and the changing role of NATO as the individual country chapters on the 
war in Afghanistan and the analysis in chapter 3 demonstrate. This shows that the 
opposition had a strong transatlantic preference.
Evidence of alliance politics as a decisive factor in deciding on policy 
reactions to the crisis supports the conclusion that Germany deemed US involvement 
of primary importance in this case and aligned with NATO in order to ensure US 
participation in the solution of the crisis. Germany did consider US involvement 
crucial in this particular case as the US was an important political player in the 
Western Balkans, including in FYROM. Causing a conflict with the US over the 
handling of the crisis, or over the application of military instruments located in ESDP 
would have been foolish (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005).
Alliance politics considerations were also important as the US preferred the 
involvement of NATO in this case, and Germany did not dispute this assessment. 
From the point of view of the US, the administration wanted to ensure that its 
interests in the Balkans were served, and that any potential ESDP take-over, or EU 
political negotiation stood a chance of success before handing the matter over to the 
Europeans. Only when the situation was deemed safe, and the EU had proved capable 
of conducting political negotiations and military operations according to US interests 
did they leave matters to the EU CFSP (Interview with French official, 8 September 
2005). However, the US did signal a willingness to allow for an ESDP takeover of 
the NATO mandate as the conflict itself was of a smaller size than Bosnia and 
Kosovo had been, and the risk of resurgence of violence lower than in previous 
conflicts in the Western Balkans (Interview with US official, 20 October 2005).
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The US was not keen on contributing soldiers and the incoming Bush 
administration had indicated that it intended to withdraw US troops from the Balkans 
and at least initially remained at the sidelines of the conflict (Agence France Presse, 
22 March 2001). Nevertheless, the US had a strong interest in a peaceful resolution to 
the crisis and to maintain its political influence on international policies in the 
Balkans. For the US, NATO was the institutional venue to do so (Interview with 
German official, 21 November 2005). As a result, making sure that the US was 
involved in the resolution of the crisis in FYROM, would remain involved in regional 
security and would be supportive of a potential ESDP mission in the future was an 
important consideration for German policy makers. This consideration led to the 
application of NATO instruments and close coordination with the US on the 
resolution of the crisis. 66
Empirical evidence also supports the conclusion that Germany regarded 
NATO as the prime forum for the military solution of the crisis. However, there is no 
evidence that this was a question of NATO’s continued relevance in the post-Cold 
War era. Rather, this was a question of credibility on the ground. NATO enjoyed 
greater credibility with especially the Albanian Macedonians and symbolized 
continued US involvement; when it came to an ESDP takeover of the NATO 
mandate, the EU had to first convince the Macedonian government to consent to this 
mandate (Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005). And, the fact that President 
Trajkovski requested NATO assistance in the solution of the crisis (NATO, 20 June 
2001) left no other choice for the institutional venue in the first instance.
66 Indeed, upon the first suggestion of an ESDP mandate for the NATO mission, although the US did 
not signal aversion to an ESDP mission in principle, Germany still insisted on US and NATO 
involvement and the conclusion o f the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement, and took a cautionary view towards 
the eventual handover. Although this is discussed in more detail in the next section, it shows that 
alliance politics consideration o f wanting to ensure close coordination with the US in the resolution of  
the crisis were determining factors in German decision-making in this case.
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The EU was an appropriate forum for the political negotiations, but NATO 
was the prime forum for a military operation and in general signalled US backup, and 
EU/US unity in the approach towards resolving the crisis. The political decisions 
taken with respect to NATO also reflect Germany’s traditional foreign policy 
preference of putting the transatlantic relationship first and the EU second, a tradition 
that continued under the Red/Green government - as Foreign Minister Fischer was 
keen to point out (Fischer, 2001). However, this was not a question of continued 
NATO relevance, as there had been gradual moves towards the EU assuming greater 
responsibility in the Balkans.
IV. Policy area 3: The politics of the ESDP takeover from NATO
While German reactions towards the crisis in FYROM demonstrated a preference for 
a European approach to the resolution of the crisis in the first policy area and the 
general salience of the European agenda, military operations were conducted in the 
framework of NATO. An ESDP take-over was not considered expedient until much 
later, when the EU expressed willingness to take over the NATO mission in FYROM 
at the Copenhagen Council in December 2002 (Council of the European Union, 29 
January 2003). This suggests that despite the high profile of the EU CFSP and ESDP 
in governmental debates, and despite the professed goal on the part of the Chancellor
f n
for Europe to play a greater part in matters of security , alliance politics 
considerations overwhelmingly determined German decision-making with respect to 
the timing of the handover from NATO to ESDP.
67 This is evident from an op-ed piece in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, where SchrOder had 
written that ‘in the future, the EU must be capable to make a contribution to a stable world order that is 
commensurate with its economic and political potential’ (cited in Deutscher Bundestag, 15 March 
2001).
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Despite the salience of the EU CFSP in the political resolution of the crisis 
and the increasing role taken on by Germany in the military management of the crisis 
as part of the NATO Operations, military crisis management was pursued in the 
framework of NATO, rather than that of ESDP. Germany was not in favour of EU 
Special Representative Francis Leotard’s suggestion of an ESDP take-over of 
Operation Essential Harvest because it was considered too early. This was on account 
of timing both where the institutional set-up of ESDP and conditions on the ground in 
FYROM were concerned. Only when the security situation in FYROM had improved 
to the point where an ESDP mission was considered safe, and only on the condition 
that the institutional arrangements between NATO and the EU would be resolved, did 
Germany support the ESDP take-over of the NATO Operation (Interview with 
German official, 21 November 2005).
However, different players in the German government viewed the matter of 
the take-over, both on the question of timing and principle, differently. Whereas 
Chancellor Schroder and Foreign Minister Fischer -along with Javier Solana- were in 
favour of a handover early on (Interview with German official, 3 November 2005), 
the Foreign Office itself did not concur with Fischer’s position and managed to delay 
the process. Officials in the Federal Foreign Office were able to impact policy 
outcomes through the formulation of negotiating positions and the formation of 
broader policy attitudes and opinions. High ranking officials also had access to the 
foreign minister directly and could influence his stance on a specific crisis and his 
negotiating position internally -  and, as one official interviewed remarked ‘the 
Foreign Minister usually listened’ (Interview with German official, 21 November 
2005). This function was of particular importance in determining the timing for 
support of the ESDP take-over operation as the Federal Foreign Office considered the
127
timing of the initial suggestion premature (Interview with German official, 21 
November 2005). The Ministry of Defence, on the other hand, objected to an ESDP 
take over for reasons both of principle and of practicality (Interview with former 
German official, 8 February 2006). This demonstrates that while EU assumption of 
military responsibility in FYROM was viewed favourably on the political level, 
government bureaucracies both in the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of 
Defence viewed the matter of an ESDP take-over with more caution.
Based on the stated priority to preserve stability in the region, and to find a 
political solution based on previous lessons drawn from Balkans conflicts, NATO 
was considered an appropriate institutional venue both for host country credibility 
and for the symbolism of US involvement on the part of the Federal Foreign Office 
(Interview with German official, 21 November 2005). The Federal Foreign Office 
also did not consider the EU ESDP ready to take on such a mission in terms of its 
military evolution and considered an ESDP mission as too early, both where the 
institutional construction and the situation on the ground were concerned -  there was 
still potential for escalating violence, which made the introduction of new 
instruments risky. The Balkans and the ESDP departments within the Federal Foreign 
Office both shared this cautious attitude, but for different reasons: the Balkans 
department because it considered the situation still too risky for the ESDP to assume 
responsibility (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005) and was not 
necessarily in favour of ESDP to begin with (Interview with German official, 3 
November 2005), and the ESDP department because it insisted on the conclusion of 
the Berlin Plus agreement between NATO and the EU before launching an ESDP 
mission (Interview with German official, 3 November 2005). This reflects both 
utilitarian and transatlantic preferences within branches of the Federal Foreign Office.
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The bureaucracy thus acted as a ‘retarding element’ rather than a ready facilitator of a 
transition to more responsibility for ESDP (Interview with German official, 3 
November 2005). While there was no objection to an ESDP mission in principle, 
especially given the small size of the mission, it was only when stability in FYROM 
was guaranteed that the foreign ministry gave the green light for an ESDP mission 
(Interview with German official, 21 November 2005).
The Ministry of Defence, on the other hand, objected to the utilization of 
ESDP instruments altogether, primarily on utilitarian grounds: NATO was 
conducting three active operations in the Balkans at the time, and it was not 
considered useful to dislodge one of these operations in order to start an ESDP 
mission when the EU at that point had not even undertaken a crisis management 
exercise (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006).68 With respect to 
the Federal Foreign Office, a former official in the Ministry of Defence stated that 
‘people in the Foreign Ministry are happy to play strategist, but they do not 
understand the practical limitations and necessities’, indicating that where officials in 
the Foreign Ministry were more positive towards an ESDP mission in principle, the 
Ministry of Defence adopted a cautious attitude (Interview with former German 
official, 8 February 2006). What spoke in favour of the ESDP takeover in the minds 
of defence officials, however, was the chance to improve the working mechanisms 
with the French by arriving at a formalized agreement between NATO and the EU. 
This was viewed as a clear advantage because cooperation had been difficult in the 
past where it had ‘always been 14 against 1 where the cooperation with NATO was 
concerned’ (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). On account of
68 The first EU Crisis Management Exercise (CME 02) took place from 22 to 28 May 2002
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this reasoning, the Ministry of Defence came to view an ESDP takeover as 
advantageous.
The prospect of formal cooperation mechanisms between the EU and NATO, 
French insistence for an ESDP take-over and the absence of US opposition to the 
ESDP assuming the mission subsequently led to the endorsement of the proposal at 
the European Council of Copenhagen in December 2002. With respect to the 
Europeanization and alliance politics frameworks, this indicates that alliance politics 
considerations rather than those of Europeanization, conditioned policy responses 
with respect to this particular policy area.
Europeanization
Given the size and the symbolic value of a military operation, the eventual use of 
ESDP instruments was viewed favourably in principle, but was a question of timing: 
while Germany and other member states’ lack of support for Leotard’s initial 
suggestion delayed the application of ESDP instruments, it did not mean that 
Germany did not support the development or utilization of ESDP instruments in 
FYROM in principle. This is demonstrated by the fact that Germany did push for the 
application of ESDP instruments in FYROM at the NATO summit in Prague in 
November 2002 (Overhaus, 2003: 56). This in turn suggests, along with the early 
support of the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister for an ESDP mission, that policy 
preferences with regard to the third policy area exhibit some, albeit weak, evidence of 
Europeanization. This applies with respect to Europeanization understood as policy 
adaptation as well as changing policy preferences: ESDP came to be supported as the 
appropriate institution by important decision makers; a key bureaucracy adapted its
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preference on the use of ESDP instruments, and policy elites generally favoured the 
application of ESDP instruments.
Fischer addressed the issue of the ESDP take-over for the first time publicly 
after the summit in Barcelona on 22 March 2002 at the Bundestag: in recognizing the 
broad support for such a mission he explained that the problem of not wanting to 
create dual structures with NATO had delayed the mission. He also stressed that the 
delay was a problem between Greece and Turkey rather than a ‘European problem’. 
At that point, then, ESDP had become considered an appropriate tool, also in terms of 
symbolism for a greater responsibility of the EU CFSP and ESDP in crisis 
management.
Although Germany did regard NATO as the prime forum for the solution of 
the crisis and did inhibit an inherent preference for NATO over the EU setting, early 
discussions of an ESDP takeover of the NATO mandate show that reservations out of 
concern over its impact on the transatlantic relationship in this case eroded relatively 
quickly, particularly as this was an operation of a small enough size -but of 
significant symbolic value for the EU ESDP- that the EU ESDP could take over 
without endangering the regional peace, and had US support (Interview with US 
official, 20 October 2005). The costs of supporting an EU-ization (in the sense of a 
change in label from NATO to EU ESDP) of the intervention in FYROM, therefore, 
were low and Germany could and did support the ESDP takeover at relatively low 
political cost (Overhaus, 2003). This shows that there is some evidence of 
Europeanization with respect to the third policy area; however, considerations of 
Europeanization were weighed against those of alliance politics. This means that the 
alliance politics framework represents the most appropriate framework for explaining 
decisions adopted with respect to the timing of the ESDP takeover from NATO.
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Alliance Politics
Considerations that point towards evidence of alliance politics were present in the 
decisions taken with respect to this particular policy area. However, the indicators of 
alliance politics were of a different nature than in those in the previous policy area: 
rather than fundamental transatlantic preferences, German policy makers delayed the 
application of ESDP instruments out of utilitarian reasons, and on account of US and 
German preferences for a formalized agreement on EU access to NATO assets prior 
to the launch of an ESDP operation. Since these two considerations determined 
German policy decisions in this case, the alliance politics framework best explains 
German policy choices in this case.
Despite the high salience of the EU agenda as it applied to the EU CFSP 
among the German government particularly the Chancellor and Foreign Minister, an 
ESDP operation as suggested by Francis Leotard was considered too early, and of 
little use except for its symbolism as far as ESDP was concerned and in FYROM 
generally (Interview with German official, 3 November 2005). Although this 
symbolism as part of a growing European role was important, it had to be weighed 
against other factors. To be sure, Fischer had termed the NATO mission in FYROM 
as a test case for European capacity in crisis management, as Europe carried the main 
responsibility for developing a regional security structure in the Balkans (Associated 
Press, 3 September 2001). But, deployment was considered risky, as NATO had to 
rely on the goodwill of the two parties of the conflict to settle the conflict and as there 
was risk that the conflict could result in new violence. This precluded the application 
of ESDP instruments in the first instance. But, Fischer did not preclude an ESDP 
mission in FYROM in the future. His refusal to push for an earlier takeover came out 
of considerations that NATO had greater credibility on the ground and the consent of
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the Macedonian government, in addition to the fact that the EU ESDP was not yet 
ready to assume such a mission (Agence France Presse, 9 September 2001).
V. Conclusion
The analysis of the empirical material surrounding German policy decisions in the 
crisis of FYROM has shown that the application of EU CFSP instruments was of 
high salience to the German government. Although officials in the Federal Foreign 
Office took a cautious stance on the application of new institutional instruments in 
order to ensure a peaceful solution to the crisis, and although Germany retained the 
use of the Contact Group as a forum to shape international policy responses to the 
crisis, the application of CFSP instruments was important in order to show that the 
EU could act in this conflict. The German government, particularly its elected 
officials, stressed the implications for the EU CFSP and ESDP in German 
participation in the NATO framework, and the importance to shape European 
security institutions. This leads to the conclusion that German foreign policy in this 
case can be termed Europeanized in so far as the CFSP agenda was of high salience 
and as far as national and European preferences were equated. Policy elites also 
favoured the application of CFSP instruments, and the EU was not only suggested as 
the appropriate institution but the application of instruments was also quite important. 
This did not extend to the application of ESDP instruments, however. Although the 
evolving ESDP was of some salience to the government as part of a larger role for the 
EU in the future, the application of ESDP instruments was not deemed appropriate at 
the time it was first suggested. This was on account of alliance politics 
considerations. Together with the fact that NATO was considered the appropriate and 
important institution for the military part of the solution to the crisis leads to the 
conclusion that alliance politics explains policy decisions of a military nature. This
133
was both on account of ensuring continued US involvement in the Balkans as well as 
heeding US preferences, but also out of a transatlantic preference where Germany 
regarded NATO as the prime forum for the solution of the crisis: the suggestion of an 
ESDP operation neither originated in Germany nor was it supported until it became 
safe to do so. Lastly, NATO was also given preference out of utilitarian reasons due 
to its previous involvement in the Balkans and because it enjoyed greater credibility 
with the host country, FYROM. This then leads to the overall conclusion that while 
the crisis of FYROM shows that German policy was Europeanized as far as the 
political negotiations were concerned, the role afforded to the EU CFSP stopped 
short of a military nature due to alliance politics consideration. The Europeanization 
framework therefore only partially explains German decision making in this case.
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Chapter 5. Germany and the war in Afghanistan.
I. Introduction
This chapter analyses German foreign policy decisions taken with regard to the war 
in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September. German participation 
and contribution in all three policy areas was significant. Berlin pledged a total of 
5,100 of troops to OEF (3,900) and ISAF (1,200). Germany also played a large role 
in the reconstruction efforts both through the EU CFSP and through national 
commitments: Germany suggested the mandate and lobbied for the appointment of a 
German national as the first EU Special Representative, and hosted the Bonn 
Conference on Afghanistan from 27 November through 5 December 2001. 
Germany’s commitment was particularly significant with regard to the use of military 
force, an area where Germany had traditionally been cautious and seen the use of 
force as ultima ratio. Chancellor Schroder in particular regarded military 
participation in OEF and ISAF -apart from an expression of solidarity with the US- 
as a means to increase Germany’s independence and latitude for action in world 
politics. As this chapter will demonstrate, there is evidence of Europeanization in 
German foreign policy as far as the formulation of the EU’s political and economic 
role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan is concerned. There is also some evidence of 
alliance politics considerations in the decision to invoke article V of the NATO treaty 
in connection with military participation in OEF and as concerns the institutional 
anchoring in ISAF. The main consideration for Germany in participating in OEF was 
to respond to greater systemic forces and the policy preferences of the US and the 
desire on the part of Germany to show solidarity after the terrorist attacks on 11 
September in order to use this response also to increase German standing 
internationally and to signal Berlin’s growing ambitions. As for policies to tackle the
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war on terror more broadly and beyond Afghanistan, the EU was considered an 
important platform. This supports Europeanization hypothesis, although interest in 
the EU platform did not extend to the military engagement through ISAF or OEF. 
Significant evidence of Europeanization can be found in the policies towards the 
political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, where a single voice for the 
EU and a profile for the EU CFSP was not only of high salience for German policy 
makers, but also viewed as a vehicle to increase Germany’s scope for action and to 
export national preferences onto the EU level. Berlin’s increasing engagement took 
place through international institutions and reinforces the fundamentally multilateral 
conception of German foreign policy. However, solidarity with the US and increasing 
national influence influenced and took precedence over considerations of the place of 
the EU CFSP/ESDP where military participation in OEF was concerned.
I. Policy area 1: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the war on terror
This section shows that the motivation behind Berlin’s decision to contribute military 
forces to OEF supports the alliance politics hypothesis as it was largely motivated by 
considerations of solidarity with the US. Alliance politics played a role in the 
commitment to contribute to OEF due to the invocation of Article V of the NATO 
Treaty, even though Germany’s military contribution to OEF did not take place as 
part of a NATO operation. Evidence of Europeanization does exist with regard to the 
use of instruments and initiatives within the EU CFSP in taking measures against 
international terrorism and as a means to demonstrate solidarity with the US. But, this 
did not include military operations. In addition, domestic motivation and preferences, 
particularly those on the part of Schroder to increase Germany’s international
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standing, determined policy outcomes, which are captured by neither of the two 
approaches.
After the attacks on 11 September and the impending war to oust the Taliban 
from power, the Federal Foreign Office set up a special section (Sonderstab) for 
Afghanistan in order to coordinate German policy towards the war in Afghanistan 
and the country’s reconstruction. The Ministry of Defence planned and co-signed 
Germany’ military contribution to the war in Afghanistan. Apart from the chancellor 
and foreign minister, other relevant actors, as in the crisis in FYROM, were members 
of the Bundestag whose consent to Germany’s military contributions to OEF was 
required to enable military deployments. Chancellor Schroder in particular assumed a 
key position in the formulation of policy responses, going as far as linking German 
consent to military deployment to a vote of confidence in his government in order to 
ensure the support from members of the ruling coalition rather than having to rely on 
votes from the opposition as in the case of German contribution to NATO Operation 
Essential Harvest. For Schroder, the aim of increasing Germany’s action radius and 
global standing in security and defence policy that had been one objective in the 
military participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest was a key goal in the 
case of OEF. Foreign Minister Fischer, in contrast, emphasized the multilateral nature 
of the response to the attacks; this signalled that Fischer, although not necessarily 
objecting to Schroder’s emphasis on Germany’s changed role in the world, 
emphasized a more traditional German foreign policy position by focussing on 
multilateral institutions and initiatives through which to pursue German responses to 
the war on terror.
Following the events of 11 September and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, 
German foreign policy exhibited potentially contradictory, but essentially interlinked,
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objectives: to assert Germany’s national position in a changed geo-strategic 
environment, and to push for a greater profile for the EU as well as the UN. This was 
also reflected in the debates in the Bundestag. In the first address to the Bundestag 
after the attacks on 19 September, Chancellor Schroder stressed the need for 
solidarity with the US and Germany’s willingness to contribute militarily to the war 
against terror by stating that ‘we as Germans and Europeans aim for unqualified 
solidarity with the US’ adding at the same time that solidarity and gratitude for the 
US were not a sole basis for the legitimacy of any potential military deployment, but 
that the goal of any decision would be ‘to save the future of our country in a free 
world, because this is the real issue’ (Schroder, Deutscher Bundestag, 19 September 
2001,18302 A). Schroder also frequently emphasized Germany’s increasing role and 
international standing, stating that the period of German post-war foreign policy 
where allies would expect ‘something like secondary assistance’ had irrevocably 
passed with the attacks on 11 September. Instead, Germany would have to take 
seriously its responsibility and commitments to the defence of freedom and human 
rights, to bring stability and security explicitly including contributions in military 
operations (Schroder, Deutscher Bundestag, 11 October 2001, 18682 C).
The decision to contribute troops to the US-led war on terror created 
significant unease among the German public and particularly among the ruling 
coalition, where Schroder faced a potential revolt from members of his own Social 
Democratic Party and Green coalition partner. While the Cabinet approved the plan 
for the deployment, and deployment met with the approval from the CDU, CSU and 
the FDP, members of both the SPD and Green party were against the deployment 
(Longhurst, 2004: 84). This put the ruling coalition under significant stress. By 
contrast, for the CDU/CSU the attacks of 11 September had reinforced the parties’
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transatlantic leanings as well as the conviction that German security interests would 
have to be protected with political as well as military means -  and wherever threats to 
German security originated geographically (Katsioulis, 2004:227-252). The PDS, as 
in the case of the NATO and eventually also ESDP Operations in FYROM, opposed 
the deployment of Bundeswehr troops. In light of a growing level of dissent within 
the governing coalition and the prospect of having to rely on opposition votes to 
secure a parliamentary majority for military support (Financial Times, 14 November 
2001), Schroder went as far as linking parliamentary approval for the deployment of 
3,900 Bundeswehr troops, including by January 2002 about 100 special forces 
(KSK), to a vote of confidence in his government in order to secure the necessary 
votes in favour of Bundeswehr deployment from his own party on 16 November 2001 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 16 November 2001; Financial Times, 14 November 2001). He 
narrowly survived the vote of confidence by a count of 334 (of 662) votes.
As had been visible in the case of FYROM discussed in the previous chapter, 
for Schroder the war in Afghanistan presented an opportunity for Germany to play a 
more assertive role in international politics, and one that was not pursued entirely 
through international institutions, as the contribution to OEF -  which constitutes a 
coalition of the willing, rather than a NATO force - demonstrates. Although much of 
this was done also on account of solidarity with the US, the size of the contribution 
and the departure from previously held preferences and positions, particularly with 
respect to the use of military force, supports the conclusion that this was also to 
increase Germany’s international profile and room for manoeuvre, and arose out of 
national preferences.
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Europeanization
While the EU agenda was of some salience to German policy makers in the war on 
terror, this did not apply to military participation in OEF. As a result, evidence that 
would support the Europeanization hypothesis is limited with respect to this 
particular policy area. Although the decisions on the part of Germany to initiate and 
support EU-level meetings and initiatives to show a united position against the war 
on terror and to demonstrate solidarity with the US reflect the salience of the EU 
CFSP as an appropriate institution in the war against terror, there was no discussion 
for the EU to play a military role in OEF. Of course, given the preference of the US 
in this matter this would not have been expected to begin with.
However, the application of EU CFSP instruments, or at least an EU Special 
summit and measures to combat global terrorism was important to German policy 
makers as they did not want to see the EU sidelined completely in the war in 
Afghanistan. This supports one indicator of Europeanization, that of the salience of 
the EU CFSP. To illustrate, Foreign Minister Fischer stated that Germany would 
‘pursue a parallel policy, that of making a national contribution -in  the question of 
the political solution, in the question of the military solidarity, in the question of 
humanitarian initiatives- but also not tire to strengthen European visibility and to 
accomplish more of a common foreign and security’ (Fischer, Deutscher Bundestag, 
18 October 2001,18993 C).
Both the chancellor and the foreign minister, therefore, would have preferred 
for the EU to play a bigger role, although their position was not shared by other EU 
member states. To illustrate, Schroder stressed the necessity for a comprehensive 
approach to the fight against terrorism as well as prevention and management of 
crises, and that the EU would have to strengthen its cooperation in this respect. With
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respect to the EU, Schroder emphasized that it was at German insistence that the 
Belgian EU presidency had called for a special summit of the European Council on 
21 September to discuss the EU’s stance on the war on terror (Deutscher Bundestag, 
19 September 2001,18302D). And, Schroder explicitly stated that ‘the terrorist threat 
is also a test for the EU CFSP -  the diplomatic activities of the EU and its member 
states must lead to a cohesive foreign and security strategy (...) the successful 
inclusion of Russia in the alliance against terror and the important role that the 
German foreign minister and other European politicians play in the Middle East 
express the potential of the EU and its member states, a potential that has to be used 
more than in the past (Schroder, Deutscher Bundestag 18 October 2001: 18982D). 
Members of the ruling coalition supported and acknowledged Schroder’s initiative, 
stating that ‘after 11 September, the European Union has become more important 
than ever’ (Gloser, Deutscher Bundestag, 18 October 2001,18988A). This shows that 
the leading coalition supported a growing role for the EU.
There is also evidence of the third indicator of Europeanization, that of policy 
preferences for a European approach: partly in an effort to qualify the Chancellor’s 
emphasis on Germany’s national ambitions in several speeches and interviews in the 
German press and at the Bundestag, Foreign Minister Fischer stressed German 
integration in Europe and Europe’s global interests. He also stated explicitly that the 
EU, particularly CFSP, had to be careful of not being sidelined in the new geo­
strategic landscape. The question, to Fischer, was ‘whether Europe was ready and is 
there a possibility to position Europe more visibly?’ Noting that there had been a 
common position among EU member states, irregardless of whether or not they 
belonged to NATO, Fischer went on to state that ‘we wish that things continue in this 
direction, that for example also in the post-Taliban solution for Afghanistan the EU,
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and not just its member states, play a visible role’ (Fischer, Deutscher Bundestag 18 
October 2001,18993 C). This reflected a European preference. Germany’s national 
interest and its foreign policy were to remain embedded in the European context and, 
more importantly, Germany’s role in Afghanistan was to be defined as a European 
contribution, and that the EU would be in a position to play a particularly significant 
role in the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 18 October 
2001). Fischer, then, not sharing the chancellor’s emphasis on Germany’s national 
standing, emphasized Germany’s embeddedness in international institutions, 
particularly the EU. However, this did not touch on the specific decision to deploy 
forces as part of OEF or, as the analysis of the third policy area will show, to the 
coordination of an ‘EU force’ under ISAF. Although Germany took the position that 
the EU should take into account the military and political aspects of the crisis, this 
position that was not shared by other member states. In the end, for Fischer, the crisis 
demonstrated that Europe was ‘not yet built for the question of war and peace’ (Der 
Spiegel, 21 January 2002).
And indeed, Berlin consistently pushed for a greater profile for the EU in the 
war on terror as well as in the reconstruction of Afghanistan discussed in later 
sections of this chapter, and aimed to play a significant role in these EU initiatives. 
The Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001, a German 
initiative, discussed EU policies towards fighting international terrorism went beyond 
a statement of solidarity with the US to include plans for a European policy to combat 
global terrorism by enhancing police and judicial cooperation, developing 
international legal instruments, putting an end to the funding of terrorism, 
strengthening air security and coordinating the EU’s global action (Council of the 
European Union, 21 September 2001). The European Council conclusions also
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specifically made reference to the need to develop the EU CFSP and ESDP in order 
to make the EU effective as a global actor.
With regard to the other indicators of Europeanization developed in chapter 2, 
there is little evidence that would support the indicators of policy projection, or 
adaptation understood as compromising national preferences to enable policies at the 
EU level. Given the limited role to play for the EU CFSP in this matter, Germany did 
not compromise its national preferences in order to accommodate the use of 
CFSP/ESDP instruments. Rather, as will be shown in the analysis of the second 
policy area, Germany pursued some national policy preferences -  for the EU to play a 
visible role in world politics, and to underline German investments in Afghanistan- 
through the EU CFSP (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006). The 
general salience of the EU CFSP in German foreign policy in this case suggests that 
the EU presented a potential vehicle for Germany to increase its influence, and that it 
was perceived as an appropriate political platform to formulate a response to the 
attacks of 11 September. The EU CFSP, therefore, presented a venue through which 
to reinforce German national perspectives although, importantly, this did not extend 
to the war against terror in Afghanistan as it concerns participation in OEF itself but 
instead concerned the development on an EU strategy against international terrorism.
As for the existence of shared European and national preferences, the war 
against terror was considered a European as well as a national concern, indicating 
that European and national preferences were broadly shared, at least at a rhetorical 
level. However, this was not with respect to the EU CFSP -  the EU platform was one 
platform but not the most important one in this particular respect. In conclusion, 
therefore, while there is some evidence that supports the Europeanization hypothesis 
in this policy area, the evidence is very weak in that it is restricted to broader
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measures to combat global terrorism and to show solidarity with the US in view of 
the terrorist threat. With regard to the military contribution to OEF, however, the 
Europeanization hypothesis has no explanatory value.
On the contrary, Chancellor Schroder also stated early on that the transatlantic 
partnership and solidarity with the US would frame policy responses despite the need 
for European solidarity (Financial Times, 3 October 2001). Thus, while the EU 
agenda was of some salience, this did not translate into specific policy actions where 
military operations were concerned but focussed on broader responses to the threat of 
global terrorism. It also did not preclude German participation in mini-meetings 
ahead of EU meetings to coordinate military action with Britain and France, which 
drew criticism from smaller member states and charges of ‘mini-lateralism’ to the 
detriment of EU unity (Financial Times, 19 October 2001). This shows that the EU 
was not the only, and not necessarily the most important, platform considered 
important by German policy makers.
Alliance Politics
While the evidence of Europeanization in this policy area is rather weak, this does not 
hold equally true for evidence of alliance politics and the use of NATO as a policy 
platform in the war against terror and OEF. The invocation of article V of the NATO 
treaty at the request of the US (Financial Times, 3 October 2001), and the use of the 
NATO Treaty as a legal basis -together with UNSC resolution 1368 and 1373- for 
Germany’s contribution to OEF points towards the centrality of the alliance in 
German foreign policy decisions in this case.
There is significant support for the third indicator of alliance politics, that of 
giving preference to the US and NATO as an institutional forum out of a transatlantic
144
preference. Germany aligned with NATO on the basis of the NATO treaty, and to 
show solidarity with the US -  a point frequently made in public debates and speeches 
by members of the government as well as the opposition. For instance, speaking for 
the Christian Democrats, Merz positively acknowledged Schroder’s repeated 
emphasis on unrestricted solidarity with the US and mentioned that ‘we from the 
CDU fraction in the Bundestag had supported you from the start’ even when it 
became clear that ‘this solidarity would exceed words’ but would include military 
measures. Merz also stated that ‘solidarity with the US cannot be contingent on 
success of the operation. The solidarity with the US and our own, national interest 
calls for the deployment of Bundeswehr forces’ (Merz, Deutscher Bundestag, 16 
November 2001, 19858D). Although this demonstrates Germany’s transatlantic 
preference, NATO was not considered an appropriate institutional venue for the 
execution of OEF, as the US did not exhibit a preference towards the use of NATO 
either for utilitarian reasons or in order to involve all NATO members in OEF. In this 
particular case, then, alliance politics refers to relations with the US rather than just 
relations within NATO.
Transatlantic preference is reflected in a number of domestic decisions also on 
the part of the ruling coalition, despite reservations voiced with respect to the use of 
military force by some members of the SPD and the Green Party. With the exception 
of the PDS, there was broad domestic support for the invocation of article V and 
solidarity with the US. The Bundestag voted on 19 September in favour of following 
up declarations of solidarity with concrete measures. Arguments with respect to the 
participation in OEF reflect transatlantic preference in a number of respects. Peter 
Struck, at the time chairman of the SPD fraction in the Bundestag, argued that 
solidarity with NATO and the US was justified on account of NATO’s contribution
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to Germany’s post-World War II security; and one could not give up on this constant 
in German post-war policy ‘when for the first time solidarity is requested from us’ 
(Struck, Deutscher Bundestag, 16 November 2001,19862B). In addition, normative 
arguments were put forward in Bundestag debates that emphasized NATO as a 
community of values that made solidarity a matter of more than just a contractual 
obligation but also a contribution to the defence of values: Schroder stated that the 
invocation of article V was ‘a decision of great ramifications that commits us not just 
formally (...) the attacks on New York and Washington were not just attacks on the 
American values, they were attacks on (...) the values in our Basic Law (...). We have 
experienced solidarity over decades. This is why it is simply our duty (...) to give 
back solidarity in this situation (Schroder, Deutscher Bundestag, 8 November 2001, 
19287B). This confirms that the alliance politics framework is more applicable when 
it comes to the analysis of this particular decision point, and that it applies to policy 
actors across the party spectrum.
The decision to deploy troops as part of OEF was not motivated by 
considerations that would support the Europeanization hypothesis. But, neither is the 
approach of alliance politics suited to fully explain decision-making in this case as 
domestic considerations of a growing international role for Germany were relevant 
for understanding policy decisions. The alliance politics approach does not account 
for the fact that Germany’s motivation for military participation in OEF apart from 
transatlantic solidarity were also to increase Germany’s action radius and ‘normalcy’ 
in a post-Cold War era. Thus, German participation in OEF is best understood as an 
expression of transatlantic solidarity in the war against terror, which was largely 
determined by the preferences and requests made by the Bush administration in 
addition to efforts by Chancellor Schroder to do away with Germany’s post-World
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War II special status (Sonderweg), which supports or can be explained by neither 
framework applied in this thesis.
III. Policy area 2: Afghanistan’s reconstruction: the political and economic 
dimension
Germany played a significant role in devising policies towards Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction after the fall of the Taliban, both by hosting the Bonn Conference on 
Afghanistan and by initiating the appointment of an EU Special Representative. 
Unlike the case of OEF and ISAF, the EU CFSP agenda was of importance and 
utility in this case, and presented an important policy platform for reinforcing 
national preference and to give the EU a voice more generally -  something that was 
important for German policy makers in the war on terror and Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction, but that was eclipsed by other considerations in the case of German 
participation in OEF and ISAF. The empirical evidence presented and analyzed in 
this section will demonstrate that German foreign policy exhibited signs of 
Europeanization. Specifically, this refers to the salience of the European agenda, the 
use of the EU platform in an attempt to increase German influence over the policies 
as well as the existence of shared definitions and preferences that favoured the 
application of instruments located in the EU CFSP.
The relevant actors in the reconstruction in Afghanistan included the Federal 
Foreign Office, the Foreign Minister and Chancellor. Members of the Bundestag and 
the Ministry of Defence were not involved in this instance, as there was no military 
contribution at stake, and as the Bundestag had no authority to block or influence 
German foreign policy. Foreign Minister Fischer appointed Hans-Joachim Daerr as 
Afghanistan representative in October 2001. The Federal Foreign Office also set 
upset up a special department (Sonderstab) for Afghanistan headed by Ambassador
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Michael Schmunk in order to coordinate the political questions and all aspects of the 
German contributions to the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Interview with German 
official, 30 August 2005).
German policy makers early on raised the issue of post-conflict reconstruction 
of Afghanistan with other relevant actors: the UN, US as well as other EU partners. 
In fact, there had been informal bilateral talks between the Federal Foreign Office 
and the British Foreign Office in early 2001 on what to do about Afghanistan 
(Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006); and while these talks did not lead to 
specific policy proposals or initiatives they show that Germany had a strong interest 
in Afghanistan. As in the other two policy areas, German policy makers aimed at 
playing a key role in this area as well -  but did so through the auspices of 
international institutions, notably the UN and the EU. And, other than in the case of 
military deployment to OEF and ISAF, the German lead and European involvement 
in the reconstruction of Afghanistan had broad domestic support as well, as is evident 
from statements made in the Bundestag.
Germany hosted the Afghanistan Conference in late November 2001 at the 
request of UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi, which signified the 
substantial stakes and interest for Germany in the international efforts of Afghanistan. 
Given the positive perception of Germany in Afghanistan, Germany was a natural 
candidate to host the Conference and to play a leading role in the coordination of 
international reconstruction efforts (Interview with German official, 30 August 2005). 
The presence of both Chancellor Schroder and Foreign Minister Fischer at the 
signing ceremony signified the importance of the policy for the German government. 
The German concept for the international efforts in Afghanistan included support for 
the UN in leading the implementation of the Petersberg Agreement, to recognize the
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EU as one of the pillars for economic reconstruction, and use the existing good will 
of the Afghani people towards Germany, which lent credibility to Germany as 
playing a leading role (Klaiber, 2003: 12).
Germany’s political engagement for the reconstruction of Afghanistan was 
also due to the fact that Germany had a historically strong interest and connection to 
Afghanistan, including a close relationship with Afghan exiles in Germany. Berlin 
therefore had the reputation as honest broker in Afghanistan. In addition, echoing the 
sentiments of increasing Germany’s independence and room for manoeuvre, Berlin’s 
political and military engagement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan was also a 
question o f ‘no taxation without representation’, and the aim to play a significant role 
through and in EU efforts, given that ‘Germany is a net payer in the EU’ (Interview 
with German official, 1 September 2005). This signals that the EU CFSP was 
perceived as a much more useful political platform in the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan on the part of the German government than in the two previous policy 
areas.
The priorities with regard to the CFSP in this case were to both consolidate 
and make visible the EU’s efforts in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and there 
were no differences in view among the key participants in the German government. 
Given the extent of Germany’s involvement in the formulation and coordination of 
reconstruction efforts, the EU represented an important platform through which to 
pursue German national interests, and to consolidate policy efforts. The extensive use 
of the EU platform also suggests an inherent preference on the part of German 
government officials and the foreign office for the use and application of EU CFSP 
instruments.
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Europeanization
In the policy decisions surrounding the reconstruction of Afghanistan, there is 
significant evidence that supports the Europeanization hypothesis particularly with 
regard to the salience of the European agenda in German foreign policy, as well as 
using the EU CFSP as a vehicle to export national preferences and to reinforce 
national policy efforts on the EU level: the EU platform was used to increase national 
influence and to pursue national policy preferences through the EU CFSP. Given that 
Germany exported policy preferences on to the EU and shaped EU policy to a 
considerable extent, there is no evidence of Germany adhering to common policy 
objectives over other considerations or preferences; similarly, there is no evidence of 
Germany relaxing traditional policy positions in order to accommodate the progress 
of EU projects. Policy elites favoured the application of CFSP instruments, 
suggesting the existence of norms and preferences that favoured the application of 
EU instruments over other possibilities.
Despite concerns and press commentaries about member states’ tendencies 
towards nationalization following the events of 11 September (Hill, 2004), the EU 
CFSP was suggested as an appropriate institution in the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, and the application of CFSP instruments was important. The European 
agenda in national foreign policy was salient as far as the EU CFSP was concerned. 
As mentioned previously Chancellor Schroder initiated the emergency European 
Council at Ghent on 19 September, and indicated that he would address the role of 
Europe and the EU CFSP in the fight against terrorism at the European Council. 
Foreign Minister Fischer echoed much of these statements and expressed the 
German preference that this would carry on in a post-Taliban solution for 
Afghanistan, where the EU could play a visible role and build on its strength in
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humanitarian issues, economic reconstruction, and conflict management (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 18 October 2001, 18981 C - 18992 B). Germany also pushed for the 
application of EU political instruments in Afghanistan on 8 October, a proposal was 
rejected by the Belgian presidency (Financial Times, 9 October 2001). Earlier, 
Germany had presented what was later termed a ‘reflection paper’ on the political 
reconstruction of Afghanistan at a special meeting of Asia experts on 3 October that 
did not find favour with other EU member states on account of lacking political 
instruments and a not sufficiently coherent foreign and security policy (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 18 October 2001, 18981 C, 18992 B). Still, this demonstrates not only 
that Germany took an active role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan but attempted 
to involve EU instruments.
What is more, Berlin actively pushed for a political role for Europe, and this 
had broad public support. To illustrate, on 18 October in the Bundestag Schroder 
stated that ‘together with the United Nations we will have to define and put into place 
a long term concept for Afghanistan’s stabilisation. Here Europe, not just the member 
states as allies of the US, will have to play an important role. Especially in the 
question of the post-Taliban-process, the voice of Europe must be heard and the 
activities of Europe must be visible. Europe will support the long-term inclusion of 
Arab and Islamic states in the anti-terror coalition. (Schroder, Deutscher Bundestag, 
18 October 2001, 18983 A). This view was shared by members of the ruling 
coalition: a member of the Green party stated that ‘the UN as well as the EU will be 
an important factor in the future developments of Afghanistan. It is important to 
remember that the EU in cooperation with other international organization has a 
considerable potential for conflict prevention and crisis management, and can support
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stabilisation -  as we have seen in the development of Macedonia (Sterzing, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 18 October 2001, 19002 B).
There was, therefore, the recognition of the potential for a significant role for 
the EU, including and going beyond financial contributions by the EU 
Commission/the first pillar mentioned in chapter 3. The resulting German policy 
initiatives strongly support the first indicator of Europeanization, that of salience. 
But, the EU CFSP also represented a platform through which to pursue national 
policy preferences and was used as a vehicle to increase Germany’s political profile 
internationally. This supports the second indicator of Europeanization, that of 
exporting policy preferences on to the EU agenda. The appointment of a German 
diplomat as the EU’s special envoy to Afghanistan in particular supports this 
conclusion. It was a German initiative to appoint an EU Special Representative, a 
German was nominated for the position, Germany drew up the mandate and paid for 
much of the expenses (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006).
The theme of German engagement in the framework of a European effort 
emerged before Klaiber’s appointment both in the domestic debates as well as on the 
international level, as illustrated above. In an interview with Minister of State Dr. 
Volmer on the Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, Volmer highlighted the active 
German role in the ‘Afghanistan Support Group’ that had been devising policy 
options for a post-Taliban Afghanistan long before US air strikes, and stated that 
Germany would play a role within the EU, particularly in the suggestion of sending 
an EU-envoy to Kabul so that Europe would gain more visibility (ZDF, 30 November 
2001). Berlin was of the view that the EU should have a political representative in 
Kabul to assist in the political process and to make the EU’s efforts in the country 
visible -  in other words, to give the EU a voice (Interview with former German
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official, 9 February 2006). Klaus-Peter Klaiber was appointed EU Special 
Representative to Afghanistan on 10 December 2001 and served for six months to 
coordinate EU actions in the country (Council of the European Union, 10 December 
2001). The mandate was drafted by Germany, and there was no other candidate put 
forward. Funds for the EU Special Representative’s salary were made available by 
Germany as well, and Klaiber worked out of the embassy of the former East 
Germany, suggesting that Klaiber’s appointment essentially constituted a national 
secondment and financial contribution rather than an EU post (Missiroli 2003: 8).
Prior to leaving for Afghanistan and in discussing the limits of his 
appointment with an advisor to the chancellor, Klaiber was also to interpret his 
mandate flexibly in acting on behalf of the EU (Interview with former German 
official, 9 February 2006). This carte blanche from the German government to push 
the envelope suggests that Berlin’s interest in EU visibility in Afghanistan was 
strong. It also suggest that Berlin had an interest in pursuing its policy preferences 
through this appointment, and that other EU actors, such as Javier Solana, were 
eclipsed by this effort. To illustrate, one former German official interviewed 
mentioned that he was disappointed that Solana never paid a visit to Afghanistan 
during Klaiber’s mandate. He also recalled an occasion early on during Klaiber’s 
term where there had been a disagreement between Klaiber and Solana on account of 
the timing and content of a press conference where Solana afterwards accused 
Klaiber of going beyond the EU’s (and by extension the EUSR’s) mandate (Interview 
with former German official, 9 February 2006). This anecdote illustrates that German 
policy preferences were exported on to the European level at the expense of the 
visibility and ability to act on the part of Javier Solana and the Council Secretariat.
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There were thus several instances in which German policy makers either 
initiated or suggested EU policies, or used the EU as a platform to discuss policy 
proposals. This highlights the argument that Germany’s policy efforts within the EU 
consistently pushed for a stronger EU role and points toward the salience of the EU 
agenda in German foreign policy. This is also evident from the German and French 
proposals for the EU to back a UN initiative for a national assembly of tribal and 
ethnic leaders on the meeting of the EU foreign ministers on 8 October (Financial 
Times, 9 October 2001); the demand for the inclusion of measures of how the EU 
could combat terrorism in its own states or what the EU could do about Afghanistan 
in the conclusion of the meeting on 17 October and Chancellor Schroder’s suggestion 
at the close of the UN Conference in Afghanistan of a potential co-ordinated EU 
contribution to an international force in Afghanistan (Financial Times, 6 December 
2001).
These statements, along with the initiatives taken by Germany, serve to 
support the argument that Germany used the EU to project its national power. 
Germany’s evocation of the EU platform, of strengthening the EU’s capacity to act, 
and of policy initiatives taken within the EU also indicates that German policy 
makers perceived German preferences overlapping with those of the EU.
Alliance Politics
There is no empirical support for considerations of alliance politics having played a 
role in this case. For one, this was because this particular policy field was not related 
to military measures where NATO would have been an appropriate institution. More 
fundamentally, US preferences did not factor significantly in German considerations. 
Rather, German preferences ran counter to that of the US in formulating policies for 
Afghanistan’s reconstruction, for instance with respect to the question of membership
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in the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) where the US preferred to work with 
Afghan warlords in the hope of gaining information on terrorists’ whereabouts, rather 
than weakening their political influence in the country (Baraki, 2004).
Instead, the initiatives undertaken by Germany with respect to this policy area show 
significant evidence of Europeanization. The salience of the European agenda was 
high, the EU CFSP was suggested as an appropriate institution, and Germany used its 
political and diplomatic weight to raise the EU’s profile in this case. While the 
salience of the European agenda speaks for national adaptation to the European 
agenda, no other indicators that would point towards national adaptation were found 
to be present in this decision point. In contrast, Germany used the EU as a policy 
platform to export national preferences: by lobbying for the appointment of a German 
national as EUSR Berlin ensured not only the visibility of the EU CFSP in the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan but also increased German influence on Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction: Germany took the lead, in terms of numbers at least, in ISAF, hosted 
the UN Conference on the reconstruction of Afghanistan and thus invested 
considerable resources in the country. The EU therefore represented one additional 
platform through which to assert national influence. In addition, Germany had 
expressed an interest in utilizing and giving a place for the emerging EU CFSP early 
on following the attacks on 11 September. This indicates the existence of a genuine 
German preference for a stronger and more capable EU, at least politically.
IV. Policy area 3: German participation in ISAF
This section argues that considerations of participation in ISAF, as before in OEF, 
were not determined by considerations that would significantly support the 
Europeanization hypotheses. While strengthening the European agenda was of 
salience to policy makers and frequently used as a rhetoric device in domestic debates
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-especially those that involved the use of military force- this did not translate into 
giving the EU CFSP or ESDP a role to play in ISAF and the suggestion of IS AF as an 
EU force on the part of the Belgian Presidency was subsequently rejected.
The relevant actors in the Federal Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence as 
well as the elected officials were the same that were involved in OEF. Whereas the 
chancellor and foreign minister were in favour of a significant military investment on 
the part of Germany that included assuming the lead function for ISAF, the Ministry 
of Defence cautioned against the assumption of a German lead as the Bundeswehr 
was not considered ready to take on such a task. This does not mean, however, that 
the Ministry of Defence did not share the overall objective of German military 
contribution to ISAF.
Given Germany’s high profile in the diplomatic engagement for the peace 
process in Afghanistan, the contribution to OEF as well as the country’s 
reconstruction, military participation in ISAF followed logically. Germany welcomed 
the UN Security Council Resolution stationing ISAF for an initial mandate of six 
months, and regarded it as a legal basis for German participation in ISAF. Moreover, 
members of the governing coalition such as Klose and head of cabinet Struck 
indicated early on that Germany should consider a lead nation position (Agence 
France Presse, 20 December 2001) -  although Defence Minister Scharping indicated 
at the time that the Bundeswehr was ‘not yet capable’ to do this (Berliner Zeitung, 22 
December 2001). Germany was also not in favour of an overall US command but 
insisted on keeping the two operations -  ISAF and OEF -  separate for reasons of 
domestic sensibilities. After a meeting of the cabinet on 21 December on the 
deployment of German forces, defence minister Scharping said that Germany would 
put at ISAF’s disposal the necessary capabilities as soon as possible (dpa, 22
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December 2001). Among government officials, both in the ministry of defence, the 
foreign ministry as well as the chancellor and foreign minister, participation in ISAF 
was uncontested. This basic consensus on German participation in ISAF extended to 
actors in the broader political process as well.
On 22 December 2001 the Bundestag voted in favour of German participation 
in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which began in January 2002 
and where the German contingent numbered 1200 initially and increased up to 2500 
by 2003 when Germany and the Netherlands assumed the lead (Wagener, 2003: 33- 
49). With the exception of the former socialist party (PDS), the governing coalition as 
well as the opposition were in agreement on the necessity of military measures to 
support the reconstruction of Afghanistan -  both on the initial deployment as well as 
the extension of the original mandate beyond 20 June 2002.
Other than in the debates over OEF, however, in the case of ISAF, the issue of 
an EU format for the European contributions to ISAF created some discord among 
EU member states, and was at least informally discussed as a possible option even if 
no specific plans for a concrete operation followed from these discussions (Interview 
with former German official, 8 February 2006). Germany did not, however, in the 
end support these discussions, even if Chancellor Schroder pledged support in an 
international force as a potential co-ordinated EU contribution at the close of the 
Bonn Conference on 5 December (Financial Times, 6 December 2001). This 
demonstrates that a preference for a more visible role for the EU existed on the part 
of Chancellor Schroder, although this was not appropriate in practice. For one, the 
appearance of a co-ordinated EU force in Afghanistan resulted in criticism from other 
NATO partners, in particular Canada, that the Europeans were hijacking ISAF, 
possibly as a dry run for the planned EU rapid reaction force, which also created
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some unease among other EU member states, notably Britain (United Press 
International, 10 January 2002). From the perspective of a former German official 
interviewed ‘the CFSP/ESDP at that time was still in its infancy and not robust 
enough to undertake such an operation’ (Interview with former German official, 9 
February 2006). Fischer subsequently rejected the Belgian claim at Laeken on 14-15 
December that the ISAF force was created by the EU where eight of the fifteen EU 
members were included stating that it could not be an EU force due to the EU’s lack 
of operational structures, and that the issue would be handled by the UN Security 
Council instead (Financial Times, 14 December 2001).
Europeanization
As with the military participation in OEF, there is little evidence to support the 
Europeanization hypothesis in the case of ISAF. Despite initial discussions about an 
EU force, and statements of the possibility of an EU coordinated force on the part of 
the chancellor, the idea was abandoned and not taken up again. This suggests that the 
application of CFSP/ESDP instruments did not figure prominently enough in German 
decision-making in this case to move from policy suggestions to operational 
planning. With regards to the following indicators for Europeanization -  the 
adherence to common policy objectives, the use of the EU as a cover or the existence 
of shared definitions and preferences, or the relaxation of traditional policy positions 
to accommodate progress of EU projects - there is no evidence in German policy 
decisions that would support either of these indicators of the Europeanization 
hypothesis.
However, the fact that a possible EU operation was initially discussed 
suggests some salience of the European agenda. ISAF was important to safeguard
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and ensure the reconstruction of Afghanistan, which involved significant EU and 
member state involvement, and was therefore indirectly of salience to EU (and, by 
extension, German) efforts even if it was not part of the EU CFSP agenda proper. 
Still, the salience of the EU agenda did not reach the military contribution: although 
the EU as an institutional platform had been briefly discussed this did not lead to 
concrete plans for a military mission under an EU label as the CFSP/ESDP was not 
yet in possession of the necessary military instruments to carry out such a mission 
(Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006). As in the case of OEF and 
the war on terror more broadly, while there was a preference for a European approach 
in principle, this did not extend to the question of military force. However, in the case 
of ISAF, other than OEF, the use of an EU-label for a military contribution to ISAF 
was at least considered as the statement of Chancellor Schroder at the Bonn 
Conference cited earlier demonstrates. From the perspective of the Ministry of 
Defence, this would been pointless from an operational point of view to begin with, 
as a potential EU force would have had to either rely on national headquarters or on 
NATO structures because the EU was neither in possession of head quarter structures 
nor a planning room. (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). 
There was, therefore, agreement among officials in the Federal Foreign Office and 
the Ministry of Defence that an EU force was neither practical nor desirable.
Still, there is evidence that the members of the government, in particular the 
Foreign Minister, in principle supported a strong EU profile in this case; and that the 
application of EU CFSP instruments was of high salience. Fischer, reacting to a 
charge from the head of the CDU fraction Friedrich Merz that the EU had been 
sidelined in international and German foreign policy formulation stated that ‘of 
course 11 September made clear that the EU is not prepared to make decisions on war
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and peace. Of course we would have wished for a stronger European effort. The 
government (...) has insisted that Europe is more visible. It is not a coincidence that a 
German diplomat is going to represent the EU as Special Representative. This makes 
clear our European conviction.’ However, Fischer also stated that ‘this also makes 
clear how important it is that the Federal Republic of Germany engages in this’ 
(Fischer, Deutscher Bundestag, 22 December 2001, 20827 B). This highlights 
Fischer’s preference for both a European approach but importantly for a German lead 
in this approach. Together with Schroder’s public statement on a potential EU force, 
this indicates that the position of the chancellor and the foreign minister on the 
German role in Afghanistan were fairly close. And, an official in the Federal Foreign 
Office stated that ‘it all depends on how you sell something’ (Interview with German 
official, 1 September 2005) -  indicating that although this was not an ESDP 
operation, the ‘EU’ - label was nevertheless of salience for German policy makers.
Although the analysis of policy decisions and domestic debates shows that 
German policy exhibited some signs of Europeanization with regard to the salience of 
the European agenda, the use of the EU as a platform for Germany to increase 
national influence, and the preference for a European in the framework of a 
multilateral approach, this was confined to the political, not the military responses to 
the war in Afghanistan. While the European agenda, including ESDP, had become 
more salient on account of the events of 11 September and the changed geo-strategic 
environment in the eyes of German policy makers, this did not apply to policy 
responses to the war in Afghanistan where an ESDP mission was not considered 
realistic (Interview with German official, 1 September 2005).
However, the analysis of the second policy area has shown that the presence 
of international security forces was recognised as vital for successful reconstruction
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efforts by the EU and other international actors. This went as far as EU Special 
Representative Klaiber calling for a broadening of the ISAF mandate outside Kabul 
and lobbying for its extension, going beyond his official mandate, and welcoming 
British offers to play a leading role in ISAF (Agence France Presse, 12 December
2001). Although Klaiber acted as EU envoy rather than a German official, the 
significant financial and personal support of the German government for his position 
suggest that he acted with the implicit consent of the German government to lobby on 
behalf of the EU and to set the parameters of his mandate as far as possible 
(Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006). This in turn speaks for a 
German preference for a European approach even as it concerned the peacekeeping 
operation. It also demonstrates the export of German national preferences on to the 
European agenda, even if ISAF of course was not an EU force. This was because 
ISAF was considered necessary for the stabilization of the country, and supported 
other reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan undertaken by the EU and other 
international actors. It also reflects the considerable commitment to Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction -political, economic and military- on the part of the German 
government. Taken together, the evidence of some salience of the European agenda 
and thoughts over a coordinated EU force constitute weak evidence of 
Europeanization, in particular when compared to the role of the EU agenda with 
regards to Afghanistan’s political and economic reconstruction. But, as this section 
has demonstrated, policy decisions and policy rhetoric with respect to ISAF 
demonstrate German interest in a European profile, including ‘selling’ ISAF as an 
‘EU’ effort.
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Alliance politics
While evidence of Europeanization is weak in this case, there is some evidence that 
supports the alliance politics hypothesis. This applies in particular to the indicators of 
giving preference to NATO for utilitarian considerations as well as for reasons of 
transatlantic preferences. There is no evidence to support indicators 1 and 2 -  that 
states align with NATO in order to keep the US involved in European security 
concerns, and a US preference that leans towards the use of NATO. This was not a 
case of an explicit US preference leaning towards the use of a NATO framework as 
no US troops participated in ISAF, and as US Commander General Tommy Franks 
had overall command of ISAF to begin with (United Press International, 10 January
2002). The US, then, had an interest in overall command of OEF and ISAF with 
respect to the two operations’ coordination, but did not have an explicit interest in 
involving NATO to a greater extent.
However, NATO came to be considered as the prime institutional forum out 
of a transatlantic preference as well as for utilitarian reasons. To be sure, Germany 
did discuss an EU-coordinated force, which points against a clear transatlantic 
preference at least on the part of Chancellor Schroder, but did not advocate or 
proceed with more serious operational planning when it became clear that some 
European and North American NATO members were opposed to this idea -  apart 
from the fact that it was not considered practical to begin with (Interview with former 
German official, 8 February 2006).
And, as in the debates over participation in OEF, Chancellor Schroder 
accepted if not initiated the country’s growing role internationally, including in 
military deployment -  and did so out of transatlantic solidarity rather than merely
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exhibiting a preference for a European approach. To illustrate, Schroder emphasized 
that ISAF ‘is a consequence of politically decisive actions. It is also a consequence of 
the unrestricted solidarity, which included military means’ (Schroder, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 22 December 2001, 20822C). In the end, NATO was regarded as the 
prime forum for the solution of the crisis. Given NATO’s operational capacities, 
rather than the EU ESDP, Germany regarded NATO as the prime forum for the 
solution of the crisis, preferring NATO over other possible institutional settings 
(Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). This reinforces the 
indicator of giving NATO preference out of a clear transatlantic preference, but also 
for utilitarian reasons.
In conjunction with the last point, NATO was considered the most appropriate 
forum as the military tools were available through NATO but not through other 
regional or international institutions. This supports the final indicator of alliance 
politics, that NATO was given preference for utilitarian reasons. To be sure, NATO 
was not initially considered as the appropriate institutional venue, but was considered 
as such later on when the ‘lead nation’ model with a 6-month rotation proved too 
cumbersome and complicated. The use of NATO was also problematic in terms of 
employing NATO in an out-of-area operation in Afghanistan (Interview with policy 
analyst, 10 June 2005), and by restrictions on NATO’s geographic scope that had to 
be debated and changed by the members of the alliance before consenting to an out- 
of-are mission (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006). Besides the 
emphasis on the individual national contributions made by Germany and other lead 
nations, the debate over a NATO command, and a German lead, for ISAF emerged. 
In practice, however, NATO had already played a supportive role during the 
German/Dutch lead of ISAF, and it was more a question of showing a NATO flag in
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a new geographic and geo-strategic environment rather than a far-reaching change to 
the operation itself (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006).
This demonstrates that alliance politics considerations also played a part in 
German decision-making. Minister of defence Struck did suggest a take-over of 
NATO after the German/Dutch lead of ISAF ended in August 2003 after a meeting of 
NATO defence ministers in Warsaw on 24 September 2002 (Agence France Presse, 
24 September 2002), and NATO subsequently decided to lead ISAF in April 2003 
and NATO assumed ISAF command on 11 August 2003. This was because the ‘lead 
nation’ model did not prove useful in the reconstruction of ISAF: not only was it a 
big job logistically but it was also hard to secure a follow-up lead nation. A former 
official from the Ministry of Defence stated that the UK spent 9 rather than the initial 
6 months as lead nations due to difficulties in finding a replacement -  and Germany 
had similar problems (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). 
Anchoring ISAF in NATO, therefore, was a way to provide institutional continuity.
Germany, then, insisted on the deployment of NATO as much out of 
utilitarian reasons as of a transatlantic preference, and against initial considerations of 
expanding NATO area of operations. Given the operational necessities, NATO was 
considered the most appropriate institutional venue for the task at hand, and the 
relevance of NATO in a post-11 September environment considered important. 
German insistence on a role for NATO in ISAF demonstrates that alliance politics 
considerations explain decisions taken with respect to the institutional anchoring of 
NATO.
In the case of German participation in ISAF, the evidence on the 
Europeanization and alliance politics hypotheses is mixed. There is limited evidence 
of Europeanization in German foreign policy decision-making and the fact that an
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EU-coordinated force was discussed. This does suggest that the EU CFSP was of 
some salience to German policy makers. However, the salience of the EU agenda was 
weighed against alliance politics considerations and, given the lack of interest in an 
EU-coordinated mission by other EU and NATO allies and domestic objections on 
the part of the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, did not lead to 
further attempts to push for an EU force. This suggests that the interest in an EU- 
coordinated force on the part of Germany was not sufficiently strong to begin with, 
and the tension between the EU and NATO/transatlantic alliance framework not 
significant enough for Germany to more forcefully push for an EU-coordinated force 
in ISAF. In the end, alliance politics considerations, in particular those of the utility 
of NATO instruments as well as a transatlantic preference, determined the outcome 
of the policy choices.
V. Conclusion
The argument put forth in this chapter is that German policy decisions in the case of 
Afghanistan were motivated by three separate and only partially linked priorities: to 
assert national weight (‘normalisation’) in the changed global landscape and to 
increase the scope of action where military action outside NATO borders was 
concerned; to show solidarity with the US following the terrorist attacks on 11 
September but to also multi-lateralize policy responses especially military 
contributions under NATO for mainly utilitarian reasons; and to create a political 
space and role for the EU CFSP and to use it to advance Germany’s policy positions 
and global standing. Other than in the case of FYROM, German policy decisions 
towards the war in Afghanistan exhibit signs of Europeanization understood as 
national adaptation as well as projection: while the European agenda remained salient 
for the sake of strengthening the CFSP, the EU CFSP was also used as a platform to
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increase national influence on an EU level. On a political level, the EU CFSP was 
considered, and ended up playing a significant part in the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, and in coordinating the political and military contributions of the EU 
member states. This was done in large part at Germany’s behest, supporting the 
conclusion that the EU CFSP agenda was of high salience to German policy makers 
and that Germany projected national policy preferences on to the EU level. When it 
came to military contributions, however, transatlantic solidarity and pragmatism won 
out over giving the ESDP a military role to play, or of going as far as labelling 
individual member states’ contributions as an EU force. The focus instead was to 
show solidarity with the US, and to eventually push for a NATO mandate for ISAF in 
order to ease the logistical burden on the individual ISAF lead nations. Unlike in the 
case of FYROM, ESDP was not considered as an option in the future, both out of 
consideration of the lack of institutional capability but of transatlantic considerations.
This leads to the conclusion that German foreign policy decisions in the war 
in Afghanistan were not dominated by considerations of Europeanization where the 
military contributions are concerned, although empirical evidence of Europeanization 
exists that points to a salience of the European agenda. Alliance politics, and 
solidarity with the US were of primary importance in the military management of the 
crisis; however, responses were not located in NATO specifically. The chapter 
therefore concludes that the amount of space afforded to the EU CFSP, and 
Europeanization considerations, were restricted and largely determined by US 
preferences where military operations were concerned -  therefore, the 
Europeanization framework is not appropriate to explain all major aspects of German 
political decision-making with regard to the war in Afghanistan, even if evidence of 
Europeanization exists with respect to the political aspects of Afghanistan’s
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reconstruction. A role for the EU CFSP was important, and pursued by German 
policy makers, even if it was not the only or the first priority when determining 
policy choices. But, neither is the alliance politics framework and appropriate 
explanatory framework for all three decision points. This is because considerations of 
national prestige and the insistence on a broader UN framework also played a role in 
the decision-making in this case.
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Chapter 6. France and the crisis in FYROM
I. Introduction
This chapter shows that France took a lead role in shaping the EU crisis management 
response in FYROM and attempted to carve out a stronger role for the EU CFSP, 
including ESDP. This applies both to the management of the crisis as well as the 
post-crisis period, where France initiated a discussion of the ESDP take-over of the 
NATO Operation. What was later to become Operation Concordia had symbolic 
value both for the application of EU crisis management tools as well as for member 
states vested in the development of the EU ESDP and its application, particularly in 
the Western Balkans. This position is consistent with past French policy behaviour 
and preferences towards matters relating to the development of ESDP and EU crisis 
management in general and in the Balkans in particular, where France has 
consistently pushed for greater EU involvement, and now for a greater role for the 
EU CFSP and ESDP. Paris pursued its influence by means of initiating discussions 
and suggestions for policy actions on the crisis in the framework of Franco-German 
summits, but also by initiating a meeting of the Contact Group in Paris. The 
appointment of former Minister of Defence F rancis Leotard as EU Special 
Representative also indicates that France sought to increase French power and 
influence within the EU in the political negotiation of the crisis. Although the initial 
suggestion for an ESDP mission had to be abandoned because of opposition from 
other member states to any initiative outside the NATO framework in the absence of 
a formal agreement over EU access to NATO assets, it provided the impetus for a 
broader discussion and eventual realisation of the ESDP take-over from NATO. 
Finally, the lack of domestic debate on the matter of an EU force or the nature of 
French involvement in FYROM reflects a general French preference, and a broad
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consensus, for a stronger EU role in political and military crisis management. The 
chapter therefore concludes that French foreign policy in this case exhibits strong 
evidence of Europeanization. However, France’s initial emphasis on the involvement 
of NATO and the US in regional security matters as well as the use of the Contact 
Group also points towards evidence of alliance politics.
II. Policy area 1: Support for the EU CFSP in the political negotiations
The nature of French interest in FYROM stems exclusively from political 
considerations on the country’s importance for regional stability and European 
security. Unlike EU member states geographically closer to the Western Balkans, 
such as Germany, there was little concern over a large number of refugees making 
their way to France in case of another outbreak of large-scale violence. French 
involvement in the crisis in FYROM is thus best understood in light of previous 
engagements in the Balkans from the early 1990s and in terms of the significance of 
EU crisis management instruments located in CFSP and ESDP in FYROM as well as 
for the future course of developments of EU crisis management in the Balkans and 
beyond.
France from the beginning of the crisis supported a strong role for the EU, and 
initially emphasized the commitment for the territorial integrity of FYROM. The key 
participants with respect to this policy area were President Chirac and Foreign 
Minister Vedrine. At the Quai d’Orsay, the director of Strategic Affairs, Gerard 
Araud, was also an important figure as he was involved in shaping policies towards 
FYROM, particularly the decision to appoint a French national as EU Special 
Representative (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005). There was thus a
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common objective for the EU CFSP to take a lead role and to establish the EU as a 
foreign policy actor among key participants in the French government.
Given the central role played by the US in the previous conflicts in the 
Balkans, coordination with the US was regarded as important on the part of Paris. 
This applies also with respect to the second policy area, given French military 
engagement in the region, but is relevant in the negotiation phase as well. Chirac also 
pursued political initiatives in the framework of the Contact Group, and initiated a 
meeting in Paris on April 11 to discuss the general situation in the Balkans. While the 
EU line on FYROM -  favouring political dialogue -  was relatively uncontroversial, 
other issues, such as Kosovo or the potential secession of Montenegro from Serbia 
had more weight. The use of the Contact Group format was sure to include Russia 
and the US in the discussion on the future of the region, and constituted another effort 
to keep the US involved. In a statement issued after the talks members of the Contact 
Group called for restraint on the part of the government, to condemn extremism for 
the ethnic Albanians, and affirmed their commitment to maintain the territorial 
integrity of FYROM (Washington Post, 12 April 2001). This shows that the 
involvement of the US, and therefore alliance politics considerations, was an 
important political consideration on the part of the French leadership as well.
France also pursued bilateral relations with FYROM in support of the French 
and European position. For instance, Macedonian President Trajovski visited France 
on 28 February 2001 to draw attention to his country’s situation and to demand more 
efforts on the part of KFOR to secure the borders between Kosovo and FYROM. On 
this occasion President Chirac stated that France ‘condemns, without reservation, the 
terrorist acts and we cannot accept these’ (Chirac, 1 March 2001). After the onset of 
the crisis in 2001, French officials used these visits to support the EU position on
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territorial integrity and to council restraint from the part of the Macedonian 
government in dealing with the ethnic Albanian rebels. In addition to a policy of 
stabilization, Chirac also affirmed to President Trajkovski that FYROM should have 
a European vocation, which showed a general preference for Europeanising the 
Balkans and the eventual goal of EU membership stating that France ‘of course 
supports the association between the Republic of Macedonia and the European 
Union’ (Chirac, 1 March 2001).
This section has shown that key members of the French government sought to 
play a lead role in European efforts in the negotiation of the crisis. France did so in 
particular through the Franco-German relationship, through which a number of policy 
initiatives were generated. In addition, Paris also sought to increase its own national 
standing within the EU through the appointment of a EUSR who, on French 
insistence, led to the appointment of a French national. But, France sought to play a 
key role in the crisis through the Contact Group and to retain US and Russian 
involvement in the crisis. With respect to this particular policy area there is no 
evidence of domestic differences between the Elysee and the Quai d’Orsay as to the 
nature and the means to pursue French interests in the crisis.69 The next section will 
analyse in more detail the extent to which French foreign policy in the case can be 
said to have been ‘Europeanized’.
Europeanization
This section shows that French foreign policy decisions with respect to the support
for the EU CFSP in the political negotiations exhibit evidence of Europeanization.
The EU was regarded as a platform to enhance French influence, and the EU agenda
69 This confirms the cohesion o f the French policy (and intellectual) elites -  and the concentration of 
power and influence at the centre, the Presidency and the Quai d’Orsay in particular (see Niblett, 2001 
and Blunden, 2000).
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in this crisis was of high salience. French policy decisions and the underlying 
motivations behind them therefore support indicators of Europeanization that point 
towards adaptation and projection. First, the salience of the EU agenda was high in 
this case and policy elites favoured the application of CFSP instruments; second, the 
EU was used as a platform in an attempt to increase national influence; third, and 
related, the EU was used as a cover to initiate policies on the domestic or 
international level. Paris did pursue national policy preferences -  to maintain a high 
French profile in the management of the crisis -  through initiating policy through the 
EU CFSP.
As for the salience of the EU agenda, an official in the Quai d’Orsay stated 
that ‘France is implicated in the EU CFSP where national action is subsumed in a 
European framework. Since Dayton, EU policy action in the Balkans is an illustration 
of what the EU should do and how it should use its instruments, civil and military 
tools, first and second pillar instruments’ (Interview with French official, 12 August 
2005). This implies a general salience of the EU agenda in French politics towards 
the Western Balkan region to begin with; and later conditioned French responses to 
the crisis itself. In practical terms this is evident from French initiatives, together with 
Germany, to propose policies for the EU to adopt and to use the EU as a platform for 
statements in support of the Macedonian government.
Within the European framework, President Chirac pursued a number of 
political initiatives in particular through bilateral cooperation with Germany. This is 
consistent with the argument that France has consistently ‘pursued the idea of Europe 
as a political as well as an economic force by means of a special relationship with
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Germany’ (Blunden, 2000:19).70 The crisis in FYROM and how to respond to it was 
on the agenda in bilateral meetings during the French-German Herxheim summit in 
Germany on 20 March 2001. Both Chirac and Schroder emphasised that territorial 
integrity was not to be put in question, certainly not by Albanian ‘terrorists’, appealed 
to both parties to stop the violence, and to the Macedonian government to find a 
political solution and welcomed the fact that the government has adopted an open 
position with regards to minority rights (Chirac and Schroder, 20 March 2001). At the 
suggestion of Chirac, both countries also suggested that it would be a positive step to 
have the Macedonian President address the European Council on the situation in 
FYROM, a suggestion that was subsequently taken up by the Swedish EU 
Presidency, as mentioned in chapter 3. At the press conference following the 
European Council, Chirac emphasized that ‘we (the Council), notably France, have 
encouraged the Macedonian authorities to deepen their political dialogue and their 
inter-ethnic cooperation, meaning their effort at better integration of the Albanian­
speaking community in Macedonia’ (Chirac, 24 March 2001). In addition to 
demonstrating the salience of the EU agenda in French foreign policy, this statement 
also serves to underline national influence on the formulation of European policies.
With respect to French-British relations, by contrast, the situation in FYROM 
was not discussed during the annual Anglo-French summit on 9 February 2001, 
although European defence was an item on the agenda: while France and Britain had 
pioneered the idea of a European rapid reaction force, there was a divergence of 
views on the degree of independence between EU decision-making and that of
70 Although the French/German relationship was strongest during the Mitterand/Kohl period and has 
weakened since Chirac coming to power in 1996 and SchrOder in 1998 (see Blunden, 2000), it 
nevertheless continues to serve as an important political platform, as the crisis in FYROM 
demonstrates.
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NATO, indicating the conceptual differences between the two countries with respect 
to European autonomous action (BBC News, 9 February 2001).71
The salience of the EU agenda is also evident from a statement made by 
Francis Leotard looking back on his appointment where he said that ‘Europe’s 
leadership (in the negotiation of the crisis) is uncontested’ (Assemblee Nationale, 23 
October 2001). The fact that Leotard at the same time expressed disappointment that 
the mainly European peacekeepers were deployed under a NATO rather than an EU 
label, indicates the salience of the European agenda in French domestic politics with 
respect to this as well as the third policy area. More generally the view on the crisis in 
FYROM, applied to both the first as well as the third policy area was that ‘the EU 
must be ready, Europe must be an actor, when possible it must act. It’s the French 
European method: to push the agenda, and if we can show that the EU is an actor we 
should show that the EU can do it alone’ (Interview with French official, 8 July
2005).
With respect to the second indicator of Europeanization, the use of the EU 
platform in an attempt to increase national influence is evident from the use of the 
Franco-German relationship to initiate EU-wide policies such as inviting President 
Trajkovski to the Gothenburg summit and the appointment of an EU Special 
Representative. It is even more evident from the lobbying for the appointment of a 
French national who served as Minister of Defence during the 1990s: based on his 
past experience and statute he was sure to be able to use the EU platform to increase
71 In addition, the Anglo-French summit to be hosted by France in December 2002 had to be 
postponed after a spat between Blair and Chirac at the EU summit in Brussels in October 2002 (The 
Guardian, 29 October 2002). This supports the argument that French suggestions for a military role for 
the EU fell victim to a cooling of British-French relations following the St. Malo process (Howorth 
2003-04:176). While the content o f the meetings as well as the personal animosity between Blair and 
Chirac is more relevant to explain policy outcomes with respect to policy area 3, it is cited here 
because it serves to underline the strength and the centrality o f the Franco-German relationship in 
decision-making with respect to the EU CFSP.
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French visibility and influence in EU foreign policy and to pursue national as well as 
European efforts and policy ideas. The last point, that of initiating policies became 
increasingly important during the debates over ESDP, as the discussion of the third 
policy area will show. But, by appointing a high profile French national to work 
alongside Javier Solana, France was able to actively shape EU negotiations in this 
case. This is also confirmed by a member state official who stated that ‘Leotard had a 
strong personality, and frequently did manage to eclipse Solana’ (Interview with 
German official 1 September 2005). This suggests that Leotard did not strictly adhere 
to his mandate of acting ‘under the authority of the High Representative’ (Council of 
the European Union, 29 June 2001). Lastly, the fact that ‘given the urgency of the 
situation, and exceptionally, most administrative expenditure of the Special 
Representative shall be covered by France’ (Council of the European Union, 29 June 
2001) suggest that Leotard’s, similar to that of Klaus-Peter Klaiber in the case of 
Afghanistan - was at least as much a national as a European appointment.
Foreign Minister VSdrine and the Director of Strategic Affairs at the time, 
Gerard Araud, were keen on appointing a French national as EU Special 
Representative in order to increase French influence on EU policies (Interview with 
French official, 8 September 2006) -  an idea that also originated in discussions 
between France and Germany. The emphasis on the appointment of a French national 
shows that strengthening the voice of the EU in the negotiation phase was a priority, 
but equally that national projection, and French influence in the EU negotiations, was 
important. At the General Affairs Council on 25 June, Javier Solana nominated 
Francis Leotard as EU Special Representative who worked alongside his American 
counterpart James Pardew in the political negotiation of the crisis (Council of the 
European Union, 18 April 2002). This was done on French suggestion and serves as
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an indication of French interest in a high profile role in the crisis in FYROM. The 
argument that appointing a French national served to increase national influence on 
EU policies is supported by the fact that, the appointment of Special Representatives 
is important for taking national influence and to improve a deficit position in a 
particular policy field (Interview with German official, 8 August 2005). A member 
state official interviewed accordingly stated that one additional consideration in this 
particular case could have been -apart from a general desire for French influence in 
the crisis in FYROM- that the French profile in the Balkans was relatively low 
compared to other EU member states: Sir Paddy Ashdown, a UK diplomat, was High 
Representative in Bosnia, Germany had played a visible role through initiating the 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 1999 and through the appointment of 
Michael Steiner as UN administrator of Kosovo and Bodo Hombach as the Special 
Coordinator of the Stability Pact, which meant that France had not been as strongly 
represented on such a high level (Interview with German official, 8 August 2005).
At the press conference following the General Affairs Council on 25 June, 
Vedrine stated that ‘on our behalf, Javier Solana has been constantly toing and froing. 
So there were only two practical ways to ensure completely effective European 
Union action. Either Mr Solana had to spend all his time doing that (...) or we had to 
find a European Union representative to complement and build on Mr Solana’s 
efforts under his authority. This is an idea Joschka Fischer and I had, following which 
France took the initiative in Goteborg of proposing a name. President Chirac and the 
Prime Minister agreed that it should be Francis Leotard; the discussion of the past 
few days was on this point’. On the selection of Leotard, Vedrine stated that he was 
the appropriate choice because ‘there’s a need, given the situation’s complexity, for a 
politician with experience of such complexity. And having been Defence Minister at
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a time when the Balkans issue, in the broad sense of the term, was already very much 
a matter of cbncem, Francis Leotard is familiar with these issues’ (Vedrine, 25 June 
2001). Leotard was replaced by Alain Leroy in October 200172, following Leotard’s 
early resignation after the rejection of his proposal (BBC News, 10 September 2001).
There is little effort of policy adaptation, however: France did not adhere to 
common policy objectives over other considerations and preferences. Paris also did 
not explicitly equate national with European preferences with respect to the case of 
FYROM, although members of the French policy elite have on other occasions made 
general comments on the effect of Europe on national foreign policy and vice versa: 
in the view of Foreign Minister Vedrine, for instance, Europe’s role is to organize the 
convergence of state policies and each foreign minister will have to merge national 
with the growing “European interest”. While Vedrine does acknowledge that ‘a larger 
Europe will not be France writ large’ he is confident in French strength to belief that 
‘this mix of national self-assertion and cooperation is satisfying’ (cited in Hoffman, 
2001: 140). This in turn indicates an elite consensus with respect to France’s role in 
the EU and by extension, the world, which is also reflected in the academic literature 
on French foreign policy. For instance, Treacher (2001: 153) argues that French 
leaders ‘have aimed to preserve France’s international rang by raising the collective 
stock of Europe (...). Europe is required to function as a multiplier for French 
power’. This is reflected in French policy initiatives with respect to FYROM, where 
France did assume a lead role in formulating and initiating policies adopted under the
72 While Alain Leroy is also French, his appointment had less to do with increasing national influence 
but with Leroy’s previous experience in the Balkans following missions in Bosnia and Kosovo where 
he had worked with Javier Solana, who suggested his appointment (Interview with French official, 8 
September 2005; Agence France Presse, 8 October 2001). Still, his predecessor was pleased ‘that it has 
been a Frenchman who had been chosen to succeed him’ (A ssem ble Nationale, 23 October 2001) -  
indicating a preference for a strong French role and representation in FYROM on the part of at least 
one government official.
73 The pursuit o f France’s international position -its rang (rank)- lies at the heart o f French foreign 
policy; both for seeking prestige as an end in itself as well as affirming France’s influence in the 
international system (Macleod, 2001: 144; see also Grosser, 1995).
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EU CFSP and negotiations conducted by representatives of the EU CFSP. Appointing 
a French national to conduct these negotiations, lastly, ensured influence on the EU 
CFSP.
The crisis in FYROM had symbolic value for the EU and its new crisis 
management tools. Given French preferences for a greater role for the EU in matters 
of security, the application of tools located within the EU CFSP/ESDP was quite 
important. In addition to taking a lead role in the EU CFSP through pushing for the 
appointment of a French EU Special Representative, Paris also sought to maintain 
national influence with respect to the management of the crisis by participating in the 
Contact Group, and by taking a lead within the EU in the initiation of policy 
proposals within the Franco-German summits. As in the case of Germany, the use of 
the Contact Group weakens the Europeanization hypothesis because it indicates 
considerations that support the alliance politics hypothesis and the role of the US in 
the mediation of the crisis -in  addition to preserving national influence on the 
outcome of the negotiations.
\
Alliance Politics
French foreign policy with respect to this policy area also exhibits some evidence of 
alliance politics, in particular the aim of keeping the US involved in European 
security. This is evident from visits to the US where the crisis in FYROM and 
American commitment to the Balkans more generally was discussed, and from the 
initiation of meetings of the Contact Group as forum of negotiations. Rather than a 
fundamental transatlantic preference, however, the underlying motivation for 
cooperation and for involving the US best fits the indicator of utilitarian reasons for 
involving the US.
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The crisis in FYROM coincided with the new Republican administration 
under George W. Bush, who had campaigned on pulling US troops out of the Balkans 
(Daalder, 2001). During Hubert Vedrine’s visit to Washington in 26 March 2001, the 
first after the new administration had taken office, the crisis in FYROM was 
discussed. Vedrine warned the US against removing troops from the region, and from 
disengaging from the Balkans. In press statements following his meeting with Colin 
Powell, Vedrine emphasized that the French and the EU position were close to that of 
the US: to assist Macedonian armed forces, and to pursue goals unilaterally but also 
through NATO. This shows that there was a strong interest on the part of France in 
keeping the US involved in the Western Balkans in general, and FYROM in 
particular.
France also pushed for action on the part of KFOR to secure the borders, and 
initially was in favour of extending KFOR’s mandate to extend to FYROM. To 
illustrate, during his visit to the US, foreign minister Vedrine stated that ‘we are keen 
to cooperate much and as well as we can in a whole series of areas’ including 
FYROM, and ‘we want to work together to find the solution to these problems, point 
by point, crisis by crisis (...). We wish to do so in a spirit of friendly, frankness and 
very open, intense and dynamic cooperation’ (Vedrine, 26 March 2001). Other than 
in the case of the UK or Germany, where cooperation with the US in this case has 
tended to be phrased in terms of a general transatlantic preference with an emphasis 
on the centrality of US-German/British relations, Vedrine’s phrasing does indicate 
neither blanket support for the US nor a fundamental transatlantic preference for 
resolving regional security issues. Instead, it reinforces the conclusion that the pursuit 
of a public profile for France the EU CFSP was of importance to French decision­
makers in this case.
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The analysis has shown that while there is evidence of Europeanization in this 
particular policy area, the use of parallel platforms of negotiations and the aim of 
retaining national influence mean that the pressure to adapt to any EU policy was low 
as France was quite influential in shaping policies both at the European level and in 
the framework of the Contact Group. Most evidence of Europeanization also points 
towards France using the EU platform for either leading in the formulation of EU 
responses through Franco-German summits in particular; or by successfully lobbying 
for the appointment as a high profile French national as EU Special Representative. 
France was also keen on involving and cooperating with the US in the crisis in order 
to ensure a peaceful outcome. This supports the alliance politics framework. Unlike 
Germany, however, the preference attached to the US was not framed as one of 
shared values or an instinctive transatlantic preference, but on account of utilitarian 
considerations. Continued US involvement in European security was regarded as 
important for stabilising the Balkans, including FYROM.
III. Policy area 2: Participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest
This section shows that French foreign policy with respect to the involvement in 
NATO Operation Essential Harvest exhibits evidence of alliance politics, primarily 
for the indicator of utilitarian reasons. The analysis of preferences of key participants 
in governmental process show that, as in the first policy area, Paris was keen to build 
on its previous investment in FYROM and the Western Balkans more generally. With 
respect to French participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest, this applies 
mostly to French military investment through NATO and bilateral military assistance 
rather than initiatives undertaken under the EU CFSP. In contrast to the two other 
countries analyzed in this thesis, France is not a member of the NATO Central
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Military Command but under President Chirac has normalised its relations with the 
alliance and has begun to reintegrate into the military structure of the Alliance in 
order to allow for French participation in combined operations in Bosnia under 
NATO command (Lansford, 2002: 128).74 This illustrates the difficult position of 
France vis-a-vis NATO and indicates utilitarian rather than fundamental preferences 
in the choice for NATO as well as French preferences for an early (and autonomous) 
ESDP take-over analyzed in the third policy area. As in the first policy area, there is 
no evidence of a general transatlantic preference or the aim of keeping the US 
involved in European security beyond utilitarian reasons.
The key participants in this policy area were President Chirac, Foreign 
Minister Vedrine and Minister of Defence Alain Richard. President Chirac 
participated in the international decision-making on a military intervention through 
NATO, EU and bi-lateral initiatives with Germany. Whereas there is no evidence of a 
fundamental disagreement over the use of NATO instruments as opposed to those 
located in the EU CFSP/ESDP, Chirac took pains to point out European cooperation 
within the NATO operation and to emphasize French national contributions -  
reinforcing the conclusion of France maintaining its rang and international status 
through the use of multilateral institutions (Treacher, 2003). Vedrine was present in 
the French-German summit where Leotard’s proposal was first discussed. Richard, 
lastly, as head of armed forces oversaw the actual military deployments.
As in the case of the first policy area, the Franco-German relationship proved 
a key platform for negotiating the terms of French (and German) engagement in the 
NATO Operations. At the summit in Freiburg on 12 June, Chirac’s suggestion on
74 Beyond Bosnia, Chirac’s move was also motivated by the realisation that ‘the French had to be on 
the inside of all aspects o f NATO to have any real influence in the Europe o f the future ( . . . ) ’ 
(Treacher, 2001:35). France came back to NATO because the organization had become a central 
security institution after the end of the Cold War. French policy makers, then, belatedly adjusted to 
geopolitical transformations (Menon, 1995).
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military cooperation with German units within NATO was confirmed by Schroder 
and put in place by the foreign and defence ministers of the two countries on July 5. 
Both countries cooperated in NATO Operation Essential Harvest - two German, two 
French and one Spanish companies were placed under overall French command 
(NATO, 16 December 2002). The two countries at the foreign minister level also 
discussed Leotard’s proposal for an EU force in Berlin on 5 September, although 
Foreign Minister Fischer did not endorse the plan but preferred an international force 
backed by a UN mandate (Financial Times, 6 September 2001). As has been shown 
in chapter 4, Germany’s position, although in principle in favour of the creation of 
ESDP and autonomous capabilities as well as a gradually expanding role for the EU 
CFSP and ESDP in the Balkans, depended to a great extent on the position of the US 
and on clearly defined arrangements between the EU and NATO on the use of assets. 
This indicated to French officials that the timing for the ESDP takeover was too 
early, and required further negotiations within the Franco-German alliance as well as 
the EU more broadly.
Europeanization
As is to be expected, there is little evidence of the Europeanization framework as 
policy decisions concerning French military commitments involved NATO, not the 
EU. As a result, the indicators of Europeanization developed in chapter 2 do not 
apply to the empirical material presented with respect to this particular policy area, as 
the use of instruments located within EU CFSP/ESDP was not considered. As is 
evident from the statements of Alain Richard and Jacques Chirac cited in the previous 
section, however, French official frequently framed the NATO Operation as a 
‘European action’ and a demonstration that Europe could act, even if an operation
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under the EU label had not yet materialized. This reflects a general and fundamental 
preference towards an EU approach, including the application of instruments located 
in the EU CFSP/ESDP. This preference is also reflected in the close Franco-German 
coordination on a military level even if this was not subsumed under an EU label. In 
addition, as chapter 4 has shown, the close military coordination with the French 
made the German military deployment more acceptable in Berlin.
Alliance Politics
This section argues that a number of indicators of alliance politics are applicable with 
respect to the second policy area. First, as in the first policy area, France had an 
interest in keeping the US involved in European security -  in particular because the 
incoming Bush administration had made it clear that it did not favour continued US 
deployment in the Balkans. This affirms the first indicator of alliance politics, where 
states align with NATO and the US to keep the US involved in European security. 
Second, and partly as a result, there were utilitarian considerations at play as well. 
NATO, based on its military possibilities and by virtue of already being in the area, 
was considered the more appropriate political and military institutions with respect to 
Operation Essential Harvest. However, this does not extend to the question of the 
extension of NATO Operation Essential Harvest, as the analysis in the third and final 
policy area will show.
Chirac’s input in decision-making on the international and NATO level built 
on previous French involvement as France through NATO, which had been active in 
FYROM prior to the onset of the crisis due to its commitment in KFOR. A French 
general, Marcel Valentin, had lead the extraction force XFOR in FYROM in 1999 
that was charged with protection the first deployments of KFOR in Kosovo. General
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Valentin was later given the command over KFOR, the first time a French general 
had been placed at the head of the entire KFOR mission rather than a particular sector 
-  in the case of France this had been Mitrovica (Interview with policy analyst, 10 
June 2005). Chirac accordingly highlighted French contributions and the situation in 
FYROM in his address to the NATO North Atlantic Council meeting where he stated 
that ‘with regard to the Balkans, and as a French general prepares to take over 
command of the KFOR, I would like to mention the dangers of the crisis affecting 
Macedonia (...). We must state clearly that we will not accept a new outbreak of 
violence (...) we must not preclude any form of actions needed to thwart such 
developments’ (Chirac, 13 June 2001). This shows that the priority of Chirac was to 
highlight France’s national commitments within NATO rather than moves to work 
outside the NATO framework. It also confirms two indicators of alliance politics: 
first, that of preference given to NATO for utilitarian reasons: NATO was considered 
the appropriate resource for reasons of prior involvement in the region. Second, that 
of preference given to NATO as an institutional forum -  France considered NATO as 
the primary forum for the solution of the crisis.
With respect to specific decisions and suggestions put forward within NATO, 
France initially suggested KFOR’s mandate should be changed to operate in FYROM 
in order to resolve the crisis. Alain Richard confirmed on 27 June that France was to 
contribute several hundred soldiers to the British-led mission, where, on 20 June 
Donald Rumsfeld had let it be understood that the European could keep this operation 
among themselves in light of Republican opposition in the Senate against direct 
engagement in the conflict. Alain Richard stated that ‘the operations in Macedonia 
are the first ones carried out and practically led exclusively by Europeans within the 
Alliance (...) which shows us that Europe is both politically and militarily ready to
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act’ (Richard, 2 October 2001). This again signals agreement on the part of key 
participants in the French government. As in the first policy area, there is no evidence 
of fundamental disagreement on the policy objective of French military lead in the 
NATO Operation with respect to NATO Operation Essential Harvest. The decision to 
participate in the NATO Operation, moreover, was uncontested among the 
participants involved.
With respect to the second policy area, the empirical evidence supports the 
alliance politics model more than it does the Europeanization model. France 
considered NATO the appropriate forum for the launch of Operation Essential 
Harvest, and contributed sizably to the mission. Although some members of the 
French government were keen to label this effort as proof of European capabilities 
and cooperation, these forces were under NATO command. This runs counter to the 
European hypothesis but confirms analyses of French post-Cold War foreign policy 
that stress France’s turn to multilateralism for the purpose of maintaining French 
influence (Macleod, 1999). It also confirms the assessment of an interviewee who 
stated that ‘France is more pragmatic towards NATO than it is given credit for. We 
will not stand in the way if NATO is the smarter solution’ (Interview with policy 
analyst, 10 June 2005).
IV. Policy area 3: The politics of the ESDP takeover from NATO
This section demonstrates that French policy decisions exhibit significant evidence of 
Europeanization, both in terms of a fundamental European preference but also by 
using the EU as a platform to push for the realization of national policy preferences. 
Consequently, the EU was of high political salience as a platform. France also 
adapted its policy preferences for autonomy from NATO to accommodate the
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progress and eventual use of ESDP instruments. Unsurprisingly, there is little 
evidence of alliance politics in this case.
The key participants in this policy area involve EUSR Leotard, President 
Chirac, the Quai d’Orsay led by Vedrine and the Ministry of Defence under Alain 
Richard. Within the French government structure, the Quai d’Orsay in particular was 
influential in pushing for an ESDP take-over. As for the Ministry of Defence, their 
influence is usually less pronounced in contrast to the President and the Foreign 
Ministry (Blunden, 2000). Within the Ministry of Defence, the Delegation aux affairs 
strategiques (DAS) under Marc Perrin de Brichambaud was quite influential although 
subordinated to the Quai d’Orsay (Interview with former German official, 8 February
2006). But, as far as the different branches of government were concerned, they were 
in agreement on the desirability of an ESDP take-over.
The suggestion for an ESDP take-over from NATO first arose from a 
proposal by EU Special Representative Leotard. Although the EU Special 
Representative does not serve in a national capacity but is to act on behalf of the EU, 
Leotard’s proposal for an EU force to take over from NATO in particular was said to 
have the backing of the French government. This also indicates that the motivations 
behind the proposal reflected France’s position on the issue of an EU takeover of the 
NATO mission in FYROM, and towards ESDP in general. All key participants in the 
governmental process supported an early handover from NATO to ESDP, and did not 
regard prior institutional arrangements between NATO and the EU as a prerequisite 
for the application of instruments located in ESDP, The next section will confirm in 
more detail that the Europeanization approach indeed explains French foreign policy 
behaviour.
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Europeanization
French actions and policy decisions confirm a number of indicators of the 
Europeanization hypothesis. The salience of the European agenda was high. This is 
demonstrated by France initiating the process through the initial suggestion in 
September 2001, and by the importance attached to the application of instruments 
located in the EU CFSP and ESDP. In fact, with respect to FYROM, the French 
position was to switch as much as possible over from NATO to EU, ‘because we 
have a policy in the Balkans, the EU is active in the Balkans, so the rationale was to 
take over -  we decided to have ESDP and should be ready for an operation in the 
Balkans’ (Interview with French official, 20 June 2005). French interest in an ESDP 
mission subsequently arose because at the time there was a trend towards a step-by- 
step increase of EU activities in the Balkans, plus a gradual disengagement of the US 
(Interview with French official, 29 June 2005).
Leotard’s proposal arose out of the security vacuum left by Operation 
Essential Harvest: a conflict that was to break out after a NATO operation expired 
would likely be more dramatic than the one just behind. His proposal stated that if the 
member states are in agreement, and NATO gives its logistical support, it should be 
possible to deploy a European force of between 1500 and 2000 words to protect the 
EU and OSCE observers (Financial Times, 6 September 2001). Leotard’s proposal 
stemmed from a consideration that was affirmed by a French official interviewed that 
‘we thought it would be possible to accomplish the task without NATO as it was a 
very small operation. From a military point of view, in the view of France, it was not 
necessary to use NATO but possible to put together an ad-hoc European-led group 
similar to Operation Alba in 1997’ (Interview with French official 20 June 2005).
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The finalization of the ‘Berlin-plus’ agreement was thus a political 
requirement from other members, notably Britain, rather than the reliance on ad hoc 
arrangements that Paris had in mind. Consequently, looking back on his appointment, 
Leotard stated that the cooperation with his American counterpart had been 
productive and that the US was conceding the EU the lead role in FYROM but noted 
that the EU was having difficulties to make visible its financial and economic lead 
role. He also expressed disappointment at not having succeeded in deploying the 
weapons collections mission under a European label, given that the forces were 
exclusively European, criticising aspirations of a Headline Goal for 60,000 forces in 
2003 if the EU was incapable of sending 1500 troops in 2001 (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 October 2001). This demonstrates that the preferences of the 
Foreign Ministry and the EUSR leaned towards the utilization of ESDP instruments. 
Neither of them considered institutional arrangements between the EU and NATO a 
prerequisite for launching an EU Operation, but the Foreign Ministry had to relent on 
this question on account of British and German opposition. As for the Ministry of 
Defence, Alain Richard ‘had looked at the EU side especially after Colin Powell 
indicated that there would be no problem if the EU wanted to step in’ (Interview with 
policy analyst, 10 June 2005). This shows that the views of the Ministry of Defence 
on this matter were identical with that of the Foreign Ministry.
The consensus of the different branches of government on this issue also 
indicates that policy elites favoured the application of ESDP instruments and thereby 
confirms the indicator of the existence of norms and preferences that point towards 
Europeanization. The stated preference among French elite was to gain European 
autonomy from NATO in the case of FYROM. One official interviewed stated ‘we 
thought at the beginning that it would be possible to do it without NATO because it
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was a very small operation. And, in fact, from a military point of view it was not 
necessary to use NATO. But it was, let’s say, a political requirement from the British 
and other members (Interview with French official, 20 June 2005). This statement 
was echoed by a member of the French Ministry of Defence: ‘do not overestimate 
that the EU wasn’t ready, Europeans were able to do the job’ (Interview with French 
official, 11 July 2005). Also, an outside observer confirmed the existence of a 
national consensus and a homogenous public opinion on this issue: from the point of 
view of Paris, ‘NATO was in Kosovo, France supported this because it was 
necessary, but really this was seen as scandalous -  it’s an old reflex; France is not 
pragmatic like the US or the UK, but orthodox’ (Interview with German official, 8 
August 2005).
Finally, French policy decisions also reflected the relaxation of traditional 
positions to accommodate the progress of EU projects, in this case the first ESDP 
mission. In the face of British and German objections to ad-hoc arrangements 
between the EU and NATO, France compromised on its initial preference to push for 
European autonomy and for making NATO less relevant - in the view of one official 
‘it had always been clear that it was really about these two issues’ (Interview with 
former German official, 8 February 2006). Finally, deteriorating relations between 
the UK and France on matters of ESDP may have contributed not only to France’s 
early push for an ESDP operation but also to the delay in the decision altogether as 
well as Paris’ compromise on the timing and shape of the ESDP mission. By the 
summer of 2001, France had -rightly or wrongly- concluded that the UK had given 
up on ESDP, and Marc Perrin de Brichambaud denounced the UK for destroying 
ESDP in October 2001, thereby provoking London (Interview with UK expert, 17 
June 2005). Relations between Paris and London with respect to ESDP, therefore,
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had reached a low point also on account of the fact that some of the UK officials 
working on ESDP had been rotated and the formerly good working relationship 
between France and the UK on this matter had deteriorated (Howorth 2004).
Alliance Politics
Given the overwhelming evidence of Europeanization in this particular policy area, it 
is perhaps not surprising that there are there is little evidence in French decision­
making that would point towards alliance politics. In addition to the general absence 
of a fundamental transatlantic preference on the part of France, which has been 
evident from policy behaviour in the first two policy areas, NATO at least initially 
was not considered of utilitarian value in this case. The military operation was small 
enough for the EU member states to manage its execution on their own.
Following the rejection of Leotard’s proposal, Foreign Minister Vedrine at the 
foreign minister meetings in Genval near Brussels stated that there should be an 
international force under a UN mandate. France preferred that NATO should remain 
to lead a military force to protect foreign observers in FYROM, rather than a UN 
force, which the Macedonian government preferred in order to dilute what it 
perceived as a pro-Albanian bias on the part of the West. Vedrine then also rejected 
Leotard’s proposal of an EU force, stating that ‘if the new European security and 
defence arrangements were organized enough for this mission, it would be a good 
idea. But because it isn’t quite ready yet, I think it is more sensible, easier and more 
practical to act in a NATO framework’ (Agence France Presse, 8 September 2001). 
This was also the rejection of an ad hoc coalition, and concessions in favour of 
clearly worked out institutional structures. Still, in principle, Vedrine’s statement 
reflects a fundamental preference for an EU mission. And, Leotard’s resignation to
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Solana on 10 September signalled the existence of disagreements in the EU and the 
NAC on further steps in FYROM after NATO completes Operation Essential 
Harvest, with a news agency citing French sources as noting that ‘NATO’s leadership 
preserves full political control over pursuing the West’s policy in the Balkans’ 
(ITAR-TASS News Agency, 10 September 2001). However, US logistical support 
supplied via a NATO base in FYROM, mostly transport and intelligence-gathering, 
was still crucial (The Economist, 15 September 2001). This then supports one 
indicator of alliance politics, that of NATO being given preference for utilitarian 
reasons -  in absence of a consensus on the deployment of an ESDP operation.
The preferences of individual policy makers involved in this decision as well 
as their stated and underlying preferences thus demonstrate that French foreign policy 
with respect to the third policy area exhibits strong evidence of Europeanization: the 
EU ESDP was considered the appropriate political and military instrument for 
addressing the security vacuum resulting from the end of NATO Operation Essential 
Harvest. The fact that this consideration had its roots in the symbolism attached to an 
EU-label and the overall, often stated preferences, of developing the EU into a 
foreign and security policy actor, underlines the fundamental preference of French 
policy makers with respect to the application of instruments located in the EU 
CFSP/ESDP. Given British and German objection to this idea, French relenting to 
the Berlin Plus agreement and continued engagement of NATO can also be 
interpreted as national adaptation to make possible the progress on a European policy, 
even if this did not reflect original French preferences. Evidence of alliance politics is 
present only insofar as NATO was considered the appropriate institutional framework 
for utilitarian reasons, and after the initial suggestion of an ESDP operation had been 
rejected.
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V. Conclusion
This chapter has shown that there is strong evidence of Europeanization of French 
foreign policy in this case. At the time, there was a trend towards a step-by-step 
increase of EU commitment in the Balkans, plus a gradual disengagement of the US 
in the region - with the exception of Kosovo and, to a lesser extent, Bosnia. The 
suggestion and subsequent debate over an EU rather than a NATO mission for 
FYROM reveals different national perceptions and preferences on ESDP. Whereas 
Britain insists on ESDP being as close as possible to NATO, for France this should 
be done only when necessary -  ‘and in the case of FYROM it did not seem to be 
necessary’ (Interview with French official, 20 June 2005). The resulting French 
position was that the EU must be a security actor. Therefore, France pushed the 
agenda to show that the EU could do so and is an actor beyond the civil-political 
aspect of crisis management. For France, the crisis in FYROM was an opportunity to 
show that the Europeans could take responsibility both in terms of the success of the 
mission as well as through value added: an integration strategy as opposed to a purely 
military approach. The EU was the most powerful tool politically in FYROM, 
although the US helped -  this was particularly important given the limited credibility 
of the EU on the ground. And, the risk of failure of an ESDP operation was low, 
given the small size of the mission and the conclusion of the Ohrid Peace Agreement 
and relatively successful implementation. France was the main contributor to 
Concordia with 193 men out of 424 in total, which was commanded by a French 
General, Maral.
In conclusion, France did use the EU CFSP in the crisis in FYROM as a 
platform to further its agenda for a larger role for the EU that would include military
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operations, and to shape EU policies towards FYROM. The aim was also to 
capitalize on the St Malo process to hurry along the process - therefore the suggestion 
of an EU operation under ESDP. Also, the European perspective including eventual 
EU membership for the individual countries in the Western Balkans was gradually 
emerging for the region and broad parameters for region were thus being set. France 
tried to influence EU policy and increase its own profile in particular through the 
appointment of a Special Representative. Thus, there was a clear and early choice for 
Europe, including a military dimension, with broader regional view and the EU’s role 
in the region that affirms the applicability of the Europeanization concept to explain 
French policy choices.
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Chapter 7. France and the war in Afghanistan
I. Introduction
This chapter argues that unlike the case of FYROM, where the Europeanization 
model offers a convincing explanatory framework for French decision-making, this 
does not apply in the case the war in Afghanistan. Instead, French reactions to the 
terrorist attacks on 11 September and the resulting military measures against 
Afghanistan were marked by a set of interrelated themes: military participation in the 
war in Afghanistan as a show both of solidarity with the US but also as an assertion 
of national influence and personal prestige on the part of President Chirac; a central 
role assigned to the UN and a fundamentally multilateral conception of the 
appropriate response to the fight against terrorism, the war and reconstruction of 
Afghanistan; the need for a broader ‘European’ counterterrorism strategy that 
involved EU CFSP and ESDP instruments; and domestic concerns over the impact of 
a war against Islamic terrorism in light of the size of the French Muslim population 
and French vulnerability to Islamic terrorism previous to 11 September (Assemblee 
Nationale, 12 December 2001:47). The nature of the conflict, the privileged position 
of the UN as a multilateral forum to sanction the use of military force and to co­
ordinate the reconstruction of the country, and the primacy of US preferences in 
what was perceived as a legitimate case of self-defence against a terrorist attack 
meant that the EU CFSP and ESDP did not hold as privileged a position in French 
political considerations as it did in the case of FYROM. As far as the European 
security architecture was concerned, the effects of 11 September were perceived as 
reinforcing the developments put in motion by the St. Malo process. However, ESPD 
was not advocated on the part of the French government or used as a political or 
military tool in the war against Afghanistan. There was no appetite for pushing for an
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EU label in what was, essentially, a transatlantic moment and a conflict where a 
European approach was regarded as of little added value. Although the 
Europeanization approach does not lend itself for an explanation of France’s military 
contribution to the war on terror, it goes some way to explain decisions taken in the 
wider anti-terrorism campaign and in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Formulating 
an EU response to international terrorism and the war and reconstruction of 
Afghanistan was of salience, although these considerations do not apply to the 
military measures taken in the war in Afghanistan per se. While this weakens the 
Europeanization hypothesis in favour of the alliance politics model, neither of the two 
approaches can adequately account for the privileged role of the UN and the strong 
multilateral impulse in French national foreign policy in this case.
II. Policy area 1: OEF and the war on terror
This section argues that French contributions to OEF were motivated first and 
foremost by considerations of solidarity with the US. The alliance politics 
framework, understood as the recognition of the US’ right to self-defence in light of 
the terrorist attacks as well as the need for a transatlantic stance against international 
terrorism that included a military component, offers a strong explanation for French 
policies in this case. However, the alliance politics framework does not account for 
the strong multilateral impulse in French foreign policy in this case, which accorded a 
central role for the legal sanctioning of the intervention as well as measures against 
international terrorism more broadly to the United Nations. The role and visibility of 
the European Union did hold a prominent place in French political considerations as 
well, demonstrating that French moves to have the EU play a part in the political 
response to international terrorism support the Europeanization hypothesis -  even if 
this does not apply to decisions concerning the military contributions to OEF itself.
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Domestically, the impending elections in the first half of 2002 made the war in 
Afghanistan an important opportunity for elected members of the French government, 
notably President Chirac, to show public leadership in order to increase chances of 
re-election.
The key participants in this policy area involved President Chirac and Prime 
Minister Jospin as well as the foreign ministry under Hubert Vedrine. Unlike in the 
case of FYROM, where there was broad consensus among the different branches of 
government on a strong French role, participation in OEF and the war on terror 
provided a key opportunity for Chirac to increase his personal profile vis-a-vis the 
centre-left government under Prime Minister Jospin in light of the impending 
elections in 2002. Domestic electoral concerns thus played a role in the presentation 
if not the formulation of these policies for the President, especially where military 
participation in OEF was concerned.
There were nuances among the key players in the French government in 
accenting the relative weight of the UN, solidarity with the US and the use of the 
European platform to negotiate solutions to international terror and coordinate 
military responses with its major EU allies. President Chirac equally highlighted 
French solidarity with the US and initiated the French lead in drafting a UNSC 
Resolution. Foreign Minister Vedrine, on the other hand, emphasized multilateralism 
and the geographic restriction of military measures to Afghanistan. The Jospin 
government, lastly, was more critical of the US and military operations and 
highlighted the societal implications of the war on terror on the French Muslim 
population. However, the basic position of the centrality of the UN for legal 
sanctioning of the military measures against Afghanistan and for coordinating the 
subsequent reconstruction of the country; and of the need of solidarity -also due to
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invocation of Article V of the NATO treaty -  with the US and the participation in 
military measures were shared among the relevant members of the French 
government and there was no significant friction.
While opinions on the appropriate response to the attacks, military 
participation in OEF sanctioned by a UN Security Council Resolution, was broadly 
shared among members of the French government, there were nuances in the 
positions and preferences of the key government figures. Foreign Minister Hubert 
Vedrine in particular drew attention to concerns over US multilateralism a la carte 
and the potential geographic expansion of the military strikes to include Iraq, whereas 
president Chirac initially highlighted French solidarity with the US and military 
contributions to the US-led war on terror. This supports the argument that while 
France remains a strong ally of the US, it is equally ready to contest US domination 
and to assume the costs associated with such a policy (Tardy, 2003: 107). The 
importance of the UN as a means to multilateralize the war on terror and the 
significance of French efforts to that effect as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council was shared by all members of the government, however, and 
reinforces the argument that maintaining global influence by means of multilateral 
institutions represents a key goal for France (Treacher, 2003).
Preferences on the part of the President, on the other had, focussed on gaining 
personal clout domestically and internationally, and were weighed differently from 
that of the foreign minister, who was more vocal in his concern about formulating a 
multilateral approach to the fight against terrorism, Chirac’s personal standing 
through high profile visits and meetings also suggest that in addition to concerns over 
France’s global standing with respect to the US and the formulation to a political 
response to the war on terror, at least one initial instinct on the part of the French
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President was to increase his personal standing publicly as well as internationally 
with regards to the US in addition rather than the preference for a particular 
institutional venue. Although the need for solidarity with the US was shared across 
the political spectrum and military contributions to the war against terror broadly 
supported domestically, the show of solidarity on the part of President Chirac resulted 
in accusations that Chirac was using this as a photo-op in light of impending 
elections, sidelining other actors in the French government and the EU, including the 
EU Presidency, Belgium (BBC Monitoring Europe, 19 October 2001).
Prime Minister Jospin stated that while France would not ‘shirk its 
responsibilities’ it would reserve the right to make ‘a free judgment about French 
participation in a military engagement’ (cited in Gordon and Suzan, 2002:1). This 
also shows that while Jospin’s socialist government also broadly supported the war 
against terror, Jospin was more nuanced with respect to solidarity with the US. The 
French government was therefore careful not to frame the conflict as a clash of 
civilizations (Assemblee Nationale, 3 October 2001). For France, the future of 
Afghanistan and the international policy towards Afghanistan was also explicitly 
contingent on the broader geopolitical conditions that included Pakistan, Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia (Assemblee Nationale, 12 December 2001: 66).
France put 22 combat aircraft at the disposal at the US, and was the only other 
country besides the US to operate combat aircraft in Afghanistan, carrying out 
bombing missions as part o f ‘Operation Anaconda’. France also made available the 
Charles de Gaulle carrier battle group (US Department of Defence, 14 June 2002). 
France also, together with Britain, provided special forces -  but made clear in 
meetings with Blair that a wider war against terrorism involving Iraq and Egypt 
would be difficult to maintain in light of France’s historic links in the Middle East
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and North Africa (The Observer, 23 September 2001), hinting early on French 
opposition to US plans to widen the scope of military attacks to Iraq, for instance. 
Accordingly, a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the question of US 
attacks on other countries said that ‘if the US asks for a strike elsewhere, we will 
have to retain our authority to consider it’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 October 
2001).
Following the change of government after the presidential elections in April 
and May 2002, French leadership became more outspoken against the geographical 
extension of the ‘war’ on terror to Iraq. The new foreign minister de Villepin stated 
that ‘no military action can be conducted without a Security Council decision. That's 
a principle from which France can't depart’ (de Villepin, 27 August 2002). Chirac 
explained the French position in an interview with the New York Times as based on 
the importance of multilateralism; prevention rather than preventive action; and 
emphasis on the negative repercussions of a war in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict (Chirac, 8 September 2002). Although this does not apply to the war in 
Afghanistan directly, the two statements do illustrate that the President and the 
Foreign Ministry had come to pursue a similar political line on the war on terror 
following the presidential elections that emphasized the need for multilateral 
measures and a broader conception to the war on terror rather than a continued 
emphasis on solidarity with the US.
In addition to the military contributions to the war on terror and relations with 
the US, France also pursued policies through the UN, which was a vital platform for 
Paris to formulate multilateral policies towards OEF and the war in Afghanistan. The 
UNSC resolution 1368 sanctioning OEF and the toppling of the Taliban regime was a 
joint initiative of France and the UK (Chirac, 16 November 2001), initiated by Chirac
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in response to the attacks on 11 September as France held the rotating presidency in 
the UN Security Council that month (New York Times, 8 September 2002). This 
reflected the preference for a multilateral approach on the part of France and the 
search for a political solution to the fight against terrorism. It also affirms that the 
political priorities beyond solidarity with the US were a fundamental preference for 
multilateral solutions.
Europeanization
With regard to the military participation in OEF, there is only weak evidence of 
Europeanization of French foreign policy. As demonstrated in the preceding section, 
the primary impulse for French policy makers was that of solidarity with the US and 
the importance of a multilateral approach to the conflict. The UN constituted the most 
important multilateral forum to sanction military action against Afghanistan as well 
as political actions in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Considerations of the EU 
CFSP were subordinated to these fundamental impulses.
The use of the EU as a political platform resulted in charges of increasing 
Chirac’s personal profile in the run-up to the mini-summit in Ghent between France, 
Germany and Britain. The meeting was called by Chirac in order to discuss military 
contributions to the war on terror, a meeting that was also attended by Prime Minister 
Jospin. The tri-lateral meeting did not directly result in a policy proposal, and did 
nothing to further the appearance of EU unity: rather, the Ghent summit ‘was a 
disaster, with the Union appearing both marginalised and crippled by internal 
bickering. After the summit, the UK, France and Germany all insisted that the 
Taliban government had to be toppled, thus effectively disowning a common EU 
declaration advising that the West should not impose a government on Afghanistan’ 
(Peterson, 2002: 6). The Belgian EU Presidency was disappointed at the meeting and
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critical of President Chirac who, ‘presumably for electoral reasons’ had publicized 
the separate meeting -  and in fact, since the attacks of 11 September and statements 
and US visits by Chirac, his popularity had increased, while that of his rival, Lionel 
Jospin, had fallen (BBC Monitoring Europe, 19 October 2001). Chirac attending 
Blair’s Downing Street Dinner in early November 2001 similarly gave the impression 
of EU disunity, although Peterson (2002: 6) notes that ‘what matters most about the 
meeting was its original purpose -to  agree the essential points of a common European 
line ahead of Chirac’s visit to Washington- and its success in agreeing such a line.’ 
Chirac did communicate to Bush that Europe supported two basic positions with 
respect to Afghanistan: Europe would support the military campaign as long as it was 
limited to Afghanistan, accompanied by a humanitarian aid effort and a post-Taliban 
scenario agreed collectively by the Western allies; and the UN had to play a leading 
role in post-war Afghanistan (Peterson 2002). This demonstrates that Chirac aimed 
to speak for Europe, but also that formulating a European position was of importance 
for the President. Nevertheless, this did not result in policies adopted under the EU 
CFSP and illustrates the difference between a ‘common’ and a ‘single’ foreign policy 
(Patten, 17 October 2001).
As in the case of FYROM, the Franco-German relationship as a means to 
initiating policy proposals was a second platform for formulating French policy 
responses within the EU CFSP. France together with Germany brought an action plan 
to the Foreign Minister’s meeting in Luxemburg on October 8 with the aim to define 
a EU position and to initiate an common political strategy for the EU. The final 
statement subsequently read that ‘the military action being taken is one part of a 
wider multilateral strategy in which the European Union is committed to playing its
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part. This involves a comprehensive assault on the organisations and financing 
structures that underpin terrorism’ (General Affairs Council, 8 October 2001).
This shows that the EU platform was used to submit proposals previously 
formulated with Germany, highlighting the role of bilateral relations with another 
member state. With respect to the underlying motivations these moves do serve as 
evidence of one indicators of Europeanization: that of the salience for the European 
agenda, where the application of EU CFSP instruments is deemed important on the 
part of policy decision makers.
Apart from these instrumental considerations with respect to the EU’s role in 
the fight against terrorism, there is also some evidence of norms and preferences 
among elites that favoured if not the application of EU instruments then at least the 
progress of those instruments in light of the war in Afghanistan. This is apparent from 
concerns voiced over the fate of ESDP in light of changed geo-strategic realities: for 
instance, the fate of the nascent ESDP and the concept of I ’Europe de la defence was 
of concern in the National Assembly insofar as the British contribution to the war in 
Afghanistan and the close position to the US in the emerging question of a conflict 
with Iraq could potentially put in question the concept of a European defence -  an 
interpretation the government denied with reference to the Laeken summit where 
ESDP had been declared operational (Assemblee Nationale, 18 February 2002). The 
existence of such sentiments in turn demonstrates the centrality of ESDP and the 
concept of an autonomous defence in the wider governmental process, and the value 
and preferences attached to a European approach to security and defence.
However, the fact that EU action towards the war on terror did not go beyond 
statements of solidarity with the US and the conceptualization of a larger multilateral 
strategy in the war on terrorism through judicial means that were taken up by the
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Spanish EU presidency in the first half of 2002, do not demonstrate evidence of the 
other indicators of Europeanization developed in chapter 2. Similarly, the mini­
summits, although intended to co-ordinate activities of the big three member states, 
did not result in policies adopted under the EU CFSP. There is no evidence of France 
compromising on national considerations or preferences in order to adhere to 
common objectives, and the EU did not constitute a cover through which to pursue 
national objectives. Instead, while the European agenda was of some salience for 
French policy makers, and while the EU CFSP constituted an institutional platform 
through which to reinforce French national preferences, the EU was not considered 
the central political platform. Rather, this fell to the UN.
Alliance Politics
In contrast, alliance politics considerations, expressed as solidarity with the US and 
the recognition that this was essentially a US-led war, offer a convincing explanatory 
framework for French policy actions as they concern participation in OEF. The 
professed solidarity with the United States supports one indicator of alliance politics: 
that of states aligning with the US out of a transatlantic preference and solidarity with 
the US, which was reinforced by the invocation of article V. Importantly, however, 
this does not restrict itself to NATO as an institution exclusively but to US 
preferences on the nature of allies’ contributions and French-American relations more 
broadly. The invocation of Article V of the NATO treaty made this a case of 
collective defence and a matter of alliance politics in the first place. It also made the 
military contribution to OEF uncontested. To illustrate, Mr. Valero of the Foreign 
Ministry was cited in the press as stating ‘it’s a case of legitimate self-defence, the 
Americans call the shots here’ (The Irish Times, 6 March 2002).
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Meetings between French and US officials following the attacks on 11 
September provided one platform for negotiating French participation in the war on 
terror. President Chirac was the first head of state to visit Washington on 18 
September where he declared French solidarity and offered military contributions to a 
US-led war against terrorism in Afghanistan. The emphasis on military assistance 
without ‘a blank cheque’ and the condition of France being consulted in advance 
about the objectives of military action (Gordon and Suzan, 2002) signalled that 
France was unwilling to go along with a geographic expansion of the military 
operations against terrorism to other countries or regions. Significant military 
participation in OEF was, however, not in question and justified to the public as the 
need for solidarity and the price for freedom and dignity in the face of terrorism 
(Chirac, 7 October 2001). France played a major role in the air campaign and 
contributed substantially to OEF, although there was some consternation among the 
educated public and intellectual policy circles about the relatively minor military role 
assigned to France on the part of the US (Moisi, 9 October 2001; Lansford, 2002), 
with Britain being called upon to a much greater extent.
In addition to military measures, the solidarity with the US was also expressed 
on a public level, with the French newspaper Le Monde declaring in response to the 
attacks of 11 September that ‘we are all American’ (Le Monde, 13 September 2001), 
and Chirac affirming that ‘France has placed itself at the side of the American people. 
Out of friendship, out of solidarity. But also because we know that all democracies 
are in danger when one of them is struck in the heart like this.’ (Chirac, Paris, 16 
November 2001). Vedrine stated that the French government approved of the 
American reaction not only out of solidarity but because of the shared political 
objectives ‘to cut the terrorist network of Bin Laden.’ (Vedrine, Assemblee
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Nationale, 9 October 2001). Although foreign minister Vedrine later criticized the US 
for a post-11 September ‘simplistic attitude’ following Bush’s state of the Union 
address on 29 January 2002 that included the ‘axis of evil’ metaphor, and emphasis 
on the ‘war’ on terrorism and the need for ‘pre-emptive action’,75 the initial 
preference on the part of the French government was solidarity with the US, visibility 
for French military contributions, and a public profile for President Chirac.
US preference towards requesting assistance from individual NATO allies 
supports the alliance politics indicator of states adhering to US preferences, even if 
the US did not choose to involve NATO as a whole in the military operation. With 
respect to specific French actions, France’s offer at a NATO Ambassadors’ meeting 
on 8 October 2001 to provide increased support by French AWACS aircraft in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as backfill in order to facilitate the deployment of five NATO 
AWACS aircraft requested by the US to assist with counterterrorist operations 
(NATO Press Release, 8 October 2001) illustrates France’s practical military support 
for the US. This also means that conceptually, alliance politics understood as NATO 
the institution only does not suffice but must be extended to include individual 
countries’ relations with the US. The fact that Chirac pledged military assistance out 
of solidarity with the US in light of the terrorist attacks and shared military goals with 
respect to OEF Afghanistan also indicates that participation in OEF was based on 
more than merely the legal obligation due to the invocation of article V.
While offering a convincing explanatory framework for France’s military
participation in OEF, the alliance politics framework is less applicable with respect to
broader political measures to combat international terrorism in the case of the war
against Afghanistan. There is no evidence of France regarding the crisis as a platform
75 Vedrine was cited as stating that ‘today we are threatened by a new simplistic approach that reduces 
all the problems in the world to the struggle against terrorism (reported in International Herald 
Tribune, 7 February 2002).
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for NATO to prove its post-Cold War relevance or of an inherent preference towards 
NATO over other institutional settings. For one, NATO as a primarily military 
alliance was not considered the appropriate platform for political measures. Secondly, 
although cooperation with the US, including an increase in intelligence sharing 
(Shapiro, 2002), in broader measures against international terrorism and the capture 
of Taliban leaders was not contested, the UN in particular was considered vital for 
launching multilateral measures and policies -  indicating the fundamentally 
multilateral conception of the best way in which to combat international terrorism.
III. Policy area 2: Afghanistan’s reconstruction
This section demonstrates that with regard to Afghanistan’s reconstruction there is 
some evidence of Europeanization in French foreign policy decisions, although the 
Europeanization approach only partly accounts for French policy decisions in this 
case. Given the primarily political rather than military nature of the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan and the decisions pertaining to it, the alliance politics model has little 
value in explaining policy decisions in this particular policy area.
The key participants in this policy area are President Chirac and the Foreign 
Ministry. With regard to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the political approach 
taken -  an overall UN umbrella to organize the reconstruction with a political role for 
the EU to raise its political and economic profile in Afghanistan -  was uncontested 
among the branches of the French government. On 1 October the government through 
Foreign Minister Vedrine presented a plan on the humanitarian and political aspects 
of reconstruction of Afghanistan that contributed to the international effort in these 
matters and helped orient and define the work of the UN as set out later in UNSC 
Resolution 1378 (Assemblee Nationale, 21 November 2001), which was also 
highlighted by the President (Chirac, 6 November 2001). At the 8 October foreign
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minister meeting in Luxembourg, France pushed a detailed option that involved 
setting up an ‘interim structure’ under the UN to tackle the most urgent consequences 
of the crisis, after which a transitional administration representing all Afghan factions 
should be set up. According to this plan, the EU would help with the reconstruction 
programme, coordinated by a group set up under the UN and bringing together all the 
countries bordering Afghanistan (Press Association, 8 October 2001). The UN thus 
had a central role in French conceptions of a political solution for Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction, although the European Commission was considered to play a central 
role in the reconstruction of the country.
As for bilateral relations between Paris and Kabul, France hosted President 
Karzai on his first official visit to a European country, and the first visit of an Afghan 
official to France since 1965 to underscore Afghanistan’s close relations with Europe 
(Agence France Press, 27 February 2002). France also pledged significant bilateral 
aid for Afghanistan’s reconstruction: €27.5 million were pledged in Bonn, targeted 
specifically towards projects of education and agriculture and supplemented by €20 
million also for saving Afghanistan’s cultural heritage (Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 2 
March 2002). France also undertook bilateral assistance and assumed leadership for 
setting up the Afghan parliament.
Europeanization
For France, the EU CFSP represented an important and relevant platform through 
which to give the EU a voice in Afghanistan and through which to highlight the EU’s 
efforts in the country’s reconstruction. This included both economic and political 
efforts and thus the application of instruments located in pillar 1 and pillar 2 were 
concerned. As in the case of OEF and ISAF, however, the involvement of the UN
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held a central place in French political considerations under which EU involvement 
was subsumed. This, in addition to a number of national contributions to 
Afghanistan’s reconstruction that did not serve to underline a common EU line, such 
as taking responsibility for helping to set up a parliament, and bilateral financial aid 
as a basis of French assistance, means that the Europeanization hypothesis is not an 
all-encompassing explanatory approach in this case but only accounts for parts of 
French political considerations in this case.
France did not object to but supported the German proposal on the 
appointment of a EUSR, and did highlight the substantial financial contributions of 
the EU Commission. Together with early proposals on action plans for Afghanistan 
that were brought to the Foreign Minister meeting and European Council following 
the attacks on 11 September, this also suggests a salience of the EU agenda and can 
be argued to reflect a French preference in favour of a strong political profile for the 
EU in this case. Unlike Germany, where the EU platform constituted an important 
institutional venue through which to ‘upload’ German policy preferences and to 
increase Germany’s clout in this particular policy area, however, uploading specific 
policy preferences, or ensuring a strong national influence on the formulation of EU 
politics was not as important a consideration for France.
The EU, meanwhile, also represented an important platform to push for and 
propose political actions for the EU CFSP, again through the formulation of policy 
proposals through the Franco-German relationship. At the EU summit, France and 
Germany proposed that Afghanistan’s former king become a national figurehead and 
called for UN role in reshaping of Afghanistan (CNN.com, 17 October 2001). The 
UN was thus perceived as the prime multilateral institution to oversee the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan. Chirac agreed with Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN Special
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Representative about ‘absolute priority must be given to putting in place a political 
solution and to take into account the humanitarian drama that risks unfolding if we do 
not do all that is necessary to prepare all that is essential’ (Chirac, 8 November 2001). 
Chirac also stated that the solution prepared by France and the UK that was to be 
voted on 15/16 November was important not because it would solve everything, but 
because it ‘will confirm the authority of the United Nations to put in place a political 
solution to the Afghan problem. ’ (Chirac, 8 November 2001). This call for a UN role 
was repeated Prime Minister Jospin, who urged quick action by the UN for a peaceful 
transition in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban (Agence France Presse, 13 
November 2001). Subsequently, France fully supported the Bonn process and the 
political state building process that this necessitated and that the international 
community, France included, would support.
Importantly, however, the reconstruction of Afghanistan was organized under 
an UN umbrella, and the UN therefore represented for France the prime multilateral 
forum under which the international community should act, even if the EU was to 
play a part in this. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, moreover, 
France had more latitude to influence the UN’s response and as a result also the 
global approach to the conflict and the country’s reconstruction As this was 
considered a global rather than a regional problem -  both terrorism and the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan -  that to a significant extent involved non-European 
powers (unlike FYROM, which essentially represented a regional crisis), the UN was 
the natural forum for resolving questions of the reconstruction of Afghanistan and 
there was no conflict between the UN and the EU in this case but the primacy of the 
UN was not contested.
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French policies towards the post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan built on 
previous engagement in Afghanistan and were not all conducted through multilateral 
channels. And, the fact that France took on the lead in setting up parliament -  a 
national, rather than an EU endeavour -  means that there was also a national profile 
apart from the roles of the UN and the EU that had importance in this case. This was 
also due to the fact that countries taking a lead in a particular field of specialisation 
reflected a pragmatic approach rather than developing separate EU -or multilateral- 
policies for these cases, which would have been time-consuming and would have 
delayed the dispersal of aid -  in addition to the factor of national prestige and 
signalling national commitments to Afghanistan on the part of the French 
government. The fact that not all economic and political assistance was subsumed 
under an EU label but was publicly highlighted and explicitly framed as national 
contributions to the reconstruction of Afghanistan does not support the 
Europeanization approach: the EU was one political tool among many, and there is 
no evidence of national preferences being compromised or adapted in favour or in 
light of EU adaptation pressures.
Alliance Politics
One recurring theme with respect to this policy area was that of a division of labour 
and burden sharing between the US and other industrial countries and the EU - the 
US had borne responsibility for providing security and expected others to take the 
lead in the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan (Balaj, 2002:44). This meant that 
the EU, but most importantly the UN, was afforded a more significant place in 
national decision-making where the reconstruction of Afghanistan was concerned 
than was the case in the military operations OEF and ISAF. This has served to
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reinforce the Europeanization hypothesis both in terms of the salience of EU 
economic instruments and the political goal to highlight and make visible the EU’s 
contribution in order to increase the EU’s political visibility and room for influence. 
At the same time, this means that the alliance politics framework has no explanatory 
value in this case.
IV. Policy area 3: French participation in ISAF
This section argues that alliance politics considerations, understood both as French- 
US relations and bilateral relations with other NATO members, go a long way in 
explaining French policy decisions in this case. The question of an ‘EU force’, while 
attractive for policy makers in principle particularly as a way to ‘sell’ ISAF 
politically as an EU action, did not result in policy actions in reality or even in 
concrete policy proposals to that effect. Instead, this question did not go beyond 
initial discussions that arose out of considerations brought forward by EUSR Klaus 
Klaiber on ways to raise the EU’s political profile in the war in Afghanistan.
As in the first policy area, key participants include the President, Foreign 
Ministry and the Ministry of Defence. Compared to French participation in OEF, 
military contributions to ISAF were comparatively small, as Paris agreed to a force of 
550: headquarters staff, battalion HQ, infantry company and others (United Press 
International, 10 January 2002). Having secured a UNSC Resolution for setting up 
ISAF, French support for the construction of the force itself was not in question. 
However, among allies there were diverging positions on th$ question of the 
institutional anchoring of ISAF, its geographic scope and the role of NATO in overall 
ISAF command.
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On the question of an EU force, this was discussed informally, and there were 
some differences between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence: 
‘whereas the military favoured an EU format for practical reasons, the Quai d’Orsay 
from a political standpoint was towards NATO’ - albeit cautiously due to ‘the 
geographic reach of the mission and the signal it would send towards the Muslim 
world to have NATO operating in Afghanistan’ (Interview with policy analyst, 10 
June 2005). In contrast to the crisis in FYROM, where two branches of government, 
the foreign ministry and the ministry of defence, were in agreement that an EU force 
was expedient and appropriate but compromised the idea on account of the 
preferences of Britain and Germany, there did exist differences of opinion within the 
French government on this question. But, importantly, for the foreign ministry the 
war in Afghanistan was not regarded as a European conflict where the EU could 
make a difference politically through an EU-force (Interview with policy analyst, 10 
June 2005). The aim of coordination with the preferences of the US and other allies 
as well as the nature of the conflict itself meant that an EU format was not considered 
practical in this case and the foreign ministry prevailed in the question of institutional 
format for ISAF.
France also took the position that ISAF should not expand beyond Kabul, 
signalling differences with the UN as well as EUSR Klaiber on the nature of the 
mandate as well as the geographical scope of ISAF as both Brahimi and Klaiber were 
in favour of an expansion beyond Kabul. As part of ISAF, France was in charge of 
securing the main road from Kabul to the airfield in Bagram (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 
2 March 2002) and agreed that its 500-strong detachment in ISAF would stay 
beyond the planned end of the mission on April 30. Like Britain and Germany, 
France was opposed to a radically altered mandate beyond Kabul (Agence France
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Press, 28 February 2002). France, ahead of the presidential election in April and 
weary of increasing troop commitments, rejected calls for an expanded presence with 
Chirac stating that he was ‘not convinced that [expansion of ISAF] is the right 
solution.’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002:47).
On the question of the construction of ISAF, then, there existed some 
differences in preferences among branches of the French government. Whereas the 
Ministry of Defence looked at an EU format, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from a 
political standpoint was not in favour of an ‘EU-force’, a view that was shared by the 
President. However, Chirac did make efforts to ‘sell’ ISAF as well as the contribution 
of Eurocorps in leading ISAF as a proof of / ’Europe de la defense, suggesting a 
preference on the part of the President for Europe to show face in the military 
peacekeeping operation as well. Similarly, German preferences for a NATO mandate 
for ISAF were not shared by the French government for reasons both of the out of 
area nature of the mission as well as concern over potential demands made on the 
French military.
Europeanization
With respect to the construction of ISAF as well as the question of its institutional 
anchoring, there is little evidence of Europeanization. The EU CFSP/ESDP did not 
constitute a platform to launch policies or to export national preferences or influence. 
Neither is there evidence of policy adaptation, as there was a low salience of the 
CFSP/ESDP agenda and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not in favour of pushing 
for the ESDP agenda. Similarly, Paris did not compromise on national policy 
preferences or positions to accommodate the progress of EU policies in this case.
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There is some evidence, however, of the existence of preferences for an EU label, and 
a general value attached to ‘European’ efforts.
The swift dismissal of the suggestion of an ‘EU force’ was mainly on account 
of the fact that the ESDP had not sufficiently evolved in its capabilities for France to 
consider the application of EU instruments in peace-keeping in Afghanistan. Unlike 
the case of FYROM, there was no ‘added value’ for an EU label in the construction 
of ISAF (Interview with French official, 28 June 2005), in particular given the 
sensitive nature of the operation and concerns that a NATO -or EU label, for that 
matter- for ISAF would invoke concerns over a ‘clash of civilizations’, and a battle 
between the West and Islam (Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005). While 
discussions of an EU force and efforts to portray this multinational force as a 
European effort demonstrate the salience of the ESDP agenda in French foreign 
policy in general, they do not confirm any additional indicators of Europeanization 
formulated in chapter 2, such as adaptation pressures acting on French policy makers, 
or of the EU CFSP and ESDP representing a vehicle to increase national influence.
In addition to the ‘value added’ of an ESDP operation or a coordinated ‘EU- 
force’, officials in the Foreign Ministry were clear that ESDP and the EU would not 
have been ready to assume an operation in Afghanistan. According to one official 
‘and it was before Macedonia, so it was not possible to have an EU operation, and I 
guess that we would not have been ready for that. It was more logical to begin with 
the Balkans. I remember also that when we decided to launch Artemis some, even the 
Germans, were not ready to do it’ (Interview with French official, 20 June 2005).76 
This demonstrates that for France ESDP was not perceived as an appropriate tool to
76 Operation Artemis was a short-term ESDP military mission to the Democratic Republic o f the 
Congo launched in June 2003. France acted as the framework nation and provided the bulk o f the 
personnel with contributions from both EU and non-EU nations. Artemis was the first autonomous EU 
military mission outside Europe and therefore an important milestone in development o f ESDP (see 
Gnesotto, 2004).
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undertake a peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, and this for a variety of reasons: 
the fact that ESDP had not sufficiently evolved, reluctance on the part of other EU 
member states, and the centrality of the US in this case. And, in the long run, the 
situation in Afghanistan remains volatile: ‘violence is still going on, the political 
process is too fragile, and it is not a job the EU can do on its own’ (Interview with 
French official, 11 July 2005).
France, therefore, did not find it expedient to push for an EU-force or the 
utilization of ESDP instruments. The utility of such a move was considered 
negligible, both in terms of the value added of a potential ESDP operation and a EU 
approach as well as in terms of the insufficient progress of the institution to undertake 
such a military endeavour. While the issue was discussed in the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC), French policy makers were clear on the fact that this was neither 
the appropriate time or occasion of an ESDP mission with a French official stating 
that ‘yes, I remember it being discussed in the PSC especially with reports from the 
EUSR on the need to cooperate and enhance the visibility and the effectiveness of the 
EU, and the suggestion of the EUSR for the EU to do this, the usual suspects, but it 
never led to a proposal’ (Interview with French official, 7 March 2006). There was, in 
other words, no political will for a common European approach.
French political decisions with regard to participation in ISAF as well as 
ISAF’s institutional anchoring show evidence of Europeanization only insofar as the 
popular portrayal of the multinational force as a ‘European’ if not under an actual EU 
label demonstrate a preference on the part of the government to show that the EU was 
capable of acting. Even if it was not considered practical operationally to conduct 
ISAF in an EU format it was nevertheless expedient for Chirac to label this if not an 
EU force then at least as a European endeavour: at a joint press conference on the
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European Council of Laeken, Chirac in conjunction with commenting on the 
declaring operational ESDP highlighted the EU’s capacity to respond to crises, 
conflated the national and the European contributions to ISAF by stating that ‘as you 
are aware, they (the countries of the European Union) have announced their 
willingness to participate in an international force that will be deployed in Kabul, 
Afghanistan, under the mandate of the UN and made up essentially, and also in 
totality, in any case in terms of the actual numbers, of European soldiers. They act as 
national contributions, to be sure, but they act as a clear sign of the place taken by the 
EU on the international scene’. (Chirac, 15 December 2001). Pressed on the issue of 
the Belgian statements that national contributions contributed a multinational 
European force, Chirac retracted part of the statement and indicated that this, despite 
the ‘spectacular result’ of the ESDP since the declaration at St. Malo, would have 
been a premature move, stating that ‘Yes, effectively one could have quickly made a 
uniform for Mr. Solana, a General’s uniform, and place him at the head of our troops 
over there. But things did not work out that way.’ (Chirac, 15 December 2001) and 
that ISAF constituted a multi-national force under UN authority, and contributions of 
the member states did not constitute the European army - that are probably the 
British, the Germans, the French.’ (Chirac, 15 December 2001). Despite efforts to 
portray European contributions to ISAF as signaling the EU’s ambitious role in the 
world, then, it was clear that national contributions, and nation states rather than the 
EU itself were in charge and constituent of ISAF.
Still, there is some evidence of the salience of the European agenda in French 
attempts to sell member states contributions to ISAF as a European effort, as 
statements by President Chirac cited in the previous section demonstrates -  although 
no policy actions with regard to an ESDP operation resulted from or took place on the
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basis of this. This demonstrates that despite the general salience of the EU in French 
policy discourse the preference for the EU to ‘show face’, and the existence of 
autonomous European military and defence capability in French foreign policy in the 
case of Afghanistan and the construction of ISAF, French foreign policy in this case 
exhibits scant evidence of Europeanization: apart from the rhetoric of a European 
effort, French decision-makes showed little appetite for, or interest in, advocating the 
deployment of an ‘EU-force’ in Afghanistan.
On the whole, then, the Europeanization approach is of limited value in 
explaining French positions towards the construction of ISAF. With respect to the 
indicators developed in chapter 2, this leads to the conclusion that the EU 
CFSP/ESDP played a small role in this particular decision point.
Alliance Politics
While the Europeanization approach is of limited utility to explain French actions, the 
alliance politics framework does account for some French decision making in this 
case. The analysis of the conflict was broadly shared with the US and other NATO 
members as far as there existed consensus on the idea of the historical importance to 
stabilize the country in order to foster stability in the region. There was, therefore, 
little appetite or perceived need to insist on an EU operation, and NATO as an 
appropriate military tool came therefore to be accepted as a pragmatic choice despite 
initial objections. However, French objections to the use of NATO also show that the 
alliance politics model does not serve as a convincing explanation of French policy 
preferences in this case.
French decisions confirm two indicators of alliance politics: preferring NATO 
for utilitarian purposes, and preferences of the other alliance members. However, this
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was not a case of a transatlantic preference. Rather, it was a case where the 
preferences of other alliance members impacted the French position on this matter. 
NATO’s operational capabilities and therefore utilitarian and pragmatic 
considerations played a role as well. France initially was in agreement with having 
ISAF be a multinational force under UN leadership with partial NATO involvement: 
ISAF from the beginning relied on some NATO operational capabilities, but there 
was reluctance on the part of France to operate under a NATO label so as to not 
evoke suspicions that this was a clash of civilization, or a Western effort in a Muslim 
country (Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005).
The question of substantial NATO involvement in the sense of NATO 
officially taking over ISAF command was not initiated nor initially supported by 
France. Instead, France held that the out-of-area nature of the Afghanistan mission 
exceeded NATO’s legal and institutional framework and was therefore not in favour 
of giving NATO overall command over ISAF. France did acquiesce to both in the 
end, however, for both pragmatic reasons and because of the German initiative to 
anchor such an operation multilaterally in NATO. A combination of utilitarian 
reasons of NATO’s operational capabilities as well as the preference of the US and 
other alliance members, help explain French decision-making in this case and the 
relenting of a previously held position with regards to NATO involvement in
77Afghanistan.
The evolving nature of NATO involvement initially proved to be a 
contentious issue as France blocked a greater role for NATO after Lord Robertson’s
77 Some commentators have also made the link between France’s relenting on the question of NATO 
command in Afghanistan and the political fall-out with the Bush administration over the war in Iraq 
(San Francisco Chronicle, 16 April 2003; The Economist, 1 May 2003). This is a plausible explanation 
that would affirm the alliance politics framework o f  member states yielding to US preferences. 
Because this link has not been corroborated with evidence collected in research interviews or the 
academic literature, however, it will not be used as evidence in favour o f the alliance politics model in 
this thesis.
218
initial suggestion in April 2003 for a take-over of NATO command in the summer of 
2003 (Tagesspiegel, 16 April 2003). With respect to NATO taking command of 
ISAF, France reluctantly accepted a wider NATO role after blocking initial attempts 
by NATO to play a greater role in Afghanistan, where Germany and the Netherlands 
were taking over joint command in the beginning of 2003 (Financial Times, 10 
February 2003). And, with regard to NATO expanding its role to take control of 
ISAF ran counter to French conception of NATO’s core mission of defending its 
members rather than an extension of NATO’s mandate. France initially opposed 
NATO taking over command of ISAF in Afghanistan on account of the out-of area 
nature of the mission (Associated Press, 15 March 2003) -  in addition to concerns 
that a NATO commitment would place a greater burden on French troops (San Diego 
Union-Tribune, 27 February 2003). Chirac later reflected on the changing 
circumstances of NATO and was cited as stating that ‘you have to be realistic in a 
changing world. We have updated our vision, which once held that NATO had 
geographic limits. The idea of a regional NATO no longer exists, as the alliance’s 
involvement in NATO demonstrates’ (Washington Post, 4 February 2004).
Chirac also suggested that Eurocorps take command over ISAF ahead of the 
NATO summit in Prague. And, upon the take-over of ISAF command of NATO and
*70
the assumption of lead nation by Eurocorps under the command of a French 
General, Chirac labelled the assumption of Eurocorps command under NATO a proof 
of VEurope de la defense, showing that this was not only compatible but also 
necessary for a military organisation like NATO (Chirac, 28 June 2004). This
78 The decision to deploy Eurocorps was taken in June 2003 at a NATO ministerial meeting. With 
respect to the question o f symbolism o f Eurocorps for European defense, an official in the foreign 
ministry emphasized that Eurocorps capabilities are interoperable for EU and NATO and do not 
constitute the Europeanization o f NATO or a sign o f ‘EU-isation’ (Interview with French official, 6 
July 2005); an official in the ministry o f defence pointed out that it was a test o f credibility for 
European nations as partners for NATO and the international community (Interview with French 
official, 11 July 2005) -  highlighting a subtle but important difference.
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statement also indicated the importance of a ‘European’ label for domestic purposes 
and signalled continuous French commitment to an autonomous European defence 
capabilities. It also demonstrated France’s contentious relationship with NATO, and 
constituting another case of the constant ‘ franzdsische Nadelstiche ’ -French needle 
marks- (Interview with German official, 1 September 2005) against NATO. This 
confirms France’s ambiguity towards NATO and its place in the global and European 
security architecture and the way in which French contributions were ‘sold’ 
domestically and internationally.
As in the case of OEF, the Europeanization approach constitutes a weak 
explanatory framework for French decision-making. Alliance politics, despite the 
difficult and often strained relationship between the US and France and the French 
position in NATO, is better suited to explain French decision-making -  although 
French objections to NATO command of ISAF indicates that alliance politics does 
not offer a convincing explanation for French policy preferences. Importantly, 
however, neither approach accounts for the central role of the UN in French political 
considerations in this case. While this is not to suggest a degree of institutional 
competition or tension, it nevertheless demonstrates that the conception of this 
conflict in French decision-making was global rather than regional, accounting for 
the centrality of the UN. As the analysis in the second policy area has shown, this 
holds true also for the question of the reconstruction of Afghanistan: although there 
was some evidence of Europeanization, the UN framework, and French national 
participation (along with its EU contributions) within this framework demonstrate 
that the Europeanization model is not able to adequately explain French decision­
making in this case.
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V. Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that French responses to the war in Afghanistan 
demonstrate a fundamentally multilateral conception of an appropriate policy 
response to international terrorism that emphasized the shared analysis and coherence 
of efforts between the US, France and other international partners under the UN 
umbrella. Within this multilateral preference for actions towards the war on terror, 
the war in Afghanistan and the reconstruction of the country, the French contribution 
to the war on terror first of all constituted a demonstration of solidarity with the US 
immediately after the attacks on 11 September and the centrality of the UN in the 
sanctioning of military measures and as a foundation for the political and economic 
reconstruction of Afghanistan. This policy evolved to include European and NATO 
contributions rather than just national ones vis-a-vis the US. It has been 
demonstrated that, in line with a weak ‘European’ conception of the national response 
where OEF and ISAF were concerned, ESDP itself was not considered as an 
appropriate tool for ISAF both for reasons of capabilities, the security situation on the 
ground as well as the shared analysis of the appropriate response that precluded a 
decision to launch a peacekeeping operation under an EU label. Although the attacks 
of 11 September and the incipient war on terror were perceived as an impetus for a 
speedy development of ESDP in order to meet future security challenges, this did not 
extend to the responses towards the war in Afghanistan. This in turn suggests that the 
Europeanization approach is not suitable for explaining French foreign policy 
decision-making where military action in Afghanistan, both as part of OEF and in the 
construction of ISAF, is concerned. The Europeanization framework, however, has 
some validity where the political and economic aspect in the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan and broader measures in the war on terrorism is concerned. But,
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significantly, even with regard to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, French national 
contributions outside the EU framework suggest that the EU was one tool among 
many that came to bear in Afghanistan, and not the most important and significant 
one.
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Chapter 8. Britain and the crisis in FYROM
I. Introduction
This chapter demonstrates that British decisions towards the crisis in FYROM, 
particularly those concerning the political negotiation of the crisis, show some 
evidence of Europeanization. The UK actively supported the negotiation efforts of 
Javier Solana and thus the establishment of the EU CFSP as a political actor in the 
negotiation of a regional crisis. With respect to the involvement of NATO and the 
deployment of British troops as part of NATO Operations Essential Harvest and 
Amber Fox, however, British policy decisions reveal evidence of alliance politics 
because the appropriate military tools were located in NATO, on account of the trust 
enjoyed by NATO in FYROM among both Macedonians and Albanians, and out of 
preferences for a transatlantic approach. As for the third policy area, the ESDP take­
over of the NATO operation, evidence of Europeanization is weak. Although there 
was no objection in principle among parts of the UK policy establishment on an 
eventual ESDP takeover of the NATO operation, decisions as to the operation’s 
timing were determined by alliance politics considerations. These included US 
reactions towards ESDP and relations with the incoming Bush administration in 2001 
in addition to delays in the conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreements resulting from 
Turkish reservations about EU use of NATO assets. Domestic politics played a role 
as well, less so on account of Blair’s staff changes following the June 2001 elections 
but because of negative public opinion of the EU and ESDP in particular that the UK 
government did not address. These were in direct conflict with Blair’s professed goal 
of giving the UK leadership in Europe and for pushing for a stronger and more united 
EU foreign policy and policy capabilities after taking office in 1997.
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II. Policy area 1: Support for EU political negotiations under the EU CFSP in 
the resolution of the crisis
This section demonstrates that the UK supported Javier Solana and the EU CFSP in 
the political negotiations of the crisis in FYROM, and took a lead role in this area due 
to its privileged position on the ground. As a result, this particular policy area 
confirms the Europeanization hypothesis in so far as the salience of the European 
agenda and a preference for the application of CFSP instruments is concerned. 
However, national influence on policy formulation through the Contact Group and bi­
lateral initiatives shows that the EU CFSP was not given an exclusive mandate in the 
negotiation. Alliance politics considerations were not negligible, therefore. Close 
cooperation with the United States through the Contact Group as well as bilateral co­
ordination between Prime Minister Blair and President Bush show that US 
involvement in regional security impacted British policy choices with respect to the 
handling of the crisis in FYROM. In addition, NATO formed the second pillar in the 
negotiation of the crisis, and the UK viewed NATO as vital for the resolution of the 
conflict. The close cooperation between NATO and the EU does not necessarily 
diminish the Europeanization hypothesis. To be sure, this was the first time the two
70organisations worked closely together in the solution of a crisis and NATO did 
provide an important security guarantee for the EU CFSP to establish itself as a 
political actor in the resolution of the crisis. However, the importance of NATO and 
the Contact Group points towards evidence of alliance politics as well.
The key participants in this policy area include the Foreign Office headed, 
until June 2001, by Robin Cook and by Jack Straw thereafter; and Prime Minister 
Blair. The role of Prime Minister Blair in the negotiation of this crisis was not as
79 This was undoubtedly facilitated by close personal links -  and weekly working meetings -  between 
Javier Solana and George Robertson (see Gegout, 2004); these links can be expected to have been 
made easier also because Javier Solana was NATO Secretary General prior to his appointment as 
SG/HR for the EU CFSP.
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active or visible as it was during the Kosovo war. This was due in part to the fact that 
the crisis was resolved peacefully but, more importantly, to the events of 11 
September and Blair’s shifting policy priorities as a result, which will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 9. However, Blair’s professed preference for a united Europe 
in foreign and security policy was being achieved, at least where this particular policy 
area is concerned. With respect to Blair’s preference for a strengthened EU and 
Britain’s place in it, Hill argues that following Blair’s Chicago speech (see Blair, 24 
April 1999), and in particular during Blair’s second term ‘an ambitious form of 
internationalism was developing in Blair’s outlook, whereby he wished to reconnect 
Britain to its European destiny, to help modernize the EU so that it would be fit for 
the era of globalization and above all to stay close to the United States, as the 
ultimate guarantor of British security’ (Hill, 2005: 387). This is reflected in Blair’s 
speech to the European Research Institute in Birmingham where he not only stated 
that ‘Britain’s future is inextricably linked with Europe (...) to get the best out of it, 
we must make the most of our strength and influence within it (...) we want to be 
fully engaged in a united Europe, working with an internationalist USA’, but also that 
‘Europe is in Britain’s international security interest (...) si more effective common 
foreign and security policy, together with making a success of the European defence 
initiative, is vital’ (Blair, 21 November 2001).
With respect to domestic politics there was broad agreement among the 
branches of the UK government on the overall goal of the political negotiations and 
on the appropriate political institutions: the EU CFSP, NATO, and the Contact Group 
in order to include Russia and the US in the formulation of policy. Britain also took a 
lead role in the early months of the crisis, demonstrating London’s interest and 
proactive approach in shaping the international response to the crisis. This applied
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both to local support of EU negotiation efforts, bilateral efforts between the UK and 
FYROM and the use of institutional platforms -both the UN and EU- to submit and 
initiate policy proposals.
Upon the outbreak of the crisis in March 2001, the UK was concerned first 
and foremost with applying the main lesson learnt from Kosovo: to act rapidly to 
prevent the outbreak of full scale violence that could de-stabilize the Balkan region. 
This is illustrated by a statement of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in the 
House of Commons, which read that ‘Macedonia has been a model in the region of a 
multi-ethnic and democratic government, which has not so far been the subject of 
widespread ethnic violence. If Macedonia should disintegrate into another Kosovo, 
Bosnia or Croatia, it would be a massive reverse for the United Nations, the EU and 
NATO. We recommend that the British government take the most urgent steps to 
galvanize the international community into giving both the UN and NATO a clear 
remit to bring the situation in Macedonia under control and to counter Albanian 
extremist violence against Macedonia’ (House of Commons, 27 March 2001b:2).
With respect to the Foreign Office, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook pledged 
full support for the Macedonian government, insisted that there was no prospect of 
the redrawing of borders towards a greater Albania (Press Association, 20 March 
2001) and urged both ethnic Albanian opposition parties to attend the signing of 
Macedonia’s Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU (Financial Times, 
6 April 2001). In the Foreign Office, the head of the Macedonian section in the 
Eastern Adriatic Department coordinated policy from London in close cooperation 
with the UK embassy in FYROM. Importantly, the UK embassy held a key position 
in the initial management of the crisis as it was the main diplomatic mission among 
the EU member states in FYROM. Sweden, which held the EU presidency in the first
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half of 2001, did not maintain diplomatic representation in FYROM and the British 
embassy assumed its role (Piana, 2002). Mark Dickinson, the UK ambassador at the
Q (\
time , thus took on a key position by encouraging negotiations and setting up 
meetings with Macedonian officials for Solana. On a very practical level, then, the 
UK embassy supported Solana’s role in the negotiation of the crisis starting in mid- 
March, when Solana first visited Skopje (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006): 
a demonstration that the UK supported the proactive role taken by Javier Solana (and 
Chris Patten) in the crisis. The Foreign Office’s support for Solana also confirms the 
argument that the British approach to European integration is pragmatic and based on 
a case-by-case analysis rather than on a particular idealism towards the EU (Forster 
and Blair 2002: 180). Although the UK on a very practical level supported both the 
role of the EU in the political negotiation of the crisis and the development of the EU 
CFSP and the persona of SG/HR Javier Solana as a political actor, London was 
nevertheless careful not to consent to an early ESDP deployment before the 
conclusion of negotiations with NATO, as the analysis of the third policy area 
demonstrates.
The UK through the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister was also active in
terms of bi-lateral and multi-lateral forums. These forums included the Contact
Group, the UN, and EU Summits. With respect to the broader geopolitical picture,
there was agreement among the UK government that a united stance on the part of the
international community was important, including having Russia on board (Interview
with UK official, 29 June 2006). This included meetings with the Contact Group in
order to coordinate the broader response as well as common statements with the US.
The EU and the US agreed to coordinate their efforts to promote a political solution
80 Mark Dickinson was subsequently appointed special envoy to FYROM by the EU on 16 May prior 
to the appointment o f Francois Lyotard as EU Special Representative on 29 June 2001 (Council of the 
European Union, 29 June 2001).
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to the crisis, as Bush confirmed at the US-EU Gothenburg summit (Europe Report, 
16 June 2001). The UK also used its position as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, together with France, to submit a resolution on the crisis asking the 
international community to pledge support for FYROM and for strengthening the 
current mandate of NATO forces stationed in Kosovo (Agence France Presse, 20 
March 2001). At the Stockholm Summit on 23 March, the UK together with the other 
member states reaffirmed the EU’s political support for the Macedonian government 
(Agence France Presse, 23 March 2001). These activities reinforce the argument that 
the UK supports greater European cooperation, albeit on intergovernmental lines 
(Forster, 2000: 45). Despite the key role played by the British government in 
addressing the crisis, there were concerns within the UK government that London 
was not doing enough to stop the violence: as the crisis identified in mid-June, Prime 
Minister Blair made efforts to co-ordinate policy action bilaterally with French 
President Chirac and US President George Bush after shadow foreign secretary 
Francis Maude said that Britain must be ‘far more active in helping suppress those 
forces still willing to use violence to achieve their ends’ in FYROM and Kosovo 
(Press Association, 29 June 2001).
The broad goals in the crisis in FYROM -  preventing the outbreak of large 
scale violence and a speedy resolution of the crisis - were thus shared among the 
different branches of government. This was irrespective of changes in personnel 
following the June 2001 election when Robin Cook was replaced by Jack Straw as 
Foreign Secretary. Compared to Robin Cook, a ‘born-again European’, Jack Straw 
was more sceptical towards Europe. But, the Prime Minister’s office could play a 
leading role on European policy through the creation of a senior European post, 
thereby reducing the Foreign Office’s influence (Riddell, 2005: 367). Rather than
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European credentials, then, Hill (2005: 385) asserts that Cook fell victim to Blair’s 
aim at taking foreign policy leadership as Straw seemed ‘a more pliable partner’ than 
Robin Cook. These changes were not a sign of a fundamental departure from Blair’s 
policy position with respect to the EU CFSP/ESDP or the crisis in FYROM. Britain 
assuming and active role in support of EU CFSP activities in the resolution of the 
crisis in FYROM reinforced Blair’s stated objectives for Britain’s role in the EU cited 
earlier. It also demonstrates that the policy actions and preferences on the part of both 
the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister in the case of the first policy area reflect 
Britain’s goal to play a lead in European security undertakings as well as a strong 
interest in resolving the crisis in FYROM in order to restore security in the region. To 
underline the continuity of the Foreign Office’s preference with respect to FYROM 
following the June elections, Jack Straw’s visit to Skopje following the General 
Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 25 June, was for the purpose of underlining ‘along 
with other European leaders (...) the Government’s commitment to the search for 
political stability’ (Downing Street Press Briefing, 25 June 2001).
Europeanization
The analysis in the preceding section serves as an initial indication that there is 
evidence of Europeanization in British foreign policy with respect to this particular 
policy area. This section demonstrates that evidence of Europeanization applies with 
respect to a number of indicators outlined in Chapter 2: there is evidence of the 
salience of the European agenda, the projection of national policy preferences; and 
the existence of norms and preferences that favoured the application of EU 
instruments.
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British actions in support of the EU CFSP in the political solution of the crisis 
in FYROM show that the British goal of a ‘more effective joint EU voice and 
capability’ under the Blair premiership took shape (Riddell, 2005: 376) as Javier 
Solana came to play an increasingly active role overall and in the case of FYROM in 
particular. Blair’s stated aim of a more capable European foreign and security policy 
(Blair, 21 November 2001), with Britain as a leader thus supports evidence of the 
salience of the European agenda. It also supports evidence of Europeanization 
understood as the projection of national policy preferences. Projection is reflected by 
the fact that Blair was keen on having Britain play a lead role in the emerging CFSP; 
and to assume responsibilities for regional security on the part of the EU more 
generally. These two objectives represent another ‘lesson’ of the experience of the 
conflicts in the Balkans throughout the 1990s: not only were the Europeans ill- 
equipped militarily and had to rely on US military capabilities in Bosnia and Kosovo, 
which necessitated a re-thinking on the part of EU member states to be able to take 
responsibility for peace-keeping and peace-making operations (Quiles, 1999: 26). 
But, there were also policy disagreements between the UK and the US, and this in 
turn suggested to European countries that US policies after the Cold War would be 
less predictable (Jopp, 1994: 36) - and persuaded the UK on the necessity to change 
its position with respect to the creation of the ESDP. This can also be observed by 
the policy decisions leading to the handover to from NATO to ESDP, as will be 
discussed in a later section in this chapter.
More specifically, evidence of Europeanization understood as the salience of 
the European agenda is also supported by the practical support for Solana’s 
negotiating position on the ground. Rather than the UK being indifferent to, or 
making efforts to curtail Solana’s and Chris Patten’s proactive stance with respect to
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the crisis in FYROM, London actively supported Solana’s role in the negotiations -  
in part on account of its privileged position in FYROM in the early stages of the 
crisis, in part out of a preference for the EU showing face in the crisis and the 
development of Europe as a security actor in the region more generally. The key role 
played by the UK ambassador in the early part of the crisis equally confirms national 
projection: by playing such a central role, and through the subsequent appointment of 
Mark Dickinson as special representative to FYROM, the UK increased its profile in 
the management of the crisis in the European arena. A general preference on the part 
of the Blair government to increase its national profile through a lead status in 
European affairs, including European security, is further affirmed by the fact that the 
Labour government, upon taking power in 1997 had stated that making the UK a 
leading player in Europe was one of the priorities in for the new government 
(Wickham-Jones 2000: 8; Deighton 2000).
The fact that the Blair government has played a leading role in promoting EU 
diplomatic efforts, as illustrated in the crisis in FYROM, also points towards 
Europeanization understood as a general policy preference. This is underlined by the 
argument that ‘Britain has tended to see itself as part of a possible three-sided 
‘directorate’ in key areas of EU diplomacy’ (Smith 2006: 169). It also shows that 
British policy preferences for a European approach are understood to mean British 
leadership within such an approach. This underlines that Europeanization understood 
as a fundamental policy preference and national projection both apply and are not 
easily separable empirically. The fact that the UK’s preference towards Solana’s role 
and success overlaps with the preference of the EU CFSP itself also suggests that the 
definitions of national and European preferences overlapped in this case: a success 
for the EU CFSP and Javier Solana as well as a peaceful outcome of the peace
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negotiations meant a success both for the EU as well as the UK -  and confirms the 
(instrumental) notion that ‘Britain continues to pursue the ‘politics of scale’, 
collaborating at the EU level for the sake of greater effectiveness in the pursuit of 
shared and common international goals’ (Smith 2006: 169). The fact that elites -  
including officials in the foreign office and the Prime Minister- favoured the 
application of CFSP instruments in this case also supports the existence of norms and 
preferences that favour the application of EU instruments. With respect to the UK’s 
place in European diplomacy more generally, Smith also concludes that under the 
Blair government ‘the diplomacy of international institutions and regimes, a key area 
of EU activity, has seen the British playing an active and often a leading role’ (Smith 
2006: 169). This in turn supports the Europeanization hypothesis for the first policy 
area. Importantly, however, the overlap in preferences did not extend to the 
application of military instruments located in the EU ESDP to the same extent than it 
did to the political negotiations of the crisis.
Nevertheless, the support for the EU CFSP as an institutional venue and 
British efforts at the establishment of its credibility runs counter to arguments of 
Britain lacking a European identity or preference (Garton Ash 2001) and the 
avoidance of a full commitment to European cooperation (Wallace 2005:57), even if 
the tensions in British foreign policy as they relate to the EU CFSP, particularly as 
they apply to Britain’s traditional attachment to NATO and the evolving CFSP and 
ESDP (Hill, 1996: 85) can be clearly observed in the handover to ESDP as well as in 
London’s policy towards Afghanistan, the subject of chapter 9.
Alliance Politics
In addition to evidence of Europeanization, there is also some evidence of alliance 
politics in this particular policy area. Rather than a fundamental transatlantic
232
preference that can be observed in the third policy area, however, the indicator of 
alliance politics that best explains UK support for NATO in the negotiation of the 
crisis is that of preference given to NATO for utilitarian reasons. NATO was 
considered an appropriate resource for reasons of prior involvement in the region, and 
because NATO was the preferred option for the host country, FYROM, where NATO 
enjoyed a high level of trust among the political elite as well as the Albanian 
guerrillas (Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005). By contrast, the EU CFSP had 
yet to establish itself as a trusted negotiator and there were practical concerns that 
made the presence of NATO indispensable, both in the political and military part of 
the negotiation of the crisis. Any EU effort, and potential military operation 
undertaken under ESDP had to succeed -  and the biggest concern on the part of the 
British Foreign Office was thus over buying time to resolve the crisis (Interview with 
UK official, 29 June 2006) rather than the introduction of new policy instruments. 
This supports the conclusion that the emphasis on a NATO presence arose out of 
utilitarian considerations rather than out of a fundamental transatlantic preference.
The fact that NATO through its presence and its close coordination with the 
EU CFSP and Javier Solana in effect supported the development and the 
establishment of the EU CFSP as a political actor in FYROM at the same time 
demonstrates that transatlantic preferences were not a vital political consideration in 
the sense that there was no direct competition between NATO and the EU. On the 
part of the US, there was no clear preference for NATO as an appropriate institutional 
venue to support the negotiations. Rather, the US had a clearly stated preference for 
the Europeans to assume responsibility for the security of their immediate 
neighbourhood (Interview with US official, 20 October 2005). And, with respect to
233
the political negotiation of the crisis, the EU and NATO were not in direct 
competition over political action or the application of military instruments.
In addition, the US had ceased to voice any principled objections to the 
creation of CFSP/ESDP. Madeleine Albright at the time of the St. Malo agreement 
had stated that ‘it is very important for the Europeans to carry a fair share and have a 
sense of their own defence identity’ (Albright 1998) although of course there were 
concerns in the US on the exact nature of EU-NATO relations and the degree of 
autonomy from NATO. This equally applies to the incoming Bush administration in 
2001 and US concerns were an important element in the decisions on the ESDP 
handover from NATO, as will be shown in the third policy area. As a matter of 
principle, however, the UK was aware that the US would not act against the UK as a 
consequence of the creation of the ESDP (Heisbourg 2000) -  even if the devil lay in 
the details, as will be discussed later in this chapter. With respect to FYROM it 
‘meant one less NATO mission for the US and was small in scale, anyways’ 
(Interview with US official, 20 October 2005). There was thus no objection in 
principle on the part of the US for the EU to assume responsibility -  both in terms of 
the political negotiations as well as in due course the military operations. However, as 
will be shown in the next two sections, when it came to military commitments, the 
alliance politics framework yields a more convincing explanation than the 
Europeanization framework in the analysis of British decision-making.
III. Policy area 2: Participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest
This section argues that considerations that support the alliance politics rather than 
the Europeanization hypothesis account for British foreign policy with respect to the 
involvement and preparation of NATO Operations Essential Harvest and Amber Fox.
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The UK lead in the military operation reflects British interest both in a lead role in 
NATO, and the stabilisation of FYROM more generally but also the UK’s lead 
among EU member states in terms of military capabilities. The emphasis on NATO-  
rather than ESDP- was also partly a result of the effect of 11 September on British 
foreign policy priorities. Blair focused on global rather than European security 
priorities, de-emphasized the project after 11 September, and made clear on various 
opportunities that ESDP was ‘essentially about the consolidation of NATO’ rather 
than an autonomous project (Howorth, 2004: 228) -  and thus gave preference to 
NATO as an institutional forum. Howorth also notes that the initial discourse created 
in the UK presented ESDP as a means to strengthen NATO and ‘make the world fit 
for democracy and human rights’ (Howorth, 2004: 229). Still, ESDP was not 
abandoned entirely and the continued relevance of the project were clear to the UK 
government even if the war on terror and later the war in Iraq took precedence over 
European security integration (Howorth, 2004: 230). This in part explains the delay 
in British consent to the eventual ESDP operation, which will be discussed in more 
detail in the next policy area.
The Europeanization hypothesis does not apply to the planning and 
participation in the NATO Operations in FYROM. This is because the discussion on 
a possible ESDP mission in FYROM arose in earnest only after an initial NATO 
presence had been agreed upon, despite the fact that there is some evidence that an 
eventual EU take-over of NATO was regarded as desirable early on in the process of 
negotiating a post-conflict security presence, which points towards Europeanization.
The key participants in this policy area were the Ministry of Defence, the 
Foreign Office and the Prime Minister. With respect to the UK’s participation in and 
support for the NATO Operations in FYROM, there was broad consensus in the
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different branches of the British government that NATO should assume a security 
function in post-crisis FYROM and that the UK should actively participate in these 
operations. This in turn led to the decision on the part of the UK to initiate the launch 
of NATO Operation Essential Harvest and to assume the lead role in this operation.
Direct NATO involvement in the eyes of the UK was not to extend to military 
commitments during the crisis, however, but involved only the post-settlement stage. 
While the UK in FYROM acted in support of NATO, which set up an intelligence 
cell in Skopje as a response to the escalating crisis in March 2001, London initially 
had no plans to reinforce its 5,500 strong KFOR contingent in support of stability in 
the region. This reflected domestic concerns over mission-creep and British military 
commitments elsewhere, such as Sierra Leone (Press Association, 20 March 2001) 
and suggests that the Ministry of Defence was cautious over committing a large 
number of troops. As the previous section has demonstrated, however, the UK 
supported NATO as a central actor in the negotiations and as a guarantor of the peace 
after the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, which suggests an overall priority given to 
the involvement of NATO in FYROM. Blair accordingly was reported to have 
underlined that ‘the history of our engagement in the Balkans had taught us that it 
was better to make preparations sooner and to stabilise the situation rather than wait 
and let the situation deteriorate. That was why British troops were in Macedonia. It 
was a precisely defined operation. Our aim was to help achieve a political settlement 
there’ (Government Press Briefing, 28 August 2001).
Blair, in line with his professed aim at bolstering Europe’s responses to 
regional crisis in particular after the ineffectual attempts to address the conflicts in the 
Balkans in the 1990s and in line with his commitment and readiness to intervene 
militarily during his premiership (see Kampfner, 2003), was keen for the UK to take
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a military lead in this operation. The UK role in FYROM thus also served to 
reinforce London’s claim to be the lead nation in security discussions and to set an 
example for the rest of Europe in an area where Britain is strong to help make up for 
Blair’s inability to take Britain into monetary union (Financial Times, 18 August 
2001). Equally important, the UK due to its military capabilities was the natural 
candidate among EU member states to provide much of the operational support as 
well as force components. Although the UK took a lead role among NATO member 
states in the initial stages of the management of the crisis and the preparation and 
participation in the NATO operations, there were some domestic concerns over the 
UK’s and NATO’s military capabilities in particular in light of the UK’s growing 
military commitments elsewhere -  an issue that became increasingly urgent after the 
attacks of 11 September and the UK’s growing military commitments in the war on 
terror.
Upon the launch of Operation Essential Harvest, Gen. Barney White-Spunner 
commanded the pre-deployment force of Operation Essential Harvest and Britain 
provided the headquarters and up to 1,800 troops of the 3,500 strong Operation 
Essential Harvest, although the command of the operation was given to Danish 
General Lange (NATO, 17 August 2001). The deployment also played to British 
strengths -o f  providing the initial deployments- and Britain was also one of the few 
NATO countries able to supply an operational headquarter (Financial Times, 18 
August 2001). The successful completion of Operation Essential Harvest 
demonstrated to those concerned over mission creep and insufficient capabilities that 
despite these deficiencies in capabilities even among NATO ‘there are quite a 
considerable strengths that (...) come together at points of international or localised 
crises and that is a lesson that politicians have to learn’ (Ingram, House of
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Commons, 19 December 2001: 79). But, the initial restriction of the operation to 90- 
days and Whitehall’s determination to have a clear exit strategy for British troops 
(The Guardian, 18 August 2001) did hot turn out to be realistic, and the question over 
how to best fill the security vacuum after the end of Operation Essential Harvest 
arose. And, given the increasing military commitments in Afghanistan and later Iraq, 
the UK did not aim to maintain its lead status among NATO and EU members in this 
particular NATO operation. This does not mean, however, that the decisions with 
respect to participation in the NATO operations and them taking place in the first 
place were fundamentally contested with a view to the relatively low risk involved in 
the operation and the consensus on the importance of peace in the Balkans.
Europeanization
With respect to this particular policy area, there is no evidence that would confirm the 
Europeanization hypothesis. For the UK, this was a policy area that involved NATO 
and the US only. The main challenge for Britain was to maintain US involvement in 
the country, including the consent to NATO deployment. And, unlike France or 
Germany, there was no effort to ‘sell’ British contributions to NATO Operation 
Essential Harvest to a domestic audience, which reflects Britain’s close transatlantic 
ties. This also means that the alliance politics framework is most applicable to 
explain policy decisions in this case.
Alliance Politics
With respect to NATO and its engagements in the Balkans in general and FYROM in 
particular, the continued engagement of the US in the region -both as part of NATO 
and to add political weight unilaterally- was deemed of vital importance across the 
spectrum of UK foreign policy actors. This demonstrates the explanatory potential of
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the alliance politics framework. Several indicators of alliance politics are relevant 
with respect to this decision point: the alignment with NATO in order to keep the US 
involved in European security concerns, a fundamental transatlantic preference on the 
part of the UK, and preference given to NATO for utilitarian reasons.
The importance of keeping the US involved in European security concerns, 
particularly as they relate to FYROM and the broader Balkan region was recognized 
by the UK government. This was of particular concern as the US was reluctant to 
commit troops to FYROM to begin with (Financial Times, 14 June 2001; Interview 
with EU official, 11 September 2006). To illustrate, with respect to the British 
Parliament, the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons 
noted that ‘a greater danger for the Balkan states would lie in US political 
disengagement from the region, followed by a military withdrawal’ (House of 
Commons, 18 December 2001b: 18). While it was acknowledged that there was little 
prospect of such a disengagement in the short term, or without full consultation with 
its allies, the Committee went on to warn that ‘the eyes of the United States are 
presently turned elsewhere, and history serves as a reminder of the folly of relaxing 
vigilance over the Balkans. We recommend that during the ongoing war against 
terrorism, the Government act to avoid any loss of momentum for reconstruction in 
the Balkans, by working for the continued full involvement and active participation 
of the United States in the Balkans’ (House of Commons, 18 December 2001b: 18). 
This insistence on continued US presence symbolized through the NATO operations 
in FYROM and Kosovo, in turn confirms the alliance politics hypothesis.
With respect to a clear transatlantic preference on the part of the British policy 
establishment, evidence includes the fact that while the early 1990s ‘saw the 
acceptance in the British defence establishment that they were becoming part of an
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EU defence structure (...) this was not seen in exclusive terms, and priority was still 
given in many respects to NATO as the keystone of Britain’s contribution to 
collective defence in such places as the former Yugoslavia’ (Smith, 2006:168). The 
following statement by Blair illustrates this position ‘what we want is a situation 
where NATO is the basis and cornerstone of our defence, where by preference 
NATO where it wants to be engaged, in other words where the Americans want to 
come in on an operation, NATO is going to be the body that we use (...) And I think 
if we approached it in that way we preserve the strength of the Transatlantic Alliance 
but we also give ourselves the option, where we want to, to make sure that Europe 
has its own capability’ (Blair, 17 October 2003). This means that despite 
considerations that would point towards and support the Europeanization hypothesis 
-mostly relevant to the next policy area -  NATO remained a focal point in British 
policy making. Evidence of the utilitarian reasons for NATO operations, lastly, 
includes those cited prior -  the recognition that NATO was the more credible actor 
on the ground, and the need to project capability and continued US as well as 
European involvement (Interview with former UK official, 23 September 2006).
IV. Policy area 3: The politics of the ESDP takeover from NATO
This section shows that with respect to the question over an ESDP take-over from 
NATO, the British position reflects some considerations of Europeanization but 
mostly alliance politics considerations. The Europeanization hypothesis is supported 
by evidence that the eventual take-over was not contested in principle -  after all, the 
creation of ESDP and the application of the new CFSP instruments in the crisis meant 
that the EU military instruments would be deployed in some theatre, and presumably 
close to the EU’s borders. The logical place to do this, both on account of the EU’s 
previous failures in the 1990s and on account of shifting preferences and burdens
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after 11 September, was in the Balkans (House of Commons, 5 December 2001). 
Alliance politics considerations, however, came to bear with respect to the timing of 
the take-over itself. This had to be weighed against US concerns over ESDP 
generally, the British requirement for a NATO-EU agreement over the EU use of 
NATO capabilities, and the conclusion of the Berlin-Plus agreement following a 
dispute between Turkey and Greece over the issue of involvement of non-EU NATO 
members. These matters in turn delayed the date of the first ESDP operation.
The key participants in this policy area, as in the previous one, were the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. Although EUSR Leotard’s 
suggestion in September 2001 for an EU take-over of the NATO operation was 
roundly rejected by the UK, this was on account of timing rather than on account of 
principled objection to ESDP on the part of the British government as to the timing of 
the first ESDP operation. Although there existed disagreement over the timing of the 
operation as well as over its effect on transatlantic relations within the British 
government, there were no fundamental objections on the part of the Foreign Office 
to the creation or application of ESDP instruments (Interview with UK official, 29 
June 2006) -  but there were differences among the branches of British government.
While the Foreign Office was in principle in favour of an ESDP operation, the 
Ministry of Defence regarded an early handover as hazardous (Financial Times, 4 
March 2002). Together with Blair’s shifting policy priorities with respect to NATO 
as well as Europe and Britain’s global role after 11 September, moreover, this meant 
that decisions over the timing of the ESDP handover from NATO were contested 
within the British government. Concerns over timing for the UK arose both from 
ESDP not having been declared formally operational and from the absence of a 
formal agreement of NATO over the use of assets for an ESDP operation. With
241
respect to the assumption of peace-keeping tasks from NATO, then, interest in using 
ESDP came early on, but with hesitation because the operation had to succeed -  there 
were thus concerns as to the practical considerations but no opposition to ESDP in 
general (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006). The biggest concern was buying 
time in the negotiations of the peace agreement and in the hand-over from NATO to 
ESDP (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006). To be sure, after ESDP was 
declared operational at the Laeken Summit in December 2001 the Seville European 
Council in June 2002 signalled EU willingness to take over the responsibility for 
peacekeeping from NATO. With respect to declaring ESDP operational without 
having capabilities to carry out the full spectrum of Petersberg tasks, however, the 
‘UK tried hard to persuade its EU partners that premature statements were not only 
meaningless but potentially dangerous’ (Howorth, 2003-04:179). Blair in turn stated 
that ‘once the EU-NATO links are in place, I am keen to see an ESDP operation in 
Macedonia, to show that Europe can play its part in bringing security and stability to 
this part of the continent’ (Blair, 25 November 2002).
This affirms the argument that British concerns were over appropriate 
capabilities and principles, and that the British approach to ESDP was essentially one 
of caution. It also demonstrates that even with respect to the UK, the takeover of 
ESDP was not objected to in principle: rather, in the words of a former UK official 
‘the UK was determined that the first EU military operation should be a success; it 
was concerned therefore that all the right 'bricks' should be in place before it was 
launched’ (Interview with former UK official, 23 September 2006). The conclusion 
of the Berlin Plus agreement over the use of NATO assets came to be the UK’s 
prerequisite for the first ESDP military operation in FYROM (Financial Times, 30 
October 2002), even if the mission itself was small and devoid of substantive risk.
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The requirement of sufficient capabilities and an agreement with NATO and 
the US was also often cited domestically as a prerequisite for ESDP action -  to 
illustrate, the European Union Committee stated that ‘what is imperative is that the 
EU must not lead an operation before it has achieved the full range of capabilities 
necessary to conduct it or can rely on the assistance of NATO’ (House of Lords, 29 
January 2002: 86). The actual take-over of the mission and conclusion of the Berlin 
Plus agreements was then again delayed on account of Turkey’s attitude towards 
allowing the EU ‘assured access’ to NATO planning capabilities.81
Nevertheless, agreement in favour of an -eventual- ESDP mission confirms 
the notion of a paradigm shift on the part of the UK policy establishment towards 
ESDP (Howorth, 2000) although the overall goal for the UK is to strengthen NATO 
by building up a genuine EU capacity in the defence and security field rather than 
choosing between the US and Europe, as has been the French emphasis: two 
positions that in 2000 at least -and prior to 11 September and the war on terror- were 
not mutually exclusive (Howorth, 2000: 389). British decisions with respect to 
FYROM and Afghanistan, however, reveal some friction between these two 
positions.
There were also some concerns over domestic opposition to ESDP. This 
applies in particular to the Conservative Party over concerns that ESDP would lead 
directly to the collapse of NATO (Howorth 2000: 383). More generally, in the UK 
there is widespread opposition to the idea of a ‘European Army’ (Grabbe and 
Munchau, 2002: 28) -  a concept with which the other two countries analysed in this 
thesis have less difficulty. Howorth notes that ‘the absence in Britain of any 
significant communicative discourse on security and defence during the general
81 For an analysis and overview of the issues involved with respect to Turkey prior to the conclusion of 
the Berlin Plus agreements, see Missiroli (2002).
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elections reflected (...) concern not to muddy further parliamentary waters that were 
already sufficiently murky. In the case of the UK, the Conservatives (...) decided not 
to play this particular card -  much to the relief of Prime Minister Blair, who, for his 
part, was happy (yet again) not to have to attempt to explain to the electorate what 
ESDP actually amounted to’ (Howorth, 2004: 227).82
Europeanization
Despite hesitations over the timing of the first ESDP mission, the British policy 
stance with respect to an ESDP operation supports a Europeanization hypothesis. It 
does so with respect to a number of indicators, although this was not shared among 
all branches of the UK government: the salience of the European agenda, the 
adherence to common policy objectives to allow for the progress of EU projects, and 
the existence of preferences among elites that favoured the application of ESDP 
instruments.
The salience of the European agenda in the case of the first ESDP operation is 
illustrated by the fact that interest in using ESDP instruments arose early on during 
the crisis, despite practical hesitations in light of the fact that an ESDP mission would 
have to succeed both on account of the situation in FYROM as well as the success of 
the emerging policy (Interview with UK official, 29 June 206). And, although the 
delay of the Berlin Plus agreement meant that ESDP could not be applied in FYROM 
after the Seville European Council, repeated efforts made particularly on the part of 
British diplomats to resolve the differences with Turkey (Missiroli 2002:10) in order 
to conclude the Berlin Plus agreements demonstrates that the UK was not only keen 
on arriving at a formal delineation of tasks between NATO and ESDP, but by
82 On public support -  or the absence thereof -  for the EU, see Wallace (2005) and Forster and Blair 
(2002).
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extension also to be able to employ the military instruments located in ESDP in 
FYROM.
More importantly, British interest in an ESDP mission in FYROM and 
attempts to resolve the conflict with Turkey over Berlin Plus confirms the notion of a 
paradigm shift on the part of the UK policy establishment and, in terms of the 
indicators developed in chapter 2, of the existence of preferences among the elites 
that favoured the application of ESDP instruments: although the St. Malo Declaration 
was very much a Blair initiative, Howorth notes that ‘the Whitehall teams which have 
been working on (...) CESDP have become personally much more committed to the 
project (...); there has clearly been a cultural shift both in the MOD and in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and all the evidence suggests that the UK 
government and the Whitehall machine are in this for the long haul’ (Howorth 2000: 
383). This in turn reflects a general salience of the EU ESDP in the British foreign 
policy establishment.
The indicator of policy adaptation, and of Britain giving up on traditionally- 
held policy objectives is demonstrated by the fact that the UK, once the Berlin Plus 
agreements had been concluded, gave up objections against the deployment of an 
ESDP mission and thus made possible the progress of ESDP in general. A foreign 
policy official from another member state put it more directly: ‘well, after St. Malo, 
they had to agree to an ESDP mission’ (Interview with French official, 27 April 
2006). Thus, the UK, by agreeing to the development of the ESDP in principle and by 
having been one of the drivers of that process, put themselves in a situation where 
they had to agree to the application of the instruments. This is also evident from 
leaked documents that show a split in opinion between the Ministry of Defence and 
the Foreign Office: whereas the Ministry of defence argued ESDP was not ready to
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undertake such a mission and endanger the lives of British troops, the office of 
foreign secretary Straw wrote on 17 January that ‘if we do look like becoming 
isolated we would be better to accept an EU mission and shape it to our 
specifications. We would also need to consider whether the UK should contribute 
some forces to take part in this, first, ESDP mission. The political case for doing so 
would be strong’ (cited in The Guardian, 4 March 2002). This in turn serves as 
evidence of policy adaptation in order to accommodate the use of ESDP instrument.
In addition, preference among elites leaning towards ESDP is illustrated by 
Foreign Secretary Straw’s statement at the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs on 
what the EU had learned about its capacity to act in a crisis situation from its role in 
FYROM. In terms of defence forces, he stated that ‘Essential Harvest and the work 
that followed (...) had to be put together on a bilateral/multilateral basis, in a rather 
ad hoc manner. The ESDP, with the very active support of NATO, would provide a 
better focus for all of this, and a better means of decision making. It also ensures that 
the burden of providing these forces did not always fall to two or three countries’ -  
an indicator of the salience of the EU agenda, even if Straw simultaneously issued a 
word of caution in saying that despite Europe having to shoulder a greater burden in 
regional/Balkan security as a result of 11 September and the likely evolution of the 
role of forces under the ESDP, ‘one of the reasons why the language of Laeken is 
likely to be careful is that we do not want to run before we have learned to walk in 
terms of the practical sides of the ESDP’ (Straw, House of Commons, 5 December 
2001:23).“
Evidence of policy adaptation and the adherence to common policy objectives
even in light of domestic reservations is supported by the fact that the UK consented
83 Support for ESDP also extended to the Ministry o f Defense, with the House o f Lords the one 
government institution to publicly raise the issue o f a ‘European Army’ as a potential destination for 
the CESDP and therefore -unwanted- competition for NATO (House o f Lords, 29 January 2002).
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to declaring ESDP operational and attempting to accelerate the handover to ESDP 
from NATO despite the professed reservations as to the timing of both decisions. It is 
also illustrated by a quote by Blair on ESDP and the difference among member states 
where Blair stated that ‘if we do not get involved in European defence, it will happen 
without Britain. Then those people who really may have an agenda to destroy NATO 
will have control of it’ (cited in House of Commons, 27 March 2001a).
Finally, there is an element of projection of national preferences in the ESDP 
mission as well, as Straw stated that an ESDP operation in FYROM (and the Balkans 
in general) would also ensure ‘that the burden of providing these forces did not 
always fall to two or three countries. It is flattering that everybody turns to the United 
Kingdom first but if we are talking about the defence of Europe it is not a good idea’ 
(Straw, House of Commons, 5 December 2001:22). This demonstrates that ESDP 
also constituted a practical goal for the UK. More generally, the UK’s position on 
ESDP serves as evidence of national projection as ‘the Blair government’s re-think 
on European defence was also aimed at maximizing the potential of the UK’s 
influence in Europe. This was of crucial importance to the government with the (...) 
the birth of Economic and Monetary Union on 1 January 1999, with the UK 
remaining outside’ (Whitman, 2004:436). In conclusion, despite the hesitation on the 
timing of the ESDP takeover, and the condition on a previous agreement with NATO, 
there was interest in the EU assuming a military security function under ESDP in 
FYROM, which confirms the Europeanization hypothesis.
Alliance Politics
The politics of the handover process from NATO to ESDP were impacted by broader 
geopolitical considerations that confirm the alliance politics hypothesis rather than
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that of Europeanization. With respect to indicators of alliance politics, the timing of 
the ESDP handover in large parts reflects British concerns over US preferences 
leaning towards NATO -  or at least a negotiated agreement over the relationship 
between NATO and ESDP -  in addition to utilitarian reasons for preferring to keep 
NATO in place. As a result, a second indicator of alliance politics, that of preference 
given to NATO out of transatlantic preference, can also be observed in this case.
The US, particularly the incoming Bush administration, continued to express 
caution to the ESDP project -  as did the British public. To illustrate, the Second 
Report on British-US relations states that ‘the United States government is clear that 
its ‘bottom’ line on ESDP is that European countries’ commitments to NATO must 
take precedence over any to ESDP’ (House of Commons, 18 December 2001b: 17). 
Together with changing overall priorities with respect to national security and 
defence policy (see Howorth, 2003-04: 176), this meant that ESDP as a policy 
priority moved in the background. And, the impact of 11 September shifted London’s 
priorities from regional to global issues, and made the task of transatlantic solidarity 
paramount. With respect to NATO and ESDP, the crisis in FYROM illustrated 
differences over NATO’s ‘right of first refusal’ as the UK took the position that the 
EU should not take on missions in the absence of any agreement on Berlin Plus. To 
illustrate, the European Union Committee stated unequivocally, that ‘there may be a 
temptation, if the political need for an operation arises, to conduct an EU-led mission 
for symbolic purposes before the EU is ready to do so. What is imperative is that the 
EU must not lead an operation before it has achieved the full range of capabilities 
necessary to conduct it or can rely on the assistance of NATO’ (House of Lords, 29 
January 2002: 86).
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With respect to transatlantic relations more generally, however, despite 
European disagreement and discomfort at the incoming US administration with 
respect to the withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol and plans for a nuclear missile 
shield (Whitman, 2004: 443), Blair was determined to ensure the continuity of the 
UK’s relationship with Washington -  and Hill notes that ‘it was not implausible that 
Robin Cook was moved from the FCO because he was seen as having become 
‘Europeanised’ and insufficiently pro-American’ (Hill, 2005: 388). Apart from the 
staff changes following the June 2001 elections, then, Blair was careful not to 
antagonize the US over the ESDP mission -  further confirmation of a clear 
transatlantic preference in British politics that spoke for the primacy of NATO in 
British foreign policy thinking. However, with respect to transatlantic relations more 
generally, Whitman notes that ‘the ESDP has only been one component in a difficult 
transatlantic relationship that has developed under the Bush administration. It has not 
been the central issue of dispute across the Atlantic but has added to the mix’ 
(Whitman, 2004: 445). Domestically as well the UK government was careful to 
underline that the EU would only be involved where NATO is not engaged, and faced 
a number of questions on the perseverance of NATO’s right of first refusal (Hoon, 
House of Commons, 28 March 2001a: 39). At the same time, however, Hoon was 
careful to underline that the ESDP process would considerably strengthen ‘the 
arrangements because the Americans have long argued understandably that they want 
to see a much greater contribution to military capability from European nations than 
they have in the past’ (Hoon, House of Commons, 28 March 2001b:76). In 
conclusion, it has been shown that alliance politics considerations determined British 
preferences with respect to the timing of the ESDP takeover. This applies less to the 
UK heeding to US preferences, however: rather, it was on account of domestic
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transatlantic preferences that favoured an agreement between NATO and the EU 
prior to an ESDP takeover that delayed an agreement on the first military EU 
mission.
V. Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that British policy towards the crisis in FYROM 
shows considerable evidence of Europeanization, particularly with respect to the 
support for the political support for the resolution of the crisis. Although the decision 
to launch and participate in the NATO operations does not reveal evidence of 
Europeanization, the decision processes in the actual handover from NATO to ESDP 
shows that the alliance politics approach does not fully explain British policy 
decisions with respect to the handover from NATO to ESDP. Objections to an ESDP 
operation arose not as a question of principle but as a question of timing and prior 
arrangements with the US, which points towards the presence of considerations that 
support the Europeanization hypothesis. Evidence of alliance politics exists with 
respect to utilitarian motivation, but also with respect to an enduring transatlantic 
preference. Considerations of US preference and the role of Britain in moderating 
between Europe and the US became increasingly important on account of the events 
of 11 September and caused a shift in Blair’s policy priorities as a result -  as is 
evident more starkly in British policies towards the war in Afghanistan, the subject of 
the next chapter.
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Chapter 9. Britain and the war in Afghanistan
I. Introduction
This chapter argues that Britain’s foreign policy decisions with respect to the political 
and military contributions to OEF and ISAF were motivated above all by the UK’s 
close ties with the US. Tony Blair in particular sought to not only demonstrate 
solidarity with the US but also to try to use his influence to shape US policy in 
Afghanistan towards using multilateral institutions -most importantly the UN, 
particularly where the reconstruction of Afghanistan was concerned - and to 
coordinate the contributions of other EU member states to that end. This use of the 
EU platform was met with criticism from other, particularly smaller, member states, 
including the then EU Presidency, Belgium. While the first point -transatlantic ties- 
demonstrates the validity of the alliance politics framework, the second -attempts to 
shape an EU response and to influence other EU member states using the EU 
platform- point towards some evidence of Europeanization understood as policy 
projection, even if, importantly, this did not result in a co-ordinated EU military 
action either as part of OEF or ISAF. Instead, Blair’s attempt to shape and coordinate 
EU diplomacy illustrates the importance attached to British influence over EU policy 
in this case. When it comes to the political and economic reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, the UK supported the EU pillar in the country’s reconstruction as well 
as the appointment of a EUSR in Afghanistan. This indicates the importance of a 
European profile in this policy area and supports the Europeanization hypothesis as 
the UK consented to EU policy initiatives for the sake of EU unity and a political 
profile for the EU. But, significant bi-lateral developmental cooperation with 
Afghanistan as well as the central co-ordinating role played by the UN also suggests
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that in the eyes of London, the EU was one of a number, and not necessarily the most 
important, political institution to tackle the reconstruction of Afghanistan. This 
demonstrates that national rather than European commitments were of high salience. 
While there is some evidence of Europeanization even in light of Britain’s strong 
transatlantic ties and its ‘special relationship’ with the US, the Europeanization model 
does not offer a convincing framework to explain the UK’s policy actions in the three 
policy areas.
II. Policy area 1: OEF and the war on terror
This section argues that in the war in Afghanistan, in particular where the co­
ordination of military and political support and EU measures to combat international 
terrorism are concerned, Blair made efforts to place himself at the centre of European 
diplomacy while at the same time being steadfastly supportive of the US -  indicating 
that the European agenda constituted an important political platform through which to 
increase national influence and to pursue national preferences. Although this by no 
means eclipsed the central role of the US position in British foreign policy, it shows 
that British decision-making aimed not only for the traditional role for the UK as a 
bridge between the US and the Europe, but also as a decision-maker within the EU -  
and to thereby put Britain at the heart of Europe (Wallace 2004). It also demonstrates 
that the two sets of interests were not regarded as mutually exclusive. These actions 
support the Europeanization in addition to the alliance politics model.
With respect to an analysis of the key players and their positions in the case of 
OEF and the war on terror, Prime Minister Blair occupies a central role in the 
decision-making and the shaping of UK policy preferences among elected officials -
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this on account of both what has been referred to as a presidential style84 of decision­
making (see Foley 2000, 2002, 2004) and his strongly-held moral views. On taking 
office, Blair, who was inexperienced in foreign policy, developed a strongly-held 
vision of Britain’s global responsibilities and a more interventionist foreign policy 
that was exemplified in the 1999 Chicago speech (Blair, 24 April 1999) which spoke 
of moral values, just war, and the belief that the European and American dimensions 
of British foreign could be reconciled and that there was a continuing community of 
values across the Atlantic where Britain was well placed to hold the two sides 
together in promoting those shared values in an unstable world (Wallace and Oliver, 
2004: 7; Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000, Miskimmon, 2004). On the domestic side, 
Blair had sought to increase his own influence in foreign policy prior to the events of 
11 September. The June 2001 staffing changes reinforced the Prime Minister’s hold 
over foreign policy by appointing full-time advisors for European (Sir Stephen Wall) 
and world affairs (David Manning), respectively, thereby weakening the role and 
influence of the Foreign Office (Kampfner, 2003:92). With respect to the war in 
Afghanistan, Blair also appointed a personal representative for Afghanistan. Paul 
Bergne held the position until December 2001 and Robert Cooper, the former 
Director of Asia in the Foreign Office assumed the post until mid-2002. This means 
that, irrespective of conceptual debates over the merits of the ‘presidential style’ label 
to the analysis of prime ministerial leadership in Britain, Blair’s central role in British 
foreign policy in the case of the war in Afghanistan supports the argument that his
84 The conceptual literature on the role o f the Prime Minister in British government, in particular the 
core executive model (see Heffeman, 2003) takes issue with the portrayal o f a presidential approach 
while at the same time emphasizing the growing role o f individual leader. This literature speaks of  
‘prime ministerial dominance’ (Heffeman, 2003: 350) or emphasizes ‘the structurally advantageous 
position’ of the prime minister in government (Smith, 1999:77).
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hold over key foreign policy decisions in the case of OEF was strong.85 In fact, Blair 
held only two meetings of his cabinet between 11 September and the first missile 
strikes as part of OEF on 7 October, and neither contained debate (Kampfner, 2003: 
129). In addition, the close personal connection between Bush and Blair was an 
important factor in shaping Blair’s policy responses to the war on terror.86 This also 
means that the role and influence of the Foreign Office was less instrumental in 
determining policy outcomes even if the formulation of policy was developed with 
the support of the Foreign Office (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006) -  
as was the role of the Ministry of Defence that did, however, support the military 
measures in Afghanistan and close coordination with the US.87
Prior to the attacks of 11 September, Blair’s determination to play the 
traditional role of bridge between the US and the EU appeared to be made difficult by 
the advent of the Bush administration in 2001. Blair had been worried about 
isolationist tendencies in US foreign policy following the elections in 2001 with the 
US making moves to disengage from the former Yugoslavia, the Northern Ireland as 
well as the Middle East Peace process (Riddell, 2003). Adding to this concern was 
that the US seemed to be looking elsewhere for special relationships without much 
interest in European affairs -  whereas the fact that Jacques Chirac was the first 
European leader to meet the new President added fears of the deterioration of the 
‘special relationship’88 (Kampfner, 2003: 86). The Bush administration’s attitude
85 With respect to Blair’s role, however, one official interviewed nevertheless stressed the role and 
importance o f political advisors thereby highlighting that an emphasis on Blair alone is overstated 
(Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006).
86 Foreign Minister Straw consequently stated that the policy was ‘set by President Bush and our Prime 
Minister in terms o f the overall objectives o f this military action’ (Straw, House o f Commons, 20 
November 2001).
87 This is illustrated by Defence Minister Hoon’s remark that ‘I do not believe that in the period since 
11 September two countries could have worked more closely together than the United States and the 
United Kingdom’ (Hoon, House o f Commons, 18 December 2001a: 363)
88 On the ‘special relationship’ between the UK and the US, Peter Riddell has rightly noted that it is a 
somewhat misleading term because it obscures the fact that while ‘Britain’s relations with the United
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towards defence, the environment, international law, disarmament, free trade and 
diplomacy further antagonized US allies.
In addition to the transatlantic priorities in British foreign policy, to members 
of the Foreign Office but also the Prime Minister the attacks of 11 September 
represented an opportunity to ‘fix’ Afghanistan. The stabilisation of the country had 
been a concern for the UK prior to the attacks on the United States (Interview with 
EU official, 11 September 2006). There had been attempts to formulate a policy 
towards Afghanistan in 2000, amid signs that Pakistan was getting nervous about its 
policy towards the Taliban. Robert Cooper, then-director of the Asia Directorate in 
the Foreign Office, had raised the issue with the Prime Minister to attempt to 
formulate a strategy for a UN coalition to reach a peace agreement, but not to 
recognize the Taliban regime. The resulting talks involved German officials, and 
there was a general agreement to do more on Afghanistan although any initiative 
needed the support from the new US government (Interview with EU official, 11 
September 2006). The issue was subsequently raised with Richard Haas, the director 
of the policy-planning staff at the US State Department in May 2001 and there was 
agreement on the need for a more rigorous effort although this did not result in policy 
initiatives at the time (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). This shows 
that there was a preference among policy makers in the UK to engage in Afghanistan 
prior to September 2001.
After the attacks of 11 September, the first instinct on the part of Blair was 
that the US should not feel isolated, and he called the Presidents of France, Germany, 
Russia, and Belgium, and dispatched Defence Minister Hoon to NATO and Foreign
States are unusually close (...) the relationship is inherently asymmetrical as London has a far greater 
interest in affecting what Washington does and says, than vice versa’ (Riddell, 2003: 26). As a result 
‘the most consistent feature of transatlantic relations (...) has been the desire o f other prime ministers 
to be insiders in the Washington policy debate’ (Riddell, 2003: 27) - which UK foreign policy 
priorities with respect to this policy area aptly illustrate.
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Minister Straw to prepare for an emergency EU session (Kampfner 2003: 115). In a 
conversation with Bush the next day, the two agreed to support from NATO and the 
UN for a legal and political basis for a military response. This shows that Blair 
effectively did act as a bridge between the US president and the 
international/European community, supporting the US while at the same time co­
ordinating EU actions, as well as regional diplomacy with Afghanistan’s 
neighbouring states: Blair called on Pakistan’s leader on 18 September, for instance, 
and it was announced that Straw would visit Iran (see House of Commons, 12 June 
2002a). Kampfener also notes that, importantly, initially there was no resentment 
towards Blair’s role internationally or inside the UK even if Blair did not consult with 
all but his inner circle (Kampfner, 2003: 121). Through Britain’s military 
participation in the war on terror and the close links with the US Blair was able to 
wield influence in the EU-15 (The Spectator, 27 October 2001), although the later 
events surrounding the Iraq war and Blair’s unwavering support for the war in Iraq 
and US policies threw off the fine balance and accounted for a loss of influence in 
Europe and the collapse of the ‘transatlantic bridge’ (Wallace and Oliver, 2005; 
Riddell, 2003). For the purpose of the time period of concern in this analysis, 
however, there was no contradiction between European integration and the Atlantic 
alliance in the mind of the Prime Minister.89 Along with being a partner to the US, 
Blair was ‘acting as Europe’s primary envoy to the US, and America’s primary envoy 
to the rest of Europe’ (Peterson, 2002: 4).
89 Blair underlined this point in his speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet on 12 November 2001 where 
he stated that ‘we have buried the myth that Britain has to choose between being strong in Europe or 
strong with the United States. Afghanistan has shown vividly how the relationships reinforce each 
other; and that both the United States and our European partners value our role with the other. So let us 
play our full part in Europe, not retreat to the margins; and let us proclaim our closeness to the United 
States and use it to bring Europe closer to America’ (cited in Riddell, 2003: 172).
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This shows that a European response was of importance to Blair, including 
agreeing on a common European line that included supporting the military campaign 
as long as it was restricted to Afghanistan; a collectively agreed upon ‘post-Taliban 
scenario’ with a lead role for the UN in post-war Afghanistan; and a settlement of the 
Israel-Palestine conflict. But, the ‘Downing Street Dinner’ also gave the impression 
that London had become the centre of European policy making, and that Blair ‘made 
virtually no concessions to Brussels along the lines of stepping aside to let Solana, 
Prodi or Verhofstadt present a truly common EU stance to Washington. Blair showed 
little sympathy for EU leaders of small states who complained of being cut out of 
decisions taken in mini-summits of the ‘big three’ (Peterson 2002: 7).
Domestically, Blair by and large had support for the military action in
Afghanistan,90 even if cracks appeared among some MPs voicing concerns about the
nature and frequency of the bombing campaign -  some Labour MPs expressed
concerns over the length of the bombing while the Liberal Democrat front bench was
divided between foreign affairs spokesman Menzies Campbell who backed the
government’s approach and Jenny Tonge, shadowing international development, who
joined the call by aid agencies to pause military actions (The Times, 18 October).
Clare Short also called for a halt to the bombings. Differences between Blair and
other MPs also arose with respect to the geographic expansion of the war against
terrorism to include countries beyond Afghanistan (Kampfner, 2003: 102),
foreshadowing the domestic and international divisions over Iraq. In connection with
this, there was concern over Britain’s standing in the Arab world, even if Blair tried
to give the message to other Arab nations that the UK would not back military action
beyond Afghanistan while at the same time remaining steadfastly supportive of the
90 A report issued by the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in June 2002 explicitly approved Blair’s 
decision to support the US and to take a lead role in coordinating allies’ military contributions (House 
of Commons, 12 June 2002a).
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US (Kampfner, 2003:132). This came to create more severe tensions within the UK’s 
position as Blair -  in vain - attempted to persuade Bush to deal with the Middle East 
Peace process (see Riddell, 2003 and Kampfner 2003). For the purposes of decisions 
to participate in OEF, however, support for the US in the war in Afghanistan as well 
as UK military participation in that war was uncontested in British government.
Europeanization
As the preceding section has shown, Blair sought to shape EU policy in response to 
the attacks on 11 September in line with his commitment to the bridge function 
between the US and Europe. A number of initiatives and policy positions were 
subsequently taken by the UK that support the Europeanization hypothesis; it should 
be noted, however, that this refers mainly to policy projection -  that is, the export of 
national preferences to the EU agenda and the use of the EU platform to further 
national goals -  with the salience of the EU agenda in this case also attesting to 
indicators of national adaptation. This did not only apply to the Prime Minister, 
however: with respect to the CFSP, the Committee on Foreign Affairs noted that the 
immediate response to the 11 September attacks ‘was impressive, but progress 
became bogged down in the following months (...) nonetheless, the habits of 
intergovernmental co-operation created through the EU proved valuable in this crisis’ 
(House of Commons, 12 June 2002a: 59). This in turn supports the argument that the 
EU was regarded as a useful and salient policy platform among several branches of 
the UK government. But, as in the other two countries analyzed in this thesis, the EU 
CFSP was not the only platform considered and the three states, rather than 
predominately acting through the institution, acted ‘in concert with EU institutions, as 
opposed to working at cross purposes’ (Peterson 2002: 9).
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With respect to policy decisions that point towards national projection of 
policy preferences on to the EU, the British lead in setting EU policy was evident 
from a number of actions. At the 8 October General Affairs Council, Britain took the 
lead in organizing military contributions and welcomed pledges from France, Italy, 
Germany and Spain. And, Britain, together with the countries named above insisted 
on the phrasing that the EU was ‘in total solidarity’ rather than ‘perfectly in 
solidarity’ with the US, and spelling out the post-Taliban future of Afghanistan in the 
EU document -  with Jack Straw taking a diplomatic lead in explaining how the air 
strikes were steadily weakening the Taliban (The Independent, 18 October 2001). 
The suggestion and use of the EU to coordinate action suggests that the CFSP 
constituted an institutional platform through which to increase national clout. But, the 
strict adherence to US solidarity also indicates that the European framework was also 
used to strengthen the UK policy position vis-a-vis both its European allies as well as 
the US, rather than develop a joint response out of a reflective European preference. 
The first instinct was to turn to the US. This means that the third indicator of 
Europeanization, that of preference formation, is not applicable in the British case.
This, therefore, points towards Europeanization understood as national 
projection rather than policy adaptation, even if EU unity was a declared policy goal 
of the UK -as it was for other member states as well. Blair’s general statements on the 
UK’s role in Europe, particularly with respect to the EU CFSP in late 2001 further 
support this argument, for instance that ‘Britain’s future is inextricably linked with 
Europe; that to get the best of it, we must make the most of our strength and influence 
within it (...) we will not have influence if we only ever see Europe as in opposition 
to Britain (...) in some areas Europe should do more -  in foreign and security policy’ 
(Blair, 23 November 2001).
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At the Laeken summit, Britain forced the EU to drop a drafted warning to the 
US not to extend its self-declared war on terrorism beyond Afghanistan, which had 
stated that ‘approval of the international community must be sought prior to any 
geographical extension of those operations’ (Agence France Presse, 15 December
2001). This is again an indication that the EU policy platform served to reinforce the 
UK position vis-a-vis the US rather than the EU acting as an adaptation influence or a 
normative goal. In this sense, it reinforces the notion of Europeanization of that as 
increasing international influence (Regelsberger, 1997) and of exporting policy ideas 
to the EU (Bulmer, 1998).
However, the use of the EU as a platform to promote national interests and 
influence was compromised with respect to the attendance and organizations of mini­
summits, which gave Blair (as well as the other two European leaders as analyzed in 
Chapters 5 and 7, respectively) increased clout in the conduct of the war against 
terror. With regard to the meeting between Blair, Chirac and Schroeder before the 
Ghent summit, Blair defended the meeting as necessary and would not make excuses 
for this -  except for pointing out that it had essentially been Chirac’s initiative. But, a 
month later on 4 November 2001 Blair hosted a dinner for the ‘big five’ leaders to 
co-ordinate policies, raising anger among the smaller EU nations (The Times, 5 
November 2001) which -after having been expanded to include Spain and Italy in 
addition to France and Germany to avoid the same resentment from Chirac’s mini­
meeting- had to be expanded to include Belgium and the Netherlands as well as 
Javier Solana. This illustrates that while a common stance among EU member states 
was a declared policy goal for the UK, the execution of this goal was not necessarily 
conducive to EU unity in this charged political climate, and did not necessarily result 
in policies adopted under the EU CFSP. While Blair’s policy actions point towards
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policy projection as the EU represented a means to increase national leverage and to 
prove national influence within the EU, the selective use of the EU platform shows 
that the EU was of limited value for projecting UK power, that the appearance of EU 
unity was not considered important in this respect, and that mini-lateral measures 
proved more useful for shaping Britain’s influence over policy towards Afghanistan. 
As a result, the participation and organization of the mini-summits do not point 
towards Europeanization, understood either as policy preference or national 
adaptation, but instead weakens the evidence of Europeanization presented in this 
section.
In conclusion, therefore, although there is evidence that points towards 
Europeanization understood both as national adaptation and the salience of the CFSP 
agenda and policy projection, the close link to the US as well as the participation and 
initiation of mini-summits to co-ordinate selected member states’ contributions to 
OEF indicate that transatlantic policy priorities impacted British decision-making in 
this case first and foremost.
Alliance Politics
The alliance politics framework provides a strong explanatory model for British 
decisions taken with regards to OEF and the war on terror. However, this does not 
refer solely to NATO as an institution: on the question of the role of NATO, or 
military alliances in general after 11 September, US Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld 
famously stated that ‘the coalition must not define the mission’ (Rumsfeld, 23 
September 2001) indicating that the role of NATO in the war on terror was going to 
be negligent. And, the fact that the US declined NATO and NATO Secretary General 
George Robinson’s offer of help raised the bar for NATO to prove that it was not
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redundant in the post-11 September world (Kampfner, 2003: 131; Toje, 2003). 
Alliance politics in this case, therefore, refers to UK relations with the US and other 
participating allies in addition to that of the use and attitudes towards NATO as an 
institutional framework.91
Several aspects of UK politics point towards alliance politics. British support 
for the invocation of NATO article V demonstrates the recognition that the US in the 
first instance at least had the right to retaliate against the attacks on its territory and 
that NATO was the appropriate institution for legitimizing such decisions. This 
demonstrates that the initial reaction from the UK government was not just solidarity 
with the US, but also to revert to NATO as a multilateral forum for a political and 
military response to the attacks. This is illustrated by the fact that Defence Minister 
Hoon was sent to NATO immediately following the attacks on 11 September 
(Kampfner 2003: 115), which demonstrates the centrality of NATO in policy 
considerations. More than just supporting the invocation of article V, however, 
Britain played an ‘active role’ in promoting the NATO decision to invoke Article V, 
and ‘pushed forward the deployment of joint NATO assets’ and the decision that 
‘NATO AWACS were sent to patrol US airspace on 9 October in an operation code 
names “Eagle Assist’” (House of Commons, 12 June 2002a: 48).92 More generally, 
Blair’s policy initiatives -  the aim to show absolute solidarity with the US in order to 
influence American foreign policy also - demonstrate a strong transatlantic reflex
91 The fact that NATO was not used did not render it unimportant in the view o f the UK military 
establishment, either. Rather, ‘in many ways NATO acts as a glue in military terms. The fact that we 
are used to working together, have common procedures, common doctrine, we know a lot o f the 
people involved personally, means that even if we are operating (...) without NATO, NATO stilf acts 
as a very powerful binding mechanism to enable us to operate more effectively’ (Major-General 
Milton, House o f Commons, Committee on Defence, 7 November 2001: 24).
92 However, Toje (2003) makes the point that the idea to invoke Article V came from the institution 
itself rather than the member states. While the actions on the British government contradict this 
reading o f events and attest to the centrality o f NATO as a security institution in British foreign policy, 
NATO leadership undoubtedly also had an interest in the utilisation o f NATO -  which supports the 
conclusion that ‘the invocation o f Article V can be seen as a response to NATO’s self-preservation 
challenge’ (Toje, 2003: 71)
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inherent in British foreign policy. The decision to invoke Article V and the 
investment on the part of Blair and Straw were also positively noted and supported in 
the House of Commons (House of Commons, 12 June 2002a) supporting the 
conclusion that this policy priority was shared among other branches of the 
government as well. More fundamentally, the attacks of 11 September shifted the 
UK’s emerging focus on ESDP and the evolution and direction of the European 
security institutions to the emphasis on NATO. This reinforces the alliance politics 
framework at the expense of considerations that could serve as evidence of 
Europeanization. For one, combating terrorism became a new mission for the 
alliance and as a result the UK would be in the vanguard of NATO ‘going global’ in 
this new mission in line with its transatlantic ties (Howorth, 2003-04). While these 
tendencies do not necessarily take away from the evidence of Europeanization 
presented in the preceding sub-section, they do illustrate that the transatlantic 
framework, and alliance politics in general, were strengthened and reinforced by the 
events of 11 September.
Blair’s alignment with the US in order to influence US political decisions 
certainly proves a strong indicator of alliance politics. The first consideration on the 
part of the UK was to co-operate and show solidarity with the US, even if, with 
regards to Britain’s role in OEF and the broader war on terror in the framework of the 
UK’s bridge function between the two continents, close co-operation on military and 
intelligence matters with Washington complemented rather than competed with 
closer links with EU institutions on other matters (The Times, 19 October 2001). A
93 In this respect Riddell (2003: 305) notes that while the Blair government had come closer to 
European defence, ‘Afghanistan (...) reinforced the natural tendency o f  the Ministry o f Defence to 
work alongside the Americans’. And, after the Iraq war, Secretary of Defence Hoon stated that ‘it is 
highly unlikely that the UK would be engaged in large-scale combat operations without the United 
States, a judgement bom o f past experience, shared interest and our assessment o f strategic trends’ 
(cited in Riddell, 2003: 306)
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report issued by the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs on British-US Relations 
noted that ‘the UK’s prompt actions immediately after the events of 11 September 
were regarded by the Americans not only as significant symbolic acts of solidarity, 
but also as very concrete expressions of the special relationship. The very spontaneity 
of the reaction illustrated perfectly the instinctive nature of the relationship’ (House 
of Commons, 12 June 2002a: 31).
In sum, although the application of instruments located in NATO was not 
favoured by the US, British moves towards, and support for the invocation of NATO 
article V demonstrate evidence of alliance politics. And, although NATO did not play 
a significant role in the Afghanistan campaign and military action did not ultimately 
involve NATO command structures, the UK was active in encouraging the US to 
respond positively to the offer by allies, particularly the European ones (House of 
Commons, 12 June 2002a) and did support the deployment of NATO assets. 
Moreover, the strong transatlantic orientation in British foreign policy in this case 
shows that alliance politics -  understood as the transatlantic relationship more 
broadly rather than just NATO -  was the primary political concern of the UK 
government in response to the attacks of 11 September, and that other policy aims 
were subordinated to the goal of transatlantic solidarity. This does not mean that 
these political considerations were unimportant, or that the EU did not represent an 
important political function for the UK -  but that Europeanization considerations 
were dependent and subordinated to, as well as used as a means to reinforce, the 
UK’s transatlantic ties.
III. Policy area 2: The reconstruction of Afghanistan
This section argues that the UK did not occupy a leadership position in Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction to the same extent that it did in the coordination of military
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contributions for ISAF and OEF. This was because the task of reconstruction was 
placed in the hands of the UN, involved more than one national and institutional 
actor,94 and because coherence and support for the UN effort represented a policy 
objective for the UK. In addition, the involvement of a number of actors in the 
reconstruction effort as well as the fact that another EU member, Germany, hosted 
the Bonn Conference, meant that visibility for the UK was correspondingly lower in 
this particular policy area. As the primary objective in the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban was support for the multilateral effort under 
the UN umbrella this section argues that the European agenda did not have a 
substantive profile in UK policy coordination although Britain did support the 
appointment of an EUSR and therefore a political role for the EU in the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan. In addition, the UK took a national lead in the area of 
drug eradication, further raising its national profile in one aspect of Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction and co-ordinating on a bilateral basis with the country taking the lead 
in policy reform, Germany. As a result, the explanatory power of the Europeanization 
approach is of limited value in this case.
With respect to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the relevant branches of 
government active in this policy field were the Foreign Office as well as the 
Department for International Development (DFID) headed by Clare Short, the UK 
Secretary of State for International Development (1997-2003), particularly in the area 
of providing humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. No. 10 was also active and 
involved (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006), with Blair sending an 
observation delegation to the Bonn talks. With respect to Blair’s preferences on the 
war and the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Blair preferred to finish the war quickly
94 The EU, represented by the Commission and the Presidency together with the US, Japan and Saudi 
Arabia co-chaired the Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering Group (ARSG).
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and was dubious about Brahimi’s ‘light footprint’ approach95 and ‘would have 
preferred someone like Paddy Ashdown’ who was more forceful (Interview with EU 
official, 11 September 2006). Robert Cooper, Blair’s special representative for 
Afghanistan, had to reign Blair in who wanted to ‘try and hasten things along’ when 
it came to liberating Afghanistan -  this was in order to prevent a bloodbath and to 
sound out the potential political leadership before the fall of the Taliban as well as not 
to apply too much pressure on UN envoy Brahimi (Kampfner 2003: 144). This 
demonstrates that the international constraints acting on the Prime Minister in this 
policy area did not permit the same personal leadership style -  or impact on policy 
decisions - than did the decisions on OEF and the war in Afghanistan.
The provision of humanitarian aid and the future shape of the Afghan interim 
administration were the two primary poles of international support for the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan, and the British government did not play an active but 
rather a supportive role in negotiating the post-Taliban interim administration for 
Afghanistan under UN auspices. But, the UK was the first donor country to pledge 
assistance, even prior to the UN inter-agency donor alert and thus took the lead in the 
international aid effort in Afghanistan. DFID set aside £1 million to support the UN 
Secretary-General’s Special Representative Lakdhar Brahimi and the Integrated 
Mission Task Force (IMTF) to consult the Afghan Diaspora (Short, House of 
Commons, 20 November 2001).
The UK government did however establish an observer delegation to the 
Bonn negotiations led by Robert Cooper; and Blair sent Paul Bergne as his personal 
envoy to support the UN’s lead role who in turn tried to move Northern Alliance
95 A report by the International Development Committee noted that ‘Lakhdar Brahimi's request for a 
"light footprint" approach is connected to a recognition by the international community o f the 
importance of Afghan involvement in setting policy and spending priorities’ (House o f Commons, 14 
2003:37).
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members towards accepting concessions to form a post-Taliban government (House 
of Commons, 12 June 2002b). Foreign Minister Straw in turn played a more active 
role than the delegation through ‘a series of conversations’ with Abdullah Abdullah, 
the Foreign Minister of the Northern Alliance, as well as the Russian and Iranian 
foreign ministers to ensure that members of delegations other than those of the 
Northern Alliance would be accommodated within the constitution (House of 
Commons, 12 June 2002a). Stephen Evans, finally, acted as the British Government’s 
representative in Kabul in talking to members of the Northern Alliance and making 
contact with other members of the Northern Alliance ‘to help meet the objective (...) 
of producing a broad-based multi-ethnic government (Straw, House of Commons, 20 
November 2001:6). His efforts were not integrated with those of UN Special 
Representative Brahimi on behalf of the UN and his tasks were thus more hands-on 
than that of the observer delegation to the Bonn talks: ‘although it is important that 
UN Ambassadors like Mr Brahimi should have our full support, which they do (...) 
was also provide them with a perspective from a bilateral relationship with one of the 
great parties involved in the military coalition which he may not get for himself 
(Straw, House of Commons, 20 November 2001:6).
Europeanization
Given the inherently multinational nature of the UN lead in the reconstruction effort, 
the Europeanization does not convincingly explain British policy decisions in this 
case. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Britain had more 
influence and leeway on the UN, and the EU therefore did not present a useful 
platform for the projection of national policy preferences. However, the EU did 
represent an important institutional venue through which to discuss and coordinate
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financial contributions. This in turn points towards the salience of the European 
agenda and can be used as evidence of national adaptation: informal meetings of EU 
Development Ministers including Clare Short took place on 10 October and 8 
November, and the UK contributed 19 percent of the overall EU humanitarian aid 
commitment of €44 million in 2001 (House of Commons, 23 November 2001). At 
the same time, DFID was equally in contact with other governments through the 
Afghanistan support group of major donors, including the USA, Japan and European 
member states (House of Commons, 23 November 2001) -  and, DFID saw the role of 
the EC in the release of funds to ‘support infrastructure repair, de-mining, and local 
policing; humanitarian aid delivery; and administrative support to interim 
government’ (DFID, 13 November 2001) rather than a useful political platform in 
the reconstruction of Afghanistan. While the EU constituted a useful platform to hold 
meetings on the release of foreign aid, and a mechanism and resource for the delivery 
of humanitarian aid and to lay the foundation of long-term reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, this did not involve CFSP instruments but referred to the first pillar and 
thus resources of the European Commission.
This leaves little evidence of Europeanization as far as the EU CFSP was 
concerned. With respect to the EU CFSP the UK did, however, support German 
policy initiative to appoint a EU Special Representative both as a response to another 
member states’ policy initiative and out of some value attached to giving the EU a 
political profile in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. This points towards evidence of 
policy adaptation, where a policy was agreed to for the sake of EU unity (see Wong, 
2005) even if there was no apparent UK preference in favour of such an appointment 
and the UK consented to the appointment in response to German political lobbying.
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Alliance Politics
While the evidence of Europeanization is weak with respect to this policy area, 
neither is the alliance politics framework suited to explain British policy choices. To 
be sure, there were differences between the US and European member states in the 
question of Afghanistan’s reconstruction that included the policy towards warlords 
(United States Institute for Peace, 2003) or the need for nation-building and to fight 
drugs where member states had pointed out to the US that there was a need to look at 
this sooner (Interview with Commission official, 26 July 2006). However, given that 
the UN had taken the lead in overseeing and coordinating reconstruction efforts, the 
alliance or US-British relations were not used to initiate or harmonise policies 
towards the reconstruction of Afghanistan. As a result, the alliance politics 
framework is not applicable in this policy area.
IV. Policy area 3: British participation in ISAF
This section argues that British participation and military lead in ISAF arose out of 
Britain’s preferred military leadership role alongside the US, and that British policy 
preferences show a continuation of the basic impulses and policy preferences that 
shaped British responses towards the attacks on 11 September and UK participation 
in OEF. They were, essentially, close co-ordination with the US, and a British 
leadership role in the construction of ISAF within the EU as well as with non-EU 
contributing forces. A coalition of the willing rather than a proper NATO (or EU, for 
that matter) force, the military planning under UK lead took place in close 
cooperation with the US. This supports the alliance politics framework -  the UK 
leaned towards consultation with the US and its NATO allies both for utilitarian 
reasons as well an inherent preference to coordinate military action in a transatlantic
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framework. In addition, the UK in no uncertain terms distanced itself from 
suggestions that ISAF constituted an EU force, which suggests that the 
Europeanization framework is not applicable for explaining this policy area with 
respect to the war in Afghanistan, and that any considerations with respect to 
European coordination in ISAF were subordinated to transatlantic cooperation. 
Consequently, the analysis in this section will show that the Europeanization model is 
of limited use in explaining British policy decisions in this case.
As in the decision surrounding participation in OEF, Blair continued to have a 
strong preference on the formation and role of the UK in ISAF -  although the 
military planning took place in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in close coordination 
with the US. Unlike decisions on the participation in OEF, there were more 
disagreements and deliberations that shaped the policy process, both in terms of 
domestic opposition to US military strategy as well as disagreements between the US 
and the UK over military planning. Initial discussions on ISAF took place with the 
US before the Bonn talks. The UK thought the US should not participate in the 
multinational force, and Blair’s advisor pushed for the MOD to get involved 
(Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). Blair maintained a high and public 
profile with respect to ISAF and Afghanistan not just by means of agreeing to troop 
deployments and coordinating international (in particular European) contributions, 
but also through high profile visits to British troops in Afghanistan in a context of a 
mission to Bangladesh, India and Pakistan to defuse regional tensions and to 
influence Pakistan to reject international terrorism (Agence France Presse, 8 January
2002). While Blair emphasized the British lead in ISAF, the MoD did decide on the 
strategic part of ISAF and the geographic scope of the mandate. However, there were 
reservations on lengthy British military involvement in Afghanistan: in his evidence
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to the House of Commons, special envoy Bergne stressed that British forces should 
be succeeded as rapidly as possible by a multinational force given the history of 
Britain’s relations with Afghanistan96 -  even if ISAF appears to have been welcome 
in Kabul (House of Commons, 12 June 2002b).
Given the British lead in co-ordinating military contributions to ISAF and in 
acting as lead nation for the first six months, the MoD took a larger role in the 
planning and decision-making than it did in the case of OEF, where the US 
essentially determined the targets and operations. Although some seventeen other 
countries also declared their willingness to participate in ISAF, Britain was very 
much in the lead. This was important to Blair as it demonstrated his willingness to 
show off the peacekeeping role of the military, even after 11 September (Kampfner 
2003: 146). The British lead also resulted from the fact that the UK and Germany 
were the two European countries with the strongest level of interest and engagement 
in Afghanistan (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). To guard against 
accusations of overstretch -  and out of consideration of Britain’s history of military 
engagement in Afghanistan and the resulting legacy (House of Commons, 12 June 
2002a) -  it was agreed that leadership of the force would be handed over to Turkey 
the following April. The negotiations and deliberations on the construction of ISAF 
took place on a bilateral basis and in the UN Security Council, and the UK 
Representative was unaware of any EU initiative with this regard -  but did brief the 
Coasie group97 at the Council (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). The 
EU, while not the locus of policy making, was thus kept informed of policy 
developments.
96 During the 19th century, Britain, looking to protect its Indian empire from Russia, attempted to 
annex Afghanistan. This resulted in a series o f British-Afghan Wars in 1838-42,1878-80 and 1919-21 
(Rubin, 2002).
97 COASIE is one of the Council’s specialized working groups that deals with policy towards Asia.
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With respect to ISAF and the reconstruction of Afghanistan, there were 
differences between the US and UK as well as within the UK government on the 
political and military decisions with respect to ISAF and its role in Afghanistan’s 
peacekeeping and reconstruction. For instance, Clare Short complained that the US 
were not taking the aid situation seriously enough, and the Foreign Office and US 
State Department wanted to extend ISAF’s remit beyond Kabul but were overruled 
by the Pentagon and Ministry of Defence, whereas Blair did not see this as essential, 
although desirable (Kampfner 2003: 146). Robert Cooper also tried to persuade the 
US to agree to a geographic extension of the mandate, and to think about involving 
NATO, but the Pentagon did not take up this suggestion (Interview with EU official, 
11 September 2006). The key for the UK was whether or not the US would back 
ISAF in case of crisis -  with no affirmative response from the US, however, the UK 
did not proceed with this initiative (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). 
From the viewpoint of the MOD, Britain made it clear that it would lead the force 
only if it came under overall command of the US, citing the risk and impracticality of 
running two operations -  the peacekeeping and offensive missions -  separately (The 
Times, 15 December 2001).
Domestically, there were some concerns and reservations over the need to 
establish Afghan consent to the British presence, the danger of “mission creep” and 
the need for US support for the stabilisation of the mission -  these were voiced 
publicly by Ian Duncan Smith and repeated in the Commons by Conservative 
Defence spokesman Bernard Jenkins. Blair responded to these concerns that it was 
vital that Britain bolstered the political agreement for Afghanistan and that it was ‘the 
country best placed to lead that force’ (The Irish Times, 20 December 2001), which
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illustrates that domestic reservations over the size and strength of ISAF did not 
impact policy decision-making.
Still, the promise o f ‘limited deployment’ of British troops under a 3-month 
ISAF lead in particular raised confusion and concerns domestically that the UK could 
get drawn into a more lengthy deployment. The opposition in particular wanted 
assurance that British troops would not be left in Afghanistan beyond their 90-day 
tour of duty, but with Turkey seeking assurances over the cost and guarantees from 
the US that their troops would be evacuated if unrest broke out in Kabul the change 
in lead nation status took an extra 90 days to take place (Turkish Daily News, 26 
February 2002). With respect to the number of British troops deployed as part of 
ISAF, on 19 December 2001 Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon announced the dispatch 
of up to 1,500 British soldiers, the bulk of them paratroopers, to Kabul, with an 
advance party of 200 Marine commandoes flying in immediately to head the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). There were some differences with the 
US, who tried to keep the numbers and remit of ISAF to a minimum, fearing that the 
force would ‘confuse the battlefield’ and not wanting other countries to interfere with 
the US anti-terror operation. In the end, ISAF was to be confined to guarding Bagram 
and other strategic sites, and all activities were subject to veto by the US 
administration (Kampfner 2003: 146). The agreement of troop numbers eventually 
led to the following contingent: Britain assumed the organization and command of 
first six months (rather than the three months planned initially) and supplied force 
headquarters, brigade HQ, an infantry battle group, explosive ordnance demolition 
(EOD) and others (United Press International, 10 January 2002).
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Europeanization
There is little evidence of Europeanization in this particular policy area, particularly 
as it refers to the absence of any decision that would have given an EU label for a 
coordinated contribution to ISAF. While those EU member states that contributed to 
ISAF did co-ordinate their commitments under British lead, not all EU member states 
offered troops; in the end, of the 15 countries attending a London conference to offer 
troops to the proposed force, eight were not from the EU98 (The Times, 15 December 
2001). The outright rejection of the ‘EU force’ indicates instead that the EU platform 
was not of salience in this particular policy area but rather considered inappropriate to 
begin with, and that the EU CFSP/ESDP did not represent a means through which to 
project any national preferences. On the contrary, the strong reaction on the part of 
the government as well as the domestic opposition suggests that in the case of ISAF, 
the idea of a coordinated ‘EU force’ invoked a direct threat to NATO and the UK’s 
transatlantic credentials.
The issue of an ‘EU force’ flared up at the Laeken Summit in December 2001 
when Belgian Foreign Minister Michel in the view of the British press at least 
presented ‘the force as some sort of embryonic army’ and SG/HR Solana stated that 
the force would be ‘basically an EU force led by one country of the EU’ (The Times, 
15 December 2001). British ministers and spokesmen rebuffed these statements, with 
Jack Straw saying that ‘there’s no question of the EU having a defence force, still less 
being able to deploy one it doesn’t have in Afghanistan’, whereas Peter Hain, Foreign 
Office Minister, stated that the ‘EU rapid reaction force is not even walking yet, let 
alone running and able to run an operation like that.’ Downing Street issued a 
statement saying that ISAF was ‘an UN-mandated international force which will have
98 These were Turkey, Malaysia, Jordan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and the Czech 
Republic.
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EU members. It will also have a range of other countries. Quite clearly it is not an EU 
force’ (The Times, 15 December 2001). The Conservatives in turn interpreted 
Michel’s comments as a sign that the creation of the ESDP had led to a political 
momentum where the threat to NATO had become quite real. The EU force, then, not 
only touched on issues of military practicalities but also on fears on some parts of 
British government that ESDP was eclipsing NATO.
The question of a EU-force was therefore also a topic of political tension and 
debate domestically. Charges of a political fix arose in early 2002, when Defence 
Secretary Geoffrey Hoon distanced himself from the Canadian charges that the EU 
had deliberately limited ISAF to European units (United Press International, 10 
January 2002) as representatives from ISAF signed up formally to their contribution 
at a meeting at the MOD on 10 January 2002. Canada in return withdrew the offer to 
join ISAF and accepted a US invitation to join its campaign in Kandahar. British 
Conservative Party defence spokesman Bernard Jenkin’s repeated and expanded on 
these accusations saying that they were an embryonic Euro-army in all but name, but 
these were also rejected by Geoffrey Hoon, as the countries contributing troops under 
the UK’s (in the persona of General McColl) three-month leadership excluded 
Canada, but included Britain, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Turkey, 
Belgium, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Romania, Norway, Greece and New 
Zealand (The Times, 9 January 2002).
The sizable national contributions of EU member states to ISAF could serve 
as evidence of Europeanization in terms of the co-ordination with other EU member 
states, however. This could be interpreted as reflecting a preference towards 
coordination among EU member states, particularly in regard to the sizable European 
-  albeit not under a EU label- commitments in the area of security and defence at
275
present (Giegerich and Wallace, 2004). However, the reluctance on the part of the 
British government, including the ministry of defence, to own up to such a European 
effort and in essence rejecting a EU label for the military operations, does not make 
for a convincing case of Europeanization. It neither demonstrates a preference for a 
European approach (policy adaptation), or the use of the EU platform (policy 
projection): after all, similar national constellations have been deployed under 
NATO command before, and the overall chain of command of ISAF ended with the 
US, and NATO assets were used. And, Britain’s leadership in setting up the ISAF 
peacekeeping force did not take place within a EU framework, but a national one, and 
built on the transatlantic relationship and Britain’s national military capabilities 
instead.
Alliance Politics
With respect to the creation of ISAF, there is considerable evidence of alliance 
politics in British foreign policy." This holds true with respect to the military 
planning as well as the rejection of a coordinated EU force, and points towards some 
of the indicators of alliance politics outlined in chapter two. The first is that of 
utilitarian motives of coordinating the OEF and ISAF military efforts with the US, 
who had overall command of military operations in Afghanistan. Beyond pragmatic 
reasons however, there was also a clear and instinctive preference towards a 
transatlantic framework. While internal differences within the British government -  
mainly the objections of members of the Conservative party -  precluded decisions 
towards a co-ordinated EU force, there was no appetite for such a move even in the 
government, as the statements issued by No. 10 and the Foreign Office in rejection of
99 Note that due to US preferences, ‘alliance politics’ refers to transatlantic relations and relations with 
other NATO members as much as it does to NATO as an institution.
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such a force cited in the previous section illustrate. The future of NATO and the 
transatlantic alliance more generally, which were important considerations in the first 
policy area, strongly weighed in on British policy decisions in this case.
Several policy decisions taken by the UK support this conclusion. Britain 
stated early on that it would only agree to lead ISAF if the force came under overall 
US command, with MoD forces cited as saying that it would be impractical and risky 
to run two operations, the peace-keeping and the offensive missions, separately (The 
Times, 15 December 2001). This shows that from a military planning standpoint, the 
UK -  the MoD in particular -  was leaning towards an alliance politics framework for 
ISAF. But, attitudes towards the utility of the ESDP or an ‘EU label’ for military 
operations were not confined to questions of the make-up of the ISAF force but 
preceded the events of 11 September altogether -  thereby linking into broader 
strategic priorities and preferences: the UK’s strategic priorities by early 2001 were 
seen as geographically beyond Europe.100 The appropriateness of the ESDP and the 
Helsinki Headline Goal for meeting those security challenges was therefore not 
readily apparent (Clarke and Cornish, 2002). The UK’s changed priorities meant that 
NATO was deemed a more important and more relevant institutional framework than 
ESDP (Howorth, 2003-04). While this does not mean that the UK did not continue to 
support the ESDP project, it means that London had changed its priorities -  and, with 
respect to ISAF, the changed strategic priorities and the value attached to NATO in 
transatlantic cooperation in meeting the security challenges identified and reinforced 
by the events of 11 September, meant that the EU CFSP/ESDP was not considered an 
appropriate institution in this case -  or that ISAF presented an opportunity to hurry 
the development of ESDP along.
100 Instead, security challenges now seemed to come from regions beyond Europe, including Iran, Iraq, 
Korea, China, South Asia and the Middle East (see Howorth, 2003-04).
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More fundamentally, the ‘special relationship’ and the strong value placed on 
the UK’s close ties to the US as a result determined much of the UK’s policy 
response in this case. In conjunction with the UK lead in coordinating European 
contributions to OEF, a transatlantic emphasis in the construction of ISAF was a 
logical corollary to the UK’s goal that the US should not feel isolated following the 
attack of 11 September, but that influence on US policies was best achieved through 
partnership rather than competition: US reservations towards the ESDP project, 
particularly prior to the conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreements meant that any 
moves towards an EU force were likely to be perceived on the part of the US to 
weaken NATO and transatlantic ties more generally (see Toje 2003). In a crisis that 
called first and foremost for a demonstration of solidarity with the US in the minds of 
British decision-makers, then, such a move was hardly appropriate.
V. Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that British foreign policy decisions in the case of 
Afghanistan were overwhelmingly driven by the objective to show solidarity with the 
United States and to influence US policies towards Afghanistan as much as possible -  
this applied particularly to the policy area on participation in OEF but also to the 
construction of ISAF. However, one has to bear in mind the nature of the war in 
Afghanistan and the fact that it arose as an act of self-defence on the part of the US in 
response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September -  which makes the subordination to 
US leadership unsurprising. Still, the EU was of some salience to the UK as a policy 
platform for co-ordinating military contributions and the UK subsequently took a 
leadership position among other EU member states on this matter. While this points 
towards evidence of Europeanization as policy projection, the UK leadership position
278
was sought and used as a means to help shape US policies, and the value placed on 
EU unity did not extend to the mini-summits initiated by Jacques Chirac ahead of the 
Ghent summit or the Downing Street Dinner convened by Prime Minister Blair. The 
outright rejection of the suggestion that ISAF constituted an ‘EU-force’ further 
weakens the Europeanization hypothesis. Instead, alliance politics played a decisive 
role in British decision making where the priorities of the US, and the objective to 
shape these priorities towards the use of multilateral institutions, particularly NATO 
and the UN, were of foremost importance to British policy makers. With respect to 
the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the UK did support the appointment of an EU 
Special Representative, but its first policy priority extended to support for the UN 
lead in coordinating reconstruction and humanitarian aid, with the bilateral measures 
taken towards Afghanistan, in particular the assumption of lead nation in the effort to 
eradicate drugs in the country, further attesting to the fact that the EU was not the 
most salient institutional platform even in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In 
conclusion, therefore, the Europeanization model has limited explanatory value in 
this case.
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Chapter 10. Conclusion
I. Introduction
This chapter summarizes the findings of the empirical analysis of the two crisis case 
studies by comparing the three countries’ decisions with respect to each of the three 
policy areas in the crisis in FYROM and the war in Afghanistan. A ‘horizontal’ 
comparison, in addition to analyzing the empirical evidence of the preceding six 
chapters, allows for a nuanced conclusion on the degree of Europeanization of 
national foreign policies and highlights the obstacles to further integration in the field 
of foreign and security policy. Whereas all three countries’ policy decisions revealed 
some evidence of Europeanization, this evidence has tended to be more pronounced 
when it came to decisions involving a political and economic role for the EU. As far 
as ESDP is concerned, however, two of the three countries analyzed, although not in 
principle against an ESDP mission, deferred to NATO and the US and prioritized 
institutional arrangements between the EU and NATO in the case of FYROM. In 
Afghanistan, a military mission under ESDP was not considered seriously enough for 
a policy proposal to emerge from initial discussions. This leads to the conclusion that 
alliance politics rather than Europeanization is better suited to explain decision­
making with respect to the question of the application of ESDP instruments in the 
two cases.
II. Findings: the Europeanization of national foreign policy?
1. The crisis in Fyrom
National decisions towards the crisis in FYROM reveal substantial evidence of 
Europeanization, particularly regarding the first policy area. While there is no 
evidence of Europeanization with respect to the second policy area, the third policy
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area reflects tensions between the EU CFSP/ESDP and NATO/US preferences. The 
table below summarises the findings with respect to the three indicators of 
Europeanization -adaptation, projection, identity formation- that are analysed in more 
detail in the sections that follow.
Policy area 1: support for the political negotiation of the EU CFSP
Adaptation Projection Identity formation
UK F G UK F G UK F G
high x x  x x
medium x x x
low x x
Policy area 2: participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest
Adaptation Projection Identity formation
UK F G UK F G UK F G
high
medium x
low x x x  x x x  x x
Policy area 3: the politics of the ESDP take-over from NATO
Adaptation Projection Identity formation
UK F G UK F G UK F G
high x x
medium x x x
low x x x x
Policy area 1: support for the EU CFSP in the political negotiations 
With respect to the support of the EU CFSP in the political negotiations of the crisis, 
all three countries exhibited signs of Europeanization, both in the sense of projecting 
as well as adapting national policies to the EU CFSP. All three countries made efforts
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to align their statements on the crisis with a common EU line, and all three were 
explicit that this was a crisis where the EU should take a lead in the political 
negotiation, which points towards adaptation. Moreover, two of the three countries 
analyzed in this thesis actively influenced the negotiations. France projected national 
preferences by successfully lobbying for the appointment of a EU Special 
Representative, while Britain through its embassy in Skopje played an instrumental 
part in facilitating Solana’s local impact. Germany, although more cautious on 
account of the geographic proximity of FYROM, also endorsed Solana assuming a 
role in the negotiation of the crisis. This shows that all three countries viewed the EU 
CFSP as a legitimate and important tool in the solution of the crisis and means that 
national foreign policies in the three member states were Europeanized insofar as the 
EU CFSP was accorded a significant role in the solution of the crisis: Javier Solana 
had a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the EU member states, and the EU CFSP held 
a high profile in the national discourse, particularly in France and Germany. The EU 
CFSP was suggested and supported as the most appropriate institutional platform to 
deal with the crisis. Of course, the fact that all three member states retained a crucial 
role in setting the overall political framework through the Contact Group 
demonstrates that Britain, France and Germany were equally keen to retain national 
influence in international intervention and shows the importance attached to the 
inclusion of the US as well as Russia in the solution to the crisis. However, the 
application of EU CFSP instruments in all three countries was deemed important, and 
supported through practical measures. This confirms the first hypothesis for the 
Europeanization thesis formulated in chapter 1: in the case of the political 
negotiation in the crisis in FYROM, there was a significant influence of the EU
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CFSP on national foreign policy, which resulted in governments advocating a 
significant role in the crisis.
Evidence of alliance politics was present in this policy area insofar as the 
presence of NATO in FYROM and the involvement of the US in the resolution of the 
crisis were deemed important for a peaceful outcome of the crisis. This in turn points 
towards the indicator of relying on NATO for utilitarian reasons rather than out of a 
fundamental transatlantic preference that would have made the application of 
instruments located in the EU CFSP contentious. The advancement of the EU CFSP 
and the application of political instrument located within the EU CFSP was 
uncontested and not regarded as competition to NATO. This in turn supports the 
conclusion that there is strong evidence of Europeanization in this particular 
decision point particularly with respect to the second hypothesis of alliance 
politics: the fact that there was little perceived threat towards the alliance 
allowed for a significant role afforded to the EU CFSP. In the case of this 
particular policy area, then, NATO and the EU CFSP were perceived as 
complementary rather than competing institutions by policy makers in the three 
countries.
Policy area 2: participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest 
With respect to the decision to launch and participate in NATO Operation Essential 
Harvest, the Europeanization approach is not relevant as the EU CFSP/ESDP was not 
suggested in the first place. NATO was considered the relevant military actor both on 
account of its previous involvement in the area, the trust enjoyed by the local 
population as well as the continued involvement of the US in the Balkans (Interview 
with EU official, 21 June 2005) a view that was shared by all three member states. 
Keeping the US involved in European security, and convincing the US of the
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continued need for NATO in the region as well as in FYROM in particular, 
represented a policy goal for the UK in particular (Interview with EU official, 11 
September 2006), a view that was shared by France and Germany as well. This in 
turn confirms the alliance politics hypothesis formulated in chapter 1: there was 
a significant influence of the transatlantic alliance both in terms of the goal of 
keeping the US involved in European security and utilitarian considerations, 
and this resulted in a significant role for NATO. Policy makers in all three 
countries regarded NATO as the most appropriate forum for supporting the Ohrid 
Framework agreement following the resolution of the crisis. A degree of variance can 
be observed in the German case where, although policy makers did not push for 
military instruments located outside NATO, Europe’s capacity to act was frequently 
invoked to justify German participation in the military operations conducted. This 
demonstrates that some amount of Europeanization understood as identity formation 
can be observed in the sense that military participation was linked to the EU rather 
than national unilateral preferences or NATO and transatlantic ties exclusively; and 
that this made military participation more easily acceptable domestically.
Policy area 3: the politics o f the ESDP takeover from NATO 
The analysis of the third policy area has revealed the greatest variance between the 
three countries. France was the only case where the application of ESDP instruments 
was suggested early on, and the only country that did not consider institutional rather 
than ad hoc arrangements between the EU and NATO as necessary to launch an 
ESDP operation in FYROM. This reflects the underlying attitude towards NATO, 
and the conception of the EU ESDP as autonomous and an alternative rather than a 
complementing political and military tool to NATO. The French position also reflects 
the belief that the operation was small enough for the EU ESDP to take on this
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challenge without major risk of violence breaking out anew (Interview with French 
official, 20 June 2005). French decisions in this case therefore reveal strong evidence 
of Europeanization and confirm the first Europeanization hypothesis: significant 
influence of EU security institutions result in governments advocating a 
significant role for the EU CFSP/ESDP in a particular crisis.
Britain, by contrast, while not opposed to the eventual application of ESDP 
instruments in FYROM in principle (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006), 
insisted on a prior agreement with NATO. This reflects the privileged position of 
NATO in British foreign policy thinking as well as strong ties with the US, and 
therefore confirms the third hypothesis of Europeanization: EU security institutions 
exerted some influence on national foreign policy, but this influence was weighed 
against other factors. This led to the UK advocating a partial role for the EU 
CFSP/ESDP that included political, but not military tools in the absence of 
institutional arrangements between NATO and the EU. The fact that the EU 
CFSP/ESDP as an alternative platform for policy action existed, and the fact that 
another member state pushed for the application of ESDP instruments means that 
British policy adapted to consent to an ESDP takeover from NATO. As a result, 
British policy actions with respect to the third policy area support the alliance politics 
hypothesis formulated in chapter 1: significant influence of the transatlantic 
alliance, both in terms of US preference against a European role, and pressures 
to keep NATO in play resulted in a small role afforded to ESDP when it comes 
to military matters. The German case, finally, exhibits similar evidence as that of 
the British case: the eventual application of ESDP instruments was not contested, but 
the prior agreement with NATO was a precondition for consent to such a mission. In 
addition, German policy makers also emphasized regional stability: apart from
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transatlantic relations, then, concern over the impact of an ESDP take-over on 
regional stability left the Federal Foreign Office cautious on the change from NATO. 
But, the high value placed on the ESDP and Europe’s ability to act in national 
rhetoric demonstrates that domestic norms leaned towards the application of policy 
tools in ESDP, pointing -in  addition to similar adaptation pressures facing the UK- 
towards Europeanization understood as identity formation, where an ESDP operation 
was presented as desirable and domestically acceptable. In the case of the UK, there 
was little evidence that would point towards a shifting preference towards ESDP in 
general, although the preference for NATO was on account of utilitarian reasons 
rather than exclusively transatlantic leanings.
Conclusion
The analysis of the decisions taken with respect to the crisis in FYROM show that the 
role afforded to the EU CFSP was initially a political one as all three countries were 
in agreement that the EU CFSP should play a crucial part in the political negotiations. 
The application of EU CFSP/ESDP instruments stopped short of the application of 
military instruments, however, on account of the difference of positions vis-a-vis the 
need for an agreement between NATO and the EU on the sharing of NATO assets 
before the launch of an ESDP military operation. This confirms the importance of 
alliance politics considerations in the case of Germany and Britain, although none of 
the three countries were opposed in principle to the eventual ESDP take-over from 
NATO. The fact that an eventual take-over from NATO was not contested but that 
this was a question of timing rather than principle in turn confirms the salience of the 
European agenda in the case of FYROM and the Europeanization approach more 
generally, even as it applies to military instruments located in ESDP. French moves 
towards the appointment of a EUSR demonstrate the uploading dimension of
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Europeanization, and Javier Solana’s proactive stance in the crisis meant that national 
foreign policies in all three countries adapted to changes in the institutional set-up of 
the EU CFSP.
2. The war in Afghanistan
National decisions towards the war in Afghanistan reveal some evidence of 
Europeanization, although this evidence is confined to the second policy area 
exclusively. The table below summarises the findings along the three indicators of 
Europeanization that are analysed in more detail in the sections that follow.
Policy area 1: OEF and the war on terror
Adaptation Projection Identity formation
UK F G UK F G UK F G
high
medium
low x x x  x x x  x x x
Policy area 2: the reconstruction of Afghanistan
Adaptation Projection Identity formation
UK F G UK F G UK F G
high x
medium x x x
low x x  x x
Policy area 3: ISAF and its institutional anchoring
Adaptation Projection Identity formation
UK F G UK F G UK F G
high
medium x x
low x x x  x x x  x
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Policy area 1: OEF and the war on terror
The participation in OEF confirms the alliance politics framework in all three 
countries, but shows little evidence of Europeanization in national foreign policy 
formulation. Britain, France and Germany regarded the military participation in OEF 
as a matter of solidarity with the US, with Germany and Britain in particular keen on 
disposing of the Taliban regime and the opportunity to work towards the elimination 
of security threats emanating from Afghanistan through the country’s reconstruction. 
As emerged from the analysis in the individual country case studies, both Britain and 
Germany had attempted to initiate international consensus and a strategy to do more 
about Afghanistan the year prior to the attacks of 11 September, although the terrorist 
attacks and the invocation of Article V meant that the US took a pronounced lead on 
military measures in Afghanistan.
To be sure, leaders used the opportunity for electoral purposes in Paris and to 
push the country towards assuming more responsibility internationally in Berlin, but 
the fundamental impulse in this policy area was transatlantic solidarity in response to 
the terrorist attacks. This was most apparent in the case of Britain, where Blair seized 
the occasion to not only get close to the US but also play the role of a mediator 
between Europe and the US. All three countries also placed a high emphasis on the 
use of the UN and NATO in terms of the invocation of article V of the NATO treaty 
to legitimize the military action in Afghanistan and to place the country’s 
reconstruction, the second policy area in this case study, on a multilateral footing. 
Variance in transatlantic solidarity between Britain and France also emerged with 
respect to the geographic restriction of the war on terror on Afghanistan, although 
this is not the subject of the analysis in this PhD thesis. Evidence of Europeanization 
in this case is weak as the application of CFSP instruments was not considered
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beyond statements of solidarity with the US; British, French and German efforts to 
co-ordinate their actions in order to forge a European line does not serve as evidence 
of Europeanization as this did not result in the application in instruments located in 
the EU CFSP. Still, this coordination -  and the goal for the EU to be a visible 
platform even if this did not include SG/HR Solana but was confined to the member 
states -  shows that the European agenda, defined as acting in concert rather than 
through the EU CFSP, was of some salience even in this case. As a result, policy 
actions in the three member states confirm the following hypotheses for 
Europeanization and alliance politics formulated in chapter 1: there was little 
influence of EU security institutions on national foreign policy which resulted in 
a small role afforded to the EU CFSP; by contrast, there was significant 
influence of the transatlantic alliance and US preferences, which resulted in a 
small role for the EU CFSP.
Policy area 2: The reconstruction o f Afghanistan
The analysis of the second policy area yields some evidence of Europeanization, but 
there is variance among the three countries. Germany successfully projected its 
national preference for a visible role for the EU CFSP and lobbied for and succeeded 
in appointing a German national as EUSR. With respect to Germany, then, policy 
decisions confirm the Europeanization thesis: there was a significant influence of EU 
security institutions on national foreign policy in the sense that the EU CFSP 
provided a platform through which to enforce national policy preferences of a high 
political profile for the EU. Britain and France supported this move, indicating that 
they were in agreement on the need for a visible role for the EU CFSP, and adapted 
to the preference of another member state. Neither Britain, which was very active in 
Afghanistan both in the military as well as the political and economic aspects, nor
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France, which did not take a lead role in Afghanistan or exhibit a strong interest in 
Afghanistan prior to 11 September (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006), 
regarded the EU as a similarly vital platform. This leads to the conclusion that with 
respect to the second policy area, the degree of Europeanization in France and Britain 
was low. For all three countries, however, the UN was the most important platform to 
co-ordinate the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Alliance politics was not applicable in 
the case, as the UN rather than the US took the lead in shaping the political and 
economic parameters of the reconstruction of Afghanistan. With respect to Germany, 
then, the second policy area confirms the first Europeanization hypothesis: 
significant influence of EU security institutions resulted in Germany advocating 
a significant role for the EU CFSP in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. With respect 
to Britain and France, it confirms the second Europeanization hypothesis : little 
influence of EU security institutions on national foreign policy resulted in a 
small role afforded to the EU CFSP.
Policy area 3: ISAF and its institutional anchoring
The participation in ISAF confirms the role of alliance politics rather than 
Europeanization in the policy decisions in two of the three countries. Britain and 
Germany were in favour of NATO command against initial US preferences 
(Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). This was for operational and 
utilitarian reasons, as NATO command meant that the lead-nation model could be 
abolished, although multilateral preferences in the case of Germany and the UK 
constituted a secondary motivation. For France, NATO was not regarded as an 
appropriate institutional framework, although Paris came to relent on this question in 
view of allies’ pressures and out of the recognition that transatlantic preferences and 
therefore the US were to prevail in this policy area. None of the three countries
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advocated an ESDP operation or a EU label for the European contributions for ISAF. 
This shows that despite the publicly stated intention for Europe to play a role in the 
military aspect of Afghanistan’s reconstruction on the part of the German chancellor, 
in the end considerations that reflect the Europeanization hypothesis were not 
sufficiently strong as to result in a policy proposal to employ ESDP instruments, or to 
push for a coordinated EU force. Instead, each of the three countries made efforts to 
coordinate its overall position with the other two as well as the US, although France 
and Germany attempted to sell this coordination as a European rather than national 
effort domestically. Still, as in the case of military contributions to the NATO 
Operation in FYROM, the European rhetoric adopted by French and German leaders 
points towards a preference if not for the EU ESDP, then at the very minimum for a 
co-ordinated European approach subsumed under an EU label. With respect to the 
institutional anchoring of ISAF, then, member states’ foreign policies confirm the 
following hypotheses formulated in chapter 1: while there was little influence of EU 
security institutions on national foreign policy there was significant influence of 
the transatlantic alliance and US preferences. This therefore resulted in a 
negligible role afforded to the EU CFSP.
Conclusion
The analysis of the decisions taken with regard to the war in Afghanistan show that as 
in the case of FYROM, the role afforded to the EU CFSP/ESDP was primarily a 
political one, with the Commission playing a large financial role as well. Importantly 
there was no fundamental disagreement on this role among the three member states. 
The role for the EU CFSP stopped short of a military one, however, because the EU 
ESDP was not considered ready for assuming such a task, and because member states 
had different conceptions on the appropriate institutional framework to begin with.
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Britain favoured NATO from early on and Germany likewise preferred NATO. 
France, finally, did not initially favour the use of NATO in Afghanistan, but adjusted 
its position in light of allies’ preferences.
III. Theoretical implications: Europeanization as a useful framework?
The analysis of member states foreign policies in this research has yielded some 
insights that refute arguments that the term ‘Europeanization’ ought not to be used as 
an organizing concept to begin with (Kassim, 2000: 238). For the purpose of this 
thesis, the Europeanization approach has proven useful in highlighting the influence 
of EU on national foreign policy, even if the two crisis case studies have shown that 
the influence of the EU security institutions and, by extension, the explanatory value 
of the Europeanization approach itself, is limited especially when it comes to the 
application of military instruments under the EU ESDP and uneven when it comes to 
the two crises. This in turn highlights the conceptual limitation of the 
Europeanization framework.
Focussing on processes of Europeanization has been valuable in the case of 
Afghanistan, which at first glance appeared to be determined exclusively by 
transatlantic considerations. The Europeanization approach has highlighted that the 
EU CFSP presented a useful political forum for member states in particular with 
respect to the political and economic aspects of the reconstruction of Afghanistan. It 
also shows the extent to which one member state, Germany, used the EU CFSP as a 
political platform for formulating policy. But, when it comes to the application of 
military instruments, Europeanization has shown to be of limited explanatory value. 
US preferences and member states’ aim to utilize NATO, in addition to the nature of 
the crisis, determined the responses of two of the three countries analyzed. The third
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country, France, resisted NATO assuming command of ISAF in the case of 
Afghanistan in large part out of concern over the consequences of showing a Western 
flag in a Muslim country -  and did not take a similarly large interest in Afghanistan 
when it came to matters of political and economic reconstruction as the two other 
countries analyzed in this thesis did (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006).
With respect to the crisis in FYROM, on the other hand, where all three 
countries were expected to exhibit a European preference based on Europe’s previous 
engagement in the Balkans, adopting the Europeanization approach yields a less 
surprising finding. Here, Europeanization highlighted the extent to which all three 
countries reacted and adapted to Javier Solana’s proactive stance and the recently 
created office of the SG/HR. While all three countries retained national influence on 
the negotiations through the Contact Group -in  addition to ensuring US support in 
the negotiations- France in particular used the EU CFSP to project national 
preferences by lobbying for the appointment of a EUSR. Although this did not lead to 
institutional change in national systems of governance as a result of voluntary 
agreements among member states (Olsen, 2002: 923), it does show that member 
states adapted to existing institutions within the EU CFSP as a major component in 
the political negotiation of the crisis by either supporting Javier Solana directly, as in 
the case of Britain, or by adopting a unitary political line with respect to the EU’s 
negotiation position as in the case of France and Germany. Europeanization in this 
case did include the strengthening of the EU CFSP’s organizational capacity for 
collective action (Olsen, 2002; Checkel, 2001) and therefore the development of 
institutions at the EU level. National policies on FYROM, therefore, confirm the 
existence of Europeanization processes in national foreign policy.
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The limitation of the explanatory value of the Europeanization approach 
relates to the use of military force under the EU ESDP, and conflicting views among 
the member states as to the role of the US in European security. Here, the utility of 
the Europeanization approach -  in particular by contrasting Europeanization with 
alliance politics - lies in the ability to delineate the tension between NATO and 
transatlantic relations more generally, and the goal to build up the ability for the EU 
CFSP/ESDP to act. Strengthening the organizational capacity of the EU in FYROM 
came into conflict with transatlantic preferences and priorities, and the professed 
wish for both a successful first ESDP mission and the preservation of regional 
stability on the part of Britain and Germany. This resulted in a delay of the 
assumption of the military operation under ESDP.
As expected, given the sizable US interest in both cases and the influence of 
transatlantic relations in the individual countries, there are limitations of the 
explanatory potential of the Europeanization approach. This is particularly the case 
when it comes to the application of military instruments located in ESDP, where in 
both cases member states consideration of US preferences determined policy 
outcomes. The exception is France in FYROM, although its acquiescence to the 
application of NATO in ISAF as well as its transatlantic solidarity in OEF shows that 
the transatlantic relationship was of importance in France as well.
These findings have implications with respect to the potential contributions of 
this research formulated in chapter 1 - the utility of the Europeanization framework 
to explain national decision-making in foreign security and defence policy. Although 
the comparison of the three cases has yielded some results that point towards the 
applicability of the Europeanization framework to explain policy decisions, 
Europeanization does not serve as an overall explanation for national policy
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decisions. Integration mechanisms in the sense that existing EU institutions exert 
influence on national foreign policy that results in policy adaptation were not 
observed when it came to the application of military instruments under ESDP, with 
the exception of France’s preferences with respect to an ESDP take over from NATO 
in FYROM. This means that the utility of the Europeanization framework is limited 
on account of the influence of the transatlantic alliance in national foreign policy. In 
addition to the limitation of the explanatory value of Europeanization when it comes 
to the empirical evidence presented in this thesis, there is also a fundamental 
conceptual limitation when it comes to the applicability of Europeanization.
As has been noted in chapter 2, one criticism of research utilizing 
Europeanization is that it does not have a precise or stable meaning and the 
definition, and that the operationalization of the concept presents a challenge to 
researchers. Europeanization represents an analytical concept rather than a theory. 
This means that research on the Europeanization of foreign policy, even if it does 
document processes of Europeanization, does not provide a theoretical explanation on 
the origins of these processes that are reflected in the policy decisions of member 
states,
A fundamental weakness of the Europeanization framework adopted in this 
thesis, therefore, is that it does not explain why countries prefer EU instruments over 
those located in NATO (and vice versa). The variance observed in the three member 
states’ reactions in the two different crises raises the question of what explains these 
preferences. This limitation of the Europeanization concept in explaining the long­
term trends behind national foreign policy decisions in turn points toward avenues of 
research that could fill this gap. For instance, a focus on national strategic cultures 
(see Giegerich, 2006) could complement the findings of this thesis and highlight the
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origins of national predispositions towards the EU or NATO. Such research on the 
long-term trends in national foreign policy preferences would also complement and 
strengthen the third dimension of Europeanization, that of identity formation. The 
nature of the cases selected -  two crises where decision had to be taken in a short 
time span -  has not permitted a detailed exploration of changing member states’ 
preferences. As a result, evidence gathered from the empirical analysis of changing 
policy preferences towards the EU CFSP/ESDP has been slim in the two case studies 
analysed in this thesis. Although a research focus on long-term aspects of member 
states’ foreign policies towards the EU CFSP/ESDP could document changes in the 
third dimension of Europeanization, the question of what explains these preferences 
nevertheless remains.
Also, the Europeanization framework adopted in this thesis under-explores 
the impact of 11 September on fundamental policy priorities on the part of the 
member states. To be sure, with respect to FYROM, this research has shown that 11 
September at most delayed rather than negated the application of ESDP 
instruments101 and therefore has little bearing on the decision to deploy ESDP 
instruments on the part of member states. However, with respect to Afghanistan, 
some member states’ emphasis on the strengthening of NATO after 11 September 
(see Howorth, 2003-04), and NATO’s eventual deployment in Afghanistan indicate 
that the events of 11 September may have pushed the development of ESDP as a 
military actor in the background.
101 To be sure, evidence gathered from research interview is somewhat contradictory: an EU official 
interviewed stressed that ‘there had been no collateral damage in FYROM on account o f 11 September 
’ (Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005), whereas a policy analyst said that ‘priorities with respect 
to an ESDP operation in FYROM shifted on account o f  11 September -  other things came up’ 
(Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005). The fact that Lyotard’s proposal was rejected before 11 
September, however, gives credence to the first statement and indicates that the fundamental objection 
towards ESDP on the part o f the UK and Germany were independent o f the impact o f the events o f 11 
September.
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IV. Conclusion.
The analysis presented in this thesis has shown that adopting a Europeanization 
approach that conceptualizes a number of institutional and national processes of 
change and the way in which EU CFSP/ESDP institutions are utilized, strengthened 
(or sidelined), demonstrates that specific European dynamics exist that influence and 
shape member states foreign policy. Focussing on the effects of Europeanization 
processes on national foreign policy has permitted the delineation of national 
commitments to the EU CFSP/ESDP and commitments and preferences that lean 
towards the use of NATO and that are mindful of the preferences of the US.
Beyond the Europeanization and alliance politics dichotomy, however, the 
two cases also show that the scope of applications of the instruments in CFSP/ESDP 
was not clearly defined in the minds of member states. Apart from the military 
limitations of ESDP at the time, resistance on the part of the US/NATO and member 
states preferences for avoiding transatlantic conflict, the two cases also highlight that 
there is no clear conception of where and to what end ESDP instruments should be 
employed. Whereas the Balkans were uncontested as a terrain for EU civilian and 
military crisis management instruments on the grounds of previous EU involvement, 
Afghanistan was not an area where the application of EU military crisis management 
instruments was perceived to be appropriate tools for the task of reconstruction, 
although the EU made substantial commitments to Afghanistan.
Contrasting the two case studies has yielded a surprising finding: whereas in 
the case of FYROM, the eventual use of ESDP instruments was not contested in 
principle and achieving co-ordination and coherence as part of strengthening the 
EU’s collective action capability (Olsen, 2002:3) was delayed rather than precluded, 
the case of Afghanistan has shown that the use of CFSP/ESDP instruments on the
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part of EU member states was determined by considerations that go beyond 
considerations of putting the EU on the map as a global security actor. Instead, these 
considerations included the nature and intensity of the crisis in question; the role of 
the US and the transatlantic alliance more broadly in the conflict; the geographic 
scope of the crisis; and considerations over a Westem/EU label in a Muslim country.
Events since 2001 have highlighted that questions over the EU’s military 
reach have yet to be resolved: implicitly the EU appears to be a regional security 
actor, although the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) lists terrorism and failed 
states among the key threats facing Europe (Council of the European Union, 2003): 
both are global in nature, and points toward global rather than regional ambitions for 
the EU as a security actor. Indeed, ESDP has gone global with missions ranging from 
Aceh, Indonesia to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Geographically, this 
goes beyond the immediate neighbourhood of potential member states. But, the EU’s 
global reach so far has been selective, both geographically as well as in the nature of 
the missions (Biscop, 2006; Cox, 2006). This raises the question of whether the 
reluctance to deploy military instruments under the EU ESDP is merely a matter of 
transatlantic friction and the lack of ‘Europeanization’ of national foreign policy, or 
whether at bottom this is a matter of deliberate or unintentional ambiguity as to the 
EU’s global role.
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The Crisis in FYROM - Chronology of Events
2001
January
January 21 -  One policeman killed and four injured by rocket fired at the village of 
Tearce. Albanian guerrilla group National Liberation Army (NLA) admits to the 
attack on January 26.
February
February 28 -  NATO delegation arrives in FYROM for crisis talks with Macedonian 
officials.
March
March 4 -FYROM calls for an emergency session of the UN Security Council to 
discuss setting up a buffer zone between FYROM and Kosovo.
March 19 -  EU foreign ministers meet in Brussels to discuss the crisis. Javier Solana 
due in Skopje.
March 26 -  NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, in talks with President 
Trajkovski and some of Macedonia’s party leaders. Javier Solana also present. 
March 27 -  Solana calls on ethnic Albanians rebels to start talking to the government 
during high profile visit to Tetovo.
April
April 2 -  President Trajkovski chairs talks aimed at ending the grievances of 
Macedonian’s ethnic Albanians. Chris Patten and Javier Solana travel to Skopje for 
more talks.
April 9 - Stabilisation and Association Agreement between FYROM and the 
European Union signed in Luxembourg.
April 11 -  Contact Group meets on FYROM
May
May 6 -  Solana visits FYROM after an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in 
Sweden.
May 7 -  Robertson and Solana meet with Trajkovski and Georgievski.
May 13 -  New government of national unity is elected.
May 16 - The EU Troika visits FYROM. EU appoints British Ambassador Mark 
Dickinson Special Envoy to Macedonia.
May 28 -Javier Solana visits Skopje, gives backing to Georgievski's government of 
national unity.
June
June 8 - President Boris Trajkovski presents a partial amnesty to break the country's 
military and political deadlock. NATO offers help in disarming the rebels. Javier 
Solana arrives in Skopje for two-day visit.
June 9 -  Solana expresses satisfaction with the outcome of the discussions, invited 
Macedonian political leaders to participate in the EU Summit in Luxembourg on June 
25.
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June 12 - Macedonian government adopts a peace plan which provides for amnesty 
for the rebels.
June 13 - US, France, Britain and other European allies advocated bolder action by 
NATO at an informal NATO summit
June 14 - Lord Robertson and Javier Solana meet with Macedonian government: 
NATO members strongly support FYROM and the plan for disarmament. The EU is 
ready to deploy its mission for monitoring the disarmament process. Solana, Anna 
Lindh and Chris Patten meet with Colin Powell and call to Albanian rebels to lay 
down their arms.
June 15 -  President Trajkovski attends Gothenburg summit
June 20 - Macedonian peace talks collapse amid mutual recriminations. NATO
Secretary General Lord Robertson warned that FYROM was on the brink of civil
war.
June 21 - Javier Solana makes an unscheduled stop in Skopje on his way to the 
Middle East.
June 22 - NATO officials order preparations for the alliance's third mission in the 
Balkans.
June 25 - Francois Leotard is appointed as EU Special Representative (EUSR) to 
FYROM.
July
July 2 -  US special envoy to FYROM, James Pardew, joins Francois Leotard in a 
mission to negotiate a general ceasefire
July 10 -  NATO’s plans to send about 3,000 peace-keepers to FYROM are thrown 
into doubt by fears that the mission may be too small to defend itself if a ceasefire 
breaks down.
July 19 - Lord Robertson Javier Solana are due to travel to Skopje for a two-day visit 
to meet President Boris Trajkovski and leaders of the country's Slav and ethnic 
Albanian political parties.
July 26 Lord Robertson and Javier Solana arrive in Skopje to jump-start suspended 
negotiations.
August
August 13 -  Ohrid Peace Accord signed.
August 27- NATO troops begin the task of collecting weapons.
August 29 - Lord Robertson visits FYROM to inspect Operation Essential Harvest. 
German Bundestag votes in favour of participation in Operation Essential Harvest.
September
September 5 -  Leotard proposes to send EU force after end of NATO mission. 
September 10 -  Leotard resigns from his post
September 26 -  Operation Essential Harvest ends. Follow-up operation Amber Fox 
under German lead approved
September 27 -  German Bundestag votes in favour of participation in Operation 
Amber Fox
October
October 29 -  Alain Le Roy assumes post of EUSR
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December
December 7 -  NATO decides on extension of Operation Fox until 26 March 2002
2002
March
March 15-16 - Barcelona European Council. Presidency Conclusions on FYROM 
(paragraph 61) " ..expresses EU's availability to take responsibility, following 
elections in FYROM and at the request of its government, for an operation to follow 
Amber Fox, on the understanding that the permanent arrangements on EU-NATO co­
operation ("Berlin plus") would be in place by then. To this end, the EC requests the 
relevant political and military bodies of the Council to develop as of now, in 
consultation with NATO, the options to enable the EU to take the appropriate 
decisions."
June
June 4 - NATO extends Operation Fox until 26 October 2002 
June 21/22 - Seville European Council EU Heads of State and Government take the 
view that the Berlin Plus arrangements had to be in place before any EU follow-on 
mission in FYROM
November
November 25 - UNSC agrees on new mandate for NATO in FYROM. France pushes 
for EU takeover.
December
December 14 - NATO Operation Allied Harmony, a smaller security and training 
mission, begins.
2003
January
January 18 - President Trajkovski officially makes his request to the EU for ESDP 
mission
January 21 - EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) approves the General 
Concept for the EU's actions towards FYROM February 6: NATO decided that 
DSACEUR could be offered to the EU as the Operation Commander.
March
March 31 - Operation Concordia is launched
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The war in Afghanistan -  Chronology of Events
2001
September
September 11 - Terrorist attacks on the US 
September 12 - NATO invokes Article 5 
September 21 - Extraordinary European Council
September 26 - NATO defence minister meeting. US does not request NATO-wide 
military action but makes clear the intention to build ad hoc coalitions in order to 
preserve military flexibility
October
October 7 - beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom
October 8 - EU foreign minister meeting. Germany and France present position 
papers on political strategy on Afghanistan do not make it into the final statement. 
October 12 - Lord Robertson briefs EU defence ministers on steps NATO had taken 
in response to US requests or recommendations by NATO military authorities. 
Ministers call for accelerating the setting up ESDP to enable the EU to play a role in 
the global fight against terrorism, and conclude that the EU should consider getting 
more involved in the peace-keeping operations in the Balkans to close the security 
gap left by the involvement of US forces in Afghanistan.
October 19 - EU summit in Ghent. Chirac holds talks with Blair and Schroeder at the 
eve of the meeting.
November
November 4 - Downing Street Dinner provokes anger among other EU mefnbers 
November 13 - Fall of Kabul.
November 14 - UN Security Council resolution 1378 affirms the central role of the 
UN in helping to establish a transition administration in Afghanistan.
November 19 - French marines arrive in Uzbekistan, but are prevented from moving 
into Afghanistan due to a conflict with the Uzbek authorities.
- Meeting of Defence Ministers in Brussels
November 20- Washington conference for putting in place the steering committee for 
reconstruction in Afghanistan, with four joint presidencies: United States, European 
Union, Japan and Saudi Arabia.
- EU foreign minister meeting, agreement to appoint a Special 
Representative to Afghanistan.
November 22 - Hamid Karzai is sworn in as head of interim, power-sharing 
government.
November 23 - Franco-German summit in Nantes, declaration on Afghanistan, 
calling for a new start with the UN conference in Bonn. .
November 27 - Inter Afghan meeting in Bonn under the auspices of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General of the UN, Mr Lakhdar Brahimi. 
November 29 - Anglo French summit, Blair and Chirac express solidarity with US- 
led war in Afghanistan, and indicate willingness to supply troops for a stabilisation 
force in Afghanistan.
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December
December 1 - Advance contingent of some 40 French marines arrive in Afghanistan 
and begin securing the airport of Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. 
December 3- Heavy fights as Northern Alliance seeks to capture Kandahar. 
December 5 - Inter-Afghan Agreement (‘Bonn Agreement’) signed 
December 6 - UN Security Council resolution 1383, endorsing the Bonn agreement. 
December 7- Capitulation of the Taliban in Qandahar.
December 10 - EU foreign minister meeting. Klaus-Peter Klaiber is appointed as EU 
Special Representative.
December 14/15 - EU Summit at Laeken. Dispute over nature of multinational peace 
force arises as Belgian Foreign Minister Michel claims that the force was created by 
the EU. Member states distance themselves from this statement.
December 20 - UNSC Resolution 1386 authorises an international security assistance 
force (ISAF) to be put in place in Kabul and the surrounding area. UK under Major 
General John McColl assumes command of ISAF 
- Fall of Taliban regime 
December 20-22 - Meeting in Brussels of the steering committee for reconstruction, 
EU presides.
December 22 -  Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) inaugurated and takes up its 
role
2002
January
January 21-22 - Tokyo Conference on reconstruction in Afghanistan.
March
March 28 - Security Council resolution 1401, creating UNAMA (United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) for 12 months.
May
May 23 - Security Council resolution 1413, extending the ISAF mandate for a further 
6 months from 20 June.
June
June 11 - Emergency Loya Jirga meets under interim administration of Hamid
Karzai, forms ATA with elections to be held on 7 December 2004
June 14 - Election of Mr Hamid Karzai, President of the transition government.
June 20 - ISAF command taken over by Turkey under Major General Hilmi Akin
Zorlu.
June 24 - Transition government takes up its role.
June 25 -  Francesc Vendrell is appointed as EUSR
2003
February
February 10 - Germany and the Netherlands assume command of ISAF.
August
August 11 - NATO assumes ISAF command.
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List of Abbreviations
AIA Afghan Interim Authority
CDU Christian Democratic Union
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSU Christian Social Union
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESS European Security Strategy
EU European Union
EUSR European Union Special Representative
FDP Free Democratic Party
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAC General Affairs Council
ISAF International Security and Assistance Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
PDS Party of Democratic Socialism
PSC Political and Security Committee
SDP Social Democratic Party
SG/HR Secretary General/High Representative
Bibliography
Ackermann, A. (2005) ‘International intervention in Macedonia: from preventive 
engagement to peace implementation.’ In Siani-Davies, P. (ed), International 
Intervention in the Balkans since 1995. London: Routledge, 105-119.
Adler, E. and M. Barnett (1998) Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Agence France Presse (2001) France, Britain plan to submit UN resolution on 
Macedonia, 20 March.
Agence France Presse (2001) US troop commitments to Macedonia adequate, for 
now: NATO commander. 22 March.
Agence France Presse (2001) EU leaders set for Stockholm summit. 23 March.
Agence France Presse (2001) Vedrine juge plus "commode" de maintenir une force 
de l'OTAN en Macedoine, 8 September.
Agence France Presse (2001) EU-Aussenminister beraten liber weiteres Engagement 
in Mazedonien. 9 September.
Agence France Presse (2001) France nominates civil servant as new Macedonia EU 
envoy. 8 October 2001.
Agence France Presse (2001) EU welcomes fall of Kabul, anxious over what is to 
follow. 13 November.
Agence France Presse (2001) EU envoy calls for dearly deployment of UN force in 
Afghanistan. 12 December.
Agence France Presse (2001) Blair forces EU climbdown over warning to 
Washington. 15 December.
Agence France Presse (2001) UN-Sicherheitsrat verabschiedet Resolution fur 
Afghanistan-Mission - Bundeskabinett entscheidet am Freitag fiber Bundeswehr- 
Einsatz. 20 December.
Agence France Presse (2002) Blair returns to Britain after South Asian tour. 8 
January.
Agence France Presse (2002) EU’s Afghan envoy moots broadened mandate for UN 
force. 10 January.
Agence France Presse (2002) Karzai cannot expect quick response on more French 
troops: analyst. 27 February.
305
Agence France Presse (2002) Chirac doubtful on ISAF deployment outside Kabul. 28 
February.
Agence France Presse (2002) Germany proposes to share Afghan force command 
with Netherlands. 24 September.
Aggestam, L. (1999) ‘Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign 
Policy’, Arena Working Paper 99/8.
Albright, M. (1998) ‘The Right Balance will secure NATO’s future.’ Financial 
Times, 7 December.
Allen, D. and M. Smith (1990) ‘Western Europe's presence in the contemporary 
international arena’, Review o f  International Studies 16(1): 19-37.
Allison, G. (1999) Essence o f  Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd 
edition. New York, Longman.
Andreatta, F. (2005) ‘Theory and the European Union’s International Relations.’ In 
C. Hill and M. Smith (eds), International Relations and the European Union. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press: 18-38.
Art, R. (1973) ‘Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique’, 
Policy Sciences 4: 467-90.
Art, R. (1996) ‘Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO’, Political 
Science Quarterly 111 (1): 1-37
Assemblee Nationale (2001) Declaration du gouvernement relative a la situation 
consecutive aux attentats perpetres le 11 septembre 2001 aux Etats-Unis d ’Amerique 
par M. Lionel Jospin, Premier Ministre. Paris, 3 October. 
www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dg/dg3297.asp
Assemblee Nationale (2001) Audition de M. Hubert Vedrine, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres, et de M. Alain Richard, Ministre de la Defense, sur la riposte aux 
attentats (Hearing of Mr. Hubert Vedrine, Foreign Minister and of Mr. Alain 
Richard, Defense Minister on the response to the attacks). Delegation pour l'Union 
Europeenne. Compte Rendu No 153. Paris, 9 October.
Assemblee Nationale (2001) Audition de M. Franqois Leotard, representant de 
l'Union europeenne en Macedonie. Commission des affaires etrangeres. Compte 
Rendu no 8. Paris, 23 October.
Assemblee Nationale (2001) Declaration du gouvernement sur la situation en 
Afghanistan (Declaration of the government on the situation in Afghanistan). Session 
ordinaire de 2001-2002. Paris, 21 November.
Assemblee Nationale (2001) Rapport d'informationpar la Commission de la Defense 
Nationale et des forces armees en conclusion des travaux d ’une mission d'information
306
sur les consequences pour la France des attentats d u l l  Septembre 2001 (Report of 
information by the Commission of national defense and armed forces on the 
conclusion of the work of the information mission on the consequences for France of 
the attacks on 11 September 2001). Commission de la Defense nationale et des forces 
armees. Paris, 12 December.
Assemblee Nationale (2002) Question No 69097 de Mme Feidt Nicole de 19/11/01. 
Paris, 18 February.
Associated Press (2001) Fischer: NATO-Einsatz in Mazedonien Pruefstein fuer 
Europa. 3 September.
Associated Press (2001) Zeitenwende in der Koalition; Mazedonien-Abweichler bei 
Rot-Grim gebandigt; "kein Zusammenhang" mit Bundeswehr-Beteiligung an US- 
Militaerschlag. 27 September.
Associated Press (2003) Belgium voices opposition to German plan for NATO in 
Afghanistan with EU-General. 15 March.
Auswartiges Amt (2000) Pressemitteilung 'Staatssekretar Ischinger trifft 
mazedonischen Aussenminister.’ 21 March. http://www.auswaertiges- 
amt.de/www/de/ausgabe archiv?archiv id=l 82
Auswartiges Amt (2000) Pressemitteilung 'Reise von StM Dr. Zopel nach 
Mazedonien und Albanien.’ 31 October 2000. http://www.auswaertiges- 
amt.de/www/de/ausgabe archiv id=984
Auswartiges Amt (2001) Pressemitteilung. 'Bundesminister Fischer trifft mit 
mazedonischem Premierminister Georgievski und neuem Aussenminister Kerim 
zusammen.’ 11 January. http ://www. aus waerti ges-
amt.de/www/de/ausgabe archiv?archiv id=l 161
Auswartiges Amt (2001) Pressemitteilung 'Bundesminister Fischer fordert zu 
friedlicher Losung der Konflikte in Sudserbien und im nordmazedonischen 
Grenzgebiet au f 11 March. www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/www/de/ausgabe archiv?archiv id=l303
Auswartiges Amt (2001) Pressemitteilung 'Bundesminister Fischer fordert Ruckkehr 
zum Dialog in Mazedonien’ 4 May 2001. www.auswaertiges- 
amt.de/www/de/ausgabe archiv?archiv id=1490
Auswartiges Amt (2001) Pressemitteilung 'Bundesminister Fischer fordert Festhalten 
an der Isolation der albanischen Extremisten in Mazedonien’ 24 May. 
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/ausgabe archiv?archiv id=1576
Auswartiges Amt (2001) Pressemitteilung. 'Erklarung von Bundesaussenminister 
Joschka Fischer zur Lage in Mazedonien.’ 7 June. www.auswaertiges- 
amt.de/www/de/ausgabe archiv?archiv id=1623.
307
Axelrod, R. and Keohane, R. (1993) ‘Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: 
Strategies and Institutions.’ In Baldwin, D.A. (ed), Neorealism and Neoliberalism. 
New York, Columbia University Press.
Balaj, B. (2002) 'Der Wiederaufbau Afghanistans: Das Engagement von Weltbank, 
IWF und EU’ (The reconstruction of Afghanistan: the engagement of the World 
Bank, the IMF and EU), Internationale Politik (5): 39-46.
Baraki, M. (2004) ‘Afghanistan nach den Taliban’, A us Politik und Zeitgeschichte 
(48): 24-30.
BBC Monitoring Europe (2001) Belgian EU presidency 'disappointed' over French- 
German-UK pre-summit, 19 October.
BBC News (2001) Anglo-French summit targets immigration, 9 February 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/l 161561 .stm
BBC News (2001) Greater Albania question, 18 March. 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/1228380.stm
BBC News (2001) Skopje yields to troops pressure, 10 September 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/low/europe/1535494.stm
BBC News (2001) EU pledges troops for Afghanistan, 14 December 
http ://ne ws. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/wor ld/europe/1709888. stm
BBC News (2002) Q&A: Royal Marines in Afghanistan. 16 April 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/uk news/1933038. stm
BBC News (2006) NATO takes over Afghan security, 5 October 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south asia/5408332.stm
Berliner Zeitung (2001) Bundeswehr: nach langer Ungewissheit - jetzt ein Auftritt 
mit leichter Ausriistung. Berlin, 22 December: 299.
Biscop, S. (2006) The Ambiguous Ambition: the Development o f the EU Security 
Architecture. Paper presented at the colloquium The EC/EU: A World Security 
Actor? An Assessment after 50 Years of the External Actions of the EC/EU, Paris, 
EU Institute for Security Studies, 15 September
Blair, T. (1999) Doctrine o f the International community. Speech at the Economic 
Club. Chicago, 24 April.
http ://www. number 10. gov.uk/output/Page 1297.asp
Blair, T. (2001) Speech to the European Research Institute. 21 November. 
http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/speech/sp231101 en.htm
Blair, T. (2002) Statement to Parliament on NATO Summit. 25 November 
http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page 1737.asp
308
Blair, T. (2003) Doorstep interview by the Prime Minister on the European Union
Constitution. 17 October
http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page4673.asp
Blunden, M. (2000) ‘France.’ In Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (eds), The 
foreign policies o f  European Union member states. Manchester, Manchester 
University Press: 19-43.
Borzel, T. (1999) ‘Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to 
Europeanization in Germany and Spain \  Journal o f Common Market Studies 37 (4): 
573-597.
Borzel, T. (2002) ‘Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State 
Responses to Europeanization’ Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2): 193-214.
Borzel, T. (2003) ‘Shaping and Taking EU Policies: Member States Responses to 
Europeanization’, Queen's Papers on Europeanization http://www.qub.ac.uk/ies- 
old/onlinepapers/poe2-03 .pdf.
Brown, C. (2001) Understanding International Relations. London, Macmillan.
Bulmer, S. and W. E. Paterson (1996) 'Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant 
or Emergent Leader?’ International Affairs 72 (1): 9-32.
Bulmer, S. (1998) 'New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European 
Market', Journal o f  European Public Policy 5 (3): 365-86.
Bulmer, S. and M. Burch (2001) ‘The Europeanization of Central Government: The 
UK and Germany in Historical Institutionalist Perspective’, Oslo: ARENA Working 
Paper 99/30.
Bull, H. (2002) The anarchical society: a study o f order in world politics. 
Basingstoke, Palgrave.
Caldwell, D. (197 7) ‘Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making’, American Behavioural 
Scientist 21: 87-110.
Calhoun, C. (2003) ‘European Studies: Always Already There and Still in 
Formation’, Comparative European Politics 1 (1): 5-20
Calic, M.-J. (2000) 'Deutschlands Politik im ehemaligen Jugoslawien.’ In Dittgen, H. 
and S. Schmidt (eds) Handbuch zur deutschen Aussenpolitik. 2000. Westdeutscher 
Verlag.
Caporaso, J. et al. (2001) Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic 
Change. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
Checkel, J. (2001) ‘The Europeanization of Citizenship?’ In Caporaso, J. et al. (eds) 
Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.
309
Chirac, J (2001). Point de Presse de Monsieur Jacques Chirac President de la 
Republique et de Monsieur Boris Trajkovski President de TAncienne Republique 
Yougoslave de Macedoine A Tissue de leur entretien. Palais de l’Elysee, 1 March.
Chirac, J. and Gerhard Schroder (2001) Declarations a presse de M. Jacques Chirac 
President de la Republique, de M. Gerhard Schroder Chancelier de la Republique 
federale dAllemagne et de Lionel Jospin Premier ministre a Tissue de leur rencontre. 
Herxheim, 20 March.
Chirac, J. (2001) Conference de Presse Conjointe de Monsieur Jacques Chirac 
President de la Republique, de Monsieur Lionel Jospin Premier Ministre, et de 
Monsieur Hubert Vedrine Ministre des affaires etrangeres lors du Conseil Europeen 
(2001). Stockholm, 24 March. 
http://www.elvsee.fr/elvsee/root/bank/print/2318.htm
Chirac, J. (2001) Address by Jacques Chirac, President o f France, at the special 
meeting o f  the North Atlantic Council NATO HQ. Brussels, 13 June. 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010613c.htm
Chirac, J. (2001) Intervention televisee de M. Jacques Chirac, president de la 
republique, a la suite des operations militaires en afghanistan (Televised interview 
following military operations in Afghanistan). Palais d'Elysee, 7 October.
Chirac, J. (2001) Conference de Presse de Monsieur Jacques Chirac President de la 
Republique a Tissue de son entretien avec monsieur Kofi Annan secretaire general de 
I'ONU (Press Conference of Jacques Chirac on his meeting with Kofi Annan, 
Secretary General of the United Nations), New York, 6 November.
Chirac, J. (2001) Pointe de presse conjoint de M  Jacques Chirac president de la 
republique et de M. Lakhdar Brahimi representant special du secretaire general des 
nations unies pour Tafghanistan (Joint Press Conference of Mr. Jacques Chirac and 
Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the United Nations to Afghanistan). 
Palais de l'Elysee, 8 November.
Chirac, J. (2001) Intervention televisee de M. Jacques Chirac, president de la 
republique (Television appearance of Mr. Jacques Chirac). Palais de l'Elysee, Paris, 
16 November.
Chirac, J. (2001) Conference de presse conjointe a Tissue du conseil europeen (Joint 
conference on the European Council). European Council, Laeken, 15 December.
Chirac (2004) Nato summit press conference (excerpts). Istanbul, 28 June.
Ciuta, F. (2002) ‘The End(s) of NATO: Security, Strategic Action and Narrative 
Transformation’, Contemporary Security Policy 23(1): 35-62
Clarke, M. and P. Cornish (2002) ‘The European Defense Project and the Prague 
Summit’, International Affairs 78 (4): 777-788.
310
CNN.com (2001) EU calls for U.N. role in Afghanistan. 17 October.
CNN.com (2001) EU links Afghan aid to human rights. 19 November.
Cole, A. and H. Drake (2000) ‘The Europeanization of the French Polity: continuity, 
change and adaptation’, Journal o f European Public Policy 7(1): 26-43.
Council of the European Union (2001) 2338th Council Meeting General Affairs 
Brussels March 19-20
http://www.seerecon.org/Calendar/2001 /events/c20010319 ga.htm
Council of the European Union (2001) Council Joint Action o f 29 June 2001 
concerning the appointment o f  the Special Representative o f  the European Union in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia (2001/492/CFSP). Brussels, 29 June.
Council of the European Union (2001) Conclusion and Plan o f Action o f the 
Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001. SN 140/01. 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf. Brussels, 21 
September.
Council of the European Union (2001) Council Joint Action o f 10 December 
concerning the appointment o f  the Special Representative o f the European Union. 
2001/875/CFSP. Brussels, 10 December.
Council of the European Union (2001) Presidency Conclusions, European Council 
Meeting in Laeken. Brussels, 14/15 December.
http://ec.europa.eu/govemance/impact/docs/kev docs/laeken concl en.pdf
Council of the European Union (2002) Annual report from the Council to the 
European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices o f  CFSP, including the 
financial implications for the general budget ofthe European Communities. Bmssels,
18 April
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2001 en.pdf
Council of the European Union (2002) 28th Council meeting Bmssels, 27 May 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/02/148&format=HT 
ML&aged= 1 &language=EN&guiLanguage=en
Council of the European Union (2003) Council Joint Action on the European Union 
military operation in the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia 2003/92/CFSP. 
Bmssels, 27 January.
Council of the European Union (2003) Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 
December 2002, Presidency Conclusions. Bmssels, 29 January. 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf
Council of the European Union (2003) A secure Europe in a better world: European 
Security Strategy. Bmssels, 12 December.
Council of the European Union (2005) Factsheet: the EU and Afghanistan. Bmssels, 
May. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/050511 Afghanistan.pdf
311
Council of the European Union (2006a) Summary o f  Remarks by Javier Solana, EU 
High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy at the meetings ofEU  
Foreign and Defence Ministers. Brussels, 13 November.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms Data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/91654.pdf
Council of the European Union (2006b) EU Special Representatives. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=263&lang=en&mode=g 
Accessed on 19 February 2007
Cox, M. (2006) Why ESDP. Evidence presented at Hearing ‘The Security Strategy 
and the Future of the European Security and Defence Policy’ European Parliament, 
Brussels, 13 July
Daalder, I. (2001) ‘NATO in Macedonia: Giving Peacekeeping a Bad Name’, Vrede 
en Veiligheid, 1 November.
Deighton, A. (2002) ‘The European Security and Defence Policy’ Journal o f  
Common Market Studies 40(4): 719-741.
Der Spiegel (2002) Interview mit Bundesaussenminister Joschka Fischer. 21 Januar.
Deutsch, K. (1957). Political Community in the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, 
Princeton University Press.
Deutscher Bundestag (2001) 158. Session, 15 March, Plenarprotokoll 14/158
Deutscher Bundestag (2001) 183. Session, 6 July, Plenarprotokoll 14/183
Deutscher Bundestag (2001) 184. Session, 29 August, Plenarprotokoll 14/184
Deutscher Bundestag (2001) 187. Session, 19 September, Plenarprotokoll 14/187 
Deutscher Bundestag (2001) 190. Session, 27 September, Plenarprotokoll 14/190
Deutscher Bundestag (2001) 192. Session, 11 October, Plenarprotokoll 14/192 
Deutscher Bundestag (2001) 195. Session, 18 October, Plenarprotokoll 14/195 
Deutscher Bundestag (2001) 198. Session, 8 November, Plenarprotokoll 14/198 
Deutscher Bundestag (2001) 202. Session, 16 November, Plenarprotokoll 14/202 
Deutscher Bundestag (2001) 208. Session, 13 December, Plenarprotokoll 14/208
Deutscher Bundestag (2001) 210. Session, 22 December, Plenarprotokoll 14/210
312
Deutscher Bundestag (2002) 14 Session, 5 December, Plenarprotokoll 15/14
De Villepin, D. (2002) Opening speech at the tenth ambassadors' conference. Paris, 
27 August
http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2002/villepin82702.asp
DFID (2001) Afghanistan - Recovery: an emergency plan for the first 100 days. 
London, 13 November.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmintdev/84/8402.
htm
Die Zeit (2001) Politik der zittrigen Hand. 
http://www.zeit.de/archiv/2001/32/200132 dt. aussenpoliti.xml
Downing Street Press Briefing (2001) 25 June.
dpa (2001) Bis zu 1200 deutsche Soldaten nach Kabul. 22 December.
Duke, S. (1999) The elusive quest for European security: from EDC to CFSP. 
Basingstoke, Macmillan.
Dyson, K. and K. Goertz (2003) ‘Living with Europe: Power, Constraint, and 
Contestation.’ In Dyson and Goertz (eds), Germany, Europe and the Politics o f  
Constraint. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
The Economist (2001) Wake up, Europe! London, 15 September.
The Economist (2003) Dealing with the foot-draggers: blame, aim, fire. London, 1 
May.
Eldridge, J. L. C. (2002) ‘Playing at Peace: Western Politics, Diplomacy and the 
Stabilization of Macedonia’, European Security 11(3): 46-90.
European Commission (2001) Cards Assistance Programme former Yugoslav 
Republic o f Macedonia 2002-06.
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/cards/pdf/publications/fvrom strategy pap 
er.pdf
European Commission (2003) Country Strategy Paper (CSP) Afghanistan, 2003- 
2006. http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/afghanistan/csp/03 06.pdf
European Commission (2006) DG-Enlargement: Relations between the EU and the 
former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia.
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/intemational/bilateral/background/mkl en.ht 
ml
Europe Report (2001) EU/US: Summit fails to resolve climate change row, 16 June.
Everts, S. (2000) Berlin-Paris-London. In A. Pijpers (ed) On Cores and Coalitions in 
the European Union: The Position o f Some Small Member States. Clingendael 
Institute: 15-32.
Featherstone, K. and C. Radaelli (eds) (2003) The Politics o f  Europeanization. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Financial Times (2001) Ethnic Albanian leader pessimistic over talks. London, 6 
April.
Financial Times (2001) US wary of committing Nato troops to Macedonia. London, 
14 June.
Financial Times (2001) The Balkans revisited: Fighting in Macedonia has raised fear 
of another war in the region. London, 7 August.
Financial Times (2001) Show of force guards tense path to peace: Britain's role 
reflects a desire to protect political, military and economic investment in the Balkans. 
London, 18 August: 5.
Financial Times (2001) Special Envoy Seeks EU Force for Macedonia: Plan for 
Troops to Follow NATO Mission. London, 6 September.
Financial Times (2001b) Nato enters uncharted waters as it adapts to new 
environment. London, 3 October.
Financial Times (2001) Europe fails to find united line on Kabul after the Taliban. 
London. 9 October.
Financial Times (2001) Plan for 'Big Three' summit opens EU rift. London, 19 
October: 1.
Financial Times (2001) Schroder takes gamble on vote of confidence: troop 
mobilisation German chancellor forces vote in order to put pressure on dissenting 
coalition legislators. London, 14 November: 12.
Financial Times (2001) Political change must be quick, say aid donors. London, 6 
December: 6.
Financial Times (2001) EU in attempt to forge Afghan policy. London, 14 December.
Financial Times (2001) Peacekeeping dispute mars first day of EU summit. Financial 
Times, London, 15 December: 7.
Financial Times (2002) UK resists moves to deploy EU force in Macedonia. London, 
4 March.
Financial Times (2002) Dispute over defence force links with Nato. London, 30 
October
314
Financial Times (2003) ’NATO credibility at risk' over call to defend Turkey. 
London, 10 February: 6.
Financial Times Deutschland (2001) Sondersitzung des Bundestags zu Mazedonien- 
Einsatz moglich. 28 June.
Financial Times Deutschland (2001) Bundeswehr vor Nato-Einsatz in Mazedonien. 2 
July
Financial Times Deutschland (2001) Mazedonien-Einsatz kostet mehr als 120 Mio. 
Mark; Budenswehr muss vorfinanzieren - Sondersitzung zu deutscher Beteiligung 
wahrscheinlich kommende Woche. 16 August: 11.
Fischer, J. (2001) Die Antwort auf fast alle Fragen ist: Europa’, Die Zeit 
http://www.zeit.de/2001 /12/Politik/200112_fischer.neu9.3 .html.
Foley, M. (2000) The British Presidency. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
Foley, M. (2002) John Major, Tony Blair and a Conflict o f  Leadership. Manchester, 
Manchester University Press.
Foley, M. (2004) ‘Presidential attribution as an agency of prime ministerial critique 
in a parliamentary democracy’ British Journal o f  Politics and International Relations 
6(3): 292-311.
Forster, A. (2000) ‘Britain.’ In Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (eds), The Foreign 
Policies ofEUM ember States. Manchester, Manchester University Press: 44-63.
Forster, A. and Wallace, W. (2000) ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy: From 
Shadow to Substance?’ In Wallace, H. and Wallace, W. (eds) Policy-Making in the 
European Union, 4th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Forster, A. and A. Blair (2002) ‘Trends and patterns in British European policy.’ In 
Blair, Alastair and Anthony Forster (eds), The Making o f Britain's European Foreign 
Policy. Harlow, Pearson Education Limited: 167-191.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2001) Kampfe konnen wieder ausbrechen. 
Frankfurt, 25 October.
Garton Ash, T. (1993) In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent. New 
York, Random House.
Garton Ash, T. (2001) ‘Is Britain European?’ International Affairs 77(1): 1-13.
Garton Ash, T. (2001) ‘Is There a Good Terrorist?’ The New York Review o f Books 
48.
315
Gegout, C. (2004) ‘An Evaluation of the Making and Functioning of the European 
Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) System.’ PhD Thesis, 
European University Institute, Florence.
General Affairs Council (2001) Press Release Brussels, 8 October. 
www.vale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept 11/eu 005.htm
George, A. (1979) ‘Case studies and theory development: the method of structured, 
focused comparison.’ In P. Lauren (ed) Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, 
Theory and Policy. New York, NY: Free Press: 43-68.
George, A. and A. Bennett (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Giegerich, B. (2006) ‘National policies toward ESDP : 1991-2003.’ PhD Thesis, 
London School of Economics and Political Science
Giegerich, B. and Wallace, W. (2004) ‘Not Such a Soft Power: the External 
Deployment of European Forces’, Survival (Summer): 163-183.
Gilpin, R. (1981) War and Change in World Politics. Princeton, Princeton University 
Press.
Ginsberg, R. (1989) Foreign Policy Actions o f the European Community: The 
Politics o f  Scale. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Ginsberg, R. (1999) ‘Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: 
Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap’, Journal o f Common Market 
Studies 37(3): 429-454.
Ginsberg, R. (2001) The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire. 
Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield.
Gnesotto, N, (ed) (2004) EU Security and Defence Policy: the firstfive years (1999- 
2004). Institute for Security Studies, Paris.
Goldstein, J. and R. Keohane, eds (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy. Ithaca NY, 
Cornell University Press.
Gordon, P. and B. Suzan (2002) 'France, the United States and the War on 
Terrorism’, U.S.-France Analysis, The Brookings Institution,! January 
http://www.brook.edu/fp/cuse/analvsis/terrorism.htm
Gourevitch, P. (1978) ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of 
Domestic Politics’, International Organization 32(4): 881-912.
Government Press Briefing (2001). Tuesday 28 Morning Briefing. London, 28 
August. http://www.number 10.gov.uk/output/page2147,asp
316
Gow, J. (1997) Triumph o f the Lack o f Will: International Diplomacy and the 
Yugoslav War. New York, Columbia University Press.
Gowa, J. (1989) ‘Bipolarity, Multipolarity and Free Trade’, American Political 
Science Review 83/84: 1245-56.
Grabbe, H. and W. Munchau (2002) Germany and Britain: an alliance o f necessity. 
London, Center for European Reform.
Grieco, J. (1997) ‘Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics.’ In 
Doyle, M. and J. Ikenberry (eds) New Thinking in International Relations Theory. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Gross, E. (2006) ‘The EU in Afghanistan: what role for EU crisis management and 
conflict prevention policies?’ CFSP Forum 4 (4), July 2006: 11-14.
Grosser, A. (1995) ‘Le role et le rang.’ In Andre Lewin (ed), La France et VONU 
depuis 1945. Conde-sur-Noireau : Arlea-Corlet.
Grund, C. (2003) 'Mannschaftsdienlich gespielt. Rot-gruene Suedosteuropapolitik.’ 
In Sebastian Hamisch, Constantin Grund and Hanns Maull (eds) Deutschland im 
Abseits? Rot-grune Aussenpolitik 1998-2003. Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft: 107-120.
The Guardian (2001) Troops arrive for Balkans task. London, 18 August: 2.
The Guardian (2002) Leaked papers reveal split over Macedonia troops. London, 4 
March.
The Guardian (2002) Chirac furious after row with Blair: Chirac cancels summit after 
row with 'very rude' Blair. London, 29 October.
Haas, E. (1958) The Uniting o f Europe: Political, Economic, and Social Forces, 
1950-1957. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Haas, E. (1960) ‘International Integration: The European and Universal Process’, 
International Organization 4: 607-46.
Haas, E. (1964) Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International 
Organization. Stanford, Stanford University Press.
Heffeman, R. (2003) ‘Prime Ministerial predominance? Core executive politics in the 
UK’, British Journal o f Politics and International Relations 5 (3): 347-372.
Heisbourg, F. et al. (2000) European Defence: making it work. Paris, Institute for 
Security Studies
Hill, C. (1993) ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's 
International Role’, Journal o f  Common Market Studies 31(3): 305-28.
317
Hill, C. (1996) ‘United Kingdom: Sharpening contradictions.’ In Christopher Hill 
(ed) The actors in Europe's foreign policy. London, Routledge: 68-89.
Hill, C. (1998) ‘Closing the Capability-Expectations Gap? A Common Foreign 
Policy for Europe? ‘ In S. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds) Competing Visions o f the 
CFSP. London, Routledge: 18-38.
Hill, C. (2003) The Changing Politics o f  Foreign Policy. New York, Palgrave 
MacMillan.
Hill, C. (2004) ‘Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 
September 2001’, Journal o f  Common Market Studies 42(1): 143-63.
Hill, C. and M. Smith (2005) ‘Acting for Europe: Reassessing the European Union's 
Place in International Relations.’ In C. Hill and M. Smith (eds) International 
Relations and the European Union. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 388-406.
Hill, C. (2005) ‘Putting the world to rights: Tony Blair's foreign policy mission.’ In 
Anthony Seldon and D. Kavanagh (eds) The Blair Effect 2001-05. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press: 362-409.
Hix, S. and K. Goertz (2000) ‘Introduction: European Integration and National 
Political Systems’, West European Politics 23(4): 1-26.
Hoffmann, S. (2001) ‘Classic Diplomacy in the Information Age; Hubert Vedrine 
explains French Foreign Policy’ Foreign Affairs, July/August: 137-141.
Hollis, M. and S. Smith (1991) Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
House of Commons (2001a) Anglo-American Defence Co-operation. Commons 
Hansard, Column 803. London, 27 March.
House of Commons (2001b) Government policy towards the Former Republic o f  
Yugoslavia and the wider region following the fa ll o f  Milosevic. Select Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, London, 27 March.
House of Commons (2001a) Examination o f Witnesses (Questions 20-39), The Rt 
Hon Geoffrey Hoon. Select Committee on Defence. London, 28 March.
House of Commons (2001b) Examination o f Witnesses (Questions 60-79), The Rt 
Hon Geoffrey Hoon. Select Committee on Defence. London, 28 March.
House of Commons (2001) Examination o f Witnesses (Questions 20-39). Major- 
General Tony Milton, OBE, RM, Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts. 
Select Committee on Defence. London, 7 November 2001.
House of Commons (2001) Examination o f Witnesses (Questions 1-19), The Rt Hon 
JackStraw. Select Committee on Foreign Affairs London, 20 November.
318
House of Commons (2001) International Development -  Minutes o f Evidence. 
Memorandum submitted by The Rt Hon Clare Short MP, Secretary o f State for  
International Development. Select Committee on International Development. 
London, 20 November.
House of Commons (2001). International Development -  Written Answers to 
Questions (23 Nov 2001). Commons Hansard vol 375 no. 58. London, 23 November.
House of Commons (2001) Examination o f Witnesses (Questions 20-40), The Rt Hon 
JackStraw. Select Committee on Foreign Affairs London, 5 December.
House of Commons (2001a) The Threat from Terrorism: Examination o f  Witnesses 
(Question 363). Select Committee on Defence. London, 18 December
House of Commons (2001b) British-US Relations. Select Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. London, 18 December
House of Commons (2001) Defence - Minutes o f  Evidence (Question 79). Select 
Committee on Defence. London, 19 December.
House of Commons (2002a) Foreign Policy Aspects o f the War Against Terrorism 
Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. London, 12 June.
House of Commons (2002b) Foreign Policy Aspects o f the War Against Terrorism: 
Memorandum from Mr. Paul Bergne. Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. London, 
12 June.
House of Commons (2003) Afghanistan: The Transition from Humanitarian Reliefto 
Reconstruction and Development Assistance. London, 14 January.
House of Commons (2004) Foreign Policy Aspects o f the War Against Terrorism. 
Select Committee on Foreign Affairs London, 29 July.
House of Lords (2002) Eleventh Report: The European Policy on Security and 
Defence. European Union Committee. London, 29 January.
Howorth, J. (2000) ‘Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review 5: 377-396.
Howorth, J. (2003-04) ‘France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis’, Survival 45(4): 
173-192.
Howorth, J. (2004) ‘Discourse, Ideas and Epistemic Communities in European 
Security and Defence Policy’, West European Politics 27 (2): 29-52.
Howorth, J. (2005) ‘From Security to Defence: the Evolution of CFSP.’ In C. Hill 
and M. Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press: 179-204.
319
Human Rights Watch (2002) Paying for the Taliban’s Crimes: Abuses against ethnic 
Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan. Report 14 (2), April.
Huntington, S. (1960) ‘Strategic Planning and the Political Process’, Foreign Affairs 
38: 285-99.
The Independent (2001) EU May Take Over From NATO in Macedonia. London, 7 
September.
The Independent (2001) War on Terrorism: Diplomacy - foreign ministers beef up 
statement of support by EU. London, 18 October, 4.
International Crisis Group (2001a) The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion. 
Balkan Report no. 109. Skopje/Brussels, 5 April.
International Crisis Group (2001b) Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace. Balkans 
Report n. 113. Skopje/Brussels, 20 June.
International Crisis Group (2001c) Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum. Balkans 
Briefing. Skopje/Brussels, 8 September.
International Crisis Group (2002) Moving Macedonia Toward Self-Sufficiency: A 
New Security Approach for NATO and the EU. Balkans Report no. 135. 
Skopje/Brussels, 15 November.
International Crisis Group (2005) Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European 
Union's Role. Asia Report No 107. Brussels, 30 November.
International Herald Tribune (2002) France upbraids U.S. as ‘simplistic’. 7 February.
International Herald Tribune (2002) A Post-Prague Agenda for NATO. 27 
November.
Ioannides, I. (2006) ‘EU Police Mission Proxima: testing the European approach to 
building peace.’ In Nowack (ed) Civilian Crisis Management: the EU way. Chaillot 
Paper no. 90, Institute for Security Studies, Paris: 69-86.
The Irish Times (2002) France joins in Afghan bomber attacks. 6 March: 10.
The Irish Times (2001) Internment revisited as UK prepares to lead force. 20 
December, 9.
Irondelle, B. (2003) ‘Europeanisation without the European Union? French Military 
Reforms 1991-96’, Journal o f European Public Policy 10 (2): 208-226.
ITAR-TASS News Agency (2001) EU special envoy tenders resignation. 10 
September.
320
Janning, J. (1996) ‘A German Europe -  A European Germany? On the Debate over 
Germany’s Foreign Policy’, International Affairs 72 (1): 33-41.
Jopp, M. (1994) The strategic implications o f European integration. Adelphi Paper 
no 290, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
Jorgensen, K. (1997) ‘PoCo: The Diplomatic Republic of Europe.’ In Jorgensen, K. 
(ed) Reflective Approaches to European Governance. London, Palgrave: 167-180.
Juncos, A. (2006) ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Testing Ground for the ESDP?’, 
CFSP Forum 4 (3): 5-8.
Kaarbo, J. (1998) ‘Power Politics in Foreign Policy’, European Journal o f  
International Relations 4(1): 67-97.
Kampfner, John (2003) Blair's War. London: Free Press.
Kassim, H. (2000) Conclusion. In Kassim, H., Peters, B.G. and Wright, V. (eds) The 
National Co-ordination ofEUPolicy. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 235-264.
Katsioulis, C. (2004) ‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik im Parteiendiskurs: Alter Weinin 
neuen Schlauchen.’ In Hamisch et al., Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Eine Bilanz der 
Regierung Schroder. Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft: 227-252.
Katzenstein, P. (ed) (1997) Tamed Power: Germany in Europe. Ithaca, NY, Cornell 
University Press.
Keatinge, P. (1984) ‘The Europeanization of Irish foreign policy.’ In P. Drudy and D. 
McAleese (eds) Ireland and the European Community. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 33-57.
Keohane, R. and J. S. Nye (1977) Power and interdependence: world politics in 
transition. Boston, Little Brown.
Keohane, R. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Klaiber, K. (2002) The European Union in Afghanistan: Impressions o f  my term as 
Special Representative. National Europe Centre Paper No. 44, Australian National 
University. http://www.anu.edu.au/NEC/klaiber.pdf
Klaiber, K. (2003) ‘Political and Economic Reconstruction in Afghanistan’, German 
Foreign Policy in Dialogue 4(10): 12-15.
Knill, C. (2001) The Europeanization o f National Administrations: Patterns o f  
Institutional Change and Persistence. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Krasner, S. (1971) ‘Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)’, 
Foreign Policy 1: 159-79.
321
Krasner, S., ed. (1983) International regimes. Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press.
Kratochwil, F. and J. G. Ruggie (1986) ‘International Organization: A State of the 
Art on the Art of the State’, International Organization 40(4): 753-75.
Ladrech, R. (1994) ‘Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case 
of France’, Journal o f  Common Market Studies 32(1): 69-88.
Lansford, T. (2002) ‘Whither Lafayette? French Military Policy and the American 
Campaign in Afghanistan’, European Security 11 (3): 126-145
Layne, C. (1993) ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise’, 
International Security 17 (Spring): 5-51.
Le Monde (2001) L'Union europeenne et l'OTAN coordonnent leurs efforts pour 
soutenir la Macedoine. Paris, 21 March: 3.
Le Monde (2001) We are all American. Paris, 13 September.
Lieven, A. (2001) ‘The End of NATO’, Prospect, December.
Light, M. (1994) ‘Foreign Policy Analysis.’ In Groom, A. and M. Light (eds.), 
Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory. London, Pinter 
Publishers: 93-108.
Lijphart, A. (1971) ‘Comparative politics and the comparative method’, American 
Political Science Review 65: 689-93.
Liotta, P. H. (2003) ‘Spillover Effect: Aftershocks in Kosovo, Macedonia and 
Serbia’, European Security 12(1): 82-108,
Liotta, P. H. and C. R. Jebb (2002) ‘Cry, the Imagined Country: Legitimacy and the 
Fate of Macedonia’, European Security 11(1): 49-80.
Little, R. and M. Wickham-Jones (ed) (200) New Labour's foreign policy: A new 
moral crusade? Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Longhurst, K. (2004) Germany and the use o f force. Manchester, Manchester 
University Press.
Lucarelli, S. (2000) Europe and the Breakup o f  Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in 
Search o f  a Scholarly Explanation. The Hague, Kluwer Law International.
Macleod, A. (2001) ‘France : Kosovo and the Emergence of a New European 
Security. ’ In Pierre Martin et Mark R. Brawley (eds.), Allied Force or Forced Allies? 
Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO'S War. New York, St Martin's Press: 113-130.
Major, C. (2005) ‘Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy -  Undermining 
or Rescuing the Nation State?’, Politics 25(3): 175-190
322
Manners, I. and R. Whitman (2000) The Foreign Policies o f European Union 
Member States. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal 
o f Common Market Studies 40(2): 235-258.
Mastanduno, M. (1999) ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. 
Grand Strategies after the Cold War.’ In E. Kapstein and M Mastanduno (eds) 
Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War. New York, 
Columbia University Press.
Mathiopoulos, M. and I. Gyarmati (1999) ‘Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward 
European Defense’, The Washington Quarterly 22(4): 65-76.
Maull, H. (1995) ‘Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis’, Survival 37(4): 99-130.
Maull, H. (2000) ‘Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ’Civilian Power'?’ Survival 
42(2): 56-81.
Mearsheimer, J. (1990) ‘Back to the future-instability in Europe after the Cold War’, 
International Security 15(1): 5-56.
Menon, A. (1995) ‘From independence to cooperation: France, NATO and European 
security’, International Affairs 71 (1): 19-34.
Merton, R. (1957) Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, IL, Free Press.
Meyer, C. (2005) ‘Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A 
Constructivist Framework for Explaining Ideational Change’, European Journal o f  
International Relations 11(4): 523-50.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001). Daily Press Briefing: Statements made by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson (excerpts). Paris, October 9. 
http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/briefing/us091001 .asp
Miskimmon, A. J. (2004) ‘Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of 
the EU: between Europeanization and national singularities’, PhD Thesis, University 
of Birmingham.
Missiroli, A. (2002) ‘EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish 
Delight for ESDP’, Security Dialogue, 33 (1): 9-26
Missiroli, A. (2003) Euros for ESDP: financing EU operations. Occasional Paper no 
45. Paris, Institute for Security Studies.
Mitrany, D. (1966) A Working Peace System. Chicago, Quadrangle Press.
Moi'si, D. (2001) France and the fighting spirit: The French are caught between 
British fervour for the war in Afghanistan and German wariness. London, Financial 
Times, 9 October: 25
323
Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community’, Journal 
o f Common Market Studies 31(4): 473-524.
Moravcsik, A. (1998) The choice for Europe : social purpose and state power from  
Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press.
Morgenthau, H. (1948) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r Power and Peace. 
New York, Alfred Knopf.
NATO (1999) The Alliance’s Strategic Concept. Rome, 23-24 April. 
www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm
NATO (2001) Skopje requests NATO assistance. Brussels, 20 June 
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/0618/e0620a.htm.
NATO (2001) NATO Authorises the Deployment of Headquarters of Task Force 
Harvest. Brussels, 15 August.
NATO (2001) Facts and Figures - the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
Brussels, 17 August.
NATO (2002) Operation Essential Harvest: Task Force Harvest Mission. 
http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/skopje/harvest.htm. Brussels 16 December.
NATO (2003) Task Force Fox. 31 July. 
http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/skopie2/FOX.htm
NATO (2004) NATO-EU: Chronology, 29 July 
http ://www.nato. int/i ssues/nato-eu/chronolo gy. html.
NATO (2004) NATO Topics. NATO-EU: A strategic partnership, 2 December 
http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/policv.html
NATO (2005) NATO in Afghanistan: Factsheet, 21 February
http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm
NATO Notes (2002) ‘NATO and the EU: Row over Macedonia?’ 4 (3), 27 March.
NATO Notes (2002) ‘Afghanistan: Still too ‘out of area’ for NATO?’ 4 (10), 19 
December.
NATO Notes (2003) ‘Beyond Kabul: Testing ISAF’s potential and limits’ 5(3), 
October.
NATO Press Release (2001) 138. Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord 
Robertson. Brussels 8 October
Neue Zurcher Zeitung (2001) Die CDU/CSU nun fur einen Nato-Einsatz. 29 August.
324
Neue Ziircher Zeitung (2002) Franzosische Zusagen an Karzai (French commitments 
to Karzai). Zurich, 2 March: 1.
Neumann, I. B. (1998) Uses ofthe other: "The East" in European identity formation. 
Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press.
Neustadt, R. (1960) Presidential Power: The Politics o f Leadership. New York, John 
Wiley.
New York Times (2002). Interview of President Jacques Chirac. New York, 8 
. September.
Niblett, R. (2001) ‘France and Europe at the end of the Cold War: Resisting Change.’ 
In R. Niblett and W. Wallace (eds) Rethinking European Order: West European 
Responses, 1989-97. London, Palgrave.
Nuttall, S. (1992) European Political Cooperation. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
The Observer (2001) The Countdown: marching to the brink of battle. London, 23 
September: 11.
Ohrgaard, J. (2004) ‘International relations or European integration: is the CFSP sui 
generisT In B. Tonra and T. Christiansen (eds) Rethinking European Union Foreign 
Policy. Manchester, Manchester University Press, Manchester University Press: 26- 
44.
Olsen, J. (2002) ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’, Arena Working Paper 02/02.
OSCE Press Release (2001) Need for intensified dialogue in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. Vienna, 30 March.
Overhaus, M. (2003) 'Zwischen kooperativer Sicherheit und militarischer 
Interventionsfahigkeit. Rot-grane Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen von ESVP und 
NATO.’ In Sebastian Hamisch, Constantin Grand and Hanns Maull (eds) 
DeutschlandimAbseits? Rot-grune Aussenpolitik 1998-2003. Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft: 49-64.
Patten, C. (2001) In defense of Europe’s foreign policy. Financial Times, 17 October.
Peterson, J. (1998) Introduction: the European Union as a global actor. In Peterson, J. 
and H. Sjursen, A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the 
CFSP. London, Routledge: 3-17.
Peterson, J. (2002) 'Europe, America and 11 September’, Irish Studies in 
International Affairs 13: 1-20
Piana, C. (2002) ‘The EU's decision-making policy in the common foreign and 
security policy: the case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, European 
Foreign Affairs Review 7(2): 209-226.
325
Pond, E. (1999) ‘Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe’, The Washington Quarterly 22(4): 77- 
92.
Posen, B. (2004) ‘ESDP and the Structure of World Power’, The International 
Spectator 39(1).
Press Association (2001) Cook pledges support in Macedonian borders crisis, 20 
March.
Press Association (2001) Blair and Bush discuss Macedonia crisis, 29 June.
Press Association (2001) Four EU countries pledge to go to war. 8 October.
Putnam, R. (1988) 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games’, International Organization 42 (3): 427-460.
Quiles, P. (1999) L'OTAN, quel avenir? Rapport d'information de la Commission de 
la defense de l'Assemblee Nationale n 1495. Paris.
Radaelli, C. (2002) ‘Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive 
Change’, European Integration Online Papers 4(8).
Radaelli, C. (2004) ‘Europeanization: Solution or problem?’, European Integration 
Online Papers 8(16).
Regelsberger, E. (ed) (1997) Foreign Policy o f the European Union: from EPC to 
CFSP and Beyond. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner.
Richard, A. (2001) The European Union, a rising feature on the international stage. 
Remarks by H.E. Mr. Alain Richard, Minister of Defence of France. 12th Forum 
Bundeswehr & Gesellschaft, Welt am Sonntag, Berlin, 2 October.
Riddell, P. (2003) Hug Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and the 'Special 
Relationship'. London: Politico's.
Riddell, P. (2005) ‘Europe.’ In Anthony Seldon and David Kavanagh (eds) The Blair 
Effect 2001-05. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 362-383.
Ripley, B. (1995) ‘Cognition, Culture, and Bureaucratic Politics.’ In L. Neack et al 
(eds) Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its second generation. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall.
Risse-Kappen, T. (1996) ‘Identity in a Democratic Security Community: The Case of 
NATO.’ In Peter J. Katzenstein (ed) The Culture o f National Security. New York, 
Columbia University Press: 357-399.
Risse, T. (2001) ‘A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation- 
State Identities.' In Caporaso, J. Cowles, M.G., and Risse, T. (eds) Transforming 
Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca, Cornell University Press: 
198-216.
326
Roberts, N. and P. King (1991) ‘Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure and 
Function in the Policy Process’, Journal o f  Public Administration Research and 
Theory 1(2): 147-175.
Rosati, J. (1981) ‘Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: 
Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective’, World Politics 33: 234-52.
Roy, O. (2004) Afghanistan: la difficile reconstruction d ’un Etat. Chaillot Paper No. 
73, December. Paris, Institute for Security Studies
Rubin, B. R. (2002) The Fragmentation o f  Afghanistan. New Haven.
Riihe, V. (1994) Deutschlands Verantwortung: Perspektiven fur das neue Europa. 
Berlin, Ullstein.
Rumsfeld, D. (2001) News Transcript. United States Department of Defense, 23 
September.
Sabatier, P. (ed) (1999) Theories o f  the Policy Process. Boulder, CO, Westview 
Press.
San Diego Union-Tribune (2003) France wary of expanding NATO peacekeeper role: 
involvement in Afghanistan raises concerns over mission of alliance. San Diego, 27 
February.
San Francisco Chronicle (2003) France makes initial foray into mending its 
relationship with U.S. - serious negotiations precede leaders' first talk in 2 months. 16 
April.
Schauble, W. (1994) Und der Zukunft zugewandt. Berlin, Siedler.
Scharpf, F. (2005) Notes Towards a Theory of Multilevel Governing in Europe. 
http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg dp/dp00-5.pdf
Schilling, W. et al. (1962) Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets. New York, 
Columbia University Press.
Schimmelfennig, F (1998/99) ‘NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation’, 
Security Studies 8 (2/3): 198-234.
Schimmelfennig, F. and U. Sedelmeier (eds) (2005) The Europeanization o f Central 
and Eastern Europe. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
Schneckener, U. (2002) Developing and Applying EU Crisis Management: Test Case 
Macedonia. ECMI Working Paper #14. European Centre for Minority Issues, 
Flensburg.
Schwegmann, C. (2000) The Contact Group and its impact on the European 
institutional structure. Occasional Paper 16. Paris, Institute for Security Studies.
327
Shapiro, J. (2002) The role o f  France in the War on Terrorism. Brookings Institution.
Singer, D. J. (1961) ‘The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations’, 
World Politics 14 (1): 77-92.
Smith, M. (1999) The Core Executive in Britain. London: Macmillan.
Smith, M. E. (2000) ‘Conforming to Europe: the Domestic Impact of EU Foreign 
Policy Cooperation’, Journal o f European Public Policy 7(4): 613-31.
Smith, M. E. (2004) Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization o f  
Cooperation. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Smith, M. and R. Steffenson (2005) ‘The EU and the United States.’ In C. Hill and 
M. Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union, pp. 343-364. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press: 343-364.
Smith, M. (2006) ‘Britain, Europe and the World.’ In P. Dunleavy et al. (eds.), 
Developments in British Politics 8. London, Palgrave: 169-173.
Smith, S. (1994) ‘Foreign Policy Theory and the New Europe.’ In W. Carlsnaes and 
S. Smith (eds) European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in 
Europe. London, SAGE Publications: 1-20.
Snyder, G. (1977) Alliance politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Sokalski, H. J. (2003) An Ounce ofPrevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in 
Preventive Diplomacy. Washington, D.C., United States Institute for Peace Press.
The Spectator (2001). The Great Euroamerican Plot. 27 October, 20-21.
Stavridis, S. (ed) (1997) New challenges to the European Union: policies and policy­
making. Dartmouth, Aldershot.
Steiner, M. (1977) ‘The Elusive Essence of Decision’, International Studies 
Quarterly 21:389-422.
SUddeutsche Zeitung (2001) Nato in Mazedonien unter deutscher Fuhrung Parlament 
stimmt mit grosser Mehrheit zu. Munich, 28 September.
Suddeutsche Zeitung (2001) Wir mussen die Terroristen bekaempfen und besiegen. 
Interview mit Bundesaussenminister Fischer. Munich, 18 October.
Tagesspiegel (2003) Nato will Schutztruppe in Kabul fuehren. 16 April 
http://archiv.tagesspiegel.de/archiv/16.04.2003/531047.asp
Tams, K. (1999) ‘Functions of a European Security and Defence Identity and its 
institutional form.’ InHaftendom, H. Keohane, Rand Wallander, C. (eds.), Imperfect
328
Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
80-106.
Tardy, T. (2003-2004) 'France and the US. The inevitable clash?’ International 
Journal 59 (1): 105-126.
The Times (2001) Blair can count on support - for the time being. 18 October.
The Times (2001) Prodi's criticism of solo diplomacy devalues EU. 19 October. 
The Times (2001) Europe split over No 10 summit. 5 November.
The Times (2001) No 10 fury as EU claims Afghan role. 15 December.
The Times (2002) Britain picks 'Euro-army' for Afghan peacekeeping mission. 9 
January.
Toje, A. (2003) ‘The First Casualty in the War against Terror: The Fall of NATO and 
Europe's Reluctant Coming of Age’, European Security 12 (2):63-76.
Tonra, B. (2001) The Europeanisation o f National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish 
and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union. Aldershot, Ashgate.
Tonra, B. (2003) ‘Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility 
of a Cognitive Approach’, Journal o f Common Market Studies 41(4): 731-56.
Torreblanca, J. (2001) Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the 
Europeanization o f Spanish Foreign Policy. Arena Working Paper 01/26.
Treacher, A. (2001) ‘Europe as a Power Multiplier for French Security Policy: 
Strategic Consistency, Tactical Adaptation’, European Security 10(1): 22-44.
Treacher, A. (2003) French Interventionism: Europe's Last Global Player? 
Aldershot, Ashgate.
Turkish Daily News (2002) British Opposition worried about British troops stuck in 
Kabul, 26 February.
UK Ministry of Defence (2001) Military Technical Agreement Between the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of 
Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’), http://www.operations.mod.uk/isafmta.ndf
United Nations (1945). Charter of the United Nations. 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/
United Nations (1999) Security Council fails to extend mandate of United Nations 
Preventive Deployment Force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Press 
Release SC/6648. 25 February
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990225.sc6648.html
329
United Nations (1999) UNPREDEP Mission Profile 
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred p.htm
United Nations (2001) Agreement On Provisional Arrangements In Afghanistan 
Pending The Re-establishment Of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn 
Agreement), 7 December
http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2005) Refugee Statistics, 
Afghanistan. http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/afghan?page=background.
United Press International (2002) Analysis: All-European force criticized. London, 
10 January
US Department of Defence (2002) International Contributions to the War Against 
Terrorism, 14 June
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/d20020607contributions.pdf
United States Institute for Peace (2002) Taking Stock and Looking Forward - 
Intervention in the Balkans and Beyond. Report.
United States Institute for Peace (2003) Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: 
Warlordism, Reconstruction, and Ethnic Harmony. Special Report No. 105, April
Vedrine, H. (2001) Visit to the United States -  Statements made by M. Hubert 
Vedrine during his press conference with Mr. Colin Powell, Washington 26 March. 
http://www.ambaffance-uk.org/article-imprim.php37id article=5621
Vedrine, H. (2001) Interview given to Radio France following the EU General 
Affairs Council, Luxemburg, 25 June.
http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/article-imprim.php37id article=5529
Waever, O. (1996) ‘European Security Identities’, Journal o f Common Market Studies 
34(1): 103-32.
Waever, Ole (2004) ‘Discursive Approaches.’ In A. Wiener and T. Diez (eds) 
European Integration Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 197-215.
Wagener, M. (2003) ‘Auslandseinsatze der Bundeswehr. Normalisierung statt 
Militarisierung deutscher Sicherheitspolitik.’ In Maull et al (eds) Deutschland im 
Abseits? Rot-grune Aussenpolitik 1998-2003. Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft: 33-49.
Wagner, W. (2003) ‘Why the EU’s common foreign and security policy will remain 
intergovernmental: a rationalist institutional choice analysis of European crisis 
management policy’, Journal o f European Public Policy 10(4): 576-595.
Wagner, R. H. (1974) ‘Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on 
International Relations’, International Organization 28: 435-66.
330
Wallace, W. (1994) Regional integration: The West European Experience. Brookings 
Institution, Washington DC.
Wallace, W. (2004) The Collapse o f British Foreign Policy. Speech given at Chatham 
House. London.
Wallace, W. (2005) ‘The collapse of British foreign policy’, International Affairs 
82(1): 53-68.
Wallace, W. and Oliver, T. (2005) ‘A Bridge Too Far: The United Kingdom and the 
Transatlantic Relationship.’ In Andrews, D. (ed) Alliance under Stress. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Walt, S. M. (1987) The Origins o f Alliances. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Walt, S. M. (1997) ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’, Survival 39(1): 156-79.
Walt, S. M. (1999) ‘NATO's Future (In Theory). ’ In P. Martin and M. Brawley (eds) 
Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies? 
Basingstoke, Palgrave: 11-26.
Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory o f  International Politics. New York, McGraw-Hill.
Warleigh, A. (2006) ‘Learning from Europe? EU Studies and the Re-thinking of 
‘International Relations’, European Journal o f International Relations 12 (1): 31-51
Washington Post (2001) Balkans Uprisings Condemned: Powell Assures Europeans 
of U.S. Commitment to Region. Washington, DC, 12 April.
Washington Post (2004) Chirac’s multipolar world. Washington, DC, 4 February: 
A22
Webster, P. (2002) Blair's mission to Kabul. The Times, 8 January.
Welch, D. (1992) ‘The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm’, 
International Security 17: 112-46.
Wendt, A. (1992) ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: the Social Construction of 
Power Politics’, International Organization 46(2): 391-425.
Wessels, W. (1982) ‘European Political Cooperation: A New Approach to European 
Foreign Policy. In David Allen, Reinhardt Rummel and Wolfgang Wessels (eds) 
European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign Policy for Western Europe. 
London: Butterworth.
White, B. (1999) ‘The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis’, European 
Journal o f International Relations 5(1): 37-66.
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (1999) Text of a letter from the 
President to the speaker of the house of representatives and the president of the
331
senate, March 26. Washington,
http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/text/pres325.txt
DC.
The White House (2002) Operation Enduring Freedom: One Year of 
Accomplishments http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/defense/enduringffeedom.html
Whitman, R. (1999) Amsterdam’s unfinished business? The Blair government’s 
initiative and the future o f the Western European Union. Occasional Paper 7, Institute 
for Security Studies, Paris.
Whitman, R. (2004) ‘NATO, the EU and ESDP: An Emerging Division of Labour?’ 
Contemporary Security Policy 25(3): 430-451.
Wickham-Jones, M. (2000) ‘Labour's trajectory in foreign affairs: the moral crusade 
of a pivotal power?’ In Little, R. and M. Wickham-Jones (eds) New Labour's foreign 
policy: A new moral crusade? Manchester, Manchester University Press: 3-32.
Williams, M. and I. B. Neumann (1996) ‘From Alliance to Security Community: 
NATO, Russia and the Power of Identity’, Millennium: Journal o f International 
Studies 29 (2): 357-87.
Wohlforth, W. (1999) ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’, International Security 24 
(Summer): 5-41.
Wong, R. (2005) ‘The Europeanization of Foreign policy.’ In C. Hill and M. Smith, 
International Relations and the European Union. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 
134-153.
Wong, R. (2006) The Europeanization o f  French Foreign Policy: France and the EU 
in East Asia. London, Palgrave Macmillan.
ZDF (2001) Interview Volmer. Morgenmagazin, 30 November.
Zielonka, J. (1998) Explaining Euro-paralysis: why Europe is unable to act in 
international politics. Basingstoke, Macmillan Press.
332
